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Legalizing the Revolution 
Sandipto Dasgupta 
This dissertation reconstructs a theoretical framework for the Indian Constitution. 
It does so immanently, by focusing on the making of the Indian Constitution, taking into 
account both the demands of its specific historical conditions, and the formal constraints 
of drafting a constitution. The dissertation shows that in its historical context the task of 
the Indian constitution makers should be understood as creating a constitutional system 
that can mediate a transformation of the social condition. Performing this task required 
reinterpreting the established tenets of constitutionalism. The reinterpretation produces a 
distinct variation of constitutionalism that is termed transformational constitutionalism.   
Part I of the dissertation focuses on some of the central tenets of constitutional 
theory by examining the writings in which they first assumed their paradigmatic form. 
The concepts are situated in the historical context in which they were formulated to 
highlight the specific challenges they were a response to, and hence distinguishing them 
from the conceptual terrain in which the Indian Constitution was formulated. Part I also 
shows the essentially preservative nature of the main tenets of constitutional thought, and 
that the fully developed versions of its central concepts seek to preclude any possibility 
for major changes in social conditions.  
Part II sets out the historical developments that led to the material and ideational 
terrain on which the Indian Constitution was conceived. It first outlines the institutional 
and discursive structures of colonial rule to tease out the development of concepts that 
would serve as the point of reference for the constitution-makers. Part II then turns to the 
resistance to colonial rule by focusing on the ideas and politics of M.K. Gandhi to 
delineate the strengths and weaknesses of Congress’s claim to represent the Indian nation 
at the moment of independence, and outline the two different visions of what it meant to 
free oneself from colonial subjugation, and the different challenges for bringing those 
visions to fruition. Finally, Part II outlines the way in which the Indian constitutional 
vision was caught in an interdependent dynamic of break and continuity with its colonial 
past.  
After Part I and II have traced the conceptual coordinates of a modern 
constitution, and the specific historical condition in which the Indian constitution was 
conceived respectively, Part III focuses on the Indian Constituent Assembly Debates to 
show how the framers sought to respond to the concrete challenges facing them by 
creatively reinterpreting the precepts of modern constitutionalism itself. The dissertation 
shows that the Indian Constitution has to be understood as a totality containing three 
related strata – that of constitutional imagination, promises, and text – which exist in 
tension with each other. This tension constitutes the contradiction at the heart of the 
Indian Constitutional form. The dissertation concludes by following one such 
contradiction, between the strata of imagination and text as it developed during the most 
important constitutional conflict of the initial years on the question of compensation for 
acquisition of property. It also demonstrates how that conflict fundamentally shaped the 
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The Indian Constitution did not garner wide acclaim at the time of its making, 
either at home,1 or abroad 2. Even the Constituent Assembly admitted that its creation had 
received a “mixed reception”. 3  Despite its original reception, today the Indian 
constitution is almost universally known and well regarded. One can speculate about the 
probable reasons for this prominence. One, the constitution has been credited with 
playing an important role in India’s achievement in creating and maintaining a 
functioning democratic system, a fact that has been the subject of much discussion in 
recent literature on the country.4 Second, India’s constitution has been viewed as a model 
for creating a stable political order in the context of a “divided society” or “ethnic 
diversity”, a topic that has received sustained attention from both scholars as well as 
policymakers since the 1990s.5 Third, the extraordinary prominence of the Indian higher 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Rajeev Dhavan, in his characteristically sardonic manner, provide a brief summary of the 
 
2  Arnold Zurcher, writing the year after the Constitution was adopted: “for the Eastern 
constitution-writers appear to have absorbed also the Western penchant for prolixity and 
constitutional gobbledegook. As a result of this too faithful imitation, India has acquired the 
unenviable reputation of having formulated what is probably the longest written constitution in 
history. Its printed English version covers some two hundred pages exclusive of supplementary 
schedules which account for some fifty additional pages.” [Arnold J. Zurcher, ‘Introduction’, in 
Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II: An Examination of Significant 
Aspects of Postwar Public Law with Particular Reference to New Constitutions of Western 
Europe, Arnold J. Zurcher ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1951), at 9].  
 
3 Frank Anthony, Constituent Assembly Debates [hereafter CAD], 25 November, 1949.  
4 Atul Kohli ed.,The Success of India’s Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), Ramachandra Guha, 
India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: MacMillan, 2007).   
 
5  Sujit Choudhry, ed., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 





judiciary in all areas of governance is often understood as a mark of the significance of 
constitutional processes in Indian public life.6 Fourth, the acknowledged influence of the 
Indian Constitution in subsequent constitutions made by other countries has made it an 
important element in the global circulation of constitutional ideas.7  
To these four possible reasons, let me add two more. The size of India as a 
country, and the diversity of social and political conflicts experienced in its history, mean 
that the Indian constitutional system has had to address an unparalleled range of issues. 
From religion to secessions, economic welfare to coalition governments, federalism to 
affirmative action, armed rebellions to linguistic diversity, the list can go on. In other 
words, every major challenge faced by constitutions anywhere in the world would 
probably have an analogous instance in Indian constitutional practice. To this we can add 
the importance of the Constitution in Indian politics. Despite its massive length, and at 
times arcane language, rarely a week goes by without the Constitution being invoked in 
relation to some significant conflict or the other – with each of these disputes reaching 
the Supreme Court for adjudication or resulting in demands for a constitutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, eds., Autonomy, 
Self-Government and Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in 
Divided Societies (London: Routledge, 2005).  
 
6 Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Court in Comparative 
Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
 
7 There has been no scholarly work on the place of the Indian constitution in the global, especially 
anti-colonial, imagination. In an interview, Aristide Zolberg recounts the influence the Indian 
example had over the African political imagination. Courtney Jung, ‘Professor Zolberg goes to 






amendment. Almost all the major domestic political or policy decisions in the last two 
decades have either at some point been contested in the courts and have undergone 
changes as a result, or, have been spurred by a decision of the Supreme Court, with the 
court on both occasions basing its intervention on an interpretation of the Constitution.8 
Similarly, every major social movement of the last twenty years at some point during its 
agitation has filed a petition at the Supreme Court, framing its demands in explicitly 
constitutional language. Therefore, be it with regard to governmental decisions or popular 
movements, it is impossible to ignore the Constitution if one wishes to study Indian 
political development since Independence.  
Theorizing the Indian Constitution 
Despite the importance of the subject, there have been few attempts to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical account of the Indian Constitution that takes into consideration 
both the historical and political conditions of its making, and the intricacies of its formal 
structure. One of the reasons for this is the oft-lamented separation between legal practice 
and social science scholarship in India.9 There exists a formidable body of legal writings 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 This clarification is necessary in view of the fact that the Indian Supreme Court is not a 
constitutional court. That is, its jurisdiction is not limited to only constitutional matters. It is the 
highest appellate court of the land, which can adjudicate on any legal dispute. Therefore, its 
decisions are not based on constitutional interpretation in every instance. However, every time it 
has intervened in major political or policy disputes over the last two decades, it has done so on 
the basis of a constitutional interpretation.   
9 See, Upendra Baxi, “The Little Done, The Vast Undone: Some Reflections on Reading 
Glanville Austin’s The Indian Constitution”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 9 (1967), at 323 
– 420, also, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty’, in Public 
Institutions in India: Performance and Design, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Devesh Kapur eds. (New 






that provide a detailed account of each element of the formal structure of the constitution 
and the relationships between them.10 However, all of them are written in a legalistic-
formalistic mode, with very little to say about the Constitution beyond existing case laws. 
Formalism, in their case, is a strictly methodological choice rather than a theoretical 
position. One does not encounter a coherent narrative about the Constitution, but rather 
simply a legal commentary, written by lawyers, for lawyers.  
On the other side of the law/ social science divide, the Constitution has been the 
object of study for several non-lawyer scholars. A majority of those works have focused 
on either specific aspects of the Constitution,11 or have investigated how it deals with 
particular issues (caste and religion being the two most prominent).12 The question they 
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10 The most influential and important one is H.M. Seervai’s magisterial three-volume work, that 
all lawyers try to quote from when they are arguing a case: H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of 
India, Vols. I – III, (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Company, 1997, 4th edition). Other 
well-regarded legal accounts of the Constitution are: Durga Das Basu, Constitutional Law of 
India (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall, 1998), Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India: An 
Exhaustive Article-Wise Commentary (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Company, 2008), 
Shiv Dayal, The Constitutional Law of India: Annotated (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 
1969), and Mahabir Prasad Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1978).  
 
11  There have been several collections of essays on the Indian constitution consisting of 
scholarship of this nature. Some of the more significant ones would be: Rajeev Bhargava ed., 
Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008), Zoya 
Hasan, E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan eds., India’s Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, 
Controversies, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan, and Arun K. 
Thiruvengadam eds., Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) [which has several essays on the Indian Constitution], Public Institutions 
in India: Performance and Design, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Devesh Kapur eds. (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) [which has a few essays dealing with constitutional institutions 
and issues].   
 
12 On caste, see, Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and Backward Classes in India 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Ratna G. Revankar, The Indian 
Constitution: A Case Study of Backward Classes (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 





seek to answer is what the Constitution has to say regarding x or y issues, rather than 
suggest a theory of the Constitution as a whole. This leaves us with a relatively smaller 
body of work that does make overarching claims about the nature of the constitutional 
system as a whole. I have addressed the specific limits of these narratives in more detail 
in Part III, but foreground my argument in more general terms here. Almost all of these 
works try to incorporate the Indian Constitution within a pre-existing legal or 
constitutional theory.13 Within this approach, the attempt to theorize the constitution in a 
familiar liberal vein has become the most influential of late within a general climate of 
the ascendancy of political liberalism in Indian intellectual life.14 My disagreement is 
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Comparative Constitutional Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), Hanna Lerner, 
Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
[who though focusing on religion uses the analytical category of ‘identity’], Deepa Das Acevedo, 
‘Secularism in the Indian Context’, Law and Social Enquiry 38:1 (2013), at 138 – 167.    
 
13 To name a few, we are offered a description of the Constitution as an liberal treatise 
[Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy 
(London: MacMillan, 2007)]; as an Ackermanian incorporation of the principles of popular 
sovereignty with procedural safeguards [Sarbani Sen, Popular Sovereignty and Democratic 
Transformation: The Constitution of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007)]; as a 
critical evaluation from an Arendtian point of view [Uday Singh Mehta, ‘Indian 
Constitutionalism: The Articulation of a Political Vision’, in From the Colonial to the 
Postcolonial, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori eds., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007)]; and as one that claims that the Indian constitution is based on 
the ancient English principle of equity [Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire: A 
Legal and Political History, 1774 – 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)]. There is an 
exception to this mode of analysis, constituted by works from what could be called a social-
democratic standpoint. I will address those works in a later stage in the introduction.  
 
14 The most noted attempt in this regard has been of Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s. See, Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta, ‘India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty’, in Public Institutions in India: 
Performance and Design, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Devesh Kapur eds. (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), and, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: 
Judicial Review and the ‘Basic Structure’, in India’s Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, 
Controversies, Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan eds., (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 






largely with the conclusions of these works and the process through which the 
conclusions are reached. All of them approach the Constitution through a well-
established theory of what a constitution ought to be, and with certain abstract ideals, and 
subsequently focus on discovering the embodiment of those ideals in different provisions 
of the Constitution, give or take a few deviations. Those deviations are explained away as 
a result of the necessary political hazard of pragmatic bargaining, therefore having no 
bearing on constitutional theory. In other words, they deduce what a constitution should 
be a priori, and then apply that deduction to analyze the Indian Constitution. To do so, by 
necessity, they explain away either certain peculiar formal characteristics of the 
Constitution,15 or the contingencies of the historical situation that was reflected in the 
deliberations in the Constituent Assembly as a result of pragmatic compulsions or 
individual proclivities.  
In this context it might be useful to quote a portion of the concluding speech by 
the Constituent Assembly President Rajendra Prasad, which addressed the difficulty of 
relating the document to any familiar category of constitutions. “The first question which 
arises and which has been mooted is as to the category to which this Constitution 
belongs”, Prasad said. “It makes no difference so long as the Constitution serves our 
purpose. We are not bound to have a constitution which […] falls in line with known 
categories of constitutions in the world. We have to take certain facts of history in our 
own country and the Constitution has not to an inconsiderable extent been influenced by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 





such realities as facts of history.”16 Prasad’s statement makes two related points: that the 
Indian Constitution escapes any easy description accorded to it though the lens of 
established constitutional doctrines, and that a proper description of its nature must take 
into account “certain facts of history”, that has shaped the Constitution “not to an 
inconsiderable extent.” How different would the results of such an approach be from the 
one I have described above?  
The fact that the framers conceived certain ideals as valuable is not a subject of 
controversy. However, general theories of ‘democracy’ or ‘liberalism’ can tell us very 
little about the specificity of the Indian experience.17 The crucial question pertains to how 
the framers thought those ideals could be realized and translated into a viable 
constitutional system given their particular historical condition, a challenge that required 
reflection and reinvention of familiar notions of what formal characteristics the 
constitution should have. To ignore the centrality of that process in the creation of the 
Indian constitution means ignoring both the specificity of the historical context, and the 
peculiarities of the constitutional form, both being closely related to each other. 
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16 Rajendra Prasad, CAD, 26 November, 1949.  
 
17 This framing has been influenced by a ‘methodological point’ advanced in another context [of 
democracy in Africa] by Mahmood Mamdani, in his book Citizens and Subjects. Mamdani 
demonstrates how issues of democracy and governance in Africa cannot be simply “read off as 
prescriptions from a general theory”. That discourse turns “a concrete historical experience – of 
civil society in the West – into the basis of a general and prescriptive theory,” turning democracy 
into a “turnkey institutional import.” In a similar vein, the approaches outlined above, could be 
read as turning the Indian Constitution into an “institutional import.” See, Mahmood Mamdani, 
Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: 






It should be clarified that this dissertation’s attempt is not to mount an argument 
from the point of view of Indian exceptionalism, i.e., to simply say that the Indian 
condition was different in an absolute sense and hence all the ideas produced within that 
context has to be understood as wholly sui generis, where conceptual terms derived from 
outside of that context is of no value. I do entirely agree with the claim that the Indian 
framers did aspire to certain political values, and conceived of those values as universal. 
At the same time, they realized that there was a real danger in assuming that they had 
inherited a condition where those values could be realized unreflexively. Their reflection 
on how to overcome the challenge of universal aspirations and particular realities, 
suggests a responsibility and responsiveness to their historical condition. Consequently, 
an account of the Constitution they created needs to fulfill the responsibility of 
historicization. Historicization in this case would mean being attendant to the complexity 
of the socio-political constellation that makes any claims about an unproblematic 
genealogy of either liberal or democratic constitutional values amongst the Indian 
constitution makers difficult to maintain. Instead of a priori deduction, the constitutional 
imagination has to be understood, and its embodiment situated, within a historical terrain 
marked by complexity, conflict and constraints.  
Over the last four decades, important scholarly work has been done in the fields 
of history and social sciences in India to provide a picture of that complex terrain.18  
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18 I have in Parts II and III of the dissertation draws extensively from this literature, in particular 
the works of Partha Chatterjee, Sudipta Kaviraj, Sumit Sarkar, Ranajit Guha, Bernard Cohn, 






These works have shown how the development of ideas and institutions in India has 
followed a unique path and sequence, and the contradictions inherent therein, thereby 
critiquing both the triumphalist nationalist narrative of independence and modernization, 
and its subsequent liberal revision. In their place, these scholars have highlighted the 
transitional and contingent nature of the socio-political constellation of the post-colonial 
nation-building project. However, this tradition has neglected to give sufficient attention 
to the Constitution. One can get a sense of the causes of this neglect from the scattered 
observations on the Constitution in works within this scholarly tradition. There exists a 
skeptical view of the efficacy of legal and constitutional discourse in offering a 
meaningful understanding of the political and social struggles of post-colonial India. 
Therefore, the feeling is that there is little to be gained from engaging with the 
constitutional form or practice on its own terms if one wants to understand the trajectory 
of Indian political development. This is not a criticism of the works of these scholars, 
none of which make any claims regarding constitutional theory. However, the 
marginalization of the Constitution as a relevant category for investigation within a 
critical tradition of studying Indian politics leads to an absence of a critique of the 
prevalent liberal/ nationalist understanding of the Constitution on its own terms. As a 
result, ironically, one ends up with a view of the Constitution that is very similar to the 
liberal/ nationalist version.19 Unlike their liberal counterparts, their assessment of the 
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19 For example, Sudipta Kaviraj writes that the Indian Constitution reveals an essential liberal 
vision, “in its central business of laying down some limits and prohibitions through the rights of 
property, etc, although this serious and decisive core is surrounded by looser reformistic advisory 
clauses, and based on some necessary illusions of bourgeois power.” Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘A Critique 





Constitution is overwhelmingly critical, but that critique is often based on the ideological 
role the Constitution plays in the liberal/ nationalist narrative, rather than an alternative 
exposition of the historical specificity of the constitutional form.20 In other words, both 
the liberal/ nationalist and the critical mode of scholarship understand the Indian 
Constitution not on its own terms, but using criteria external to it. Therefore, while I draw 
heavily on the critical insights of this scholarly tradition regarding Indian history and 




20 Upendra Baxi’s seminal body of work constitutes an important exception within the critical 
tradition. Baxi, who is a legal scholar himself, has argued that Indian constitutional analysis needs 
to go beyond questions of constitutional theory and law to take into account larger socio-
historical factors. This dissertation has drawn upon his insights on the Constitution at various 
points. However, Baxi’s primary focus has been by and large the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
and his reflections on the Constitution were made in that context. He did take up the making of 
the Constitution in a few of his articles, most notably the over 100 page book review of Granville 
Austin’s book. But even there, he is interested in the Constituent Assembly Debates as a way to 
critique the Supreme Court’s reading of the Constitution on specific points. Hence his writings, 
though extremely important, have been more in the nature of disparate critical insights, around 
specific issues, rather than one overarching theory. See, Upendra Baxi, ‘The Little Done, The 
Vast Undone: Some Reflections on Reading Granville Austin’s The Indian Constitution,’ Journal 
of the Indian Law Institute, 9 (1967), at 323 - 420. Upendra Baxi, ‘Accumulation and Legitimacy: 
Indian Constitution and State Formation,’ Delhi Law Review 13 (1991), at 72. Upendra Baxi, 
‘Constitution as a Site of State Formative Practice,’ Cardozo Law Review 21 (1999-2000), at 
1183. Upendra Baxi, ‘The Justice of Human Rights in Indian Constitutionalism,’ in Indian 
Political Thought: A Reader, Akash Singh and Silika Mohapatra eds., (London: Routledge 2010). 
 
21 At this stage, I should also clarify, that the focus in this work has been on constitutional theory, 
rather than a theory of transformation. That is to say, the underlying query has been, what sort of 
a constitutional vision and practice is produced if one takes the commitment of performing social 
transformation through a constitutional path as a foundational premise; instead of the question, 
what role did the Indian Constitution play regarding how a social transformative agenda was 
conceived and implemented in the initial years of independence. The latter question is obviously 
not un-important, and for those interested in it certain parts of the work might be informative, but 





 My approach in this dissertation is to take the Indian Constitution as an object of 
investigation and critique on its own terms. Doing so requires two methodological moves. 
On the one hand, one has to reject the method of a priori deduction based on certain well-
acknowledged principles of constitutionalism. This approach reifies the constitutional 
system into certain abstract norms derived from pre-existing constitutional theory, 
thereby erasing the historical specificity of the Indian constitutional experience and the 
very real conflicts and negotiations that lay at the heart of the production and 
development of the Constitution. On the other hand, one has to be attendant to the fact 
that it was not just any system of political rule, but a democratic constitutional system 
that was being crafted. In other words, it was a constitution that was being written, which 
had certain formal and linguistic conventions. Paying attention to this dimension requires 
paying attention to how those conventions developed (not as a priori principles, but 
historically); the history of their reception amongst the makers of the Constitution 
(through colonial rule, anti-colonial struggle, and global constitutional developments); 
and crucially how the framers sought to translate their vision, within the context of their 
historical condition and the constraints imposed by antagonisms and alliances, into a 
coherent constitutional text by reinventing (but never rejecting) those formal and 
linguistic possibilities. Consequently, the dissertation is attentive to both the demands of 
history and the demands of form. It traces the way in which those demands were 
negotiated to reconstruct a theory of the Indian constitutional experience.  
As is implicit from my description of the approach above, the primary focus of 





sources that are hence subjected to the most extensive discussion are the records of the 
debates of the Constituent Assembly and the various notes, reports, and resolutions that 
pertained to the making of the Constitution.22 The last chapter of the dissertation extends 
the timeline further by a few years to show how the contradictions located within the 
constitutional form through an analysis of the drafting process developed within the first 
few years of its adoption. My focus on the making of the Constitution also helps me to 
demonstrate the point made earlier about the uniqueness of the Indian constitutional form 
and practices being closely linked to the historical specificity of the Constitution’s 
moment of creation.23  
Transformational Constitutionalism 
To say that I will analyze the making of the Constitution on its ‘own terms’ begs 
the questions what those terms are – namely ‘to craft a democratic constitutional system 
in the historically specific conditions of post-independence India’. Both the phrases 
emphasized in that sentence have to be taken into account. To focus only on the 
constitutional portion would give us results that would be ahistorical, to focus only on the 
historical condition would be to treat the Constitution as merely instrumental to the 
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22 There have been very few works that have studied the Constituent Assembly debates in a 
sustained manner. The classic on the topic remain Granville Austin’s four decade old history of 
the making of the Indian Constitution, and this dissertation draws upon it. However, Austin was a 
historian, and his attempt was to give a detailed and accurate picture of the process than to 
reconstruct a theoretical framework for the Constitution. See, Granville Austin, The Indian 
Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972).  
 
23  Some of the ‘peculiarities’ of the Indian Constitution that have been discussed in the 
dissertation are: the nature of judicial action, the idea of ‘permissible limits’ for individual rights, 
the Directive Principles, the Seventh and the Ninth Schedules to the Constitution, the role of the 





contingent interests of those who came to power in post-independence India. In other 
words, this brings us back to the earlier point about the demands of form and demands of 
history, now from the point of view of the framers of the Constitution (hence ‘on its own 
terms’). From the subject position of the constitution makers, we can call the demands of 
form the aspiration (of creating a democratic constitutional system), and the demands of 
history the necessities (arising from the challenge of creating a viable constitutional order 
under the given circumstances). As will be demonstrated in the dissertation in more 
detail, these two demands created a unique tension. The nature of the anti-colonial 
struggle that led to the Constituent Assembly, and the material conditions of Indian 
society at large meant that there was no existing consensus on the nature of a new 
political or social order. If such a consensus could be presumed, the Indian framers could 
have gone on to create a constitution to institutionalize a new order without considering 
whether the conditions for it existed. In other words, the aspiration could have been 
fulfilled without having to worry about the necessities. In the case of India, as the framers 
themselves acknowledged, such a presumption could have been fatal for the 
constitutional system they sought to create.24 Hence, the realization of the aspiration was 
inexorably bound to adequately taking into account the necessities. Therefore, the 
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24  I give several examples in the dissertation from the Constituent Assembly debates to 
demonstrate this. The following quote from a speech made by B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, is representative: “How long shall we continue to live this life of 
contradictions? […] If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political 
democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else 
those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which is 
Assembly has to laboriously built up.” In the context of the rest of the speech, the ‘contradiction’ 
Ambedkar refers to is between constitutional and democratic principles, and the real material 






framers had to be attendant to both the creation of the Constitution and the conditions of 
its possibility, simultaneously. 25 Their task could therefore be defined as crafting a 
constitution that brings about the conditions of its own possibility. Shorn of the 
theoretical jargon, in the specific historical context of the Indian Constitution, this task 
was understood as transforming the existing social condition through a constitutional path 
to make it such that a constitutional system can become both viable and stable.26  
Understanding the task of the framers helps to clarify Rajendra Prasad’s statement 
quoted earlier about the Constitution not falling within established concepts of 
constitutions, since those concepts had to be reinterpreted in light of “realities of history”. 
Constitutions have generally been conceived of as bringing revolutions to an end, 
institutionalizing the new social and political order. Makers and scholars of constitutions 
generally describe them variously as the imprimatur of a transformation achieved, the 
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25 To provide another representative example, consider this quote from Prime Minister Nehru 
given at the Assembly: “The [Constituent Assembly] has to keep in mind the transitional and the 
revolutionary aspects of the problem, because, […] you are thinking of something which is 
dynamic, moving, changing and revolutionary. These may well change the face of India either 
way; whether you deal with it or do not deal with it, it is not a static thing. It is something which 
is not entirely, absolutely within the control of law and Parliaments. That is to say, if law and 
Parliaments do not fit themselves into the changing picture, they cannot control the situation 
completely. This is a big fact.” Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949. 
 
26 To offer yet another representative example, note the metric used by Purnima Banerji, a 
member of Congress from Bengal, as she assessed the success of the task the Constituent 
Assembly took upon itself. She recounted how the constitution provides for a representative 
democracy and political freedom. But those, she goes on to say, were only a part of the task.  “We 
ourselves during our freedom movement said”, she continued, “that it was not for the loaves and 
fishes of office that we were fighting but rather that we might have the political power in our 
hands with which we could fashion and remould and change the whole structure of society in 
such a manner that the grinding poverty of the masses may be removed, the living conditions of 
the people may improve and we could establish a society of equals in this great country of ours. 
To apply that test to this Constitution, Sir, I feel that it does provide those minimum necessities 






coda of a revolution over. Few talk about “ remold[ing] and chang[ing] the whole 
structure of society” as a constitutional goal.27 Indeed, instead of formalizing the end of 
the revolution, the constitution makers in India had to make it the mode of mediating the 
necessary revolutionary changes in social and economic conditions. Translating this 
vision into a system required reconfiguring the established tenets of the constitutional 
form.  
Therefore, the making of the Indian Constitution produced a distinct 
reinterpretation of what constitutions can and should do, one that I term ‘transformational 
constitutionalism’. Transformational constitutionalism is a vision of a constitutional 
structure that facilitates and mediates a deliberate process of transforming the social 
condition. Over the course of the dissertation, I give this concept a more concrete form, 
and engage with the various implications that arise from it. In the remainder of this 
introduction, I will provide brief sketches of some of the more significant issues that this 
dissertation engages with in that process.  
The Indian Constitution and the Postcolonial Predicament 
The particular nature of the relationship between the constitution and social 
transformation, in the Indian context, was a specifically postcolonial phenomenon. The 
term postcolonial has two important resonances for this project. First, it marks the 
significance of the colonial rule and the struggle against it, in creating the conceptual 
coordinates within which the transformational constitution was conceived and produced. 
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To borrow Sudipta Kaviraj’s formulation, in this sense the term ‘postcolonial’ does not 
simply register the “trivial fact” that the constitution “emerged after the colonial regime 
departed but in the stricter sense to mean that some its characteristic features could not 
have arisen without the particular colonial history that went before.”28 Therefore, I cannot 
satisfy my objective of delineating the historical specificity of the constitutional 
imagination without engaging with its postcolonial nature. This might be the most 
important sense in which I use the word postcolonial in this dissertation, and it provides 
the primary justification for the entire second part of the dissertation.  
Second, the term denotes a particular sequentiality of issues facing the 
constitution makers that is common to the experience of most other ‘postcolonial’ 
countries. The relationship of constitutionalism with two other important developments 
of the modern age – democracy and capitalism – happened in a particular sequence in the 
history of the West. Accordingly, the many conflicts and contradictions amongst those 
three played out and were resolved (to the extent that they have been) over a period of 
nearly two centuries. In a newly independent India, these three arose as ideals and 
systems to be strived for simultaneously. The problem of how to achieve them, and how 
to resolve the potential conflicts, had to be dealt with within the same overarching vision 
of nation-building. Hence, questions of an economic development plan and agricultural 
policy became entwined with deliberations on constitutional provision for judicial 
review; granting universal adult franchise had to deal with the ways to ameliorate the 
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28 Sudipta Kaviraj, “A State of Contradictions: The Post-Colonial State in India”, in in States and 
Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects, ed. Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath (Cambridge: Cambridge 





social cleavages that provided for separate electorates during colonial rule. In other 
words, social, political and constitutional questions had to, by necessity, be intertwined, 
and similarly our analysis of the Constitution cannot treat them as separate issues.  
These three goals, that of constitutionalism, democracy, and capitalism, were 
related to colonialism in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, they were necessary 
projects to make independence from colonialism meaningful – the creation of a proper 
constitutional government in place of colonial despotism, the establishment of a 
democratic polity as opposed to unrepresentative colonial domination, and the 
development of the economy to cure the distortions and underdevelopment fostered by 
colonial exploitation. At the very same time, the prototype for these imaginations and 
their desirability as political and economic systems were derived from the very same 
metropole from which independence was sought.29 Realizing these projects, hence, 
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29 On a different note, this raises a parallel dilemma for someone who wishes to study that 
process. How are we to analyze this process by using terms derived from a Western historical 
experience as a colonial inheritance (which we cannot escape), without reducing that process to a 
footnote noting a variance within the Western tradition of constitutional theory? This latter 
question is especially relevant in the context of the rise of the ‘rule of law’ projects where non-
governmental and international agencies (like the World Bank) have been proscribing an “ideal” 
constitutional system for countries across the world, and the concurrent rise of the law and 
development school which argues for certain uniform legal structures to go with the uniform 
aspirations of global capital. [For discussions of this trend, see, Heinz Klug, Constituting 
Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) [Introduction], Francis G. Snyder, ‘Law and Development in 
Light of Dependency Theory’, Law and Society Review, 14:3 (1980), at 723 -804, David 
Schneiderman, ‘Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the Magnitude of 
Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism’, Law and Contemporary Problems 63: 4 (2000), at 83-109]. This 
present work at this stage does not entirely solve this dilemma, but it was one with which I 






signified a particularly “postcolonial predicament”,30 constituting a dialectic of break/ 
continuity with the colonial past. The dissertation will delineate how this dialectic not 
only informed the formulation of the Constitution, but also the contradictions that 
emerged therein subsequently.  
Constitutional Interpretations and Constitutional Politics 
Making social transformation a part of the constitution-making project 
immediately opens up a set of interesting problems. The first thing that draws one’s 
attention is the inherent tension between the two central terms – transformation and 
constitution. Constitutions establish an order. Transformations change existing orders. 
Constitutions are associated with terms like security, stability, predictability etc. 
Transformations, on the other hand, bring forth instability, unpredictability, and the loss 
of security for certain vested entitlements.  
Transformational constitutionalism was not a brilliant synthesis that managed to 
overcome this antagonism. Rather it was an attempt to hold on to both those aspects – 
order and flux, taming and change – in an uneasy and incomplete dialectical relationship. 
The reason for that, as has been explained, can be found in the mutual dependency of a 
social transformative agenda and a constitutional project. The viability of a stable 
constitutional structure required transformation of the society, while a project of social 
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30 I have borrowed the term postcolonial predicament, also used in the title of this section, from 
Carol A. Breckenridge, “Introduction”, in Orientalism and Postcolonial Predicament: 
Perspectives on South Asia, ed. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: 






transformation that did not destabilize the political order required mediating it through 
the constitution. Hence, both the elements of order and change had to be retained.  
This conflictual codependence, I will show, produced three distinct, but related 
strata within the constitutional form.  First emerged a stratum of constitutional 
imagination, consisting of a broad agreement on the necessity to transform society 
through a democratic constitutional path. Second, there arose a stratum of constitutional 
promises, consisting of agreements on more specific sets of principles and issues, stated 
in broad declaratory terms. However, the stratum of imagination introduced a fluidity and 
uncertainty in the constitutional form, as a result of accommodating the transformational 
agenda. This created a counter move to ensure that the ‘through a constitutional path’ part 
of the transformational constitutional vision is strengthened to make the future 
constitutional outcomes as certain as possible. The certainty was sought in proceduralism 
– with intense deliberation in the Assembly on the words, phrasing, rules etc. As a result, 
the transformational constitutional vision underwent a complex legalistic presentation. 
This presentation constituted the third stratum, of constitutional text. The stratum of 
imagination marks to the fullest extent the creative departure of the Indian Constitution 
from established understandings of what a constitution can be. The stratum of text returns 
to a large extent to well-known traditions of legal constructions, familiar to the framers 
largely through the colonial encounter. In between the two lay the promises, which were 





The Constitution has to be understood as a totality containing these three strata. 
However, they exist in an uneasy cohabitation, and the tension between them is where the 
contradictions within the constitutional form could be located. The contradictions are an 
important outcome of the analysis offered in this dissertation. This is in the context of yet 
another view of the Constitution, prevalent during the initial decades of independence, 
that the Indian Constitution managed to resolve the seeming dichotomy between social 
transformation and a constitutional order. This view, which could be broadly called 
social-democratic, held the attempt of the framers to create a constitutional order that 
could mediate a transformational agenda to be the same as an unproblematic execution of 
that task. Thereby it missed the contradictions that were inherent to the transformational 
constitutional form, making it unable to offer a satisfactory explanation as to the 
constitutional conflicts and crises that arose within a year of the adoption of the 
Constitution. In this context it is important to stress that this dissertation’s account of 
transformational constitutionalism is a critical, rather than a similarly optimistic one. 
Locating the contradictions within the Indian Constitution, and tracing how they 
developed through constitutional practice in the initial years, is central to the critical 
aspect of my project.31   
Whether these contradictions are productive or limiting depends upon how one 
reads the Constitution in the context of constitutional politics. In the first two decades of 
the Constitution, the focus was primarily on the strata of constitutional text. This meant a 
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31  S.K. Chaube’s work is a representative example of this view. Shibanikinkar Chaube, 
Constituent Assembly of India: Springboard of Revolution (New Delhi: People’s Publishing 





cycle of judicial decisions and constitutional amendments, whereby what was at stake 
was crafting the most appropriate legal formulation. This resulted in limiting the 
constitutional project as understood on its own terms, that is, it failed to facilitate a 
thoroughgoing social transformation through a constitutional path. I will suggest three 
main reasons for why a constitutional politics conceived primarily as a legal struggle was 
limiting in this sense. One, because the stratum of constitutional text primarily consisted 
of those elements of the constitutional form that were designed to constrain rather than 
provide flexibility.  Two, because the Courts interpreted the text using autonomous 
conventions of legal interpretations that were premised upon separating law from larger 
political and social considerations, and therefore refused to take into account the 
imperatives of social transformational agenda.  Three, because the language of law 
excluded the vast majority of the masses who had very little familiarity with it, and 
therefore were left out from becoming active participants in the domain of constitutional 
practice. Instead, if the stratum of constitutional imagination was invoked as a 
centerpiece of a mass political mobilization, then transformational constitutionalism 
could have come closer to fulfilling its potentials. Nevertheless, the transformational 
constitutional vision embodied in the Indian Constitution has lost none of its relevance in 
a country riven by inequality and exploitation. However to hold transformational 
constitutionalism to its promise, one would have to move beyond petitions to 






The Indian Constitution and Constitutional Theory 
Transformational constitutionalism is not a proposed model for constitution 
making. It is not an abstract list of criteria that I believe should be followed whenever 
constitutions are written. Rather, it is a reconstruction of a distinct theoretical vision of 
what constitutions can and should do arising out of the specific historical experience of 
making the Indian Constitution. Nevertheless, that reconstruction has certain 
interventions to make in contemporary constitutional theory.  
The Indian constitution making experience can be understood as a kind of 
innovation in constitutional theory by necessity. Reflection on the conditions of 
possibility for having a constitutional order at all led the framers to creatively reinterpret 
the precepts of modern constitutionalism itself. This inherited body of constitutional 
theory, they discovered, contained some historical and social assumptions that did not 
obtain in India. Their reflection on the relationship between constitution-making and 
social order forced them to rethink the process itself. The Indian constitution makers, 
aware of a lack of a strong “social consensus”32 regarding the constitutional order, 
attempted to fashion a constitution that could bring about the conditions of its own 
existence. This process – reinterpretation borne out of reflection – demands as much of 
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32 Defined as, “the absence of any underlying agreement among social groups about the scope and 
purpose of government and the relation of government to society”. Arnold J. Zurcher, 
‘Introduction’, in Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II: An Examination 
of Significant Aspects of Postwar Public Law with Particular Reference to New Constitutions of 






our scholarly attention and analytical labor as the outcome of that process. However, the 
focus of constitutional theory has been, in most cases, on the latter. 
Constitutional theory derives its basic tenets from the two great revolutions of the 
late-eighteenth century – the American and the French. The principles and institutional 
designs born out of the constitutional moments that gave concrete shape to the age of 
democratic revolutions, have since been abstracted into formal characteristics and 
formulae for institutional design. 33  To put it in another way, the legitimacy of 
constitutions that was derived out of a genealogical link to the ideas generated by the 
revolution has been replaced by legitimacy of constitutions based on their formal 
characteristics.34 Therefore, while the world in which those constitutions were crafted has 
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33 Generally, these are identified as enumerated individual rights, certain limits on decisions in a 
democracy made by the majority, and certain institutional arrangements (e.g., separation of 
powers) that ensure that there would be obstacles to the path of certain drastic political changes. 
For enumerations of substantive characteristics of constitutionalism on more or less these lines, 
see, Jon Elster, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune 
Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 1 – 17, Said Amir Arjomand, 
“Constitutional Development and Political Reconstruction from Nation-building to New 
Constitutionalism”, in Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction, Said Amir Arjomand ed., 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), Andras Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), Akhil Reed Amar, ‘The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution’, in Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), at 1131, David Beatty, ‘Human Rights and the 
Rules of Law’, in Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective, David Beatty 
ed., (Norwell: Kluwer Academic, 1994), Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
 
34 Constitutions, by their own terms, claim to legitimize a set of legal, administrative, and political 
practices, which they stipulate. The legitimacy of those practices, in so far as they are 
constitutional, must necessarily rest on a claim of legitimacy, prior in time, of the constitution 
itself. This legitimacy was historically garnered through a revolutionary process. The consensus 
generated by the revolution regarding a new social and political order, and new ideas, is 
subsequently institutionalized by the constitution. Yet over time, the principles and institutional 
designs devised in those moments have come to signify abiding principles and formal blueprints 
for institutional design. This has given rise to a different claim of legitimacy for constitutions – 





changed significantly, the formulations often have not.35 As the sociologist Gianfranco 
Poggi observed, “Considerable as [the socio-economic changes] are, such changes 
frequently are not registered in the state’s formal constitutional structures, which remain 
those designed between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.”36  
The socio-economic landscape of the mid-twentieth century, an outcome of the 
changes Poggi referrers to, produced issues like increasing complexities of the economic 
sphere brought about by industrialization, economic regulations, working class 
mobilization, cultural diversity that could not be repressed etc., that the eighteenth 
century constitutional thinkers were not familiar with. On the other hand, the Indian 
constitution makers explicitly acknowledged the significance of these and other social 
questions in their elaboration of a constitutional vision. The Indians took the concepts of 
their predecessors, and reinterpreted them in view of a changed social condition, one that 
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these formal characteristics as the essence of a constitution, without which they would cease to be 
one properly so called. 
 
35 Faced with the challenges of these changing conditions, the answer has often been to either find 
administrative solutions, enlarging the scope of the executive and bureaucratic apparatus without 
concurrent shift in the formal structure of the constitution; or, and the two are not mutually 
exclusive, depending upon judicial interpretations to do the work of necessary adjustments of 
constitutional principles. Changes and adjustments, when they need to happen, take place at a 
level below that of constitutional reorganization, through administrative or judicial work. The 
problem with this is that administrative mechanisms can lack democratic support, and judicial 
decisions can be easily overturned by a subsequent bench, as Europe and United States 
respectively are finding out in the last few years. These two adjustments often go hand in hand, 
but generally the former has been in the case in countries with a Roman law tradition and the 
latter in countries with a common law tradition. Latin American countries, despite having a 
tradition of Roman law, has often adopted the latter path in recent years.  
 
36  Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction 






resembled (and still does) that of most of the contemporary world.37 Therefore, a focus on 
the reflexive and reinterpretive nature of the transformational constitutional project, 
continually aware and responsive to its own conditions of possibility, and dealing with a 
social landscape that is distinctly contemporary, could be a way to think through some of 
the basic presumptions of prevalent constitutional thought, and to provide a critique of 
contemporary constitutional practices.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Therefore, the lesson of India’s constitution making is not simply one about how to make a 
democratic constitution under difficult conditions, or, what role constitutions can play in 
ameliorating the memory of historical injustice, two questions that have received a lot of 
scholarly attention in the last two decades. The former question has generally led to process or 
institution oriented studies of the drafting process in a post-conflict, or divided society. The latter, 
has lead to understanding how constitutions can bring about justice and closure to a nation 
transitioning from conflict to stability. Rather than any such procedural or instrumental 
understanding of constitution making, the Indian experience offers a fundamental reinterpretation 
of constitutional thought for the twentieth century world. For examples of the former, see, Cass 
R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001); Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Klaus Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist 
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Theories of Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Yash Ghai and Guido Galli, “Constitution Building Processes and 
Democratization,” in Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further Readings (Stockholm: 
IDEA, 2006), Sujit Choudhry, ed., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 
Accommodation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For the latter, see, Ruti Teitel, 
‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transitions’, The Yale Law Journal 
106:7 (1997), at 2009 – 2080, Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South 
Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Christine Bell 
and Johanna Keenan, ‘Lost on the Way Home? The Right to Life in Northern Ireland,’ Journal of 
Law and Society 32:1 (2005), at 68 – 89. There have been another important development in both 
constitutional practice and constitutional literature post 1990s, which is to do with the relationship 
of constitutionalism with globalization, international law regimes, and supra national 
organizations (e.g., the E.U.). This project, due to the specific nature of the Indian Constitution 
does not contribute to that debate directly. However, some of the complexities of Indian 
federalism that have been discussed in Part III could implicitly be in conversation with theories of 
dualistic constitutional orders. For a recent and important version of the latter, see, Jean L. Cohen, 
Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and also, Jean L. Cohen, ‘Changing Paradigms 
of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos,’ International Sociology 14:3 (1999), at 245 






The dissertation is divided into three parts, titled ‘theory’, ‘history’, and ‘praxis’. 
Analyzing the formulation of Indian constitution on its own terms required focusing on 
both the conceptual coordinates of a modern constitution, as well as the specific historical 
condition in which the Indian constitution makers sought to reinterpret them. The first 
two parts develop those two analytical axes respectively, which are then brought together 
in the third part that takes the making of the Indian Constitution as its object of analysis. 
As a result, the length of the third part is equal to the first two parts combined.  
Each part consists of two chapters. Part I focuses on some of the central tenets of 
constitutional theory by examining the writings in which they first assumed their 
paradigmatic form. The attempt is not to treat these tenets as abstract concepts to be 
subject to analytical exegesis. Rather, I have situated them in the historical contexts in 
which they were formulated to highlight the specific challenges they were responses to. 
Doing so allows me to delineate the concrete socio-historical constellation in which they 
arose, making it possible to clarify the distinctiveness of the conceptual terrain in which 
the Indian Constitution was formulated. Chapter 1 looks at the formation of ideas that led 
to the American Constitution, to tease out the concrete process of development for some 
of the abiding themes of liberal constitutionalism: separation of powers, checks to 
decisions by democratic majorities, separation of the spheres of law and politics, and 
protection of property rights, amongst others. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of 





chapter begins with analyzing the writings of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès in the context of 
the French Revolution. It shows how the idea of constituent power developed in that 
context in response to a concrete historical challenge as a revolutionary claim. The 
chapter then goes on to analyze the work of Carl Schmitt, who has deployed that concept 
most influentially in contemporary constitutional theory, but this time to reject demands 
for change in a social-democratic direction in the context of the Weimar Republic. 
Finally, the chapter looks at the work of Bruce Ackerman to trace the problems with his 
attempt to reclaim the concept of popular will for a democratic constitutional practice.  
Along with historicizing these particular concepts, Part I also develops one larger 
claim. It shows the essentially preservative nature of the main tenets of constitutional 
thought. From their distinctly revolutionary origins, the fully developed versions of these 
concepts seek to preclude any possibility for major changes in social conditions. Setting 
the stage for moving beyond them for understanding the nature of the Indian 
Constitution.  
Part II sets out the historical developments that led to the material and ideational 
terrain on which the Indian Constitution was conceived. Chapter 3 studies the 
institutional and discursive structures of colonial rule to tease out the development of five 
relevant themes, which are: nature of the state, relationship between state and society, 
law, property, and the putative colonial ‘constitution’. The object is to show how these 
themes, as they developed through colonial institutional and discursive practices, would 





Chapter 4 studies the resistance to colonial rule by focusing on the ideas and 
politics of M.K. Gandhi.  The chapter focuses on Gandhi not only because of his pre-
eminent place within the history of anti-colonial struggle, but because it allows me to 
develop two additional claims in the chapter. First, I delineate the strengths and 
weaknesses of Congress’s claim to represent the Indian nation at the moment of 
independence, which has direct bearings on why the Constitution was both democratic, as 
well as transformational. Second, by following the radical extent of Gandhi’s ideas, and 
its ultimate rejection by the Constituent Assembly, I outline the two different visions of 
what it meant to free oneself from colonial subjugation, and the different challenges for 
bringing those visions to fruition.  
Finally, Part II outlines the way in which the Indian constitutional vision was 
caught in an interdependent dynamic of break and continuity with its colonial past.  
Part III looks at the process of making the Indian Constitution and its outcomes. 
Chapter 5 analyzes in detail the deliberations in the Constituent Assembly, and the social 
and political antagonisms and alliances of the time. The chapter ends by demonstrating 
that the Indian Constitution has to be understood as a totality containing three related 
strata – that of constitutional imagination, promises, and text – which exist in tension 
with each other. This tension constitutes the contradiction at the heart of the Indian 
Constitutional form.  
Chapter 6 follows one such contradiction, between the strata of imagination and 





on the question of compensation for acquisition of property. It also demonstrates how that 
conflict fundamentally shaped the nature of Indian constitutional practice.    
It should be mentioned that the nature of the work required a prominent focus on 
the question of property. The property question – that is, what would be the status of 
property rights within the constitutional structure – is where the complexity of bringing 
together the aspects of social transformation and constitutionalism was most vividly 
evident. Social transformation required flexibility with reconsidering the existing 
entitlements in property rights, while constitutionalism required some degree of stability 
and predictability regarding a question as important as property. Therefore, the question 
of property has been a recurring subject of my focus throughout the dissertation. 
However, along with being an outcome of the nature of this dissertation, the focus on 
property in an analysis on the Indian Constitution is justified for two other reasons. First, 
the property question was the one that the Constituent Assembly deliberated upon the 
longest by far. It was also the issue around which the most significant constitutional 
conflicts arose in the first two decades of the Constitution. Second, despite it being the 
most prominent issue during the making, and the initial years of the Constitution, 
property has received far less attention by Indian Constitutional scholars, as compared to 
issues such as religion and caste.  
Returning to the structure of the dissertation, each part ends with a brief 
conclusion, titled transformational constitutionalism I, II, and III respectively. There are 





they are placed in the text, that is, after the substantive portion of each part, they will 
serve as a set of theoretical insights on the Indian Constitution with regard to the specific 
focus of each part. Read this way, ‘transformational constitutionalism I’ locates the 
distinctiveness of the Indian Constitution within the history of constitutional thought; ‘II’ 
consists of some thoughts on the way in which the Constitution was a postcolonial one; 
and ‘III’ argues how the form of the Indian Constitution, and the contradictions therein 
have relevance for constitutional interpretation and politics in India. Alternatively, the 
reader can choose to read these notes together after she has completed all the chapters of 
the dissertation, like a conventional conclusion. If they are read this way, one will see that 
they situate and clarify the transformational constitutional vision within a progressively 
specific context – from that of history of modern constitutions, to postcolonial conditions, 









In the last analysis, revolutionaries are not made by constitutions, but constitutions for the 
most part are monuments to successful revolutions. 
        Otto Kirschheimer 
 
Introduction: Bourgeois Revolutions and Constitutions 
Theories of constitutionalism, in their contemporary sense, came to be formulated 
only at a particular moment in Western history, within the conceptual universe created by 
the “radical transformation of the character of social relationship and nature of social 
power” 38  known as the ‘bourgeois revolution.’ 39  Echoing Barrington Moore’s 
provocative dictum about democracy, one can say that there is no constitutionalism 
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38 Derek Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus of Marx and Weber (London: Routledge, 
1991), at 2.  
 
39 It should be clarified that by bourgeois revolution I do not mean a singular moment of rupture 
engineered and executed by a singular class – namely the bourgeoisie. Rather I mean a 
transformation in the material, political and ideological sphere, spanning several centuries, that 
saw on the one hand the rise of a capitalist system of production, and on the other hand, the 






without the bourgeoisie.40 Constitutions, in their modern sense, were the definitive 
documents of the visions of the ascendant bourgeoisie expressed in the language of 
public law.41 There were two aspects of the ascent of the bourgeoisie that acted as an 
organizing framework for the discourse of constitutionalism. First, was the 
conceptualization of the social sphere with autonomous capacities of development and 
self-regulation, and second, was the demand that the state should be responsive to, even 
directed by, the representations of the views prevalent in the civil society.  
During the time of the absolutist states, which preceded modern constitutional 
governments, the state was posited as a functionally distinct and politically superior 
organism by emancipating itself from the ecclesiastic authority of the church and the 
dispersed and multilayered social power of the feudal nobility. 42 The concomitant 
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40 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (New York: Beacon Press, 1966).  
 
41 In the realm of private law, it would be the contract.  
 
42 See, Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974), and 
Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (London: 
Hutchinson, 1978). One should stress that this was not a development against the nobility, but 
from it. Perry Anderson shows that in the face of the declining ability of local coercion and 
exploitation of the nobility there was an “upward displacement of power” to a more centralized 
authority, the monarch. While this provided a basis for a more effective domination of the 
population (especially increasingly rebellious peasants), it was not meant to explicitly displace 
the nobility. Nevertheless, the gradual and momentous administrative and juridical reorganization 
this resulted in created the conditions for the eventual displacement of the feudal nobility from 
effective political power. [Anderson, Ibid, at 12 – 30, and 424 – 430].  
It is important to note here another dimension of the emergence of the modern state demonstrated 
by political sociologist working in a Weberian vein – the military. As Mark Bloch writes in his 
seminal work, “As even the most perfunctory comparative study will show, one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of feudal societies was the virtual identity of the class of chiefs with the 
class of professional warriors serving in the only way that then seemed effective, that is as 
heavily armed horsemen.” [Marc Bloch, Feudal Society II: Social Classes and Political 





development in political theory was the formulation of the concept of sovereignty, first 
by Jean Bodin, and then – most influentially – Hobbes.43 As opposed to medieval 
constitutions, where the authority of the monarch was framed within a customary set up 
of multiple power holders and hence constrained by the same, Bodin declared the 
sovereignty of the monarch to be the “most high” and “absolute”.44 With these thinkers 
political thought broke decisively from the medieval idea of authority as an exercise of 
traditional justice,45 and enunciated the idea that political power meant the sovereign 
capacity to create new laws.46  While, an unified and centralized political power – which 
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arrangement to a standing army controlled by the monarch was decisive for both the genealogy as 
well as nature of the modern state. Charles Tilly has shown that most of the basic features of the 
early modern state can be understood as an answer to the ruler’s quest to provide themselves with 
a more powerful and centralized armed force. These quests were driven by both defensive and 
expansionary wars fought with outsiders, and need for increasing control within the territory. 
What resulted, Tilly argues, is what can be called a “centralization trend” that is the hallmark of 
modern states. [See, Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1990 
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).]  
  
43 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian 
Franklin ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) [1576]. Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan, Richard Tuck ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) [1651].  
While Bodin is rightly seen as the first author to theorize the modern notion of “sovereignty” the 
idea itself can be traced back to Ancient Rome, and the absolute martial powers of the Emperor. 
The idea persisted through the Middle Ages as well in occasional proclamation of different kings. 
See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, F.W. Maitland trans.,  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958).  
 
44 Bodin, Ibid, at 5. Bodin specifically lists the “true kings” of “France, Spain, England, Scotland, 
Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia and Muscovy” to be sovereigns of this type.  
 
45 See, Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974), 
Chapter 2.  
 
46 “The principal mark of sovereign majesty and absolute power is essentially the right to impose 
laws on subjects generally without their consent […] There is indeed a distinction between justice 
and law, for the one merely implies equity, while the other implies command. Law is nothing 
other than the command of the sovereign in the exercise of his power.” Bodin, Ibid, at 23. [The 





was the crucial first step to the process Weber would term ‘rationalization’ – was in 
keeping with the needs of the emerging commercial society, its refusal to be bound by 
anything other than the locus and condition of its creation came into contradiction with 
the logic of that nascent social form.  
Hence, by the seventeenth century, we see arguments being made for the 
corresponding emancipation of society from the state. The term “society” as we tend to 
understand it is itself a product of the late seventeenth century.47 It developed during the 
Enlightenment to mean a self-governing totality, as the “symbolic representation of 
collective human existence” and “the essential domain of human practice”.48 Under the 
conditions of an absolutist state, in the Hobbessian presentation, there were only two 
choices available – anarchy or submission to absolute political power. Through the 
articulation of the “social”, Keith Michael Baker argues, subsequent theorists of the 
Enlightenment avoided that choice, through “recourse to a notion of society as an 
autonomous ground of human existence, a domain whose stability did not require the 
imposition of order from above, and whose free action did not necessarily degenerate into 
anarchy and disorder below.”49 The most well known early theorists of the ‘social’ in this 
sense were Locke in England, and Montesquieu in France, whose writings served as the 
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taken in its medieval sense].  
 
47 Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual 
History”, in Main Trends in Cultural History, Eds. Willem Menching and Wyger Velema, 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), at 95 – 120.  
 
48 Ibid.  
 






conceptual foundation for ideas of constitutionalism to come. In the economic sphere, 
this conception of society found its parallel in the works of the classical political 
economists, who claimed that the state should only provide security and legal guarantee 
for the smooth functioning of the process of exchange, rather than try to direct that 
process in any way.50   
Therefore, theories of constitutionalism arose at the moment in history when 
“society had already experienced, through autonomous economic and cultural growth, its 
own capacity for development and self-regulation.” 51 Hence, “The state’s very existence, 
and its mode of operation, would have to seek justification in the extent to which it 
allowed that development to unfold according to its own logic, rather than imperiously 
directing it and bending it to the state’s own ends.”52 A constitution was seen as the 
instrument through which this particular “mode of operation” could be achieved. Its two 
abiding characteristics at the time were, as Jurgen Habermas points out, “delimited 
jurisdictional areas and observance of legal formalism”.53 The former referred to the 
scope of state action while the latter to its nature. In terms of the scope, the overriding 
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50 This was directed specifically against the economic role played by the absolutist state, which 
had continued to provide the political basis for economic systems of late-feudalism and early 
mercantilism. 
 
51 Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990), at 53 -54.  
 
52 Ibid.  
 
53 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 






principle was that the state should not become an actor in the social sphere.54 In terms of 
its nature, legal formalism meant that law was to become (with some exceptions) the 
language through which the state expressed itself; and that it did so only in general and 
abstract terms. Its very abstractness maintained, in keeping with the needs of the social 
order, the neutrality of the state and the autonomy of the social process along with 
fulfilling another crucial need of commercial societies – predictability.55 As the legal 
theorist Franz Neumann has explained, in its ideal form, “every legal norm is a 
hypothetical judgment on the future behavior of the state.”56  
But it was not just the reconceptualization of the architecture of the state to 
provide for the autonomy of the social form that provided the impetus for constitutional 
thought. Along with the claim of economic freedom for the bourgeoisie there was also 
the question of translating their social power into political power. Jurgen Habermas gives 
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54 The state had a role to play in the social sphere, that as a guarantor of institutions and rights if 
they were threatened either from outside (war) or from within (disputes). For example, the state 
was to act as a guarantor of property right by a. upholding the basic principles of property in the 
sphere of the public law (e.g. the due process clause of the constitution) and b. guarantying the 
smooth enjoyment of those rights through the process of private law (e.g., enforcing contractual 
obligations).  
 
55 A point made, most famously, by Max Weber. “Industrial capitalism must be able to count on 
the continuity, trustworthiness and objectivity of the legal order, and on the rational, predictable 
functioning of legal and administrative agencies.” [Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, 
eds. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), at 1095]. 
For yet another version, which traces the genealogy of the distinctive nature of rule of law all the 
way to thirteenth century papal revolution, see, Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).  
 
56 Franz Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society 






us the most influential, if stylized, version of this transition.57 Habermas charts the rise, in 
the Europe of eighteenth century, of a mode of social interaction separate from those 
through money and power – one that he would call the bourgeois public sphere. What is 
distinctive about this sphere is a new set of communicative practices – a model of 
sociability and a rational critical discourse. It consisted of “private people” coming 
together as a “public”, making “public use of their reason”.58 It was only a matter of time 
until this critical discourse began to claim political influence. “A political consciousness 
developed in the public sphere of civil society which, in opposition to absolute 
sovereignty, articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and 
which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e., public opinion) as the only legitimate source 
of this law.” And hence over the course of the eighteenth century, “public opinion 
claimed the legislative competence for those norms whose polemical-rationalist 
conception it had provided to begin with.”59  
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57 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of the Bourgeois Society, Thomas Burger, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). 
  
58 Habermas, Structural Transformation, at 27. These characteristics form the core of what 
Habermas wants to hold on to in his idea of the ‘public sphere’ as a utopian ideal that, in a 
reconstituted form, could become the site of progressive and democratic politics in our present 
time. On this point, also see, Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), and Craig 
Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere”, in Habermas and the Public Sphere, 
ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). For a comprehensive analysis of the category 
of civil society, and the potential for its reconstruction as a site for democratic possibilities, see, 
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 
 
59 Habermas, Structural Transformation, at 54. Historically, this happened at different points of 
time in different countries, as Habermas notes. In England the point was Glorious Revolution, in 






When modern constitutional states arose in the wake of the bourgeois revolution, 
they institutionalized this claim of the public sphere – of law as ratio. They also provided 
certain guarantees for the functioning of the public sphere.60 This was the context in 
which modern constitutionalism spoke of social control of state organs – the principle of 
rationally produced public opinion transformed into law through a representative 
legislature.61   
Together, these two demands of the ascendant bourgeoisie, economic and 
political, directed against the vestiges of feudal order and absolutist monarchs, 
constituted the manifesto of constitutionalism. England was where these ideas first found 
their expression.62 Over the seventeenth century, the English landed gentry and urban 
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60 Habermas, Structural Transformation, at 83. Also, 70 – 88. Amongst the guarantees were rights 
of free speech and association, which guarantees the ability of the public sphere to function. 
Another important right was the right to property. Property guaranteed the functioning of 
individuals in their private sphere. Property also had distinctive political value – it allowed a 
private person to act politically, to act as a member of the public sphere. For a more detailed 
discussion on the role property played in a political theory context, especially with respect to 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant, see, Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984).    
 
61 Habermas, Structural Transformation, at 88.  
 
62 Giovani Sartori has argued that the term ‘constitution’ in the modern sense evolved as a 
specifically English word, rooted in the evolution of English legal terminology. Sartori writes, 
“Yet the very term "constitution" has acquired its modern meaning in English, in the course of the 
evolution of the English legal terminology. The Latin term constitutio meant  the very opposite of 
what is now understood  by "constitution." A constitutio was an enactment; later, after the second 
century, the plural  form constitutiones came to mean a collection  of laws enacted by the 
Sovereign; and subsequently the Church, too, adopted the term for  canonical law. The terms 
constitutio and constitutiones were not frequently used, however, by  the English medieval 
glossators (while frequently used, as a synonym for lex and edictum,  by the Italians). This 
explains why, in the  course of time, the word constitution became  a "vacant term"— i.e., a term 
available for a  new employment – in English (this does not necessarily mean in England), and 





merchants, no longer dependent on express grants of the King for their economic 
privileges, challenged the absolutist tendencies of the Stuart monarchy, 63 bringing about 
revolutionary changes in how political power was to be wielded in England ever since. 64 
However, the changes in England were gradual, episodic, and by some accounts spanned 
more than a century.65 A century after the English had successfully inaugurated the time 
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‘Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion’, The American Political Science Review, 56:4 
(1962), at 853 – 864.] 
 
63  The two most influential social historians of seventeenth century England, providing 
explanations of the constitutional developments through changes in social relations are R.H. 
Tawney and Christopher Hill. See, Richard H. Tawney, ‘The Rise of the Gentry, 1558 – 1640’, 
Economic History Review 11 (1941), at 1 – 38; Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution: 1603 
– 1714 (London: Routledge, 2002); Christopher Hill, Some Intellectual Consequences of the 
English Revolution (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). Also see, Lawrence Stone, 
‘State control in sixteenth century England’ The Economic History Review 17:2 (1947), at 103-
120; and Frederick Jack Fisher, Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). For another, slightly different version, 
see Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and 
London’s Overseas Traders 1550-1653 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Brenner 
stresses the role of London based merchants who traded with the ‘new world’ (as opposed to 
chartered corporations like East India Company, which traded with European and Asian 
countries). Brenner argues that these merchants, not reliant on the King for charters and other 
assorted mercantilist protections, and more desiring of dynamic expansions and naval superiority, 
provided the crucial radical energy to overthrow the King during the revolution. For a contrary, 
self-proclaimed ‘political’ explanation, distinct from both the constitutional and the social 
interpretations, and focusing instead on intra-court power struggles and royal finances, see, 
Conrad Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).  
 
64 The Whig version of these events portrayed this conflict in specific constitutional terms, as a 
heroic parliament defending the liberties of Englishmen against the absolutist pretentions of the 
Crown. For contemporary, “neo-Whiggish”, versions of this story, see, Jack H. Hexter, ‘Power 
Struggle, Parliament, and Liberty in Early Stuart England’, Journal of Modern History 50 (1978), 
at 1 – 50; Wallace Notestein, The House of Commons: 1604 – 1610 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971); Wallace Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons 
(London: British Academy, 1924); Jack H. Hexter, ‘Power Struggle, Parliament, and Liberty in 
Early Stuart England’, Journal of Modern History 50 (1978), at 1 – 50; Jack H. Hexter, ‘The 
Early Stuarts and Parliament: Old Hat and Nouvelle Vague’, Parliamentary History 1 (1982), at 
181 – 215. 
 
65 See, for example, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation 





of modern constitutionalism, its ideas where sought to be condensed in a written 
document following the American and French revolutions – providing modern 
constitutions their definitive points of reference. The experience of each with creating a 
constitution, and hence the theorization of the same, were different. In the following two 
chapters, I will try to follow two of the most abiding such legacies that shaped the 
tradition of constitutional thought – limited government, and popular will.  
It should be stressed that the titles to the next two chapters are not to be taken as 
descriptive of the American and French constitutional experience as a whole. 66  These 
chapters do not aim to define in any way those two constitution-making processes, either 
through these or other terms. Rather, my ambition is to briefly delineate the historicized 
origin of these two strains in constitutional thought. Especially, I am interested in 
focusing how these concepts arose as a way of distinguishing the revolutionary moment 
and the constitutional moment by way of consolidating political rule through the latter in 
the wake of the former.  Doing so will allow me to show how the Indian constitution 
makers, facing a historically different sets of problem with regard to consolidation, had to 
posit a distinct set of constitutional values and functions. The exercise therefore resists 
any simple generalization of the nature: “American constitution was about creating a 
limited government”. Rather, it tries to show how limited government as a specific idea 
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66 Of course these were not the only focus of the respective constituent assemblies, and in the 
following chapters I do present how several disparate concerns overlapped and were sought to be 
resolved. The Americans proclaimed their constitution in the name of the people, and the French 
founders debated extensively how to structure political power, and sought to learn from the 






and formal characteristic arose as a way of resolving a particular set of contradictions. 
The reason the Federalists and Sieyes are discussed under the respective headings is not 
because those were the ideas that defined them, but because those ideas found the most 
sustained and significant elaboration in their thinking about constitutionalism.67 And 





67 The reason for this, one can speculate, is the distinct set of problems facing each. The 
Federalists were concerned with the creation of a new state combining the thirteen different 
colonies. Sieyes, on the other hand, sought to provide grounds for conquering and refashioning an 
existing state. Hence while the principal focus of the former demanded an elaboration of juridical 
architecture of the state, the latter an elaboration of the question where to locate the sovereign 
power of the state. For an interesting discussion of this distinction, see, Gerhard Casper, 
“Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century”, The Supreme Court Law Review, 







1.1 “They Are Born Equal Instead of Becoming So” 
1.1.1 Social Consensus 
 The revolution in America was distinct from the revolution that preceded it by a 
century in England, or the ones that would follow it in continental Europe, in the sense 
that it was not the result of a struggle against an entrenched social system, namely 
feudalism. When they rose up against a king across the ocean, all they sought was to 
severe their tie with him, not transform a social and political order which made the king 
who he was. In his seminal work, Louis Haartz elaborates on Tocqueville’s claim that 
Americans were born equal rather than becoming so.68 America never had to go through 
a social revolution like those in Europe in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries – 
a struggle between the feudal nobility and the nascent bourgeoisie for social power – and 
hence a corresponding political struggle against an ancient regime. As a result liberalism 
emerged on the scene in the new world not as the victorious ideology in a bloody 
struggle, but as a hegemonic ‘way of life’. Liberalism did not have to make its case on 
the basis of the interests of a class against another (i.e., that of the bourgeoisie against 
that of the feudal nobility), it posited itself as a fundamental and abiding consensus – a 
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68  Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political 






“Lockean Consensus” to use Haartz’s term – about the nature of the American order. And 
precisely because it bore no marks of a past concrete struggle, it brooks no serious 
challenge in its future.69 One can see this consensus was the heavy use of Locke’s theory 
of “social contract” as the theoretical background for the revolutionary act,70 or in the fact 
that within a few years a whole set of procedures were devised for the creation and 
adoption of new constitutions ensuring that legal institutions filled the space temporarily 
opened up by the revolution.71 The idea of a “contract” – broken and then fixed – gives a 
sense of the limited nature of the revolutionary act, entirely focused on the legal and 
institutional aspects of the government.72  
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69 To quote Hartz, “there is a kind of Biblical irony here. European liberalism, because it was 
cursed with feudalism, was forced to create the mentality of socialism, and thus was twice cursed. 
American liberalism, freed of one was freed of the other and hence was twice blessed.” Hartz, 
Ibid, at 78.  
 
70 On the importance of pre-existing social cohesion in Locke, John Dunn says, “the groupings of 
human beings set over against the state misliked […] are in their existing solidarities, habits of 
practical cooperation traditions of perception and sentiment, and in some measure even their 
residual institutional facilities, potentially still a single coherent political body.” John Dunn, ‘The 
Contemporary Political Significance of John Locke’ Conception of Civil Society’, in Civil 
Society: History and Possibilities, Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani eds., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 56.  
 
71 For a discussion of the deployment of social contract theory as a justification for the revolution, 
see, Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political 
Liberty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company,1953).  
  
72 On this point, Thad Tate writes, “The characteristic ways in which Americans employed it [the 
language of social contract] point above all to the limited objectives of the Revolution, to what at 
times appears to be the forging of an anti-revolutionary tradition by a group of successful 
revolutionaries.” Thad W. Tate, “The Social Contract in America, 1774 – 1787: Revolutionary 







Haartz’s argument is not without its critiques. One could say following Bruce 
Ackerman, that while Haartz is justified in claiming that the American republic was not 
the product of a social revolution, he is mistaken in making the claim that there was 
nothing revolutionary about the political beginning as well.73 This claim, Ackerman 
contends, understates the significance of framing the first republican constitution of the 
modern era.   
This critique needs to be qualified. On the one hand, one can say that while a 
political act of founding was undoubtedly a significant, even revolutionary, event, 
Americans did not have to contend with the question of concrete social antagonisms,74 or 
the social nature of the new political structure that they were creating.75 When the 
question of social antagonism arose in the discussions and writings of the founders, it 
always did so in an abstract rather than concrete form. As Haartz points out, the famous 
discussion of ‘factions’ in Federalist 10 is almost entirely theoretical, determining them 
as “sown in the nature of man” and locating their probable cause in a wide array of 
factors: from religion to the influence of charismatic leaders. Even when “unequal 
distribution of property” is acknowledged as the most “durable source of factions” 
nothing is said about the specific nature of those factions, or actually existing tensions 
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73 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991), at 26. 
  
74 Except the question of slavery, which was dealt by overwhelming repression and complete 
exclusion of a group from society by branding them property.  
 
75 In contrast to the revolutionaries in, say France a decade later, as we will see in the following 
section. Unlike Sieyes, who explicitly discussed the problems with the feudal social orders, and 
their corresponding political privileges, the Federalist papers are remarkably free of any 






caused by them, only theoretical potentials in the future. 76 On the other hand, one cannot 
ignore the massive and genuine upheaval in political discourse and practice that the 
revolution brought about.  
1.1.2. Republican Crisis of Authority 
Once the overarching authority of the monarchy that undergirded the political 
relation of obedience and obeisance was overthrown, and in the absence of any other 
source of traditional source of hierarchy, the American political stage was flooded with 
an unprecedented spectacle of popular power. The democratization brought about by the 
revolution was real, and the sense of a popular source of legitimacy for the new political 
authority from the state houses to the town halls got translated into actual practices of 
popular participation in politics, and fostered questioning of any source of hierarchy in 
society. In the immediate years following the revolution, regular people challenged 
embedded oligarchic or aristocratic holds over local politics, and state houses passed 
radical legislations affecting taxation, inheritance, alienation of land, insolvency and debt 
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76 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition, at 31.This was despite the presence of actual questions of 
social antagonisms, like the Daniel Shays’ rebellion or debtor relief movements, which indeed 
affected the thinking of the founders. Abstracting away from concrete instances, as Morton 
Horwitz would argue, was one of the central ideological devise of the post-revolutionary liberal 
thought in America. [see, Morton J. Horwitz, ‘The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic 
Thought’, Journal of Law and Economics 19:3 (1976), at 621 – 632.] Also, relevant to note here 
is Hartz’s argument about the scope and nature of these rebellions in comparison to their 
counterparts in Europe. “Daniel Shays, frightening as he was to Governor Bowdoin and the 
Continental Congress, could not become anything like Babeuf or even Winstanley. […] 
Obviously [Babeuvistes] wanted to complete a social transformation already begun, […] and one 
can agree [that the] Diggers cherished the same notion. In America, where no such transformation 
had ever been begun, how could the idea of completing it arise? Of course, the Shays forces 
pointed to the events of 1776 and after, and their own contributions to them, but these could not 






relief.77  It is this democratization of political practice, marked by increased popular 
participation in the political sphere that scholars have alluded to as the ‘republican’ 
moment in post-revolutionary life. Pioneering work by historian Bernard Bailyn, and his 
student Gordon Woods, documented in extensive details how republicanism was the 
prominent political ideology in the years around 1776.78 The story of the following 
decade or, between the revolution and the Constitution, is one now made familiar by 
scholars, which can be shorthanded as a journey from republican ideals of the revolution 
to the liberal architecture of the Constitution.79 From civic virtue to individual rights, 
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77 See, Jackson Turner Main, "Government by the People: The American Revolution and the 
Democratization of the Legislatures," William and Mary Quarterly, 23 (1966), at 391-407; 
Edward Countryman, "Consolidating Power in Revolutionary America: The Case of New York, 
1775-1783," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 6 (1976), at 645-77; Jackson Turner Main, 
Political Parties before the Constitution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).  
Another important aspect was the participation of the regular people in the military action against 
the Crown. Like England of the seventeenth century, the military experience provided a 
springboard for the expression of popular democratic sentiments. See, John Shy, "The American 
Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in Essays on the 
American Revolution, Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson eds., (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1973), at 21-56.  
 
78 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of American Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1992); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776 – 1787 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).  
 
79 One strain of scholarship attempts to pitch these two schools of thought as a dichotomy – with 
widely differing normative and practical consequences. Generally, those scholars tend to share a 
strong normative preference for the Republican tradition, and a disappointment with the anemic 
levels of civic participation in the government that they blame on the originary shift to a liberal 
structure of government. The two most well known works in this vein are Quentin Skinner, 
Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Phillip Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
Yet, as another vein of scholarship argues, one should understand the Madison and other 
federalists as trying to reinvent republicanism for a commercial society. See, Andreas Kalyvas 
and Ira Katznelson, Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Stephen J. Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: 
Constitutional Design After Madison (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006). From a purely 





from non-domination to negative liberty. A common explanation for this has been sought 
in the familiar fear amongst the economically powerful of the specter of access and use of 
political power by the poor masses. In other words, it could be viewed as an early variant 
of the familiar conflict between property and democracy. The fact that it was legislations 
for debtor relief, inflationary paper money schemes, and plans to confiscate estates of 
Loyalists that caused the most concern, lends weight to this claim.80 Yet a straightforward 
story of elitist suspicions leaves out the complex nature of these anxieties, and hence fails 
to comprehend completely the sophisticated institutional and theoretical innovations that 
arose as a solution – an appreciation that is crucial for our purpose in this chapter, to 
demonstrate how the organizing principle of constitutionalism is to bring the revolution 
to an end. With that in mind, one can restate the problematic in the following terms. The 
rule of the British crown provided a justification for the organization of power based in 
tradition and customs. The hierarchy and order in the body politic flowed down from the 
authority of the Crown at the top. The removal of that source, through a revolution 
drawing its language from republican ideals, meant that the source of political authority 
in the last instance were “the people” – authority now flows up from below, rather than 
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social contexts of Ancient and Modern republicanism, and hence an argument for why the latter 
should look at liberalism for answers is of course Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the 
Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns”, in Constant: Political Writings, ed. and trans. 
Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 308 to 328. 
 
80 See, Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776 – 1787 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), Chapter 10; William W. Fisher III, “Making Sense of 






down from the top.81 This principle, when translated into unmediated popular power in 
local governments is where one can locate the tumult and the corresponding anxiety of 
the post-revolutionary years – what Jason Frank has called “symptoms of broader post-
revolutionary crisis of authority”.82 The solution that came from the Federalists (and 
Madison, more than any other)83 could be understood as institutional (separation of 
power, larger electoral districts) and discursive (constitutional law) innovations that made 
the translation of popular mobilizations into political power more difficult, if not – in the 
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81 There were two steps to this process. First was the rejection of the crown. The British, while 
cutting off the head of the king and changing the relationship between the king and the parliament 
for all time to come, maintained a continuity of their constitution. The Americans claimed, via 
social contract theory, that with the deposing of the king, were thrown back into the ‘state of 
nature’. Social contract theory provided the theoretical tools for the transition from one source of 
authority to the other, as well as a justification for the revolution itself. However, republicanism 
gained prominence during the second step – of creating a new authority drawing on “we the 
people”. see, Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of 
Political Liberty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company,1953), and Thad W. Tate, “The 
Social Contract in America, 1774 – 1787: Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative Instrument”, 
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 22:3 (1965), at 375 – 391. 
 
82 Jason Frank, “Publius and Political Imagination”, Political Theory 37 (2009), at 79.  
 
83 There is a debate amongst historians as to how far one can accept the general belief that 
Madison should be primarily and overwhelmingly credited with the design of the constitutional 
structure. It is true that many of the specific proposals of Madison failed to make it into the 
constitution (for example, congressional veto on state legislations, proportional representation in 
the upper house, etc.). As Forrest McDonald shows, "of seventy-one specific proposals that 
Madison moved, seconded, or spoke unequivocally in regard to, he was on the losing side forty 
times." [Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), at 208 - 209]. However, no matter what the fate of 
specific proposals and win-loss records are, the influence of Madison can be seen in the larger 
theoretical underpinning and architectural blueprint of the whole exercise – in, as we will see, the 
innovation through which situated principles of republicanism were abstracted to produce a 
liberal constitutional structure in the name of “We the People”. For a sustained and convincing 
argument from the point of view of political theory as to why this was – and remains – Madison’s 
constitution, see, Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American 







absence of extraordinary circumstances – untenable.84  The totality of these moves reveal 
two interrelated themes which have been central to liberal constitutional and legal 
thought since – formalism and depoliticization. The former are ways in which concrete 
and situated practices are abstracted into formal principles or processes. The latter is the 
way certain social institutions and relations – the original one being property – are denied 
political standing. Through this double move of formalization and depoliticization, 
liberalism erected a wall between the time of revolution and the time of constitution. 
Roughly speaking, these moves corresponded to two primary axes around which the 
separation of revolution and constitution was organized. While these axes were related, 
we can treat them separately first for the sake of clarity.   
1.2 The Problem of Democracy 
1.2.1 A Federalist Answer to a Republican Demand 
During the debates on the American constitution, the Antifederalists were the 
ones advocating constructing a constitutional structure by drawing from the legacy of the 
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84 As Jennifer Nedelsky argues: “Madison’s objective, embodied in the 1787 document, was not 
formally to preclude the people from using Federal government for unjust and destructive 
purposes, but to make it extremely difficult for them to do so.” [Nedelsky, Private Property and 
the Limits of American Constitutionalism, at 146.] In contrast, the central argument of Bruce 
Ackerman’s – which we will examine in a subsequent section –  is that the constitution did not 
make that translation untenable, rather demanded that the mobilization was of a certain magnitude 
to register its demand on the political map of the country. Yet, in this “two track” system is an 
acknowledgement that through that move concrete practices of popular politics was denied their 
potency. Popular power could now be manifested only through near revolutionary moments of 
upheaval. In Ackerman’s own account the only two such moments were the bloodiest war in the 
country’s history, and an economic crisis that put in danger world wide the very essence of liberal 







republican ideals of 1776. According to them, one should structure political power in 
such a way that it is a microcosm of the society at large. Their reference point was 
ancient Rome, where each branch of government reflected a particular social class. 
Society was to be mirrored in politics – the closer the resemblance, the more democratic 
the system. In terms of representation, the system should be designed in such a way that 
there was an identity of interest between the represented and the representative.85 In other 
words, they sought to create the Constitution in such a way that it makes possible the 
translation of active popular mobilization into political decisions, taking their cue from 
the localized and energized civic participation that was the bedrock of republicanism. The 
unmediated nature of the passage from popular sentiments to political power meant that 
one had to assume a high degree “virtue” amongst republican citizens – an ability to 
overcome private interests for the public good. As Gordon Wood writes, for this to work, 
“each man must somehow be persuaded to submerge his personal wants into the greater 
good of the whole. This willingness of the individual to sacrifice his private interest for 
the good of the community – such patriotism or love of the country – the eighteenth 
century termed “public virtue”.”86 In other words, this constitution of political power 
presumed a degree of homogeneity at the level of “greater good”, and a certain ability of 
the citizenry to act according to it due to their “public virtue” or patriotism.  
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85 As a prominent Anti-Federalist said, a member of one social group could never be adequately 
acquainted with the “situation and wants” of another group. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic 1776 – 1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998 (1969)), 
at 491.  
 






For the Federalists, this entire model was based upon a fundamental 
misconception about the nature of modern societies, a misguided attempt to paint with 
colors drawn from the ancient world on the contemporary canvas of the new world. 
Alexander Hamilton, the most strident opponent of the Anti-Federalist position, wrote 
that if one was to follow the path of the Anti-Federalists, one might as well “reconcile 
ourselves to the Spartan community of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long 
beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissimulation in the circumstances, as well as 
the manners of society amongst us; and it is ridiculous to seek for models in the simple 
ages of Greece and Rome, as it would be to go in quest of them among the Hottentot and 
Laplander.”87 Divisions along the lines of private interests were fundamental aspects of 
modern society, and completely different from the social cleavages of the ancient world. 
They were necessary as an engine for the growth of commercial society, but as ‘factions’ 
they constituted a problem for the body politic. These factions had to be controlled 
through the design of the political order, not replicated in them. Rather than social 
antagonisms reflecting themselves in antagonisms in the political sphere, one had to 
strive for a distinction between the political and the social sphere. The model of 
representation that the Federalists sought was a “a house of disinterested men” who 
“would employ their whole time for public good.”88 From this removed point of view, the 
political institutions should be able to imagine the society as the totality of its process, 
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87 Alexander Hamilton, “The Continentalist: Number VI”, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton,  
Volume III, Harold C. Syrett ed. (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2011), at 99.  
 






rather than via the multiplicity of its classes.  
In other words, the problematic was not how to transcend or abolish social 
distinctions, but to control their effects on political power. In the famous discussion on 
factions in Federalist 10, Madison lays out the choice in front of the constitution makers. 
Given the inevitability of difference amongst various interest groups in society, there are 
two possible pathways available, he says. Either one could seek to “remove its causes” or 
“control its effects”. The former, he said, could take two forms. The first, “by destroying 
the liberty which is essential to its existence”, that is, through destroying the variety and 
difference in civil society.89 This, Madison wrote, was a “remedy [that was] worse than 
the disease.”90 The other path was “by giving to each citizen the same opinions, the same 
passions, the same interests.” This was deemed “unpractical”.91 Madison was surely 
thinking of some form of the ancient republics when speaking about this path, and the 
impracticability is rooted in the changes brought about by modern commercial society. 
The only path available was to control the effects. The issue, to summarize Madison’s 
point, was not the existence of divisions in society per se, rather it was the threat of any 
one of those groups taking control of political power. That is, not the existence of 
factions, but their political effects: especially after being ignited by revolutionary 
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89 Federalist 10, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 49.  
 
90 Ibid, at 50. 
  






energy.92  The solution to that problem was to be found entirely within the architecture of 
the political power to be created by the Constitution. Not, with reference to a set of 
transcendent values, but immanent to the mechanism of political power.  
1.2.2 Distancing 
The first set of solutions lay in the size of the republic and the nature of 
representation. Madison sets up the difference, in his terms, between “democracy” and 
“republic”. The “two great points of difference” are: “First, the delegation of government, 
in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest” and “secondly, the greater 
number of citizens, and the greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be 
extended.”93 The basic principle behind both these aspects of a republic is distance. 
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92 The word Madison uses to describe such moments is “passions” which could lead the people 
astray, as opposed to the cold and rational “interest” which should be the ideal guiding principle 
for political action. This association of passions with instability, and interests with prosperity was 
in itself the product of a discourse that arose with the advent of the commercial society, as argued 
by Albert Hirschman, in Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its 
Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). On a related note, Jason Frank writes 
about the problem posed by “imagination” in the post-revolutionary context. The revolution 
“unmoored” imagination from the habituations of traditions, and therefore posed a distinct 
challenge for authority and stability. An illustrative example of such an anxiety, quoted by Frank, 
is Benjamin Frank’s essay written before the Philadelphia Convention, where he writes: “The 
excess of the passion for liberty, inflamed by the successful issue of the war, produced in many 
people, opinions and conduct which could not be removed by reason nor restrained by 
government . . . it unhinged the judgment, deposed the moral faculty, and filled the imagination, 
in many people, with airy and impracticable schemes of wealth and grandeur.” [Jason Frank, 
“Publius and Political Imagination”, Political Theory 37 (2009), at 75.]  
 
93 Ibid, at 52. This idea of representation signified a vision of political rule that was more 
aristocratic than democratic. Crucially though, the necessity of aristocracy was understood and 
defended not as a social but a political phenomenon –based on merit not blood. The revolution 
was seen to unleash a new political energy, where anyone and everyone could deem themselves 
worthy of wielding political power. In other words, the problem was not the existence of social 





Distance between situated and concrete acts of popular politics and political control of 
state power. The largeness of the territory, and of the number of represented per 
representative, would create a necessary space between the politics at the grass roots level 
and at the level of central government. One can add a third kind of distance to these – that 
of time. Dismissing Jefferson’s proposal that every generation should have their own 
constitutional convention, Madison wrote: “As every appeal to the people would carry an 
implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would in great measure 
deprive the government of that veneration, which time bestows on everything, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite 
stability.”94 This approach found expression in Article V of the Constitution, which 
makes the process of amending it extraordinarily difficult.95 The result of these distancing 
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to political power. [Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776 – 1787 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), Chapter XII in general.] 
 
94 Federalist 49, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 251. A more developed formulation of Madison’s 
objection can be found in his letter to Jefferson written three years after the Federalist Papers 
were published. See, James Madison, “Letter to Thomas Jefferson, February 4, 1790”, in The 
Papers of James Madison, Vol. 13, Charles Hobson and Robert Rutland eds., (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1981), at 21 – 24.  
 
95 Stephen Holmes and Bruce Ackerman have both offered influential critiques of the thesis 
regarding the dismantling of the political energy of sovereign people through strong entrenching 
provisons. Holmes argues that the distancing is a way to ensure discipline and training that 
promotes and stabilizes democratic practices, rather than “introduce an element of nervous 
hysteria into the heart of democratic politics” through opening the process up to frequent 
mobilizations. In a similar vein, Ackerman considers the entire edifice of the constitution as a 
mechanism to separate the truly popular moments of “extraordinary politics” from the banal 
interest aggregations of normal politics. Without it we have the monism of fluctuating majority 
opinion disguising itself as the sovereign will of the people. Both these claims exhibit a 
theoretical sophistication that correctly clarifies a too simplistic reading of the constitution as a 
neutralization of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, my claim, focused solely on the relationship 
of revolutions and constitutions (rather than popular sovereignty as such) stands despite their 





– spatial and temporal – was an abstraction of the concept of people, whose sovereign 
authority founded the new republic. True to the republican tradition, the Constitution took 
as its author “We the People.” Yet this ‘People’ was removed to the point of abstraction 
from the localized and concrete community of ‘people’ that was the bedrock of 
republican vision in the revolutionary years. The will of the ‘People’ therefore became 
distinct from any actual or direct expression of that will – at any particular instance. The 
interpretation of that will would henceforth be a question of procedure and jurisprudence, 
rather than that of politics. As they entered the preamble as an abstracted People, the 
people forfeited their role as embodied political actors bestowed on them by the 
revolution they participated, and were participating, in.  
1.2.3 Diffusion  
However, even this abstraction did not guard against the possibility of the capture 
of state power by any one faction in society, though admittedly a faction that is 
exceptionally large and powerful to be able to influence a majority of the representatives. 
Such a possibility is always latent in a democracy – no matter how process oriented –  
since at its heart lies the principle of social control over political power. This is what the 
Federalists understood as ‘usurpation’. In a certain way this problem was the potential 
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constitution inaugurates a different set of political practices, fundamentally distinct from the 
revolutionary moment. That is compatible with my claim that the constitution seeks to, above 
anything else, bring the revolution to a close. See, Stephen Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the 
Paradox of Democracy’, in Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 195 – 240; Bruce Ackerman, “Neo-
Federalism?”, in Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad 







negative outcome of the distancing move. The constitution makers at Philadelphia were 
engaged in creating the architecture of a new state. The Federalist preference was towards 
centralization, moving power away from the local and state legislatures which have been 
the focal points of post-revolutionary “democratization of the mind” that they were so 
anxious to curb.96 At the same time, the creation of a powerful centralized state meant 
that the possibility of it being controlled by any one group in society, who could then use 
it for their particular ends, was all the more frightening. For a solution to this, the 
Federalists turned to Montesquieu to suggest that such a “usurpation [should be] guarded 
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate department.”97 In other 
words, the centralized power of the state had to be checked through a brilliant bit of 
engineering, by separating its control amongst different (and competing) entities, and 
setting up multiple obstacles – “veto points” in the language of contemporary political 
science – in the path of exercise of power. It was the British – whose model of sharing 
power between the king and the parliament is what Montesquieu had derived his theory 
from – who could be credited with the concept of separation of power, as this devise 
would come to be known.98  Yet it was the Americans who gave it a formal shape as a 
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96 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, at 106.   
 
97 Federalist 51, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 257.  
 
98 It can be argued that Montesquieu had misread (or possibly idealized for his own purposes) the 
British system. By the eighteenth century, through the control of the cabinet and the disuse of 
royal veto, the supremacy of the Parliament was almost fully established, a process that will be 
completed by the Reform Act of 1832. To a contemporary constitutional scholar, England, with 
its lack of judicial review, and with the executive being the leader of the majority in legislature, 






core principle for the structuring of the government, and who have remained the truest 
adherents of that principle since. The principle of judicial review, which the framers of 
the Constitution did not envisage, was a logical extension of this principle, 99 and the best 
known export of American constitutional system, and perhaps the most enduring feature 
of liberal constitutionalism.100  
If the distancing devise was meant to close the revolutionary chapter, the doctrine 
of separation of power has the effect of precluding any revolutionary transformation 
within the framework of the Constitution. The point of separation of power was to make 
exercise of political power diffused and its actions slow. It precludes any decisive use of 
state power, and hence any major shift in society unless it is of a consensual kind. Since 
any major transformative agenda necessarily affects certain entrenched interests 
negatively, such an act becomes nearly impossible. This fact itself has resulted in a rather 
short career for separation of power outside of America, despite its theoretical appeal. 101 
In this vein, the contradiction between separation of power and a revolutionary agenda 
within the framework of the Constitution would play out as a debate between liberal and 
transformational constitutionalism in India.  
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99 Jennifer Nedelsky makes a convincing argument as to how Marshall’s innovation of judicial 
review in Marbury v. Madison, was a natural outgrowth of the Madisonian constitutional design, 
which is ironic given that Madison – as the Secretary of State – was a party to the case on the 
losing side.  [Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism.] 
 
100 See, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).  
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1.3 The Problem of Property 
The other axis around which the binary of revolution/ constitution operated was 
that of property. It is accepted historical knowledge that American constitution makers 
were deeply committed to protection of property, with few (if any) qualifications.102 Yet 
one needs to clarify this general statement along three broad lines: the idea of property 
during the post-revolutionary period, the material basis of property relations, and the 
relationship between property ownership and political citizenship. Doing so will 
illuminate the ways in which the protection of property was made a central organizing 
principle of American constitutionalism, and how its legacy survives as one of the most 
enduring presupposition of liberal constitutional imagination.  
1.3.1 The Revolutionary Idea of Property and its Limits 
In colonial America, there were two competing discourses of property.103 We can 
label them as vertical and horizontal. The vertical discourse assumed that property 
relations drew its legitimacy from the divine ordained and structured political hierarchy 
of the Crown, and its corresponding regime of quasi-feudal property distribution. That is, 
one’s proprietary status was derived from the king, and that alone constituted the 
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102 See, James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
 
103 For an historical survey of the concept of property in colonial New York, with a close focus on 
the evolution of the legal right to property, see, Elizabeth V. Mensch, ‘Colonial Origins of Liberal 
Property Rights’, Buffalo Law Review 31 (1982), at 635 – 735. I have drawn widely from her 






justification for it. The origination of a right to a specific property lay in an act of a king, 
while the totality of the system, along with its inequalities and distinctions, was 
undergirded by the divine (or natural) right of the monarch. Hence, in terms of legal 
practice, this notion depended heavily on proper titles and deeds, and genealogy of 
records. In the realm of economics both feudalism and mercantilism, while differing in 
many aspects, ultimately fell back upon this notion of property relations.  
Even before the revolution, the vertical discourse of property was challenged by a 
competing vision that saw property as an expression of one’s will. Rather than legal titles 
or grants, this vision stressed actual settlement and use of land, arguing that the 
legitimacy of one’s claim to property arose out of one’s labor through which they added 
value to nature. In colonial courts, claims to ownership based on occupancy and 
cultivation frequently conflicted with the various rules of the Crown, especially if the 
land had belonged to the Native Americans.104  The vast western hinterlands of the 
continent provided both the material and ideological conditions where this vision could 
gain strength as the revolution drew near. 105  
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104 In the eyes of the British administration, these lands belonged to the Native Americans, who 
were sovereign entities. They were considered ‘vacant’, and hence fit for a legally valid grant, 
only if they have been handed over by the Native Americans to the Crown. On the other hand, 
settlers argued that these lands belonged to them since they had settled and cultivated it, making it 
productive. Several important legal rules regarding the rights to property through possession or 
undisturbed occupancy, as well as the statute of limitation (which basically prevents adverse 
claims to one’s rights after a period of time) bear the marks of that conflict to this date.  
 
105 Another important ideological condition was that of religion. Most of the settlers were 
puritans, who have been opposed to the Anglican church which was an important part of the 
traditional order that undergirded the horizontal vision of property. The puritans, in contrast, 





The reason for calling this vision of property horizontal was its relationship with 
republican politics. The independence of laboring proprietors of land, and the horizontal 
bonds of community amongst them, formed the bedrock for an authentic republican ideal 
of a community of equal citizens, free in the sense of not being dominated by or 
dependent upon anyone. 
This ideal found its most eloquent spokesperson in Thomas Jefferson, who in a 
1774 pamphlet, argued against the British land policy and feudal tenures, which were 
based on legal titles rather than laboring on land. “Our ancestors” he wrote, “who 
migrated hither were laborers, not lawyers.” Therefore, he proposed in strongly 
republican terms, that the power to allot land belongs to “society”. “This [the allotment] 
may be done by themselves assembled collectively, or their legislators to whom they may 
have delegated sovereign authority; and, if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each 
individual of the society may appropriate to himself such land as he finds vacant, and 
occupancy will give him title.”106 It is easy to get a sense from this passage of the 
proximate bonds between ideas of ownership and citizenship. If the notion of property 
based upon tradition was to be challenged, it could only be done through invocation of 
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colony, the good of the commonwealth. See, Richard H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism (London: John Murray, 1926). 
 
106 Thomas Jefferson, “Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in Continental Congress”, 
in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume I, Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney eds. 






the sovereign rights of people in a situated community.107  The localized political 
practices, and the communal bonds so cherished by republicanism that we mentioned 
earlier, was concomitant to this tangible— rather than an abstract or formalistic – notion 
of property undergirded by laboring on land. “The small holders” Jefferson observed in a 
letter to Madison, “are the most precious part of a state.” 108  
The horizontal vision of property mounted an entirely coherent challenge against 
vestiges of colonial quasi-feudal property norms and an aristocracy based on birth. 109 
Where it came up against its own limits was when it was confronted with yet another 
notion of property relations – industrial capitalism. The reason for this is not because the 
former represented a romantic notion of non-commercial agrarian economy.110 The 
material basis for the vertical imagination of property was not self-sufficient peasant 
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107 It is important to note that Jefferson uses the word society in the sense of a specific, localized, 
community, rather than as an abstract totality of human interactions – an alternative usage, arising 
out of the Enlightenment, which will eventually come to be dominant.  
 
108 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1785”, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, Volume VIII, Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney eds. (Charlottesville, 
University of Virginia Press, 2008), at 683. 
 
109 When republican politicians entered the state legislatures after the revolution, they pushed for 
laws based upon these principles. Significant amongst these were laws abolishing entail, a feudal 
legal device that allowed one to limit the ability of their descendants to alienate the land, and 
primogeniture. The effect of both of this was to prevent perpetuation of property in the hand of 
fewer families, based solely on their birth, and to promote wider distribution of property amongst 
those who would use it productively. Jefferson, who lead the move for such bills in Virginia, 
wrote that they would form a system by which, “every fibre would be eradicated of ancient or 
future aristocracy, and a foundation laid for government truly republican.”  [Thomas Jefferson, 
Autobiography, as quoted in Stanley Katz, “Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in 
Revolutionary America”, Journal of Law and Economics 19:3 (1976), at 472.]  
 
110 This was the influential thesis of Richard Hofstadter, which gave rise to the idea that Jefferson 
and other republicans were wedded to some sort of an “agrarian myth”. See, Richard Hofstadter, 






communities, but a flourishing trade in grain brought about by the rising demand for food 
in European markets brought about by a steep rise in population.111 Therefore, a 
community of farmers, not peasants, allowed Jefferson and others to imagine a country 
that was both republican and prosperous, democratic and commercial.   Therefore the 
conflict was not between two opposing and irreconcilable worldviews, they shared 
certain fundamental assumptions regarding the centrality of both private property and 
commerce in society. What industrial capitalism did was to extend the inherent principle 
of commerce – that of profit – to its logical end, where it could no longer be in harmony 
with an idea of property that was sustained by the authentic experience of laboring and 
producing on land. Maximizing of profit requires – as classical political economy had 
already announced – division of labor and accumulation of capital in a few hands.112 
Under the condition of wage labor, capitalism creates an inequality in the accretion of 
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111 See, Joyce Appleby, ‘Commercial Farming and the “Agrarian Myth” in the Early Republic’, 
The Journal of American History, 68:4 (1982), at 833 -849, for a thorough rebuttal of the image 
of Jeffersonian republicans as agrarian romantics wedded to an unfeasible past, through an 
economic history of agrarian commerce in the late eighteenth century. On this point, also see, 
Robert E. Mutch, “Yeomen and Merchants in Pre-Industrial America: Eighteenth Century 
Massachusetts as a Case Study”, Societas 8 (1977), at 279 – 302; and B.H. Slicher Van Bath, 
“Eighteenth Century Agriculture in the Continent of Europe: Evolution or Revolution?” 
Agricultural History 43 (1969).  
 
112 This contradiction is evident in the works of Adam Smith, between the community of free 
exchange (envisioned primarily in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and tenuously held on to in 
the Wealth of Nations ) and the condition of division of labor – hierarchical and dependent . His 
solution was to insert the notion of “self-interest” which allowed one to formulate, from an 
‘objective’ point of view, one’s benefit and even freedom, even within a condition of hierarchical 
dominance. See, generally, Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 
2000). On the centrality of republican elements in Smith’s thoughts, see, Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), especially Chapter 1. On the 
innovation of “self-interest” and the work it does in Smith’s theorization, see, Albert Hirschman, 
Passions and Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton: 






property disassociated from the productive capacity of labor. In other words, what 
resulted was a contradiction between the logic of industrial capitalism with the situated 
experience of production that provided property its ideological validation in the new 
world.113  
In view of this contradiction, the protection for property in the Constitution had to 
consist of a double conceptual maneuver. On the one hand, it had to formulate a set of 
negative mechanisms, ensuring that the erosion of the ideological basis for private 
property, and the inevitable inequality, will not lead to political intervention in the 
process of capital accumulation organized through democratic means. On the other, it had 
to generate a positive justification for absolute right to property that could replace the 
conceptual framework wedded to farmer-proprietors.  
1.3.2 The Constitution and its Reconception of Property: “Faculties for Acquiring”  
The need for a negative mechanism was framed in the context of a prospective, 
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113 Karl Marx, writing a century later, saw this as a foundational struggle in all settler colonies, 
where the ideological link between production and property found a concrete material basis. He 
wrote: “Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of 
which one rests on the producers' own labour, the other on the employment of labour of others. It 
forgets that the latter not only is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its 
tomb alone. In Western Europe, the home of political economy, the process of primitive 
accumulation is more or less accomplished. It is otherwise in the colonies. There the capitalist 
regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his 
own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The 
contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems manifests itself here 
practically in a struggle between them.” [Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1954), Chapter 33]. By some accounts, it was Marx’s awareness of the settler colonial 
experience that led him to theorize that the advent of wage labor was the single most important 
mark of a capitalist mode of production. See, David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital 






rather than contemporaneous, threat, which would arise out of the functioning of a 
capitalist economy. As Madison expressed in the convention, “In future times a great 
majority of the people will not only be without landed but any other sort of property.”114 
Under a condition of democracy, this “great majority” organized as “the most numerous 
party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.”115 The 
worrying specter of the “superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” 
haunting the security of property accumulation was what Tocqueville subsequently, and 
memorably, call the “tyranny of the majority”.116 In other words, the problem was the 
close relation between property ownership and practices of citizenship forged within the 
ideological infrastructure of republicanism. Once the wide base of land ownership that 
supplied the “common interest” of property owners started eroding, there was ample 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 “Records of the Federal Convention, July 5 ”, in The Founder’s Constitution, Vol. I, Philip B. 
Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Chapter 16, 
Document 16.  
 
115 Federalist 51, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 255.  
 
116 Writing almost half a century after the Federalist Papers, Tocqueville comments on how the 
dispersion of powers had their intended effect. As a result the American state has “not undertaken 
the regulation of society’s secondary affairs. There is nothing to indicate it has even conceived to 
do so.” Interestingly, at the end of the same chapter Tocqueville also wonders as to what would 
happen if a democracy like the United States came to exist in a country where there is already in 
existence “a central administration” that has been made acceptable by “habit and law”. In such a 
case he feels there “would be a tyranny less tolerable than any of the absolute monarchies of 
Europe. One would need to go to Asia to find anything comparable.” It is precisely in that 
direction that we would venture, to find the Indian founders grappling with a similar problem. 
[Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I, Trans. Gerald E. Bevan (London: Penguin 






cause to worry what the nature of that relationship would become.117  
Yet, a negative restriction on political intervention in property rights posed a 
peculiar problem. The ideology the framers saw potentially dangerous to property rights 
was not one that demanded redistribution or state controls. The agrarian republicans, 
given their original struggle against a property regime underwritten by the writ of the 
Crown, were against any state intervention in property relations or any redistribution of 
property.118 Rather than a specific economic plan for restructuring property relations, 
what that vision posited was a notion of property relations determined by and drawing its 
legitimacy from the collective political expression of the people – as the passage quoted 
from Jefferson earlier made clear. Therefore no simple prohibition of certain kinds of 
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117 Madison saw two possibilities, one harmful to property, the other to democracy. “These [the 
propertyless] will either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, 
the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands; or which is more 
probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal 
danger on another side.” [“Records of the Federal Convention, July 5 ”, in The Founder’s 
Constitution, Vol. I, Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), Chapter 16, Document 16.] 
 
118 What the agrarian republicans were for was removing obstacles to distribution, as the issue 
with entails discussed earlier showed. Nevertheless, under conditions of growing 
industrialization, the lines between distribution and redistribution often got very thin. In a letter to 
Madison, Jefferson expressed concern for farmers whose lands were encroached upon by 
industries in terms that is worth quoting at length. “Whenever there is in any country” he wrote, 
“uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far 
extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labor and 
live on. If, for the encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we must take care 
that other employment be furnished to those excluded from the appropriation. It is too soon in our 
country to say that every man who cannot find employment but who can find uncultivated land, 
shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a moderate rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every 
possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land.” [Thomas 
Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1785”, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
Volume VIII, Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney eds. (Charlottesville, University of 






actions (appropriation, taxation, etc.) could exhaust the radical potential of this vision. 
What had to be achieved was a more fundamental delinking of the legal infrastructure of 
property rights from democratic political practices. In the language of the framers, this 
project emerged as the determination of the relationship between “rights of persons” (i.e., 
rights of political participation) and “rights of property”.119 Jennifer Nedelsky, in her 
seminal work on the life of these two rights in the convention has shown that while 
Madison was sincere in his hope to protect both of those rights, at every moment when a 
potential conflict arose between the two he chose the former over the latter. 120 
Rhetorically this hierarchization of rights was justified by invoking property as a natural 
right, deserving of protection for its own sake, while rights of persons were invoked in 
instrumental terms.121  
This project was undergirded by a new positive justification for property. In the 
words of Madison, “the first objects of the government” was “protection of these faculties 
of acquiring property”.122 The Constitution, the Federalists claimed, was not meant to 
protect entrenched interests in property, but a climate where the ability to acquire 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, at 503 – 504.  
 
120 Some notable examples are: freehold suffrage in the House, a Senate designed to protect the 
class of property owners, a Presidential veto to curb “overzealous” legislations. See, Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian 
Framework and its Legacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
 
121 Ibid. Also see, William W. Fisher III, “Making Sense of Madison”, Law and Social Inquiry 
8:3 (1993), at 547 – 572.   
 
122 Federalist 10, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,  






property was secure. That climate was one of “equality of opportunity” – an ideal that 
invoked the egalitarian impulses of the vertical vision of property as an abstract principle, 
to be maintained against the deep inequalities existing in actuality.123 One should be 
committed to the defense of property not just because one owns a plot of land (which 
would be less and less the case), but one can always aspire to acquiring property using 
one’s ‘faculties’. That is a “right” available to all in principle, even if only a few are able 
to exercise it in reality.   
1.4 Law and Its Abstractions 
Therefore, the abstraction of the concept of people mirrored a similar abstraction 
of the concept of property. Property was transformed into an abstract right from a set of 
practices and relations arising out of a situated community. It sought to use the 
ideological resources derived from the ‘virtues’ of the small holder – autonomy and 
freedom from state interference – while denying that ‘virtue’ any place on the political 
stage. The triad of economics, politics, and law, which formed the heart of localized 
republican practices, was disaggregated under this scheme. Economics became the realm 
of ‘rights’ that determined interactions between abstract individuals. This realm had to be 
protected from politics, which could get vitiated by the conditions of inequality and social 
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123 What proved more difficult was a similar appropriation of the other cherished republican 
concept, that of “freedom”. The corollary of  “equality of opportunity” was “freedom to own”, a 
similar two tier conceptual structure that upheld the freedom in abstract terms while ignoring the 
impossibility of it in actuality. However, that did not solve the primary concern regarding a 
republican conception of freedom, namely domination. If ownership of property was to be the soil 
from which non-dominated republican citizens were to arise, how could the same hold for 
workers who depend in more ways than one on those who own the factory? This was the tension 






conflict in the age of democracy.  Law became the discourse through which a wall was 
erected between the two. The ability of the Constitution to erect a boundary between 
politics and economy, the state and society, property and democracy – in other words, the 
essence of a “limited government” – owed a lot to the doctrinal developments in law 
which allowed it to play this unique role. The language of liberal constitutionalism, from 
its very inception, was thoroughly legal and legalistic. The final defeat of the republican 
tradition is marked by the fact that from that date onwards, Americans would measure the 
strength of their constitutional system by the strength of that separating mechanism. The 
courts, in the American imagination, are the constitutional institutions per excellence.   
Through separation of powers, the courts were to be the primary body where 
constitutional principles were to become constitutional practices – that is, elaboration of 
the principles in view of specific controversies. The legislature, where substantive will of 
the people could find its way in, was to make only general pronouncements formally 
applying to all; while the courts, who could be trusted to operate only on the basis of 
formal legalistic doctrines, were to determine the outcome of individual conflicts in 
society. In maintaining the separation that formed the core of liberal constitutionalism, a 
significant discursive weight was carried by the doctrines developed by judges and 
lawyers – the most significant of which was to emphasize the dichotomy of process and 
substance, to privilege the former.124 To take one significant example, the emerging 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Many of these doctrinal developments have taken place in the context of the constitutional 
struggles in England of the seventeenth century, from which the Americans derived it. The 
contribution of the Americans is to transform those somewhat haphazard innovations into a 





doctrines in contract law eradicated remnants of an earlier tradition that took into account 
the substantive outcome of a contract to judge its fairness. Instead, if one entered into a 
contract with the proper formalities, it was to be upheld no matter how unjust the 
outcome might be.125  
The blindness to substance by the courts does not mean that the legal concept of 
property remained static, ensconced in procedural armor. The nature of the shifts divulge 
the precise nature of the separation of law and politics under liberal constitutionalism. 
The classical view of property rights was conceived of as a strict dominion over a 
territory. Such a view of property was more in tune with an agrarian economy rather than 
the demands of an industrial capitalism. Industrial capitalism requires movement, 
constant flows and transfigurations, rather than static attachment to a place. How could 
one build a railroad, transport oil, emit chemicals if every piece of land in the country is 
parceled out into impermeable territories? Over the course of the nineteenth century, the 
courts radically altered the massive edifice of private law rules around property rights to 
make possible the functioning of industrial capital.126 These developments ranged from 
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125 Morton J. Horwitz, ‘The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought’, Journal of Law 
and Economics 19:3 (1976), at 623. At a non-procedural level, the most significant constitutional 
law doctrine for the protection of property was that of “vested rights”, whereby the State could 
not abridge entitlements accrued by individuals either from an act of the state itself at a prior 
point of time, or from another private individual through contract, etc. 
 
126 The definitive work that illustrates this shift over the nineteenth century is Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Transformation of American Law, 1780 – 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977). Willard Hurst is the other important scholar to show how law over the course of nineteenth 
century continually prepared the grounds for market to function. See, James Willard Hurst, Law 





changes in the legal concepts of liability in tort law, performance in contract, eminent 
domain, bankruptcy, and the doctrine of prior-appropriation.127 All of these changes 
reflected the emerging needs of the market and amounted to a “subsidization of economic 
growth through the legal system”.128 By the middle of the nineteenth century, these 
developments made it extremely difficult to maintain the purist position about law being 
completely separated from political or policy preferences. Yet all of these changes 
originated from the courts of law, and in the common law tradition, they were all 
presented as inherent developments in the logic of law as an organic part of society, than 
a radical change brought about by the expression of will. This is precisely why they were 
not in contradiction with the protection of property envisaged in the Constitution. The did 
not involve a redefinition of property based on the collective will of people in assemblies, 
rather, they reflected the demands of positivist ‘social policy’ and economic logic of 
growth. This clarifies the fact that protection of property in a liberal constitutional system 
is meant in a particular way – protection from democratic control. Hence, when we speak 
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Wisconsin Press, 1986). I have drawn heavily on the thesis of these works for the arguments of 
this section.  
 
127 Each of those changes can be analyzed in detail to show how they arose in response to the 
needs of an industrial economy. To give a brief example, in tort law, the shift was from a doctrine 
of strict liability, which held the “wrong-doer” absolutely liable for an injury caused to a person 
or property. What replaced it was the doctrine of negligence, whereby the claimant had to show 
some degree of willful mistake or abrogation of duty on the part of the defendant to successfully 
claim damages. This had a momentous effect on the liability of the corporations to injury caused 
in the course of doing their business, a fundamental need in an age of rapid industrialization, with 
its attendant share of accidents and injuries. Crucially, it also disbursed some of economic cost of 
industrialization to the population at large, by making them pay for the injuries caused to their 
property.     
 
128 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780 – 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard 






of the separation of law and politics under liberal constitutionalism, we should speak of it 
in that precise sense – as protection of the legal regime of property from being 









2.1 Popular Will as a Revolutionary Concept: Sieyès 
Unlike their American counterparts a few years before, the French constitutional 
thinkers after the revolution were working in the shadows of a concrete and bloody 
struggle against an entrenched social order. There’s was the most celebrated of 
revolutionary origins of a constitutional imagination, and the marks of it can be found in 
the work of the most prominent constitutional theorist of the revolution, Emmanuel 
Sieyès. Sieyès made the case for the États-Généraux, convened under the prevailing 
constitutional powers of the absolute monarchy, to turn themselves into a constituent 
assembly to promulgate a constitution de novo. To justify doing so, he made the 
celebrated distinction between the constituent power (pouvoir constituant) and the 
constituted power (pouvoir constitué). The former cannot be subsumed by the latter, nor 
be bound by the prevailing normative order, and hence be free to create a new 
constitution if it wills so. This evocation of the constituent power – the subject whose will 
is reflected in the constitution – was the most striking aspect of constitutional thought to 
come out of the French Revolution.  
2.1.1 Against All that Came Before it 
To understand the nature and implication of this claim, one must situate it within 





Committee appointed by the National Assembly in 1789, of which he was a member. The 
first point of debate was about the meaning of the word constitution itself.129 Following 
Montesquieu’s theorization of the English system, constitution could be viewed as an 
abiding order, an almost organic physiology of political institutions where each part had 
its proper functions.130 The critique of this view, which included Sieyès’, came out of the 
work of the other great political theorist of eighteenth century France – Rousseau. 
Political orders, according to Rousseau, had nothing organic or natural about them, they 
were creation of men. The Social Contract, as he framed it following Hobbes in this 
aspect, signified a decisive break with nature. The problem with all existing political 
orders is that they have everywhere put man in chains. A political order for the free could 
only be achieved if it is based on the general will of the society. Such an order then must 
mark a decisive break from all that came before it.  
Sieyès translated this abstract theory of general will in the concrete language of 
constitutional theory in the context of the debates in the national assembly in What is the 
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129 Keith Michael Baker, “Constitution” in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 
Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf Eds., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge: Belknapp Press, 
1989), at 479 – 493. 
 
130 Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold 
S. Stone eds. And trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Montesquieu’s 
theorization, especially his reconstruction of the English constitutional model would prove 
immensely influential to constitutional thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic, for example, in the 
constitutional thought of John Adams. The crucial backdrop to this constitutional model was 
Montesquieu’s idea about the nature of commercial society, a point that we will address in the 






Third Estate? 131 The constitution he argued was not any abiding natural order, but the 
creation of men – in other words, expression of a will. Who is the subject whose will 
could legitimately be accepted as a constitution? Not the privileged orders or the king’s, 
but that of the “nation”. “The nation” Sieyès writes, “exists before anything else. It is at 
the origin of everything else. Its will is always legal; it is the law itself.” 132 The nation, 
the existing and present political reality, conscious of itself as such, is the authorial 
subject of the Constitution. And in that sense, it is prior to it, and hence not bound by any 
existing social or political arrangement handed down by tradition. Thus, “[A] nation is 
independent of any form. And however it may will, it is enough that its will appear for all 
positive law to end before it as before the source of and the supreme master of all positive 
laws.” 133 To argue for the Constitution to be a fundamentally novel act – a new 
beginning radically breaking with the arrangements of the past – Sieyès therefore also 
ends up positing a subject prior to and hence not limited by the constitution to come.  
2.1.2 The Bourgeois Subject and Representation  
It is this aspect of Sieyès that has been taken up by both those who want to 
consolidate this claim, and those who want to critique it.134 Nevertheless, this aspect of 
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131 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?”, in Political Writings, ed. and trans. 
Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). 
 
132 Ibid, at 136.  
 
133 Ibid, at 139.  
 
134 The most influential attempt to consolidate this claim has been that of Carl Schmitt’s which 
we would take up in the following section. The most sophisticated critique has been that of 





Sieyès only gives us a partial understanding of the relationship posed between revolutions 
and constitutions by him, and the intellectual climate of the French Revolution. What is 
the Third Estate? is not just a constitutional theory version of a call to arms in the name 
of the ‘general will’. Pervading it is the influence of another powerful discourse of the 
eighteenth century – that of the virtues of the rationality inherent in bourgeois 
commercial society, and its superiority to the arbitrary and unproductive whims of the 
nobility and absolutist monarchy. The opening chapter of the pamphlet, titled ‘The Third 
Estate is a Complete Nation’ begins by posing the question “What does a nation need to 
survive and prosper?”, and then listing the necessary activities – agricultural production, 
industrial production, trading, and scientific and intellectual innovations. 135 It is the 
members of the third estate who undertake these productive activities necessary for 
sustaining the nation, while the nobility and the clergy do not contribute to the society in 
any productive sense and instead live parasitically off it.  Even with regards to public 
administration – the exercise of public power – Sieyès argues that the members of the 
third estate, who will occupy those positions on the basis of merit and not by the virtue of 
their birth would in theory prove more worthy occupants of those offices. Therefore, the 
“robust man” of the third estate was already doing the hard work of sustaining the nation 
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to preserve the elements of new beginning, but critiques the notion of a “constituent power” 
standing outside of the constituted form. For a comparison of Schmitt’s and Arendt’s partial 
readings of Sieyes, see, William Scheurman, “Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt’s 
Challenge to Carl Schmitt”, in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, ed. David 
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even “with one arm in chains’”.136 It was the object of the new Constitution to break that 
chain and constitute the political order to reflect the inherent rationality of the emergent 
commercial society. This idea of the social process was derived from the Physiocrats like 
Quesnay, and subsequently and more profoundly, by Adam Smith.137 The influence of 
the latter is especially evident in the pamphlet “An Essay on Privileges”, published in the 
November of 1788, which attacked the feudal order from the point of view of a society 
based on market exchange and closely tracked Smith’s similar critique offered in The 
Wealth of Nations.138  
It was this discourse, and especially the concept of division of labor, that Sieyès 
drew upon to formulate his idea of representation – his most important break with 
Rousseau. In modern society, where the majority of the populace is occupied with their 
daily toils and economic strivings, the work of legislation should be left to a group of 
specialized and enlightened minority. This was desirable from the standpoint of the 
quality of the legislative outcome, as this minority was “far more capable than they [the 
people] themselves of knowing the general interest and interpreting their own will in this 
respect”. In this, it was firmly within the tradition of the liberal idea of representation that 
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137 That it was Smith rather than the Physiocrats who had a greater influence on Sieyès by the 
time he came to write “What is the Third Estate?” can be seen in his suggestion that value comes 
from labor, rather than land, in that pamphlet.  
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was to find predominance in the Western world in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century.139  
2.1.3 The Need for the Sovereign Will: How France was not England 
The coexistence in Sieyès’ thought of what Keith Michael Baker calls “the 
rational discourse of the social” (one that acknowledged the differences in civil society), 
and the Roussean language of the will (one that stresses unity) can only be understood 
within the unique configurations of the revolutionary cause in 1789. From 1789 to 1791, 
the leadership of the revolution rested with the moderate faction of the bourgeoisie. Their 
economic plan was entirely liberal – enclosure of common lands, promotion of rural 
entrepreneurship, prohibition of guilds and corporatism, rationalization of the revenue 
administration.140 They looked across the channel admiringly, and sought to create a 
Constitution with checks and balances, and not entirely severing its ties with the past. 
Mounier and the other moderates argued that while the nation should correctly be 
assumed to be the source and justification of sovereign power, it cannot be the subject 
that exercises it either directly or in a unitary fashion in the model of the divine right of 
kings. What they suggested, and what came to be embodied in the first Constitution of 
1791 was a constitutional monarchy in the English vein, the most significant aspect of 
which was the royal power of veto, and a widening of franchise to property holders.  
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139 See, Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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Sieyès opposed the idea of a royal veto, as he also would later reject referendums 
or other attempts to institute a direct democracy. There should be no power outside of the 
national assembly – be it the king or the people – to counteract the will enunciated by the 
people’s representatives in the assembly. “The people or nation can have only one voice”, 
he argued, “that of the national legislature.[…] The expression appeal to the people is 
therefore bad, for all that it is uttered in impolitic fashion. The people, I repeat, in a 
country that is not a democracy (and France cannot possibly be one), the people can 
speak and act only through its representatives.” Sieyès was not against checks and 
balances to make the legislative process more reflexive, but it had to be incorporated 
within the design of the representative assembly itself – not brought in through the figure 
of the king or the people. In this belief he stood apart from both the moderates fearful of a 
strong national assembly, and the radicals, distrusting of any representative institution 
that could claim to speak in the name of the people. He remained consistent in this 
argument in 1791 as much as in 1799, and the consistency came from a rather prescient 
understanding of the nature of the revolution, even as its vanguard changed with 
astonishing speed.  
The opposition to the royal veto should be traced to the first stage of the 
revolution. Sieyès’ argument against it was quiet simple: France was not England. The 
absolutist monarchies, in France and other places, were results of profound historical 





circumstances.141 While the feudal class was often in conflict with the monarch,142 and 
local groups of noblemen at times revolted against the king, the monarchy or the feudal 
class – tied together by an “umbilical class cord” – could never afford to mount a full 
scale offensive to abolish each other without in turn bringing about their own demise.143 
Only in England, where the bourgeois elements both in terms of the rural gentry and the 
urban merchants formed the critical mass of the revolutionary leadership, was a 
significant structural change in the nature of monarchy achieved. In England, after the 
revolution, it was abundantly clear to all concerned that the king could no longer afford to 
defy the parliament.144 William III, the first king after the revolution, vetoed five bills all 
of which eventually became law, after which he vetoed none again. His successor Anne’s 
only veto in 1708 was the last time an English monarch would try to do so. In France, on 
the other hand, the royal veto could function as intended – as Brissot remarked – only 
under a “revolutionary king”, one who would cautiously lead the revolutionary 
transformation set in motion.145  Louis XVI, dreaming of the counter-revolution aided by 
his cousins, was as far as possible from being one.  Hence, when by the spring of 1792 it 
was clear that he was using the veto not in the interest of the nation but to put obstacles in 
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142 Indeed, it was one such  disagreement which lead to the convening of the Estates General. 
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its path, the downfall of not just the monarchy but also the Constitution was only a matter 
of time. Popular demands for the abolition of the monarchy went hand in hand with 
demands to change the Constitution. And so on August 10, 1792, the Constitution was 
abolished amidst calls to renew the revolution.  
This is exactly the sort of difference between England and France that Sieyès was 
alluding to three years before these events came to a pass. “In England” he wrote, “the 
only nobles with privileges are those granted a share in the legislative power by the 
Constitution. Every other citizen is subsumed under the same interest; there are no 
privileges that give rise to distinct orders.”146 In a footnote, he clarifies what he means by 
the lack of distinct orders in England: “The lords of the upper house do not even form a 
distinct order. There is only one order in England, and that is the nation. A member of the 
House of Lords is a great mandatory designated by law to exercise part of the function of 
legislating and the great judicial functions. He is not someone endowed with privileges 
by right of belonging to a caste.” 147 In France this was most definitely not the case. “If, 
in France, there was a desire to join the three orders together to form one, then every kind 
of privilege would have to be abolished first. The noble and the priest would have to have 
no other interest than the common interest and, under the protection of the law, would 
have to enjoy no more than the rights of ordinary citizens.”148 In England, as Sieyès 
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rightly (even if a bit too emphatically) notes, the nature of the feudal order had already 
undergone momentous changes under the Tudor and Stuart reign. The revolutionary 
changes in the constitutional order reflected that change – and not without, one shouldn’t 
forget, the first public trial and execution of a European monarch. The crucial element 
was the shift, through the first wave of enclosures, ship farming etc., in the nature of land 
holding – from the basis of feudal privilege to a commodity with its own market logic, 
and a source of profit. The English landed class, in the century preceding the revolution, 
therefore had undergone a profound shift from feudal nobility dependent on their political 
privileges, to a class of landed gentry who sought to make money from the land. This was 
the class that formed the leadership of the Whig ruling elite, and led the successful charge 
against monarchical absolutism (in an alliance with the urban merchants) in the 
seventeenth century. This is why Sieyès could claim that the English nobility, even when 
they were sitting in the House of Lords, had the “common interests” of the nation in mind 
– that is, the interests of the bourgeois social order – rather than the interests of their 
particular order.  
Therefore, the House of Lords and the constitutional monarchy that the moderates 
wanted to emulate functioned in a social condition entirely distinct from France in 1789. 
In the latter, the revolutionary bourgeoisie staking their claim to political power came up 
against the most powerful and entrenched feudal order in all of Europe, dependent 





from tax burden.149 The Bourbon monarchy, as opposed to the Hannover dynasty in 
England, was very much a part of this order. Hence, Sieyès rightly argued that no 
constitution that hopes to reflect and consolidate the fruits of the bourgeois revolution 
could afford to do so without completely abolishing the vestiges of this order.150 One can 
situate the language of constituent power within this context. To fulfill its ambition, the 
bourgeois version of the Nation could only do so by declaring itself free of any existing 
tradition and custom. It had to declare itself a sovereign originator of a new normative 
order to mount a full-fledged assault against the unyielding shackles of the past. Put in 
another way, a constitutional system that acknowledges difference in functions, reasons 
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149 There is a need to clarify this rather simplistic picture of class conflict between the bourgeoisie 
and the nobility I seem to be presenting here. A significant school of post-war revisionist 
historiography of the French revolution argued, following the seminal work of Alfred Cobban, 
that feudalism proper had already withered away under the old regime and all that remain were 
the seigniorial privileges. [see, Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).] In terms of political theory, this 
revisionism revived Tocqueville’s insights about the continuities between the old regime and the 
revolution [see, Alexis de Tocqueville, Old Regime and the Revolution, Francois Furet and 
Francoise Melonio Eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).], and the result was a 
scholarly focus on shifts and innovations in “political culture” rather than conflicts of economic 
interests. [The two most celebrated examples of which are, Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and 
Class in the French Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Mona 
Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, Alan Sheridan Trans. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988).] Nevertheless, the point stands regarding the difference in the nature of 
the English and the French nobility, given their fundamentally different relationship to land. No 
matter what economic power the nobility still had in late Ancien Regime, the customary 
‘constitution’ afforded hardly any space to the emerging bourgeoisie. That there were quite a few 
nobles who were willing to make liberal constitutional reforms (a fact that Sieyès also 
acknowledges) does not change the fact that the structure of the order that the nobility and the 
monarchy depended upon was hardly commensurate with the functioning of a liberal democratic 
constitutional order propagated by Sieyès and others.  
 
150 This is why Sieyès famously excludes the members of the two privileged orders from the 
Nation. As he wrote, “The Third Estate thus encompasses everything pertaining to the Nation, 
and everyone outside the Third Estate cannot be considered to be a member of the Nation. What 
is the Third Estate? EVERYTHING.” [Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?”, in 






and purposes in civil society could only come about if those varied members could come 
together unified against the old regime. Therefore there was no contradiction between the 
language of the sovereign will, and the language of liberal “science of the social”, in 
Sieyès’ thought. In the context of France, there was no possibility of achieving the latter 
without first locating and justifying a radically new author and architect, united in its 
purpose. In this regard, the notion of sovereignty invoked by Sieyès was fundamentally 
distinct from the version theorized by Bodin in the context of the absolutist monarchs. 
Rather than a singular locus of the authority of command, here it stood for the power to 
create, to constitute a radically new order.151 The extra-legal status of the Nation that he 
argued for was closely connected to its ability to create a new political structure, 
unencumbered by the customary rules of the Ancien Regime, vitally antithetical to the 
aspirations of the revolution. As he said, “the constituent power can do everything in 
relationship to constitutional making. It is not subordinated to a previous constitution. 
The nation that exercises the greatest, the most important of its powers, must be, while 
carrying this function, free from all constraints, from any form, except the one that it 
deems better to adopt.”152  
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momentous break from the older martial idea of sovereignty as the coercive power of command. 
He writes: “This positing aspect of the constituent power is the first fundamental trait of the 
alternative conception of sovereignty. From the perspective of the constituting act, the sovereign 
is the one who makes the constitution and establishes a new political and legal order. In a word, 
the sovereign is the constituent subject. For this reason, I define the sovereign as the one who 
determines the constitutional form, the juridical and political identity, and the governmental 
structure of a community in its entirety.” [Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy 
and Constituent Power”, Constellations 12: 2 (2005), at 226].   
 





2.1.4 The Dangers of the Sovereign Will: The Jacobin Challenge 
Yet there is no denying that the language of sovereign will, in a particular but 
very plausible reading, opens up a space between the revolutionary moment and its 
constitutional conclusion, an impossible to close circle between the constituent and the 
constituted power.153 After all, what stops another group claiming to be a revolutionary 
force from denying the authority of the new constitution the same way Sieyès denied the 
customs of the Ancien Regime?154 This question was posed in a very concrete way to the 
French revolutionaries by early 1792. For the ‘Nation’ to be able to function as a 
successful founding subject of a new political order, there needed to be a certain 
homogeneity – a bond of “common interest” to use Sieyès’ own phrase – amongst the 
members of the Third Estate. Indeed that is how Sieyès portrays them in 1789. That unity 
was premised upon its exclusion from and opposition to the first two orders, and marked 
by its contribution to the productive economy. That unity was also, to a large extent, a 
real historical fact at the start of the revolution as the middle class bourgeoisie, in its 
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153 A tension that Carré de Malberg made famous through the term “vicious circle”. [Raymond 
Carré de Malberg, Contribution á la Théorie Générale de l’État, Vol. II, at 494.] 
 
154  This is the crux of Hannah Arendt’s critique of both Sieyes’ theory and the French 
constitutional experience. “The constitutional history of France, where even during the revolution 
constitution followed upon constitution while those in power were unable to enforce any of the 
revolutionary laws and decrees, could easily be read as one monotonous record illustrating again 
and again what should have been obvious from the beginning, namely that the so-called will of a 
multitude (if this is to be more than a legal fiction) is ever-changing by definition, and that a 
structure built on it as its foundation is built on quicksand.” [Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New 






assault on the Ancien Regime, was allied with the urban poor, the small property owners, 
and crucially, the peasantry in the countryside. As long as the interests of these disparate 
classes converged, the revolution earned swift victories under the banner of the Rights of 
Man and Citizens.155 It took just three years for this coalition to fracture due to the 
irreconcilable contradiction between its two strands: those who had property, and those 
who did not.156 The bonds of “common interests” looked less and less tenable as the 
revolution moved steadily leftwards under pressure from the urban and rural radicals, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Respect and protection of property remained an integral part of that banner even when the 
leadership passed hands to more radical faction of the bourgeoisie. In the declaration of rights that 
Robespierre proposed on April 24, 1793, it was stated: Property is the right of each and every 
citizen to enjoy and to dispose of the portion of property guaranteed to him by law. The right of 
property is limited, as are all others, by the obligation to respect the property of others. It may not 
be detrimental to the security, or the liberty, or the existence or the property of our fellowmen. 
[“Robespierre’s Proposed Declaration of Rights”, April 24, 1793, in A Documentary Survey of the 
French Revolution, John Hall Stewart Ed. (1951)].  
 
156 The conceptual framework of private property and free market economy, was something the 
revolutionary leadership remained faithful to came under consistent attacks from both the urban 
and rural radicals. The first concrete expressions of these attacks were the rise in food prices and 
attacks on traders as the moderate leadership tried to introduce free market principles and remove 
paternalistic state support for grains. One of the first significant radical assault happened when 
the peasants in Etamps in Beauce attacked and killed a grain trader for alleged hoarding, shocking 
the moderate leadership in the Assembly. Ideas about collectivization and nationalization 
circulated widely amongst the rural and urban masses, and pamphlets and plans for devolving all 
private property to the Nation gained popularity. Speaking to his radical base, Robespierre 
denounced the new bourgeois leadership for protecting their right to property with the same vigor 
with which the nobility sought to protect their rights of birth. All these radical demands shared 
two main themes: A. a strict limitation on property on egalitarian lines, and B. strict controls on 
the functioning of the free market especially with regards to food and wages. As Lefebvre argued, 
when the French peasantry always read liberte and egalite as almost the same terms, and if they 
were forced to choose, they would have chosen the latter. All of this provoked a strong reaction 
from the bourgeoisie increasingly fearful of radical attacks on the right to property and therefore 
growing suspicious of the revolution itself. For a more detailed discussion of these conflicts, see, 
Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, R.R. Palmer Trans., (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, Vol. I and II, 
James Friguglietti, John Hall Stewart, and Elizabeth Moss Evanson Trans., (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), and George F.E. Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution, (Oxford: 






the desertion of the moderate bourgeoisie from the revolutionary ranks.157 Yet in the 
France of the 1790s, an alternative vision of the collective, another constituent subject 
which could claim sovereignty with the same coherence and confidence with which 
Sieyès’ Nation did so has not yet emerged.158 So the discourse of constituent power 
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157 As Hobsbawm notes, this would be the pattern visible in all subsequent bourgeois revolutions. 
The “dialectical dance” of radicalism and reaction, revolution and conservation.  “Time and again 
we shall see moderate middle class reformers mobilizing the masses against die-hard resistance or 
counter-revolution. We shall see the masses pushing beyond the moderates' aims to their own 
social revolutions, and the moderates in turn splitting into a conservative group henceforth 
making common cause with the reactionaries, and a left wing group determined to pursue the rest 
of the as yet unachieved moderate aims with the help of the masses, even at the risk of losing 
control over them. And so on through repetitions and variations of the pattern of resistance—
mass mobilization—shift to the left—split- among-moderates-and-shift-to-the-right—until either 
the bulk of the middle class passed into the henceforth conservative camp, or was defeated by 
social revolution.”  What set the French Revolution apart is how far a certain section of the 
bourgeoisie was willing to remain revolutionary, even when it went well beyond bourgeois 
interests and comfort – the Jacobins. [Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789 – 1848 (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1996), at 62.] 
 
158  The radical energy of the revolution came primarily from the Sans-Cullotes, a loosely 
organized movement of the working poor, artisans and small property owners based primarily in 
Paris and the urban centers. Their economic program combined a dislike of the rich and the free 
market ideology that revoked paternalistic state controls on the economy (like price control), and 
a preference for state guarantees for basic necessities and work. Politically they insisted on an 
egalitarian, localized, and direct democracy, and expressed it through direct actions and riots. 
While they acted as a defender of the revolution and the main engine for its successive phases of 
radicalization, they never became a class with an alternative vision of ordering politics and 
society to challenge the bourgeoisie. Such a class would only emerge in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and consolidate itself politically by the beginning of the twentieth. For a 
comprehensive political and social analysis of the Sans-Cullotes, and their composition, see, 
Albert Sobouls, The Sans-Cullottes, Remy Inglis Hall, Trans., (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1972), and George F.E. Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). Yet another significant factor for sustaining the radical energy was the 
tenuous relationship between the urban radicals and the rural peasantry. As long as the 
countryside followed the lead of the towns to erupt during every successive journées, it 
succeeded. As this alliance broke down, especially as divisions in interests grew between the 
property owning peasantry and the Sans-Cullottes, the latter went down in defeat. For a 
discussion of the central role of the peasantry in the history of the French Revolution, see, 
Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, R.R. Palmer Trans., (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, Vol. I and II, 
James Friguglietti, John Hall Stewart, and Elizabeth Moss Evanson, Trans., (New York: 





served primarily as a weapon of critique, as an idiom in which to express the profound 
distrust of the instituted order that was experienced by the radicals and the populists, till 
finally a coup could declare the revolution over.  
2.1.5 To End the Revolution 
After the fall of Robespierre, Sieyès again returned to the assembly. In his speech 
on 2 Thermidor of the Year III, he spoke entirely in the language of liberal 
constitutionalism based on the “science of the social”, rather than the language of 
constituent power. Yet the inherent logic of his constitutional thought was consistent – 
what had changed was the main threat to his constitutional vision. In place of the 
intransient Ancien Regime against whom he sought to free the constituent power from its 
bonds of tradition, there now stood the proponents of radical and direct democracy who 
saw any and every instance of constituted power as inferior to the inherent sovereignty of 
the people. Resuscitating the language of division of labour he argued that just as the 
freedom of an individual in civil society is not curtailed when someone else works for 
him, similarly the political freedom of the people is not lost through representation. It was 
“an extremely harmful error” he said, to believe that “the people should delegate only 
those powers that it cannot exercise itself.” 159 Foreshadowing the theoretical moves to be 
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made by liberal constitutionalists like Constant, he stressed on the need to divide power: 
to ensure “l’unite d’action” without risking “l’action unique”,160 a possibility that was 
latent in his previous theorization of a unified, and omnipotent, constituent subject. 
Finally, one of the most celebrated theorists of the revolution presided over the transfer of 
power on the 18th Brumaire, as Napoleon declared the revolution over, and the bourgeois 
revolution finally ended with a bourgeois dictatorship. Despite the shifts in his rhetoric, 
Sieyès remained faithful to a belief which I have argued formed the core of his 
constitutional theory – how to institutionalize the fruits of the revolution. Unlike what he 
had argued for years earlier, it did not happen through a constituent act, but a coup.  
Sieyès deployed the concept of constituent power in aid of the revolutionary 
claims of the bourgeoisie. The constituent subject had to be posited outside of the bounds 
of tradition and Ancien Regime legality, so that it could successfully replace it. To be 
successful, this originary antagonism, between the revolutionaries and the Ancien 
Regime had to be posited outside the sphere of legality. The problem that arose 
subsequently in following that logic is that all antagonisms were posited outside the 
sphere of legality, and demands against the government became demands against the 
Constitution. In view of that, Sieyès’ insistence on the importance of the constituted 
powers was not a counter-revolutionary move, but a move of consolidation. Beginning 
and consolidating revolutions are distinct questions, yet they are questions only for 
revolutionaries. However, the person in whose hands Sieyès’ concept of constituent 
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power would find its most influential contemporary incarnation, was anything but. If 
Sieyès deployed the concept as a weapon against the stultified fortress of Ancien Regime 
legality, Carl Schmitt would use it to create a bulwark against seeking to change society 
through law. Against the perspective of the Weimar Constitution, and its (albeit flawed) 
attempts at bringing in social change through a constitutional compromise, Schmitt will 
use the Constitution as a defensive mechanism resisting such shifts.  
2.2 Popular Will as a Defensive Concept: Carl Schmitt 
2.2.1 Piercing the Veil of Constitutional Law: The Critique of Liberalism 
The starting point of Carl Schmitt’s constitutional thought is his critique of liberal 
constitutionalism. For Schmitt, the liberals conflate constitutionalism with the juridical 
form of the constitution – the norms that the constitutional texts and practices espouse. 
Missing in this account, is what he calls the ‘political’ aspect – the subject from whom 
the constitution derives its authority from. Liberal theory seeks to avoid this question by 
situating the authority within the juridical form itself – it is the constitution as the body of 
norms that is the locus of its own power. This reification of the juridical form of the 
constitution is what Schmitt seeks to counter through a “positive concept of the 
constitution” whereby it “originates from the act of the constitution-making power”.161 It 
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is this “constitution making power” or constituent power – the “We the people” of the 
preamble162 – that liberalism has put a “thick veil” on. 163 
Once we pierce that veil what we get is the distinction between constitution and 
constitutional law.164 The latter is the set of norms and systems that we see in the text and 
practices of the constitution. However, the “essence of the constitution” is not contained 
in those norms and systems. Rather, “prior to the establishment of any norm, there is a 
fundamental political decision by the bearer of the constitution-making power.”165 This is 
what the constitution, as opposed to constitutional law, is – a fundamental decision 
regarding the form of the political existence by the constituent power. The validity of the 
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162 Earlier in his career, in Political Theology for example, with its idea of sovereignty based on 
the moment of exception, ends up identifying the sovereign with a decisionistic and personalized 
– hence monarch-like— figure. However, even in that work, Schmitt refuses to fully embrace the 
catholic counter-revolutionary monarchical tradition of Joseph de Maistre or Juan Donoso Cortes. 
He acknowledges that the time of monarchy has passed and that now “no one would have the 
courage to be king in any way other than by the will of the people.” Hence, such a theory is 
essentially one of dictatorship, not legitimacy, which is what traditional monarchists always 
harked back to. [Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans., George D. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), at 65 -66.] The idea of 
the dictatorship would nevertheless stay on in Schmitt’s theory in a different form, as we would 
see, but he moved away from the idea of the constituent power residing uniquely in one singular 
individual. Instead, in Constitutional Theory, he says, that in a democracy it would lie with the 
people while in a genuine monarchy, it would lie with the monarch. More specifically, speaking 
of the Weimar Constitution he says, “There [Weimar Constitution] is the decision for democracy, 
which the German people reached by virtue of its conscious political existence as a people. This 
decision finds expression in the preamble “the German people provided itself this constitution”” 
[Constitutional Theory, Ibid note 43, at 77.] 
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constitution does not arise then by virtue of its “normative correctness or […] systematic 
completeness”. Instead, “the constitution is valid by virtue of the existing political will of 
that which establishes it.”166 It is this will, whose existence constitutional law must 
presuppose, is what lies behind the veil.  
The fact that Schmitt explicitly seeks to question the depoliticization of 
constitutional law, is the facet of this theory that makes it attractive for some 
contemporary scholars.167 On the other hand, the arrival of ‘popular will’ on the scene 
raises two questions which one needs to examine further: a) who the people are and b) 
how does one identify their will. These questions are related. If the will in question was 
that of an individual monarch, then it would be unproblematic – analytically, if not 
normatively. The identification of an individual will would always be relatively easy. 
However, the will of the people is the will of the multitude. A coherent expression of this 
will, as presupposed by the theory of constituent power, must then also presuppose the 
ability of the people to act as a collective. This presupposition could take one of two 
forms. Either, one could say that the people are already a collective, sharing a common 
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167  See, Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and Constituent Power”, 
Constellations 12: 2 (2005), at 223 – 244. Schmitt’s arguments are held up in opposition to 
liberalism, which runs the risk of becoming anti-democratic through its prioritization of the 
constituted norms over the constituent people. On the other hand, this strict distinction between 
democracy and liberalism, has been criticized as “democratic mysticism” on Schmitt’s part. [See, 
Stephen Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy’, in Constitutionalism and 
Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
at 195 – 240 (231)]. The basis of the criticism being Schmitt’s inability to understand, as Holmes 
argues, that norms and rules are not necessarily antithetical to but rather enable democracy by 






identity, and from this identity flows a coherent and unified will. That is, the will 
formation is a not a process, but rather inherent to the collective identity in question. This 
would then lead to the first question – what are the identity traits that constitute the 
‘People’. Or, one could concede that the people are a disparate multitude lacking any 
such thick identity. Nevertheless they come to a common will through a process of 
collective will formation. This latter option then leads to the second question – what are 
the legitimate processes by which a will could emerge that could claim to be the 
legitimately popular will. Lets take a closer look at each of these questions.  
2.2.2 The Nation as a Pre-Political Identity 
As we have noted, the conception of the constituent power in Schmitt’s is heavily 
(though not exclusively) reliant on his reading of Sieyès. The constituent power for 
Sieyès took the form of the “Nation”. It was the nation that was “prior to everything”, the 
“source of everything”. Hence, the “manner in which a nation exercises its will does not 
matter […] Any procedure is adequate”. All it needed was the “reality of its existence to 
be legal. It is the origin of all legality.” 168 This is the theoretical trope that Schmitt 
follows. However, precisely in their respective formulation of the legitimate subject of 
constituent power – the “nation” – do they diverge in an extremely important way. As 
Ulrich Preuss argues, the divergence lies in the French and German conception of the 
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nation.169 Following the terminology established by the German historian Friedrich 
Meinecke, Preuss distinguishes the French conception of the state nation with the 
German (and Eastern European) conception of the culture nation.170 For Sieyès, coming 
from the former tradition, the nation was defined as “a body of associates living under 
common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly.”171 Nation was defined 
as a territorial and administrative unit, membership to which is incident upon being 
subject to the same laws.172 This can be seen as a legacy of the absolutist bourbon 
monarchy, which paved the way for the revolution, but it is not just an accident of 
political circumstances. Even for Rousseau, whose theoretical legacy Sieyès was seeking 
to translate into revolutionary terms, saw the General Will as being produced out of 
particular wills through a process of rational reflection, rather than as being reflective of 
some pre-political identity.  
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169 Ulrich K. Preuss, “Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the 
Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution”, Cardozo Law Review 14 (1992-93): 
639, at 645 – 656.  
 
170  Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitalism and the National State, trans. Robert B. Kimber 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970 (1963)), as cited by Preuss, ibid, at 646.  
 
171 Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?”, at 132.  
 
172 And hence Sieyes’ exclusion of the clergy and nobility from the nation was not based on 
anything inherent to them, but in their attempt to seek a privileged treatment under special legal 
status, rather than being equally subject to general laws like the rest of the citizenry. For further 
discussion on the formative concepts of the citizen and the sovereign people during the French 
revolution, see, Lucien Jaume, “Citizen and State under the French Revolution” in States and 
Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects, ed. Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath (Cambridge: Cambridge 






On the other hand, in the German tradition, the nation is conceived as “an organic 
cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular 
Volksgemeinschaft.”173 Therefore, Preuss claims, Schmitt transforms the demos of French 
Revolution to ethnos. 174  While Schmitt does not explicitly identify the subject of 
constituent power in racial or linguistic terms (in Constitutional Theory, along with race 
and language he also mentions belief, common destiny, history and tradition) what he 
does insist on is a “substantial” quality that marks the people out as a “particular 
people”.175 The process of popular will formation in this theory is not dependent on 
commonly understood modes of collective action. Rather it is this substantial pre-political 
identity of the people symbolically represented to provide the “essence” of the 
constitution. In other words, for a Schmittian theory of constitution to hold, one must 
presuppose a society that is homogenous on one or more substantive axes.  
2.2.3 Constitution as a Defense against Change 
The problem here is not simply one of Schmitt and the legacy of German cultural 
nationalism. It is in the proposed unmediated relationship between constitutionalism and 
popular will. Even without any thick idea of the ethnos, what must lie behind a 
constitution – what every constitutional system must presuppose – is a popular will. 
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173 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard 
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Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt”, in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of 
Liberalism, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), at 259.  
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Since there can only be one essence of the constitution, what underwrites it must be a 
unique will. To put it in Schmitt’s term, there must be a political unity behind any 
constitution properly so-called. As he writes, “The people must be presupposed a political 
unity, if it is to be the subject of a constitution-making power.”176 How is this unity 
constituted? Through a fundamental existential decision about the nature of the political 
subject. What makes this decision political is a determination of friends and enemies, and 
the subsequent struggle. Any social collective, be it based on language, race or even 
class, can become the basis of a political collective – indeed the political collective –  if it 
determines itself as such and goes through this struggle. Therefore, this revolutionary 
struggle for supremacy is inscribed in the body of the constitutional norms that the victors 
of that struggle proclaim. Crucially, it is only at this stage – after the constituting act – 
can the unity be recognized as such. Since there are no possible normative criteria to 
judge the unity of a political subject before it posits itself as the constituent power, the 
unity must be back on to them from their act of creation. Much like in Hobbes, the unity 
of the creator can only be presupposed through their creation. Schmitt himself 
demonstrates this when he identifies the political unity of the Weimar Constitution by 
looking at its preamble and Articles 1, 2 and 17.177 This presupposition has certain 
political implication. The mark that Schmitt wishes to inscribe on the body of a 
constitution is not that of the struggle itself, or the different interests and cleavages which 
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the struggle could have generated – but that of a unique victor. A victor that can only be 
identified through the spoils of its victory.  
It was not lost on Schmitt that this close relationship between revolutions and 
constitutions will necessarily be unstable. The need to impose unity back into the political 
community comes from the acknowledgement of that instability. Schmitt can be called a 
constitutional theorist of crisis. And it is no coincidence that his sustained attempt at 
theorizing the Weimar Constitution came out of what he perceived as a constitutional 
crisis on the horizon.178 The identification of the “clear and unambiguous” political 
decision behind the “essence” of the Constitution was a way to resolve that crisis.179 
The Weimar Constitution, for Schmitt, was a bourgeois Rechtsstaat (bürgerlicher 
Rechtsstaat). In that context the entire social rights provisions in the Constitution that 
marked the compromise with the social democrats, or the amendment provision of Art. 
76 that made the Constitution open to further future compromise, were only “dilatory” 
provision, failing to recognize the unitary nature of the political decision behind the 
Constitution, and hence perpetuated the crisis. They were signs of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what a constitution is. As framed by Andreas Kalyvas, for Schmitt, 
“The Constitution can be defined by its intent to preserve and secure the founding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); and also 
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decision of the sovereign people concerning the content and type of its political 
existence.”180  
In periods of normalcy, it is rather easy to focus one’s energy on the architecture 
of the legal form, as liberalism does. 181 But because it never acknowledges the political 
will that underwrites that normalcy, liberalism has no answer when there is a crisis, when 
the “power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by 
repetition”.182 These moments call for the identification of that will and its defense.183 
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180 Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt 
and Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 131.  
 
181 As Jeffrey Seitzer argues, under the period of German Reich between 1871 to the First World 
War, legal positivism was the dominant theory of constitutions. However, the Constitution 
remained decidedly monarchical as it was the will of the sovereign monarch that was the 
condition of possibility of the constitution, no matter how much the constitutional law resembled 
liberal tropes. Instead, precisely because the real question of the will backing the constitution was 
so settled, could the legal positivists expound on the structure of the legal norms in unproblematic 
abstraction. Jeffrey Seitzer, “Carl Scmitt’s Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: 
Verfassungslehre as a Response to the Weimar State Crisis”, in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s 
Critique of Liberalism, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), at 287 – 
289.  
 
182 Schmitt, Political Theology, at 15.  
 
183 For the Weimar Constitution, this took the form of emergency powers of the presidency. The 
parliament, by definition fractured and representing different interests was unfit to embody the 
political unity. Hence it had to be the president, who if necessary should dissolve the parliament 
and take his appeal directly to the people, who must step in to defend the constitution, even if that 
meant violating certain parts of the constitutional law. In this way the plebiscitary president, 
acting in the name of the people and violating the provisions of the constitution to defend the 
constitution, flows naturally from the necessary presupposition of political unity that is central to 
Carl Schmitt’s theory of constitutionalism. The plebiscitary individual leader appears not just as 
defender of the constitution. He could very well appear as well in its moment of creation. As 
Andrew Arato shows, Schmitt’s preferred procedure for constitution making could be either 
through  sovereign constituent assembly, or a popular executive power. [Andrew Arato, “Forms 







Many critiques of Schmitt’s work have claimed that by privileging the extra-institutional 
constituent power over the institutions created by the Constitution, he nullifies any 
possibility of a stable constitutional order. However read in the context of the Weimar 
Constitution, it appears Schmitt was focused on the “closure” of the revolutionary 
constituent process, and the defense of the fruits of it.  
2.3 Popular Will as a Procedural Democratic Concept: Bruce Ackerman  
In recent times, the attempt to reinterpret constitutionalism by focusing on the 
revolutionary nature of the constituent power has received sustained scholarly 
attention.184 In general, the focus has been on critiquing the juridical nature of the liberal 
constitutional discourse and the consequent disappearance of the constituent subject from 
the scene. These works have tried to counter this depoliticization of the constitutional 
arena by rejuvenating constitutionalism through reconnecting it with the domain of 
revolutionary politics and mobilized popular actions.  
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184 A few notable examples are: Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1998); Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Revolution: The Link Between Constitutionalism 
and Progress, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995); Frank 
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Larry Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 64–98; Roberto Mangaberia 
Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 
1976) at 192–242; Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundations of Authority,’ in 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. David Gray Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, and 
Michel Rosenfeld (New York: Routledge, 1992), at 3–67; Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: 
Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press, 1999); Sheldon Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of 
Democracy,” in Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, ed. 
J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), at 29–
58; Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl 





Some of these scholars have tended to privilege the formless dimension of the 
revolution over the formal dimension of the constitution. In this vein, Antonio Negri’s 
work tries to reclaim constituent power as a democratic force, full of creative energy and 
new political imaginations. 185  In elevating the creative political potential of the 
constituent power he puts it in opposition with a constitution that he sees as designed to 
neutralize that energy, to shackle its power. For Negri, constituent power as a political 
concept must always be in complete opposition with the juridical form of the constitution 
– forever resisting any attempt to translate its potential into law. What Negri ends up with 
then is with a theory of permanent revolution or radical democracy but not one of 
constitutionalism. It never becomes a theory of what a constitution can do, but how one 
must always resist it.  
Yet another set of scholars have tried to preserve the revolutionary dimension but 
by focusing on its effect on the legal form of the constitution – the most influential 
version being that of Bruce Ackerman’s.186 In opposition to the constitutional questions 
viewed as matters of conflicting procedural interpretations, Ackerman suggests a dualist 
theory of constitutionalism based on the American constitutional experience – consisting 
of the two tracks of normal and higher lawmaking. The track of normal lawmaking is the 
everyday quotidian one where the dispersed social actors negotiate based on their 
particular interests via established constitutional and legal channels. The track of higher 
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lawmaking, on the other hand, are moments of heightened political urgency, when 
“mobilized masses of ordinary citizens may finally organize their political will with 
sufficient clarity” to make claims in the voice of their constituent selves, affecting 
changes in the constitutional structure. 187  This track, Ackerman insists, must look 
“beyond rules” and hence remain outside the constituted norms of Article 5 amendment 
procedure. 188  
Ackerman wants to consciously distance himself from the language of 
“constituent power” which he associates closely with Schmitt, whose position 
“emphasizes the arbitrary character of acts of constituent power. Here is where the law 
ends, and pure politics (or war) begins.”189 Rather, Ackerman wants to hold on to the 
democratic and political potentials of the notion of extra-legal constitutional moments, 
minus the violence and anomie that could be implied by theorists of constituent power 
like Schmitt.190 This in turn results in him attempting to formalize the processes of 
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187 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991), at 20.  
The greater obstacles set in the path of higher lawmaking ensures that there has to be a truly 
popular mobilization, and there is not just a preference, but a strong political will to affect the 
change, even if at the cost of high sacrifice. [Bruce Ackerman, “Neo-federalism?” in 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), at 187, 193.] 
 
188 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998), at 415.  
 
189 Ibid, at 11. There is another important distinction between Ackerman and Schmitt. Ackerman 
wants to use the idea of the popular will in the service of constitutional change, as opposed o 
Schmitt who, as we saw, theorized it as a mean of constitutional defense. 
 
190 Ackerman does not seek to reject liberal constitutionalism entirely, like Schmitt, but reconcile 
it with the democratic moment of constitutional creation. As Andreas Kalyvas notes, his 
distinction between the juridified moment of normal politics and the constitutive moment of 





higher-lawmaking, which might be “unconventional” but require at different times 
“legalistic support from preexisting institutions.”191  
What Ackerman proposes is a formalistic criterion to identify the emergence of a 
will that claims to be authentically popular. Not just the process of its formation, but its 
very existence can only be confirmed via a formalistic criteria once and only once it has 
succeeded. Only after a major shift in the body of constitutional law and practices has 
occurred, can one retroactively presume the existence of people as higher-lawmakers. In 
other words, the extraordinary political will could only be evinced post-facto, after the 
changes have been made. The theory gives us a way to mark the body of the constitution 
with the fruits of a popular will – the one that succeeded. And since there is only one set 
of changes at any given time, Ackerman must necessarily presuppose a political unity, 
one that can enter the stage as the subject of constitutional politics. It is no accident that 
the President is entrusted with a considerable degree of representational burden in his 
descriptions of the processes of higher-lawmaking.192 The president, after all, is the only 
institutional figure that can claim a mandate from the entirety of the American public.  
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Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 168.] 
 
191 Ackerman, Transformations, at 87, 93.  
 
192 The presidential election plays a significant role in his five-step process, both in the beginning 
and at the end, especially with regards to Roosevelt and the New Deal. Ackerman, 
Transformations, Ibid note 54, at 387. Andrew Arato makes this point in attempting to order the 
implied preferences of Ackerman’s with regards to constitution making procedures. Andrew 
Arato, “Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy”, Cardozo Law Review 17 






There is a related critique of the two-track process that is important for our 
project. Ackerman’s theory, if it is to be valid anywhere outside America, must take into 
account its unique social and historical conditions of its place of birth. The “legally 
anomalous” process of constitutional politics must assume, even in the moments of a 
crisis, a basic degree of popular legitimacy of established institutions on one hand, and a 
minimal amount of social consensus to resort to this extra-legal but nevertheless peaceful 
process to affect fundamental changes in the governing structure. One could argue that 
the reason Ackerman could so confidently seek out an extra-constitutional space for the 
transformative will formation, is because there never was (except the Civil War) the 
threat of a genuine revolution that threatened the constitutional order in toto. Implicit in 
Ackerman is a certain assumption about the resilience of the social totality. In other 
words, the dualist theory of constitutionalism must presume, in a diluted Schmittian vein, 
a basic unity which is resilient enough to wait for a complex and unpredictable intra and 
extra institutional back and forth to resolve difficult social and political questions. As we 
shall see, this was a presumption that the Indian framers were unwilling to make.  
Revolutions and constitutions share an inseparable but uneasy relationship in 
constitutional theory. On one hand, modern constitutions, in the famous formulation of 
Hannah Arendt inaugurate “a new beginning” – a novus ordo saeclorum, echoing the 
American founders’ appropriation of Virgil for the modern age.193 The newness that is to 
be marked is brought about by a change in the material and symbolic dimensions of 
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social and political power – a phenomenon which is known by another modern 
appropriation of an ancient term, revolution.194 Therefore, a revolutionary moment tends 
to precede a constituent moment. At the same time, one can read constitutionalism as an 
erasure of the revolution, driven by the logic of bringing a closure to the revolutionary 
experience. Constitutions need revolutions, yet banishing it to historical memory is a 
condition of their own existence. Constitutionalism is seen as the art of ending 
revolutions. It is with reference to this reading that the task of the Indian Constituent 
Assembly can be taken as a point of departure for the need of a different theory.  
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Transformational Constitutionalism I 
 
The five-year period after the Second World War, were the most productive 
period in history in terms of constitution making. Across Europe, Latin America, and 
Asia, a host of nation states, new and old, drafted and adopted new constitutions.195 
Despite this global profusion of the written constitutional form, this period was not a high 
point for constitutional theory. Arnold Zurcher, in the introduction to the one of the most 
important surveys of post-war constitutions, wrote that these were new in only a 
chronological sense.196 Countries viewed having written constitutions as a “necessary 
part of the formal impedimenta” of statehood, to be borrowed formulaically from a 
different age.197 Karl Loewenstein, writing in the same volume about Europe, mentions 
the lack of “enthusiasm” that accompanied the writing of these new constitutions, 
performed more out of duty and habit.198 The crucial failure, these observers felt, was the 
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196 Arnold J. Zurcher, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War 
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New Constitutions of Western Europe, Arnold J. Zurcher ed., (New York: New York University 
Press, 1951), at 1 – 12. 
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198 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Reflections on the value of Constitutions in our Revolutionary Age’, in 





inability of these framers to propose anything innovative borne out of reflections about 
the unique socio-political problems of their time.199 They were either warmed over 
“orthodox formulae”200 or “stale compromises and extemporizations of accidental party 
configurations.”201   
Those formulae, now orthodox, had been first constructed through the struggles of 
an ascendant bourgeoisie against the absolutist state and vestiges of the feudal order. 
Constitutions referred to a new ordering principle for political and social power 
enunciated by those revolutions. Which made the Tennis Court oath, a resolution for 
drafting a constitution, a truly revolutionary statement. In performing this role, 
constitutions had both a normative and a functionalist dimension. Writing a constitution 
was both a reflection on new tenets of political philosophy, as well as an attempt to 
structure political power in practice.  
Over the nineteenth century, as the bourgeoisie steadily expanded their hold on 
political and social power, more and more states became “constitutionalized”. However, 
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the subject, clarifies up front that he is going to “steer clear of the efforts to link constitutionalism 
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in many of these cases the functional element of constitutionalism was replicated without 
the larger values they had sought to embody. For example, the French Charte 
Constitutionnelle of 1814 satisfied most of the institutional demands of the propertied 
bourgeoisie, but was in the form of a grant from the restored monarch, not a compact 
derived from popular will like 1791.202 In Latin America, the constitutions arising out of 
the long revolutionary struggle for independence, followed certain mechanisms of the 
United States Constitution but in an explicitly counter-revolutionary fashion – to check 
rather than refine the revolutionary aims.203  By the mid - nineteenth century, in the face 
of a new set of social antagonisms represented by the movements of the working class, 
the two dimensions of freedom asserted by the bourgeoisie, the political and economic – 
property and democracy – increasingly came into conflict with one another. The 
bourgeoisie were often forced to choose between economic security and political 
autonomy, and constitutions – to paraphrase Marx – lived and (subsequently) died by the 
bayonet.204 There arose a fundamental disjunction between making a constitution and 
notions of progress.  More and more, constitutions were no longer something worth 
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202 Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, R.G. Collingwood trans. (Boston: 
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203 A detailed overview of the comparative constitutional developments in nineteenth century 
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Roberto Gargarella, The Legal Foundations of Inequality: Constitutionalism in the Americas, 
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struggling for, for either the bourgeoisie or the working class. 205  In this context, 
constitutions ceased to refer to any higher ideal other than a mode of state building, – as a 
centralized bureaucratic Rechtsstaat – the paradigmatic example of which was 
Bismarck’s Constitution of 1870. As we shall see in Chapter 3, this was the way in which 
‘constitution’ was understood in the colonies as well, with a crucial difference. It was 
marked, unlike in even the most repressive countries of the metropolis, by despotism and 
administrative prerogatives. These elements were integral to the idea of ruling a people in 
the name of an absent and distant sovereign, and as such formed a part of the uniquely 
colonial version of legality.206   
After the First World War, ideals of democracy made a return to constitutional 
thought but in an extraneous rather than integral way. Constitutions were to act as a 
moderating mediation mechanism for democracy, rather than built anew around the social 
conditions of the time, marked by the contestation between labor and capital. In this way, 
the primarily functionalist understanding of constitutions were retained as they were 
viewed as a mechanism to provide a space for negotiations between competing social 
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Progress, Deborah Lucas Schneider Trans., (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), Chapters 3 
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206 For a general discussion, see, Lauren Benton, “Just Despots: The Cultural Construction of 
Imperial Constitutionalism”, Law, Culture, and Humanities 9:2 (2013), at 213 – 226. For a 
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groups. The bourgeoisie, who took a lead in writing new constitutions in the inter war 
years, sought to tame labor by tying them to constitutional mechanisms of negotiations, 
while labor sought to win political power by constitutional means.207 This was the 
hallmark of the two most important Constitutions written in the interwar years – the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the Weimar Constitution of 1919. To quote Hugo 
Preuss, the architect of the Weimar Constitution, the role of the constitution was “to 
synthesize antitheses and interests in common work and common responsibility for the 
commonwealth”.208 The lack of faith in the possibility of this “common responsibility” 
being manifested through the constitution was reflected in the choice in both cases of a 
powerful executive, backed by the bureaucracy and the military.209  
In the context of the class conflicts of twentieth century, thus, the problem faced 
by constitutions in becoming anything other than a mere functional document was one of 
the lack of a social consensus, an underlying agreement amongst the different contending 
groups in society on, at the very least, the nature and scope of political rule. As long as 
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208 Hugo Preuss, Das Deutsche Volk und die Politik (Jena: Diederichs, 1915), at 196. As quoted 
in, Christoph Schoenberger, ‘Hugo Preuss’, in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, Arthur J. 
Jacobsohn and Bernhard Schlink eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), at 115.  
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constitutions were unable to address that condition, they could only provide complicated 
formulas for bringing contending parties to the table, but could not make them view it as 
any more than a protocol of compromise. In other words, they could supply political 
opportunity, but not constitutional convictions. 
The shift in power from the legislature to the executive is symptomatic of this 
larger malaise of constitutional thought. In the eighteenth century, the former, 
embodying, or at least approximating, the popular will, was seen as the most significant 
of all the constituted institutions. As the nature of the popular consensus became 
fractured, the executive progressively became more important. In an increasingly 
complex and differentiated socio-economic sphere, the task of managing social cohesion 
fell on a large body of ‘experts’, inured from democratic process, and functioning via 
precise and technical rules and guidelines.210  
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210 There is a difference, from a constitutional point of view, in the developments of this nature in 
the continental European and Anglo-American contexts, rooted in the different history of state 
formation. In the European context, the development of the state and its administrative apparatus 
preceded that of the constitution. When societal demands increased on the state, through working 
class mobilization and otherwise, it responded by falling back on its existing and robust 
administrative machinery. In the United States, the state was the creation of the constitution, and 
in conceptual terms closely tied to it. Hence judicial interpretation played a larger role here with 
regards to the expansion of state capacity. And the executive had to fight a long drawn out battle 
with the Supreme Court over the first half of twentieth century till the matter was settled by the 
end of the 1930s. However, since the 1980s, the court has often again threatened to overrule the 
expanded functioning of the executive, revealing the fragile nature of the arrangement. On this 
point, see, Frank I. Michelman, “Takings, 1987”, Columbia Law Review 88:8 (1988): 1600- 1629. 
England, with its unwritten constitution and the slow organic development through common law 
responded through judicial action of a different kind. The common law judiciary were always 
adept at making particular, and precise adjustments to the legal structure. Hence, its response was 
different from that of its American counterparts since it was not so much interpretation but 
judicial intervention that responded to particular facts through creating new precedents. For more 





The attempt of the Indian constitution makers demand special attention within this 
backdrop of global constitutional thought. Despite plenty of borrowing (mostly from the 
their colonial predecessors), one cannot say that theirs was an exercise in gathering 
‘formal impedimenta’ of statehood, carried out without enthusiasm and contemplation. 
Rather, what we see is a different idea of what a constitution can and should do, borne 
out of reflections about the conflicts and contradictions of the historical moment. The 
Indian Constitution, like all constitutions, was written by elites, and hence these 
reflections were from their point of view. And they bore out a picture of a lack of 
consensus and large-scale material disparity in society that could jeopardize the 
possibility of having a democratic polity at all. Hence, rather than using the constitution 
as an imprimatur of their successful political ‘revolution’ (that is, their independence 
from colonial rule), they decided to perform, through a constitutional path, the social 
revolution that had never taken place. This was a fundamental departure from the tenets 
of constitutionalism derived a century or so ago. Instead of consolidating the revolution 
by constitutionalizing political rule, they had to consolidate political rule by 
constitutionalizing the revolution.  
Indian constitution making therefore involved both a functional dimension, as 
well as a set of higher values that the constitution embodied. The value, to put it 
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simplistically, was that of ‘development’ or ‘social transformation’. Said Amir 
Arjomand, in his influential classification of constitutions, has called the conjunction of 
these types of values with that of constitutionalism “ideological constitution-making”.211 
Arjomand does not mean ideological in a general sense – that is, the positing of the 
interests of particular groups as universal values. Since, one could then wonder how 
‘autonomy of society’ or ‘legal formalism’ were not ideological in exactly the same 
sense. Arjomand means ideological in a specific sense, that is, those values are different 
from the values associated by constitutionalism in its eighteenth century moment of 
inception. Hence, he sees ‘constitutionalism’ as such being made “subservient”212 to 
concerns that should not be related to it at all. However as I have shown in these two 
chapters, those values were not ‘inherent’ to the idea of constitution but ones derived 
from the particular resolution of contradictions by the American and the French 
bourgeoisie (and of course, the English, before both of them). The attempt to make those 
values and by extension the notion of constitution itself into an abstract universal is what 
made constitutions little more than formal architecture of government in the twentieth 
century. The Indian bourgeoisie instead reflected upon the condition of possibility of 
their own rule, and derived their constitutional design accordingly. The functional aspects 
of the constitution also underwent change, not because it was made subservient to, but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 Arjomand does not mention India specifically, but he does mention “wedding constitution 
making to developmentalism” and “using constitution as an instrument of social transformation”. 
Said Amir Arjomand, ‘Law, Political Reconstruction, and Constitutional Politics’, International 
Sociology 18:7 (2003), at 9. Also see, Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Development and 
Political Reconstruction from Nation-building to New Constitutionalism”, in Constitutionalism 
and Political Reconstruction, Said Amir Arjomand ed., (Leiden: Brill, 2007).  
 





because it was derived from the needs of these values and the social condition in which 
they arose – similar to, as we saw, its eighteenth century predecessors.  
“If we do not allow constitutional remedies, if we bind and fetter the future, then a 
time will come when extra-constitutional remedies will be resorted to, and when this 
Constitution will be treated as a scrap of paper.” This statement made by Renuka Roy in 
the Indian Constituent Assembly accurately summarized the task of the Constituent 
Assembly as understood by the drafters. They could not afford to treat the present 
moment as unproblematic and hence “bind and fetter” the future. Rather they had to 
remedy the deficiencies of the current moment, and find those remedies in constitutional 
terms. On their success in being able to do so depended the possibility of the Constitution 
being anything more than just a “scrap of paper.” The transformational constitution had 
to create the conditions of its own possibility.  
In the following chapters I will focus on the specific historical condition, political 










You taught me language, and my profit on’t 
Is I know how to curse. The red plague rid you 
For learning me your language!  




The history of the material and ideational terrain on which the Indian Constitution 
was conceived begins nearly two centuries before the Constituent Assembly would meet, 
with the advent of British colonial rule in India. The Indian Constitution, unlike most of 
the countries that gained independence from colonial rule after the Second World War, 
was written entirely by Indians through a Constituent Assembly that had unrestricted 
powers. 213 However, autonomy is not the same as indigeneity. 214 “We are legislating in a 
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213 As Heinz Klug observed, “The vast majority of constitutions adopted since the Second World 
War, particularly in the context of decolonization, involved the negotiated transfer of political 
power from a foreign state to local bodies. Crucial to these constitution-making processes was the 
role of the colonial power in formally passing new post-colonial constitutions. For the respective 





language which is foreign to us,” T.T. Krishnamachary said in the Constituent 
Assembly.215 It was not just the language in which the Constitution was actually written 
that bore a mark of the colonial past.216 The conceptual universe within which the framers 
of the Constitution were operating was fundamentally shaped by colonial history. In this 
chapter, I will outline the specifically colonial historicity of four related concepts and 
institutions that would help us situated the subsequent constitutional vision. These are: 
the relationship between colonial state and colonized society, law, property, and the 
putative colonial ‘constitution’. The traces of the colonial past in the Constitution has 
been understood primarily on the basis of institutional continuities. Indeed, there was 
ample and obvious evidence of such continuities. However, in this Chapter I would try to 
highlight certain features of the colonial ‘mode of rule’217(rather than institutional forms), 
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second place to the transfer of political power.” Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, 
Globalism, and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), at 94. Much have been made, justifiably, of this fact in literature on the Indian 
Constitution. See, Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972).  
214 As the Gandhian K. Hanumanthaiya lamented in the Constituent Assembly: “We wanted the 
music of Veena or Sitar, but here we have the music of an English band. That was because our 
constitution makers were educated that way. I do not blame them, rather I would blame those 
people, or those of us, who entrusted them with this kind of work.” K. Hanumanthaiya, CAD, 17 
November, 1949.  
 
215 T.T. Krishnamachary, CAD, 2 December, 1948. 
  
216 Though that particular matter was far from uncontroversial. There were suggestions to write 
(or at least translate) the Constitution into Hindi even before the Assembly began its work. Some 
progress was made in translating the Constitution into Hindi, though Nehru commented after 
seeing the first draft that he “could not understand a word of it.” Finally, after much debate, the 
idea was dropped. The only accepted legal version of the Indian Constitution is in English. For 
details of this debate, see, Austin, Cornerstone, at 281 – 282.  
 
217  Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 





with regard to the four topics mentioned above that fundamentally shaped the conceptual 
coordinates within which the framers operated.  
The defining characteristic of colonial rule is that it is a rule of strangers. 
Therefore, even discounting the historical specificities of different regions, inherent to the 
very nature of colonial rule were its externality and exogeneity. The locus of the colonial 
state was external to the colonial social form. Both in fact, and in theory, it was a stranger 
to the colonized shores – it faced the colonized subjects as an outsider and could not lay 
claim to any traditional or pre-political source of authority. This meant in turn that its 
very form was exogenous to the governed society. That is, the conceptual foundations of 
the colonial state, and the norms and institutions by which it sought to govern, were not 
generated through conflicts within the colonized society, but through the encounter with 
it. The ‘modern’ state, as it took shape in India, did not do so through any rationale 
emerging from social life.  
This process was widely different from the one through which the modern 
European state was developing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and hence the 
questions faced by the colonial rulers were fundamentally different from the ones 
informing the developing intellectual tradition of the science of politics in Europe at the 
time.218 Along with the sword that underwrote its rule, colonialism also required the pen 
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218 As Sudipta Kaviraj observes, “Colonial power or the state is not one of the classically 
constituted objects of either political theory or history, it has to be constituted as an object at the 
frontier.”, Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, 
Hegemony,’ in Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in India and Africa, D. Engels 





– it produced a discourse that provided the conceptual constellation in which colonial 
domination operated, and hence informed the particular nature of the institutions of 
colonial rule.  
For British rule in India, institutions and discourse were inextricably linked to 
each other. On the one hand, the logic and structure of these institutions, and the process 
of their formation was heavily informed by a particular knowledge of the colonized land 
produced by the rulers and their scholars – historians and anthropologists, philologists 
and economists. On the other hand, this wide body of knowledge was not produced 
through abstract intellectual pursuits, nor was it simply an unqualified version in the 
longer Western tradition of producing the abstract orientalist ‘Other’.219 Rather this 
knowledge was produced within a historically specific context of political domination, 
and more importantly, produced through the institutional arrangements of that 
domination. Almost all of the major ‘experts’ on India were associated in some capacity 
with the colonial administration, and the lens through which they viewed the governed 
was tinted primarily by the concerns of governing. A theory of colonial political 
developments therefore must take into account both the institutional and discursive 
formations, and the mutually constitutive relationship between the two.  
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219 For a discussion on the difference between the colonial discourse particular to India and 
Orientalist discourse in general as theorized by Edward Said, see, Carol A. Breckenridge, 
“Introduction”, in Orientalism and Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. 







3.1 Colonial State and the Colonized Society 
The separation of state and society under colonial rule was maintained by a 
progressive depoliticization of Indian subjects. The obvious estrangement of the 
European rulers from native society was mirrored in exiling the natives from the political 
sphere. Depoliticization was a real historical phenomenon under colonialism where 
multiple sources of power were progressively neutralized by the British as they 
consolidated their control over India, and sought to create a centralized sovereign state.220 
It was also justified through a discursive process.  
3.1.1. The Impossibility of Representation 
Indian society under colonial rule was understood as backward and lacking any 
potential for self-government. This provided a justification for a form of rule that 
deviated from the principles of representative government by then established in 
England.221 In the words of Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras and one of the more 
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220 The act of depoliticization was rather stark in the so-called princely states – states ruled by 
‘traditional’ rulers who the British maintained as client states after the policy of annexation of 
territory was abruptly abandoned following the rebellion of 1857. Rulers; devoid of actual 
political power, clung to rituality. See, Nicholas B. Dirks, The Hollow Crown (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993). Ironically these states were portrayed as illustrative and 
living examples of what an ‘Indian political system’ would have looked like in the absence of 
colonialism. 
 
221 In the recent years, there has been an extensive and sophisticated engagement with the nature 
of this deviation. See Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: India in British Liberal 
Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise 
of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), and 
Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). For an overview of the debates, see Andrew Sartori, ‘The 





influential colonial administrators, colonial rule had sufficient justification until Indians, 
“in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and 
become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to 
conduct and preserve it.” 222 What was to be the role of the state in this such a situation? 
John Stuart Mill, in his seminal treatise Considerations on Representative Government, 
said that India was “not one of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently 
advanced state to be fit[…] for representative government.”223 The role of the colonial 
state, therefore, was one of a trustee. Britain had to fulfill “the highest moral trust that 
could devolve upon a country”, and provide India with an “enlightened” political rule.224 
The concept of trusteeship fell under a long established exception to political 
representation, taken even in its narrowest sense. For example, for Hobbes, the 
represented must potentially be capable of action or will, which they subsequently 
alienate to the state.225 Hobbes calls this class of people “Natural Persons”, from which 
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222 Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, 1756 – 1858 (Manchester: The University Press, 
1917), at 285.  
 
223 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: New Universal 
Library, 1894), at 319 -320.  
 
224 Ibid.  
 
225 Hobbes had what Hannah Pitkin has called the ‘authorization view’ of representation. In this 
view the transfer of the ability to act that is inherent to natural persons to the artificial sovereign 
happens through an original moment of ‘authorization’. Since the moment of authorization 
precedes the act of representation, there can be no good or bad representation in this model – 
there could either be representation (if there is a valid authorization), or not. It is an entirely 
formalistic model. Therefore, this view falls well short of Pitkin’s criteria of what can properly be 
considered political representation as it entirely ignores the element of the action of the 
representative. It is arguably the thinnest possible theory of political representation – one suspects 





he explicitly excludes “Children, Fooles and Mad-men”.226 In their case, there should be 
a guardian or a trustee who takes care of them, rather than represent them in any 
meaningful way. As Hannah Pitkin correctly notes, “Taking care of someone or 
something helpless or totally incompetent is not representing.”227 Given the supposed 
lack of immanent political potential of the Indian society, the state by necessity had to be 
something external. It had to stand above and at a distance from this society. 
3.1.2 Agency of the State and the Essence of Society  
The concept of ‘trusteeship’ implied a radical shift of agency. Trustees do not 
respond to the demands enunciated by their wards, rather, they act in ways that they deem 
necessary given the state of the ward. In terms of the Indian colonial state, its action 
towards the colonized society was, firstly, not limited by any principles or demands 
arising from the society. This constituted the basis of the self-proclaimed ‘despotism’ of 
the colonial state. 228 Second, the fact that the state was to act on the basis of the ‘nature’ 
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down in the colonial condition. See, Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967). On Hobbes and representation, also see, Quentin Skinner, 
“Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State” The Journal of Political Philosophy 7:1 
(1999) at 1 – 19, and Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
 
226 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed., Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), at 113.  
 
227 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, at 154.  
 
228 As both James Mill and Thomas Babbington Macauley, two of the most important intellectual 
figures of colonial rule in India, told the House of Commons in 1832 and 1833 respectively, “no 
alternative method of governing India was yet in sight than that of an enlightened and paternal 
despotism.” [Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problems in 





of the society (rather than its representative demands) meant, to borrow Ronald Inden’s 
formulation, a replacement of agency with essence.229 ‘Society’ emerged as an objectified 
set of categories – static and passive – that could be acted upon. 230 The colonial state 
was, by its very nature, an interventionist state. In certain cases, intervention was the 
explicit intent, undergirded by the logic of ‘improvement’, and the attempt was to 
‘develop’ or ‘reform’ Indian society. In certain cases, however, the explicit intent was not 
to transform, but to understand.231 Yet, as scholars have shown, the particularly colonial 
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from India’s own history. It was argued that Indians have always been ruled by despots who 
administered the country with a strong hand. The British, on the other hand, would be benevolent 
despots. Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Law and the Colonial State in India,’ in Colonialism and Forms of 
Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), at 64.  
On a related note, the relationship of distance (between the ruler and the ruled) and despotism has 
been a recurrent theme in political philosophy, from the Ancients to the Moderns. Montesquieu 
notes that the specific nature of this distance is the lack of any mediating element in the space 
between. The only relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that of fear and subordination. 
As opposed to a ruling culture, there is only a ruler’s culture. Much of this applies to the nature of 
the colonial rule. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Chapters 9 and 10. For more on the central 
role of despotism in the conceptualization of colonial rule, see, Robert Travers, ‘Contested 
Despotism: Problems of Liberty in British India,’ in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberties 
Overseas, 1600 – 1900, ed., Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and 
Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History; 1400 – 1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 
229 Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), at 22 -23. Also see, Ronald 
Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India”, Modern Asian Studies 20, 3 (1986): 401-446. 
 
230 A term I borrow from Bernard Cohn. See, Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Notes on the History and Study 
of Indian Society and Culture’, in Bernard S. Cohn and Milton Singer eds., Structure and Change 
in Indian Society  (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), at 3 – 28.  
 
231 The discourses that were produced through these two types of interventions can be broadly 
categorized as the discourse of improvement and the discourse of difference respectively. In case 
of the former, the historical immaturity of the Indian society is what made it unfit for governing 
itself and necessitated the colonial rule. The colonial state, consequently, had to play the role of a 
modernizer, one that had to guide India through the paths of civilizational progress. This 
justification and the consequent structure of the colonial state is what has often been called liberal 
imperialism. Its main ideology vis-à-vis the colonized society was one of ‘improvement’. That is, 





form of comprehension – through ethnographic investigations and administrative actions 
– ended up molding the social institutions subject to that epistemic project in a specific 
way. A few examples – one of a deliberate legal intervention, and the other of 
bureaucratic classification – would make this point clearer.  
The first example would be the debate around the Abolition of Sati Act, of 1829. 
At one level the practice of sati, in which the widow was burnt alive in the pyre of her 
husband, exemplified in horrific starkness the ‘difference’ between the British and the 
Indians, and the urgent need for reform.232 But during the debate leading to the passage of 
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Developments in the middle of the eighteenth century – from events in the colony (the 1857 
rebellion), to domestic (Reform Act of 1867) to those in the fields of knowledge (the 
development of a science of society) – made the reformist discourse a little less viable for the 
colonial project. What was brought to fore was the already existing notion as to the difference of 
the Indians vis-à-vis the Europeans. So different that in fact any attempts to reform it was futile – 
India had to be ruled as it was. But to do so, one had to have an account of what it is, a precise 
map of the differences so to speak. To that end, the colonial enterprise deployed a whole series of 
apparatus which would make the incomprehensible comprehensible. One way of theorizing the 
discourse of difference is by situating it within the failure of the liberal project. Despite its 
universalist posturing, liberalism, from its very inception worked with a certain logic of 
exception. This logic worked both externally – to whom these principles could be applicable to; 
as well as internally – when are these to be suspended. Initially, the former was articulated 
through abstract general categories like Locke’s ‘man in the state of nature’ who could be 
rightfully enslaved. But in the nineteenth century as colonialism, as an enterprise, spread both in 
terms of frontiers as well as in its level of involvement, such abstract principles of exception 
became inadequate, unwieldy and vague. It became imperative to define and comprehend 
exceptions in all its particularities. A whole new science of society arose to study, understand and 
authoritatively fix the meanings of the alien conditions. As liberalism confronted its limit on 
distant shores, it could be suggested, following the provocative formulation of Uday Singh 
Mehta, that the development of social science in the nineteenth century came about as a 
“compensatory response” to that limit. [Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: India in 
British Liberal Thought, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999, at 76]. 
  
232 As Thomas Metcalf shows, the ‘difference’ exemplified by the sati was not that self-evident. 
In the eighteenth century, the representation of the sati in the British imagination was that of 
virtuous self-sacrifice, of the heroic ability to overcome the fear of death. It is only with the 
advent of a new Victorian ideal of the ‘sacrifice’ of the woman as a devoted housewife, as 





the bill, the Government did not draw upon the language of rights for the widow and a 
free individual or emphasize the coercive nature of the act. Instead, it sought out Brahmin 
scholars to find textual evidence that would show that the support for the prohibition was 
to be found in ‘scriptural authority’. The basis of the claim against sati was that the 
practice arose out of a faulty or distorted understanding of Hindu norms. The will of the 
widow as an autonomous individual did not figure in it.233  
According to the colonial discourse, the Indian subject did not possess an ability 
to act as an independent agent. Her actions were determined by certain essential 
structures external to herself. All acts by Indians could be discerned through their 
membership in some social group (caste, religious, linguistic etc). Actions of agents then 
became expressions of that essence, rather than the expression of individuality or will. 
Subjects could only give meaning or significance to a world already given to them rather 
than act upon it in a reflective manner.  
Consequently, the entirety of the Indian lifeworld was reducible to the ‘social.’ 
The idea of ‘society’ as a sphere that contained within itself the entirety of the norms and 
relations that gave meaning to the existence of Indians was generated. The complex web 
of relations which existed in pre-colonial India – political administration, rituals, revenue 
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sacrificing her life, does the sati assumes a barbaric significance. Metcalf, Ideology of the Raj, 
Ibid note 1, at 96 -98. 
  
233 Lata Mani, ‘Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India’, in Kumkum Sangri 







systems, markets etc. – were all reduced to some inalienable and unalterable social 
norms. India was a land, to quote Hegel, “which presents us with a people, but no 
State.”234 
Yet these inalienable and unalterable norms – the “essence” – was not something 
inherent to Indian society but very much a product of the colonial encounter. An 
especially illustrative example of this would be that of caste.235 In its oppressive and 
fixed hierarchy, fundamental antipathy to the notion of individualism, and privileging of 
birth over merit – it was an institution that was (and is) widely seen as “modern India’s 
apparition of its traditional being”.236 Halfway through the life of colonial rule, 237 when 
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234 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 
at 179.  
 
235 Caste, as a social institution peculiar to India, especially Hindus – is a social form of 
classification or ordering that applied to an individual by virtue of his birth. Under different 
interpretations, it was either a socially ordained division of labor, or an order of precedence and 
privileges, and by some accounts a mixture of both. Which of these interpretations gained 
prominence, would have major implications for the political nature of caste, and by extension, the 
political potential of the Indian society. 
 
236 Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), at 14.  
 
237 Caste, as a distinctive and peculiar institution, was an object of fascination for the colonial 
administrator from the very beginning. However, for the early part of colonial rule, it was mostly 
a curiosity, mentioned frequently in reports and correspondences, but never really the focus of a 
systematic enquiry. In the early stages, the focus of colonial knowledge was mostly regarding 
political history and property, both of which had a direct relevance for them – alliances and 






ethnography emerged as the preeminent form of colonial knowledge caste became as the 
main focus of that ethnographic enterprise. 238 
Like all colonial knowledge, knowledge about caste served a double purpose – 
justificatory, and disciplinary. On the one hand, it marked in the starkest terms the 
fundamental difference between Indian and European societies. On the other hand, and 
more pertinently for the colonial project, caste could be made into a definable, concrete, 
and measurable property ascribable to what was a strange and unfamiliar social form. It 
provided a coherent metric by which to comprehend and administer India.239 Yet, all 
these characteristics of caste (e.g., fixed, quantifiable) was itself more a result of it being 
a subject of an ethnographic investigation of this sort, rather than something inherent to 
it. In pre-colonial times caste signified a complex web of social relations, which varied 
vastly across regions, not some simple metric of classification.240 In the hands of colonial 
anthropologists and ethnographers, these relations took the nature of a ‘thing’, an object 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
238 Arjun Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” in Orientalism and Postcolonial 
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 319.  
 
239 See, Bernard S. Cohn, “The Census, Social Structure, and Objectification in South Asia”, in 
An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1987), at 224 – 254.  
 
240 Dirks, Castes of Mind, at 13 -14. Caste, in pre-colonial India, was linked closely to the 
political process and shaped by the struggle for power, rather than being an unchangeable social 






that could be studied, classified, and assigned specific properties to.241 It was both 
abstracted, and crystalized.  
The governmental activity that shaped the nature of caste more than any other was 
the census.242 The Census of 1901, introduced243 the concept that caste was a primarily a 
hierarchical order of social precedence.244 Therefore, the Census required not just the 
anthropometric apparatus that the colonial state could provide, but also a traditional basis 
for the ordering of precedence amongst the different castes, which were provided by 
Brahmin scholars in Bengal245 to help come up with a rank of caste hierarchies based on 
traditional Hindu texts. Since the entire claim of superiority of the Brahmin was based on 
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241 Cohn, “The Census, Social Structure, and Objectification in South Asia”, at 225.  
 
242 Caste was an integral part of the census enquiry from the very first census, in 1846. As 
Bernard Cohn notes, almost all the important writings on caste till the 1950s was done by people 
who at some point held a high position in the Census Bureau. Cohn, “The Census, Social 
Structure, and Objectification in South Asia”, at 243.  
 
243 Till the 1891 Census, one’s caste was defined by the occupation one pursued. This ‘functional’ 
definition of caste viewed it as manifesting a social order of division of labor. 
 
244  The census was conducted by Census Commissioner Herbert H. Risley. Risley held a 
‘biological’ view of caste. The two concepts (biology and hierarchy) were necessarily linked – 
the biological features which defined a caste (primarily the size of the nose) could be ordered in a 
scale that would match the social order of preference. This business with the size of the nose was 
not some eccentric idea he had come up with. Risley was a strong proponent of ‘race theory’ that 
has been in vogue in Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, and his agenda, so to speak, 
was to find a racial theory of caste. Cohn, “The Census, Social Structure, and Objectification in 
South Asia”, at 246. Also, see, Dirks, Castes of Mind, Chapter 10. 
 
245 Brahmins and upper castes, especially in Bengal, by virtue of being some of the first to get the 
benefit of English education and being employed in different capacities by the East India 






proving the timeless and authoritative existence of exactly the sort of rank that the Census 
was looking for. 246  
The project of enumerating caste in general, and the 1901 census in particular, 
were not just some benign anthropological exercise. What made them significant was the 
weight of the state behind them, which gave them a certain epistemic privilege that the 
multiple textual or customary commentaries on caste never had.247 Once caste became, by 
the work of the colonial state, an administrative subject, rather than a mere social 
practice, it in time produced a particular kind of political mobilization around it.248  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 It is not that the different scholars agreed entirely on one neat metric of caste. Such a thing was 
manifestly impossible – there being no one primary textual authority, nor an established metric of 
that sort. Tellingly, they all based their comments on different textual authorities, taking widely 
discrepant views on the particulars of system proposed by Risley. However, they were all 
intellectually committed to the principle of a hierarchy of castes, and the general position of the 
upper castes at the head of it. It was not a fabrication on their part, but part of the Brahminical 
understanding of Hinduism that they were conversant in. The point is that this was not by any 
means the only understanding of Hindu practices or caste status, neither was such an idea of 
uniform ‘authority’ available in Hinduism. However by virtue of them being co-opted into the 
colonial project, it is that version that came to become the ‘authoritative’ one. It is this epistemic 
superiority of the Brahminical view of caste that was to be more influential rather than the details 
of the actual ranking.   
 
247  As David Ludden notes, “The utility of ideas about India for governance and their 
institutionalization by the state bolstered their epistemological authority.” David Ludden, 
“Orientalist Empiricism: Transformation of Colonial Knowledge”, in Orientalism and 
Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der 
Veer ed.,  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), at 261. Moreover, this exercise 
created, for the first time, a pan-Indian comparative framework of caste that could then become 
the focus of claims and counter-claims. 
 
248 The various caste associations and sabhas that arose in India around the turn of the century 
voiced the demands of their group (often cutting across their earlier regional boundaries). As 
Dirks notes, while these associations mostly consisted of non-dominant caste groups, the irony is 
that they nevertheless made their demand with reference to and in the logic of the Brahmanic 






The story of the administrative classification of caste, provides us with a picture 
of how colonial rule and its discourses transformed both the institutional and the 
symbolic dimensions of Indian society. Colonial domination was marked doubly – as the 
political fact of subjugation to an alien power, and as a dominant discourse that 
fundamentally shaped the development of the colonized self, by at times privileging 
certain practices of the society, and sometimes giving it new meaning. Either ways, the 
fact that those privileged or new meanings had the force of the state behind them gave 
them new salience and fixity, and hence reordered social practices. By its very nature, the 
colonial state was transformative. 
 With regard to colonial law, property rights, and ‘constitution’, topics that the 
following parts of the chapter would address, both these levels of domination needs to be 
understood. The fact that law was produced by British administrators in London and 
Calcutta unilaterally, needs to supplemented with the understanding as to how those 
‘alien’ rules shaped the conceptual coordinates within which Indians – even after 
independence – formulated their practices and actions.   
3.2. Property, Law, and the State 
The shaping of the concept of property was the first significant engagement by the 
colonial state with the Indian society. The reason for this primacy was the need to secure 
revenue. The British colonial enterprise inaugurated its rule in India not with the imperial 
scepter in its hand, but the balance sheets of a mercantile corporation. 1757 – when the 





the province of Bengal in the battlefields of Plassey – is seen as the origin of the colonial 
rule in India. Collection of revenue played a constitutive role for colonial domination.  
3.2.1 Revenue and State Formation 
The importance of revenue from land for the Company was paramount. It was the 
mercantile capital that paid for not only the establishment cost of the Company, but also 
the goods they had to procure for trading purposes. Furthermore, it paid for the ever-
increasing military apparatus for both maintaining and expanding the territorial 
domination of the Company. The logic of territorial expansion of the first hundred years 
that gave shape to British India was linked to the revenue question in two ways. On the 
one hand, as revenue from land came to constitute the majority of the Company’s 
income, the only way to increase it was to increase the amount of land one controlled. 
Furthermore, the very success of Company’s trade, true to the tradition of mercantilism, 
was inextricably linked to political and territorial domination.249 Markets had to be 
captured and penetrated with the backing of force, and maintained with might. This 
expansion required a bigger and more regularized military both to capture and to defend 
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249 Securing monopoly over the market of valuable products like salt, indigo and betel nuts was 
crucial to the trading strategy of the company in the latter half of eighteenth century. See, C. A. 
Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), at 51. Also see, Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation 
of Imperial Britain (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), at 213-214. While the structural logic of 
early territorial expansion was the inexorable logic of mercantilism, the actual nature of it, and 
the zeal for it can also be explained by what Eric Stokes terms ‘local sub-imperialism’ amongst 
Company’s officials who saw an opportunity for enormous personal enrichments linked to 
political and administrative power and privileges that were created thus. [Eric Stokes, “The First 
Century of British Colonial Rule in India: Social Revolution or Social Stagnation?”, Past & 






increasing territory. To pay for that one needed a regular and substantial source of 
income, which could only be revenue from land.  
The triad of mercantilist capitalism, political domination, and military 
infrastructure is what necessitated the gradual transformation of a trading venture into a 
sovereign state. Central to all three was the question of land revenue. For the first 
hundred or so years of colonial rule, land was the primary concern that engaged the 
colonial administration; the success and failure of its officers was measured as to how 
well they could manage the collection of revenue.250 The story of the construction of the 
colonial state in India is in many ways, as we shall see, the story of the planning and the 
execution of the revenue system.  
The revenue system, and the various issues it generated, did not just necessitate 
the creation of the colonial state, it also determined its nature. This was due to a couple of 
reasons. One, the administrative apparatus of the colonial state was built primarily as one 
for the collection of revenue. The branches of the state – executive, judicial, police etc. 
were formulated around, and took shape through their engagement with this function. In 
other words, the revenue system gives us the architectural blueprint of the modern state 
as it took shape in India. Two, dealing with land revenue meant, for the colonial state, 
dealing with land and with agriculture. It meant dealing with the social process of 
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250 As Bernard Cohn notes, “Throughout the history of the company rule, as well as the imperial 
government of India, the best indicator of efficiency was its capacity to collect 100 percent of the 
assessed revenues.” Bernard S. Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India”, in Colonialism and 






production at its most basic – with all its complexities.251  Collection of revenue then 
became the primary point of contact for the colonial state and the colonized society. It 
became the lens through which each viewed the other. It also became the plane on which 
the former would seek to transform the latter, and the latter would seek to negotiate with 
the former.  
3.2.2 The Market, its Logic, and the Theory of Property 
As a result, the first and eventually the most significant effort of the colonial 
reform of the Indian society came in the form of instituting a new revenue regime in India 
in the latter half of eighteenth century. The first such attempt was what came to be known 
as Permanent Settlement, instituted in Bengal through Regulation I of 1793 by Lord 
Cornwallis.252 Permanent Settlement bestowed proprietary rights to a few large landlords, 
made them responsible for the payment of revenue, and fixed the revenue assessment in 
perpetuity. But its historical significance lay in creating what Ranajit Guha memorably 
termed ‘a rule of property’ for India. 
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251 What is important to remember here is that the main (though by no means exclusive) spoils of 
colonialism in India was the products of labor, rather than natural resources (like in Africa) or 
uncultivated land (like in the Americas). Hence, the colonial administration necessarily had to be 
involved with the social process of labor, which fundamentally determined the particular shape it 
took in India.  
 
252 The other major revenue system, instituted from 1820, mostly in western and southern India 
was known as the Ryotwari settlement. This system vested proprietary rights in the hands of 
tenants (ryots) and assessed revenue at an interval of thirty years. Despite the competing claims 
and political divisions within the administration that marked the Permanent Settlement and the 
Ryotwari settlement, the two plans shared a fundamental principle – that of the institution of 
property rights over land. The difference amongst the two was regarding which particular strata 
of the local society those rights were instituted – big landlords in Bengal, and individual peasants 





The logic behind this ‘rule of property’ was to bring about a commercial system 
of production in land. It was reasoned that security of property and predictability of 
revenue demand would create an entrepreneurial spirit amongst the landowners who 
would invest in the land to maximize their surplus. The free alienability of land, coupled 
with a limit on land tax, would create both the mechanism and motivation for an 
autonomous land market. This would turn land into a commodity, and through the ‘law of 
the market, land would end up in the hands of the most able and successful of such 
entrepreneurs. Thus, it was the primary way through which one could ‘improve’ 
agriculture in India, which the British saw as backward and underdeveloped.  
But the scope of these reforms was to do with much more than just agriculture. 
The stability of property in land was seen as the first step towards instituting a modern 
market economy in India. What was at stake was the long-term interest of the British 
colonial venture. It had to be established not on the basis of short-term enrichment via 
revenue expropriation, but by creating the conditions for British commercial interests to 
flourish. Colonial rule, if it had to be put on sure footings, had to be based on establishing 
its ‘dominion over the wants of universe’.253 By fixing the revenue on land in perpetuity, 
and foregoing the right of future revision, Cornwallis implicitly admitted that the future 
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253 An editorial in the Bengal Hurkaru, the newspaper of the European merchant community in 
Calcutta, noted that it must be “our policy to abandon altogether a narrow system of colonial 
aggrandizement which can no longer be pursued with advantage, and to build our greatness on 
surer foundation, by stretching our dominion over the wants of universe.” Bengal Hurkaru, 
editorial, 21 Oct., 1828, as quoted in Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians in India (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1959), at 43. For this reason, the European merchant community in India was a 






fiscal demands of the colonial state had to be satisfied by means other than land revenue, 
ideally through revenue from commercial activities.254  
However, by its own metric of economic ‘improvement’, the plan was not much 
of a success. In the distorted economic universe of colonialism,255 the land system 
designed to inaugurate modern market economy in agriculture settled into a static pre-
capitalist pattern of ownership. Given the difficulty faced by native entrepreneurial 
attempts,256 the surest way of making a return on one’s capital was through an ever-
increasing exploitation of agricultural labor. This was achieved primarily through 
coercion by local elites who came to see land as the safest investment in a climate of 
static growth.257 The result was a semi-feudal system in land maintained through a 
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254 Ibid.  
 
255 In colonial India, a loss of autonomy in the political sphere caused a loss of autonomy in the 
process of social development. Rather than becoming a developed capitalist economy, India was 
turned into an economic backwater supplying raw materials for the imperial economy. The 
primary focus of the colonial economic policy was to ensure cheap labor and cheap exports for 
the benefit of imperial capital, rather than the development of its native counterpart. For a more 
detailed discussion on the nature of colonial political economy, see Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The 
Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
Hamza Alavi, Capitalism and Colonial Production (London: Croom Helm, 1982) 
 
256 In the unequal competition between the demands of the developed British capital backed by 
the policies of the state and the needs of the fledgling native capitalists, there was to be only one 
winner. A definitive example of the competitive disadvantage for indigenous entrepreneurship 
can be gleaned from the simple fact that in exactly the same sectors in which European capital 
succeeded, Indian businesses failed. E.g., coal mining, jute, and steam navigation. The reason, 
apart from state backing, was the superior access to capital and an established trading network for 
the Europeans. See, Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, ‘Industrialization in India before 1947: 
Conventional Approaches and Alternative Perspectives’, Modern Asian Studies 19:3 (1985), at 
644. 
 
257 David Washbrook, ‘Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History c. 
1720-1860’, Modern Asian Studies, 22: 1 (1988) at 90. Furthermore, “[These absentee landlords] 





mixture of state patronage and traditional forms of coercion on the back of a vast 
agricultural labor force living on the margins of subsistence. This system, both 
unproductive and exploitative was the economic world in which the vast majority of the 
Indian population existed by the time colonialism ended, and became the focus of 
ubiquitous nationalist critique via the political idiom of ‘landlordism’ and ‘village in 
distress’.258 
3.2.3 The State, its Necessities, and Property Rights 
The economic aspect of the plan was only half of the story. Political domination 
was inherent to the mercantilist project of East India Company. Therefore, along with a 
source of revenue, the colonial state also needed to create a steady base for their political 
power and secure intermediaries between themselves and Indian society. Most of the 
colonial administrators believed that the stability of the political order lay in the stability 
of a proprietary order, and a responsible landowning class. As Ranajit Guha, in his 
seminal intellectual history of the revenue settlement process noted, “They all shared the 
belief that a sound administration must have the security of landownership as its basis, 
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than in directly engaging in agriculture; so that the introduction of legal private property rights in 
land tended to lengthen the chain of intermediaries above the actual cultivator and left the peasant 
petite culture intact.” There was merely accumulation without investment, and therefore 
development. [Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant 
Rebellion in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), at 151.  
 
258 David Ludden, An Agrarian History of South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 






and nothing but a permanent settlement could ensure that. In other words, Bengali society 
was to be fashioned after the image of Whig England.”259  
The peculiar confluence of economic and political logic produced a concept of 
property that was distinct from the contemporaneous Anglo-American tradition, a 
distinction that is worth pursuing in some more detail. Property, in its proper legal sense 
denotes a bundle of rights. To “have property” denotes having a set of enforceable right – 
whether it is right of use of some common resources, or exclusive individual right in a 
particular tangible or intangible thing. In England, from the early modern period 
onwards, property increasingly came to be defined as a set of absolute rights over a 
defined territory or thing, often called a ‘jurisdictional concept of property’.260 To quote 
Blackstone, property was “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.” 261  The collapsing of the different sets of rights and 
obligations that were attached to an object (most significantly, land) into an absolute and 
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259 Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property For Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement 
(New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1981), at 17. As Nicholas Dirks points out, “the Permanent 
Settlement provides one of the clearest examples of the British institutional reification of their 
concept of the old regime within the framework of a new "progressive" system governed by the 
overarching principles of order and revenue”. [Nicholas B. Dirks, ‘From Little King to Landlord: 
Property, Law, and the Gift under the Madras Permanent Settlement,’ Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 28: 2 (1986), at 307-333].  
 
260 See, David Sugarman and Ronnie Warrington, ‘Land Law, Citizenship, and the Invention of 
‘Englishness’: The Strange World of the Equity of Redemption,’ in John Brewer and Susan 
Staves, eds. Early Modern Conceptions of Property (New York: Routledge, 1996), 111-143.  
261  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (in one volume), W.M. 






exclusive right over the it, gives rise to the common idea of property as something 
“irreducibly real” and tangible, leading to the wide use of the word ‘property’ to denote a 
thing (e.g., in the usage, “That is my property”).262 This development was shaped by two 
emergent trends: commercial exploitation of land by individual proprietors following the 
first set of enclosures, as opposed to a sharing of resources in “common”;263 and the 
justificatory framework provided by a natural right theory of property, by thinkers such 
as Locke and Grotius. While the exact set of rights that constituted property and the 
mechanism for their enforcement remained a creature of positive law, the justification for 
those rights and the need to enforce them was provided by arguments from a natural law 
tradition (albeit, a modern variant of the natural law tradition).264  
The question of taxation, which gained in importance as the revenue demands of 
the modern state became more prominent, was only secondary to this development in the 
concept of property. Therefore, the laws of taxation did not determine or change the 
nature of property rights, but only what the incidence of taxation would be on a piece of 
land over which proprietary rights were already established and determined.265 In India, 
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262 For a discussion on the semantic shift in the use of the word “property” from the early modern 
period onwards, see, C.B. MacPherson, “The Meaning of Property”, in Property: Mainstream 
and Critical Positions, C.B. MacPherson ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). 
 
263 See, Richard H. Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1912), and Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution: 1603 – 1714 (London: 
Routledge, 2002).  
 
264 A discussion of the same mixture of positive and natural law arguments in the discourse of 
property in the United States can be found in Chapter 1.  
 
265 For a discussion of the development of the revenue system in England at this time, and its 





on the other hand, the modern regime of property law started with revenue as the 
exclusive focus. The ‘owner’ was the one who owed the state a regular and determined 
payment. In this sense, it was not so much an absolute conception of property over a 
particular piece of land, but an absolute conception of a specific proprietary right over 
one aspect of that land: the ‘rent’ from it,266 a part of which was payable to the state as 
revenue. The concept of property therefore never covered comprehensively the entire 
bundle of rights associated with land, and hence never crystalized them into an absolute 
right of dominion.267 Similarly, the justificatory structure for property was explicitly 
political and economic, and particular in its scope, never seriously invoking a universal 
natural or moral right.  
The disaggregation of these rights was always a political and legal possibility, and 
that is exactly what happened over the nineteenth century. The initial legal moves were in 
favor of the landlord. The acts of 1819 and 1822 of the Bengal Government, gave 
zamindars enhanced ability to evict tenants for non-payment of rent, and in general a 
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and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
 
266 Both Eric Stokes and Ranajit Guha, in their seminal works on land settlement, acknowledge 
the centrality of ‘rent’ to the new concept of property devised under colonial rule. See, Eric 
Stokes, The English Utilitarians in India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), and Ranajit Guha, A 
Rule of Property For Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (New Delhi: Orient 
Longman, 1981). 
  
267 To cite one example, Nicholas Dirks quotes a letter from the Board of Revenue to the 
Collectors in the Madras Presidency sent in 1799. Speaking about zamindari settlements, the 
Board observed “that in confirming the proprietary rights of the Zemindars we may not violate 
the ascertained right of other individuals.” Nicholas B. Dirks, ‘From Little King to Landlord: 
Property, Law, and the Gift under the Madras Permanent Settlement,’ Comparative Studies in 






more robust set of rights in the land. However, after the rebellion of 1857, the focus 
shifted from enhancing the proprietary claims of zamindars in land to maintaining 
political stability. The Bengal rent Act of 1959 stipulated for the recording of tenant 
rights providing a modicum of security to tenants, as well as protected (mostly an upper 
strata of) the peasantry from sudden and excessive increases in rents payable to the 
landlord. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 further strengthened these principles in favor 
of the tenants. The model of Bengal was soon followed in other parts of the country 
through legislations with provided security of tenant occupancy, and protection from 
disproportionate increases in rent.268 In another set of laws, the incontrovertible right in a 
market system, that of alienation of land, were sought to be limited when the buyers were 
merchants and moneylenders, who were not seen as either a part of the “traditional 
aristocracy” or “landowning classes” based on the fear that this might upset the delicate 
balance of authority that upheld the rural social order.269 The express intentions here were 
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268 These were, to name a few: Oudh Tenancy Act of 1868, Punjab Tenancy Act of 1869 and 
1898, Central Provinces Tenancy Act of 1883, North Western Provinces Tenancy Act of 1901, 
and Madras Estates Land Act of 1908. It is important to stress that despite their stated rhetoric, 
these new laws by and large did not protect the cultivator of land or the agrarian laborer, but the 
higher strata of tenants below the zamindar. It would be these privileged tenants who would 
through the twentieth century emerge as the dominant group in the countryside, and the main 
pillar of Congress rule.  
 
269 The two most significant examples were Deccan Agriculturalists Relief Act of 1879 and 
Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1901 which prohibited transfer of land outside of statutorily-
designated “agriculturalists” with the express intention of preventing large scale alienation of land 
to either merchants (the Chettiyars in Madras) or money-lenders, statutorily defined as “non-
agriculturalist”. [On this last point, see, Nicholas B. Dirks, “From Little King to Landlord: 
Property, Law, and the Gift under the Madras Permanent Settlement”, Comparative Studies in 






to prevent a scenario where a complete disembedding of land as a commodity from its 
moorings within the social structure of the village would lead to instability and disorder.  
The interest of the colonial regime did not always align with a thoroughgoing 
modernization of the productive process, especially when it could lead to large-scale 
social instability, as any process of top down transformation tends to create. As historians 
have argued, the deviation of the colonial regime from their stated belief about bringing 
in a modern form of property rights in land could be explained by the “fears which the 
British possessed [about] disturbing the bases of […] traditional authority” and thereby 
“unleash[ing] revolt against their rule”.270Therefore, the ideology of the primacy of 
property rights were in practice always balanced with discretionary and pragmatic 
political considerations by local administrative officers who were concerned with the 
specter of large scale disturbance in the agrarian sector.271 “Even in the making of land 
laws, if it was felt necessary to give proprietors some additional power […] this was 
always balanced by an express declaration to protect such customary rights as the tenants 
were believed to possess.”272 In other words, the colonial administrators were primarily 
focused on the stability of the revenue stream and of political rule. The so-called sanctity 
of property rights – the express principle behind the permanent settlement – could often 
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270 David Washbrook, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,’ Modern Asian Studies 
15: 3, (1981), at 665.  
 
271 Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920 – 1947: The Land Question, (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi and Co., 








be tampered with for that purpose.273 The on the ground necessities of stability often 
trumped more general theoretical considerations. The nature of property rights in 
Colonial India – in both its initial formulation, as well as the numerous exceptions 
formulated to it – was primarily a political question, linked to and directed by the needs 
and constraints of the state.  
This fact has lead to an influential suggestion by David Washbrook that the 
colonial regime’s “elaboration of a legal system which treated and protected landed 
property as if it existed at a remove from the state, as a private subject's right, was pure 
farce (and plainly regarded as such by the mind of local administration).”274 While 
Washbrook’s point about the lack of autonomous development of legal norms and rules 
is, as we saw, valid, his article underestimates the extremely important development 
regarding the place of law under colonial rule.  
3.2.4 The Language of Law 
The plethora of legislation dealing with occupancy rights, payment obligations 
etc., actually brought within the purview of property law the various networks of agrarian 
production below the stratum of the incidence of revenue obligations. Hence, many more 
aspects of the agrarian productive process was legalized and could now be determined by 
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273 This included the property rights of even the privileged British settlers if the political situation 
became too volatile, as it did during the peasant revolt regarding the farming of Indigo.  
 
274 David Washbrook, “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India.” Modern Asian 






reference to positive ‘rule of property’ than was the case in the first half of nineteenth 
century. 275  Zamindari became one kind of property right amongst others. 276  The 
significant increase in the aspects of the agrarian social life that took a legal character had 
real and important consequences.  
The increase in legalization transformed political battles into legal disputes. 277 
Control over land was (and continue to be till today) the primary terrain on which 
political contestations in the countryside took place. These contestations increasingly, 
though not exclusively,278 took the form of either legal challenges (in courts of law) or 
legislative demands.279 Law was not just the language in which these contestations played 
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275 Faisal Chaudhry has developed this point to propose a history of property law in colonial India 
focused not on the question of revenue settlement and ownership, but on proprietary rights in 
specific claims, obligations and exchange. Chaudhry’s subsequent claim, with which I do not 
entirely agree, is that this mirrored the advent of Classical Legal Thought in the Western world. I 
believe that classical legal thought was intimately linked to a market economy, and such a 
scenario was absent in India. In India, what this process reflects is the attempt of the colonial state 
to gain control and govern evermore aspects of the Indian social life, as understood from the point 
of view of the administration. See, Faisal Chaudhry, Legalizing the Normative: The Historical 
Ontology of Law’s Rule in British India and the Globalization of Classical Legal Thought, 1757 – 
c1920, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Harvard University, 2011). 
 
276 Ludden, Agrarian History, at 172.  
 
277 See, Nicholas B. Dirks, ‘From Little King to Landlord: Property, Law, and the Gift under the 
Madras Permanent Settlement,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 28: 2 (1986): 307-
333. 
  
278 The exceptions were the cases of peasant insurgencies outside the purview of legality and the 
dominant political process that the subaltern school of historiography sought to highlight.  
 
279 For an important analytical framework for investigating how the nature of disputes change as 
they go through the legal process, see, Lynn Mather and Barbara Yngvesson, ‘Language, 
Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes,’ Law & Society Review 15:3/4 (1980 -81): 775-
822. As we shall see later, this transformation played an important role in the way first the 






out, it was also an important tool to know how to wield. Given the complexity of laws 
and administrative rules, legal and administrative professionals who had intimate 
familiarity with them could use their knowledge to acquire and usurp substantial amount 
of property interests. For example, Binay Bhushan Chaudhury has shown that in Bengal 
in the days after the permanent settlement, most of the ‘new’ zamindars (that is, recent 
acquirer of land) came from a class based in Calcutta that used its legal knowledge, and 
proximity to the administrative and legal institutions to procure significant amount of 
landed property interests. 280  These factors meant that lawyers as a group became 
increasingly prominent and powerful within society. They were required to argue 
property disputes in courts, make representations on behalf of the landed interests in 
district towns and provincial capitals, and make depositions to the Board of Revenue. 
Their ability to speak the specific technical language that assumed primacy in agrarian 
property relations made them indispensable. 281  Within the peculiar way in which 
‘representation’ functioned under colonial rule, lawyers became the representative par 
excellence of dominant social interests.  
In the colony, ‘rule of law’ looked nothing like its metropolitan counterpart. If in 
the West, rule of law came to be defined as officials “administering the law consistently 
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280 Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, “Agrarian Relations: Eastern India”, in Cambridge Economic 
History of India, Vol. 2, c. 1757 – c. 1970, ed. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 114 - 116.  
 
281  For a sociological study of the legal profession under colonial rule, see, Samuel 
Schmitthenner, ‘A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in India’, Law and Society 






and in accordance with its tenor”, 282 such consistency or tenor was hardly in view in the 
colonies. Instead, the administration of law was consistently made subservient to the 
purely political exigencies of the preservation of the state. However, despite the deviation 
from the established connotations of rule of law as autonomy of the legal sphere, law was 
crucial to the mode of operation of colonial rule. Around the issues of land and property 
in particular, law became the primary language of communication between the colonial 
state and its subjects.  
Legal institutions around property and revenue became the channels of 
negotiation between society and the state. Those wielding or seeking to wield social 
power around land decided to negotiate with the new political reality, with the new rulers 
to protect and enhance their own entitlements.283 That fact of negotiation in itself was not 
new. What was new about it was the mode – of laws and rules and regulations. Laws and 
rules became the sphere in which the representatives of the state and the subject 
population negotiated with each other, where the bureaucratic pressure for centralization 
and homogenization and localized demands, compromises and particular claims by the 
propertied class played out against each other. In other words, law became the form in 
which a certain section of the colonized society communicated with the state.  
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282 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), at 270. 
On this particular point, also see, H.L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and Separation of Law and Morals’, 
Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), at 593.  
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 Through this process the native elites who had come in closest contact with the 
colonial regime became well versed in the language of law. This led to the emergence of 
a class of lawyers who over time became the one of the most influential section of that 
elite, even constituting the majority of the Congress leadership.284 The legal imagination 
of this class operated on two levels. At a general level, they aspired for a genuine notion 
of the rule of law, and hence had a liberal vision for the post-colonial state that they 
hoped to one-day see. At another level, law was also the means of particular transactions 
and settling social conflicts. For a society thoroughly estranged from the political sphere, 
law provided “a structural replacement for politics”.285 The immense complexity and 
arcana of the late-colonial body of law, given shape through two centuries worth of 
political calculations, administrative practice and local compromises, meant that it was 
uniquely suitable for precise and complex manipulations in the hands of skilled 
practitioners.286 In this legal imagination, that of the practitioner rather than of the 
idealist, law was seen as the most effective way to craft complex and specific solutions to 
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284  Almost all the major figures of the nationalist movement, Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah and 
Ambedkar were lawyers by profession.  
 
285 Nicholas B. Dirks, “From Little King to Landlord: Property, Law, and the Gift under the 
Madras Permanent Settlement”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 28: 2 (1986): 307-
333, at 330.  
 
286 In a different way, this also explains the influence of lawyers in society. Since the permanent 
settlement, the acquisition of land and property itself often had more to do with proximity to and 
knowledge of the intricacies of the legal system, rather than any productive activity. Lawyers 
became an indispensable element in acquiring wealth. [See, Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, “Agrarian 
Relations: Eastern India”, in Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 2, c. 1757 – c. 1970, ed. 






social problems. Both these elements of the legal imagination would come to play when 
this same set of elites set about to create the post-colonial constitutional structure.   
3.3 Administration, Law, and Constitution 
There was another dimension of law under colonial rule, as a mode of 
administration, which fell within the rubric of the colonial constitutionalism. In its 
original formulation, permanent settlement sought out not only to modernize the 
economy but also the administration. The permanency and fixed nature of the revenue 
shaped the architecture of the fledgling colonial state. The executive action of the state 
would only be limited to the collection of revenue. The unified and homogenous norms 
were to govern the relations amongst the economic actors, and conflict could be resolved 
via a judicial organ independent from the revenue collection apparatus. Permanent 
settlement was thus touted as the beginning of a modern regime of the rule of law, rather 
than the despotic rule of men. It was felt that the elimination of personalized executive 
interference into economic activities would also root out the corruption that the company 
was seen to have inherited from its Indian predecessors. True to the demand of nascent 
capitalism, greed was to be banished from the sphere of governance and facilitated in the 
sphere of the economy.287 The structure of the revenue administration came to be seen as 
the putative constitution of the colonial state.288 
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3.3.1 Colonial Constitutionalism 
Constitutional developments in India was driven by a dual logic – the centralizing 
need for control and coherence, and particularizing need for discretion. East India 
Company had transformed itself from a trading operation to a political power, not (as it 
would later claim) in a fit of ‘absentmindedness’ but by the very logic of its operation. 
The economic success of the company, as we have discussed, was inextricably linked to 
it political and military success.289 In the middle of the eighteenth century, it exercised de 
facto control over three territories,290 helmed by three Governors. In 1773, the Parliament 
back in London, taking advantage of the financial crisis faced by the Company, sought to 
bring it under stricter control of the British state. The Regulation Act of 1773 gave the 
state “the right to interfere in all aspects of the most powerful commercial enterprise in 
the realm.”291 The Parliament, preferring to deal with a centralized authority, decided to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
administration was a major concern for the bosses in London. See, Nicholas B. Dirks, The 
Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
2006). 
 
288 As Eric Stokes writes, “At the heart of Indian administration lay the land revenue system.” 
Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians in India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), at 81.  
Traces of this origin of the modern state remain in certain parts of contemporary India, where 
bureaucrats at the local levels are still referred to as ‘collectors’.  
 
289 For a detailed discussion of the unique category of the “company state”, a corporation that also 
wielded political power, see, Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and 
Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011).  
 
290 Called the three “Presidencies” – Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. By 1919, there would be 
fourteen provinces (excluding Burma).  
 






designate the Governor of Bengal as the Governor-General, and an executive council, 
with authority over the whole territory. The Charter Act of 1833 further elaborated that 
structure, bestowing legislative authority on the Governor-General. In 1858, in the 
aftermath of the rebellion of 1857, the British State finally assumed direct control of the 
Government of India. The Councils Act in 1861 set up separate executive and legislative 
councils (with the Governor-general at the head of both). The basic structure of the 
relationship between Parliament and Government of India remained the same with 
subsequent increase in the councils, representations, provincial autonomy etc. Under that 
structure Parliament exercised control through a Secretary of State based in London, who 
in turn exercised control through the Governor-General (also called Viceroy from 1858 
onwards).   
3.3.2 Coherence and Discretion 
In theory, the British Parliament had the ultimate authority to pass laws and 
manage the affairs (through its “minister”, in this case the Secretary of State). However 
having the authority and exercising it were two very different things. The major issues in 
this regard were distance, and the necessities of governance. The distance between India 
and England meant that by the time administrative matters would make their way back 
and forth from Parliament, it was almost always a fait accompli.292 While the invention of 
telegraph and the opening of the Suez canal made communications easier by the late 
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nineteenth century,293 that did not take care of the second, and more significant issue, that 
of necessities of governance. The demands of governing a country like India, with its 
specific problems and local calculations needed for maintaining political power meant 
that the executive in charge had to be given a large degree of freedom with regard to how 
to govern. The logic of empire demanded autonomy for the colonial administration on the 
ground. The complex constitutional questions of governing a foreign land had to be 
overcome through pragmatic calculations about maintaining the colonial state.294 In 
practice therefore, the Parliament would make only a few major laws to set the very basic 
outlines of the structure and powers of the Government of India. The Governor-General 
(in Council) was provided with legislative powers to make laws with regard to the 
various local matters, to go with his near autocratic executive powers. The need for 
legislative control and coherence from the top, and the need for executive discretion from 
below was also a dynamics that marked the colonial administration within India.  
The administration was centralized and unitary – a necessary feature given the 
need for an absolutist state able to dominate the society effectively. As a result, there 
arose a tendency towards abstractions – search for rules, categories, and knowledge 
through which the complex alien world could be made comprehensible and 
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294 Bernard S. Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India”, in Colonialism and Forms of 






governable.295 There was a corresponding focus on rationalized and predictable rules and 
procedures by which the state was to act. This was necessary to make the complex 
business of running a massive country, with administrators in far-flung districts, coherent 
and manageable. This need was the primary driving force for important legal 
developments, an example of which we have already discussed with relation to laws of 
property. That same need for coherence also provided the impetus for creating a unified 
legal code, first expressed in the Charter Act of 1833.296  Codification did not mean a 
clear statement of the law enunciated by people’s representative in the Parliament, in the 
sense it was used in England at that time as an important principle of representative 
democracy and the rule of law. Rather, it was to be the work of a body of ‘experts’, 
drafting rules from the first principles with the view to providing a unified and desirable 
set of rules to govern the country.297 India was seen as a “laboratory” for creating a model 
for modern and rational legal rules that could be then replicated in England, which 
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295 To this end the regime produced an immense body of surveys, studies and theories, and 
created various institutions to carry them out.  
 
296 The ambition of codification actually goes back much further, but no law resulted out of it. It 
was an attempt to locate India’s “ancient constitution” by making into codifiable laws the 
traditions and customs of the country, the most significant example of which was Nathaniel 
Halhed’s Code of Gentoo Laws. These were an attempt to bridge the “epistemic gap” experienced 
on an alien land by a “simple feat of translation”, by turning situated practices into abstract 
principles using “scientific” and philological methods. [Bernard S. Cohn, “The Command of 
Language and the Language of Command”, in Colonialism and Forms of Knowledge: The British 
in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), at 16 – 56].  
 
297 The ideological basis of the codification attempt was Utilitarian. Jeremy Bentham, in his late 
years, actually expressed his interest in being the Solon of India. For the definitive study on this, 
see, Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians in India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), at 175 – 214. 





proved much more difficult in practice given the democratic constraints back home.298 
The codification project, helmed by a “Law Commission”, was only partially successful. 
It failed in its ambition to create a unified civil code, given the sensitive and complicated 
nature of property laws, but did provide the Penal Code of 1860, the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1861, and the Evidence Act of 1872 – three statutes that are still in force in India, 
although in a modified form.  
However, for colonial administrators at all levels, there was a disjunction between 
the abstract rules and procedures emanating out of Calcutta, and the contingent world of 
social relations and practices they had to encounter on a daily basis.299 This constituted 
the need for creating flexibilities and exceptions within the uniform legal architecture. 
Some of these exceptions were made into statutory principles. The starkest examples of 
such instances can be found in criminal law,300 where special rules were made with 
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298  Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), at 231.  
 
299 For a description of this disjunction as experienced by the lower level of the administration, 
the District Collectors, see, Jon E. Wilson, The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in 
Eastern India, 1780 – 1835 (New York: Palgrave, 2008). Also see, Phillip Woodruff, The Men 
Who Ruled India, Vol. I –II (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).  
 
300 Criminal law, fundamentally concerned with disciplining population by coercion had been the 
terrain of deviation from the principles of the rule of law, and a mode of sanctioning excessive 
violence not just in India, but in all colonial encounters. Often they were linked with the need to 
produce a disciplined labor force tailored to the need of the colonial economy. For discussions 
about colonial violence through the mode of criminal law from other historical contexts, see, 
Frederick Cooper, ‘Contracts, Crime, and Agrarian Conflict: From Slave to Wage Labor on East 
African Coast,’ in Labor, Law, and Crime: Historical Perspective, Francis Snyder and Douglas 
Hay eds. (London: Tavistock, 1987), Peter Fritzpatrick, ‘Transformations of Law and Labour in 
Papua New Guinea,’ in Frances Snyder and Douglas Hay eds., Labour, Law, and Crime: An 
Historical Perspective (London: Tavistock, 1987), Martin Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social 





regards to specific segments of population, in clear and complete violation of any 
principle of equality before the law.301  On top of this, the need for exceptions were 
preserved in the form of a tremendous degree of executive discretion that in some ways 
constituted the core of the real colonial constitution, underneath the legalistic costume.302 
While those discretionary acts need not be based on any higher legal principle, the 
exercise of discretion had to be, in keeping with the functional needs of the centralized 
state, presented in a procedural form.   
What were the specific features of the colonial ‘mode of rule’ with regards to the 
topics discussed in this Chapter that will be crucial to understanding the Indian 
constitutional vision? One would be the considerable institutional and discursive 
infrastructure of an interventionist state. Second, with respect to property, the 
disaggregation of the bundle of proprietary rights in land, and the shuffling of those 
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301 Almost every history of colonial criminal law stresses the aspect of its deviation from the 
principles of the rule of law. See, Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in 
Early Colonial India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial 
Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (New Delhi: Cambridge University 
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(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985). 
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bundle of rights based on political and economic necessities of the state, created the 
conceptual framework within which property was conceived and discussed by the 
postcolonial framers.  Third, with respect to the ‘constitution’, the central role that a 
search for coherence and control played in the production of norms and rules for the 
functioning of the state would form as much a part of the postcolonial constitutional 
vision as did more normative conceptions of a ‘rule of law’. The most significant of all 
perhaps would be the legacy of the spread of the language of law amongst the Indian 
elite.  
These continuities would have to be set against the desire for the Indian 
constitution makers to decisively break away from two defining characteristics of 
colonial rule – its unrepresentative character, and the despotic discretion of the executive 
branch. The principle of a legislature elected via a universal adult franchise, and bringing 
the executive branch under complete control of that legislature will arise out of that need. 
But to understand why these were the specific axes of break and continuity, and how 
those two axes interacted, we would have to first comprehend the nature of the political 
movement that brought an end to colonial rule, and the conception of ‘independence’ 
from colonial subjugation that was produced as a result. In the following Chapter, we will 
do so by focusing on the ideas and politics of the main protagonist of that movement, and 






GANDHI AND THE ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENT 
 The discussion of Gandhi in any study of Indian constitutional history is suffused 
with an air of tragedy.303 His was a story of a path not taken, of a ‘Father of the Nation’ 
whose filial creation chose decisively not to make itself in his image. In other words – as 
one with a taste for irony would never fail to mention – the moment of his triumph, the 
birth of a new nation through the struggle that he led, was also a moment of his defeat. As 
the Constituent Assembly prepared to meet to draft a new constitution, he could only 
wish dejectedly from a distance that “God will confound the wisdom of these big men.” 
304 But it was not a coup that sidelined this popular leader as the “big men” were drawing 
up the constitution of the new nation. The logic of the discourse and practice of his 
political career created the specific political conditions that the constitution would come 
to be a response to. While his vision was marked by its absence for that constitutional 
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303 The definitive example of this is Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a 
Nation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), Chapter 2. Also see, Dilip Kumar Chatterjee, 
Gandhi and Constitution Making in India (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1984), 
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304 Mohandas K. Gandhi, “Independence’, in Harijan, 28 July, 1946, The Collected Works of 






design – evident only through the dissenting voice of a few members305 – a singular focus 
on that absence can be misleading. Indian constitutionalism came about by what his 
politics had made possible, as well as took its distinctive turn in the direction of 
transformational constitutionalism as a response to the limits of that politics. Delineating 
both these possibilities and limits is what I intend to do in this chapter.306 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
305 Some of the members of the Constituent Assembly, who at different stages lamented the 
absence of Gandhian principles in the constitutional design, were: T. Prakasam, Mahavir Tyagi, 
Damodar Swarup Seth, Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, and H.V. Kamath. 
 
306 That is the limit of my ambition in this chapter, rather than a study of Gandhi as such. The 
scholarly literature on Gandhi’s thoughts is large, and rapidly growing and I have drawn heavily 
on them to construct my arguments. The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi provides a variety of 
insights into different dimension of Gandhi’s life and thoughts from both historians and political 
theorists [The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi, Judith M. Brown and Anthony Parel eds., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)]. For a seminal study of Gandhi’s ideas in the 
context of the emerging national imagination, see, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the 
Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); for a 
discussion of Gandhi in the context of the bourgeois revolution (and its failure) in India, see, 
Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Susanne and Lioyd Rudolph have studied Gandhi through the 
prism of the Weberian idea of charisma [Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The 
Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1969)]; 
Both Akeel Bilgrami and Ajay Skaria, in different ways, have highlighted Gandhi’s critical (and 
even antithetical) relationship to Western ideas of politics and society [Ajay Skaria, “Gandhi’s 
Politics: Liberalism and the Question of the Ashram”, The South Asian Quarterly 101:4 (2002) at 
955 – 986; Akeel Bilgrami, “Gandhi’s Integrity: The Philosophy Behind his Politics”, Post-
Colonial Studies 5:1 (2002)]; Raghavan Iyer has focused on the moral dimension of Gandhi in 
conscious neglect of the political, contributing to the image of Gandhi as a bearer of ‘ethics of 
conviction’ in politics [Raghavan N. Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi 
(New Delhi Oxford University Press, 1973)]. In sharp contrast, Karuna Mantena, has argued that 
Gandhi is a ‘political realist’ in that his ideas about political action (satyagraha) was shaped by a 
profound and practical understandings of the actual dynamics of political contestation, especially 
the propensity towards a cycle of violence [Karuna Mantena, “Another Realism: The Politics of 
Gandhian Non-Violence”, American Political Science Review 106:2 (2012), at 455 – 470]. Faisal 
Devji, has tried to interrogate the relationship between the ethics and practice in Gandhi, but has 
tended to privilege the former [Faisal Devji, The Impossible India: Gandhi and the Temptation of 
Violence, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), and Faisal Devji, “The Practice of 
Prejudice: Gandhi’s Politics of Friendship”, in Subaltern Studies XII: Muslims, Dalits, and the 
Fabrication of History, Shail Mayaram, M.S.S. Pandian, and Ajay Skaria eds., (New Delhi: 





What were the possibilities? Most significantly, Gandhi was instrumental in 
transforming the anti-colonial movement into a truly popular mass movement. He forged 
an alliance with the mass of rural peasantry and mobilized them under the leadership of 
the urban elites that the Congress consisted of. The success of this alliance was the reason 
why the post-colonial polity could be constituted as a truly democratic one. Yet at the 
same time this alliance was tenuous and provisional, the causes for which lay in the limits 
of the Gandhian political repertoire. So what we have at the end of the struggle is both the 
existence of an alliance but one that is fragile enough to provide a disruptive threat. It is 
the simultaneous presence of these elements – both of which can be traced back to 
Gandhi, and arise out of the same facets of his politics—that sets up the particular 
problematic that the Indian constitution makers sought to respond to. From this vantage 
point, one can say that the Indian Constituent Assembly was deliberating the complex 
legacy of the strategies for enlisting the masses to the cause of a new nation state, and the 
hegemonic superiority of the elites within it. Hence, his absence – both real and symbolic 
– from that body was neither tragic nor ironic, since in a way it was the contradictions 
posed by his politics that the constitution was seeking to overcome.  
4.1 The Narrative 
The predicament of the colonized subject was that its possibilities of resistance 
were framed by the discourse produced by colonial power. Faced with the flaws that were 
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and original way, and has shown, approvingly, that Gandhi’s ideas were so radical so as to 
become “deeply anti-political” [Uday Singh Mehta, “Gandhi on Democracy, Politics and Ethics 





attributed to it and prevented it from being an autonomous political subject, it tried to 
overcome the deficiency on the terms determined by the very same discourse. The 
prevalent attempt was to bridge the ‘distance’ between the indigenous society and its 
colonial masters, which would then allow the former to claim the same political freedom 
that was granted within the metropolis.307 In terms of actual politics, this had two 
outcomes. Amongst the elites, who had exposure to European ideas and have been able to 
participate at different levels of the colonial administration, it meant making claims for a 
certain liberal principles in colonial governance, mostly through petitions and 
complaints.308 For the masses, whose experience of colonial rule was one of domination 
experienced through the heavy hand of the state – the revenue and criminal justice 
administration – opposition manifested through localized revolts around specific issues. 
The gap between the two remained vast, and each were tolerated, and repressed 
respectively.    
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307 This was the strategy of the nationalist elites in India before and even since Gandhi. They 
either tried to reclaim their tradition – reform Hinduism in the model of Christianity, encourage 
manly and martial qualities in their youth, and reinvent their past to emphasize qualities perceived 
as virtuous in the European tradition etc. Or, and the two were not mutually exclusive, attempt to 
create a modern civil society which could in time form the basis of a modern nation state. 
 
308 Congress politics before Gandhi were dominated by particular economic and social groups that 
belonged mainly to the three presidency towns – Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras – which 
constituted a miniscule portion of the larger Indian society. These groups were closely connected 
to the colonial administration in various forms, influenced by contemporary European aristocratic 
or bourgeois ideas, and generally were not particularly interested in any major social or political 
transformation. The other sections of the Indian society remained outside the domain of Congress 
politics by and large. Which is why when Gandhi’s first mass action in 1919, launched under the 
banner of Congress, resulting in a nation wide eruption not seen since 1857, it took the colonial 






Gandhi’s was one of the most creative and successful attempts to overcome this 
problem. The society that the nationalists of the 1920s found themselves in was 
constructed as one that was both passive and backward, and therefore necessarily 
dependent on the absolutist colonial state. The only way that society could assert its 
autonomy from the state (and thereby constitute its own independent political form) was 
to do so under the terms set by the modern Western imagination – by developing into a 
modern civil society, making legitimate claims of rational self-rule following scripts 
written in 1688 or 1789.309 Gandhi’s critique was directed against precisely at this 
assumption. What he proposed instead was another vision of the Indian society that 
would be able to free itself from its dependent relationship with the state without standing 
in the “waiting room of history”310 as it were. To do so, one had to fight not just the 
particular form of political oppression engendered by colonial rule, but also contest the 
basic tenets of the state-society relationship. Hence what Gandhi went on to formulate 
was a series of inversions of the way colonialism ordered and justified the relationship 
between the state and society.  
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309 Hence, the enthusiasm for the French Revolution amongst the Indian nationalists of the early 
days. When Raja Rammohun Roy, the pioneering liberal nationalist and modernizing reformer, 
was on his way to England in 1830, he enthusiastically saluted the tricolor when his ship stopped 
at Marseilles, and apparently hailed “Glory, glory, glory, to France”.  See, Partha Chatterjee, 
Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), at 28. A slightly different version of the event appears in 
Hobsbawm’s Age of Revolution as an illustration of the global influence of the French 
Revolution. [Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789 – 1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996), at 55]. 
 
310 To use the evocative phrase of Dipesh Chakravarty, in Dipesh Chakravarty, Provincializing 
Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 






The ostensible lack or flaws of Indian society was the product of a history 
constructed using a particular narrative structure. The impulse of the nationalist elites was 
to ‘reclaim’ history by constructing the glorious past of India. Yet, since the rules of that 
construction was the same as that of colonial historiography, one still found oneself in the 
‘waiting room’, albeit in a more favorable position. They could argue about the causes 
and nature of the Indian ‘backwardness’, as well as the time and process of recovery, but 
the fundamental logic of spatial ordering of history, by which India had to traverse the 
path of maturity, remained unchallenged. Gandhi instead sought to counter this entire 
problematic by seeking to substitute the primacy of history as a mode of understanding 
the present social condition with that of the myth.  
At the level of political practice, myths allowed him to construct a social imagery 
that was accessible to the large number of Indians outside the westernized elite. It was 
also the terrain on which he sought to construct an original notion of Indian selfhood – 
which could function both as a critique of its colonial variant, as well as posit a new 
vision of a collective. In its dominant western iteration, the temporality of history – i.e., 
how it unfolds in time –has a particular structure: linear, directional and non-repetitive. 
The present is the site of unfolding of the past, the causal arrow being strictly one-





synchronic way.311 That is, the present is the site of multiple (and sometime competing) 
pasts, all-waiting to be interpreted from the standpoint of the here-and-now. The present 
then is no longer only the site where one can correct the mistakes of the past. Instead 
there is the far more creative option of intervention to which the mythical past is always 
open. This is precisely the creative option Gandhi sought to exercise. The recurrent 
themes of the Ramrajya – the mythical polity of the Hindu mythology Ramayana – 
functioned as an alternative political vision: both immediately accessible to his audience, 
as well as critical of the present condition of colonial domination.  
This restructuring also alters the way change could be perceived or achieved. The 
western conception of history is a “chain of events”312 or a “gallery of images”313 where 
the previous causally effect the subsequent. To be revolutionary, that is effect major 
changes in history, these actions have to be original, that is, posit a break from the past. 
In the mythical structure, change need not be epochal or assertive of its originality. It is a 
process that is continuous. It happens through a process of self-realization, a creative 
reinterpretation of the self at both the individual and the collective level. This is not 
determined by the linear narrative of history – in other words, one of development or 
modernization. Instead, it is a dialogic process constituted through interpretation and 
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311 Ashish Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983), at 57.  
 
312 Walter Benjamin, ‘Thesis on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations (New York: Schoken 
Books, 1968), at 257.  
 
313 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, J. Sibree Trans. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 






reinterpretation of the already existing and yet to come myths. Thus, by freeing the 
colonized self from history, Gandhi sought to emancipate it from the ‘backwardness’ 
history consigned it to. More significantly, it undercut the basic claim of legitimacy for 
the colonial rule – the logic of ‘improvement’: a promissory note for emancipation from 
backwardness at an uncertain point in the future. Instead, Gandhi’s argument allowed him 
to change the focus to the violent and despotic oppressions of the present.314  
4.1.2. Inversions 
The basis of this creative reconceptualization of the self was the inversion of the 
terms of colonized subjectivity. In his person, Gandhi embodied much of what we have 
seen as being described as inferior about the Indian society. His frail figure, soft-spoken 
studiously non-aggressive character and rhetoric, his vegetarianism, his constant use of 
spiritual language, his mendicant’s attire were all the very symbol of the passive, weak, 
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314 Mohammed Iqbal, the philosopher and the member of the Muslim League acutely observed 
this reorientation of temporality and its radical potential. In a speech at Lahore, he said: “The 
Western man’s mental texture is chronological in character. He lives and moves and has his being 
in time. The Eastern man’s world-consciousness is non-historical. To the Western man things 
gradually become; they have a past, present and future. To the Eastern man they are immediately 
rounded off, timeless, purely present . . . The British as a Western people cannot but conceive 
political reform in India as a systematic process of gradual evolution. Mahatma Gandhi as an 
Eastern man sees in this attitude nothing more than an ill-conceived unwillingness to part with 
power and tries all sorts of destructive negations to achieve immediate attainment. Both are 
elementally incapable of understanding each other. The result is the appearance of a revolt.” 
Mohammad Iqbal, “Presidential Address Delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India 
Muslim Conference at Lahore on the 21st of March 1932”, in Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, 
Shamloo ed. (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948), at 53, as quoted in Faisal Devji, “Morality in 






effete Indian manhood.315 This embracing (rather than running away from) the supposed 
flaws of ‘Indianness’ was not a reflexive counter-orientalist move. Instead, Gandhi 
attempted to reconceptualize those very same characteristics as virtues. The orientation of 
this reconceptualization was not merely ‘traditionalist’, that is, claiming them to be part 
of Indian tradition and therefore ipso facto a virtue. Instead Gandhi’s formulation was 
universal in their scope.316 Rather than a simple defense of Indianness, they became a 
critique of western modernity and its characteristics.  
Gandhi questioned the very traits that the colonial narrative claimed Indians 
lacked. Facets of personality like aggressiveness, competitiveness, assertiveness; the idea 
of rationality as self-interested individualism, etc.317 Gandhi inverted that very lack into a 
critique of modern Western(ized) society under industrial capitalism – the violence, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
315 A point that was not lost on the British. Churchill, ever the good colonialist, famously called 
Gandhi a “half-naked fakir”.  
 
316 Its universality came from the fact that often it was a critique of European colonization on its 
own terms. It was not just liberalism that had reached its limit in the colonies – so did certain 
other traits of western civilization. The overdone machismo that was the mark of the European 
race in the colonies was in contradiction with notions like doux commerce, whose very essence 
was gentleness. Thus the very character traits that were increasingly felt to be problematic within 
European society, was exported out to the colonies where they were glorified as heroic or manly. 
This was the contradiction that Gandhi’s critique sought to lay bare. Rather than being cowardly, 
self-restraint was a sign of a high degree of moral sophistication, and in the face of adversity 
(e.g., when protestors faced with baton wielding policemen were forbidden from reacting) an act 
of supreme courage.  
 
317 Much of the inspiration for this came from western intellectuals themselves – critics of 
modernity like Ruskin, Thoreau and Tolstoy. Like them, Gandhi’s was a reactive position. In the 
conditions of colonial domination, that reaction found a specific, and original, salience. Akeel 
Bilgrami notes that these resonances are not surprising because in a way Gandhi saw India as 
standing in the same crossroads as the early modern Europe has been. [Akeel Bilgrami, “Gandhi’s 
Religion and its Relationship to Politics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi, Judith M. 






materialism and alienation it had produced. Gandhi’s explicit asceticism, and the 
principle of self-restraint was a counter to the corrupting materialism of Western, or as he 
preferred to say, modern civilization.318 Prosperity was not to be measured in terms of the 
wealth of nations (a metric by which India could never catch up with England), but in 
terms of the enrichment of the soul through moral development.319  
4.2. The Promise 
4.2.1 Non- Violence 
The basic condition for this moral development was non-violence. Non-violence, 
as Gandhi repeatedly asserted, was a sine qua non for the dialogical process of self-
realization. Violence, at its core, posits absolute certainties. It makes truth claims through 
extreme acts of self-assertion. Not only does violence make absolute claims, it also 
forecloses the possibility of any contestation of those claims. However, any singular 
moment of ascription, without any attempt to either search one’s own soul, or to convince 
the other, is completely antithetical to the Gandhian creed. Truth for Gandhi was a matter 
of search, maybe even an unending one, which is captured in his doctrine of 
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318 “There is no such thing as Western or European civilization,” Gandhi wrote, “but there is a 
modern civilization, which is purely material.” [M.K. Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Polak”, 14 
October, 1914, in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 10 (New Delhi: Publication 
Division, Government of India, 1999), at 168]. 
 
319 See, “Speech at Muir College Economic Society, Allahabad”, The Leader, 25 December, 
1916, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 15, at 272 – 280. In this lecture titled, “Does 
Economic Progress Clash with Real Progress?” Gandhi defined economic progress as material 
growth, and ‘real progress’ as moral development, setting up a clear normative prioritization of 





satyagraha.320 This faith in the individual for reflection and self-correction – not under 
conditions of command or coercion – is what formed the basis of his vision for a non-
violent mode of organization of collective life.   
The most significant of all inversion, the end to which all others build up to, was 
that of the relationship between the state and the society under colonialism. As we have 
seen, colonial rule – both discursively and institutionally – produced a binary of state and 
society whereby the latter ceded absolute primacy and agency to the former. The reason 
for this was, as we have seen, the state both determined the social form, as well as 
guaranteed its existence. Gandhi countered this by conceptualizing the Indian society as 
an autonomous entity – autonomous of both the colonial state and the colonial discourse. 
Through the dialogic process internal to it, it could come up with its own principles of 
organization and thereby overcome any need for an external authority to guarantee its 
existence. The concept of non-violence, operating as a political praxis, was deployed to 
this end.   
Non-violence – as a praxis rather than a moral conviction321 – performed a double 
role. It was directed both externally at the colonial state and internally as an alternative 
mode of resolution of social conflict and hence of organizing society. In its first role, it 
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320  Loyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political 
Development in India, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1969, at 184-185. 
For a contrary argument, see, Akeel Bilgrami, “Gandhi’s Integrity: The Philosophy Behind his 
Politics”, Post-Colonial Studies 5:1 (2002). Bilgrami argues that Gandhi’s idea of truth was 
absolute, and certain.  
 
321 Though, it should be noted, political praxis and moral imperatives are never really separable in 






sought to uncover the overwhelming violence that underwrites the very existence of the 
colonial state.322 That act of unmasking, in moments of heightened popular mobilizations, 
forced the colonial state to come out as what it really was – a purely coercive machinery, 
shorn of any glorious mission – to expose India as “one vast prison house”.323 In other 
words, Gandhi sought to take away any facade of a legitimate rule the colonial state 
might have had and compel it to justify its rule only through naked force.  
Violence, however, was not a feature of just the colonial or despotic states.  It was 
inscribed in the very ontology of the modern state since Hobbes, and Gandhi’s critique 
was directed against that very logic of organizing collective existence.324 Hobbes’ theory 
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322 As we have seen, despite all the liberal rhetoric about ‘rule of law’, a large part of the practices 
of the colonial state was based upon ‘administrative discretion’. This discretion often expressed 
itself through brutal acts of violent repression. For example, in Punjab where there was a long 
practice of enforcing ‘customs’ through almost entirely unregulated discretion of colonial 
officials. The culmination of that practice was the most gruesome act of colonial violence where 
police surrounded and fired upon unarmed protestors without any provocation or warning, killing 
more than 1,000.  Violence was also inscribed in the everyday of the colonial state practice, say 
when carrying out public health or urban planning initiatives. The extremity of the violence 
during the anti-plague initiative in Maharashtra created such levels of public antagonism that it 
lead to the murder of the Plague Commissioner W.C. Rand in Pune in 1897. Furthermore, 
Colonial criminal law often codified practices that were violent and in direct contravention of 
basic liberal doctrines, and raised despotic state violence to the status of statutory principles. See, 
Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
323 This was Gandhi’s response to the Viceroy’s threat to imprison him in view of his planned 
civil disobedience campaign against the unpopular salt laws: “In spite of the forest of books 
containing rules and regulations, the only law that the nation knows is the will of the British 
administrators, the only public peace the nation knows is the peace of a public prison. India is one 
vast prison house. I repudiate this law and regard it as my sacred duty to break the mournful 
monotony of the compulsory peace that is choking the heart of the nation for want of free vent.” 
[M.K. Gandhi, “Begging the Question”, Young India, 12 March, 1930, Collected Works of 
Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 48, at 409].  
 
324 As Eric Stokes claimed, the colonial state “approached most nearly Hobbes’ idea of the 





of the state starts with the “state of nature”, a state of near constant social strife, a “war of 
every man against every man”325 In this backdrop, the state is an artificial creation to get 
man out of this predicament.326  What it does is replace the potential of chaotic violence 
by the threat of unified and orderly violence of the state. The logic of the state is marked 
by violence doubly –the ever-present potential of violence erupting in society 327; and the 
countervailing monopoly of violence of the state.  
4.2.2 Alternatives 
Gandhi seeks to deny the latter its raison d’être by positing an alternate, non-
violent mode of organizing collective social life. As Karuna Mantena has argued recently, 
such a vision is not simply a product of a noble but naïve faith in the moral perfectibility 
of human beings – a move brought about by a ‘politics of conviction’.328 Rather, it is an 
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325 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Richard Tuck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991).  
 
326 This is what could be called the “machinistic” element in Hobbes. That the state is an artificial 
creation, a great machine – the Leviathan. An interesting point to note here is Gandhi’s view on 
machines, especially the connection he draws between machines and violence. He wrote in 1945, 
in the aftermath of the war, “Another danger in making more and more machinery is that we have 
to make great efforts for the protection of it, that is to say, we have to keep an army as is being 
done today elsewhere in the world. The fact is that even if there is no danger of aggression from 
outside we shall be slaves to those who will be in control of big machinery” (Collected Works, 
Vol. 82, at 132-33). This big machinery Gandhi speaks about, could easily be read as the biggest 
machinery of them all, the Leviathan.  
 
327 As we know, the state of nature does not get dissolved once the civil state is in place. It 
surrounds the city, in potentia. Whenever there is disobedience of the authority and its laws, there 
is a possibility of moving back into the state of nature.  
 
328 Karuna Mantena, “Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Non-Violence”, American 





attempt to posit an alternate vision of pluralistic, democratic politics, based on an 
authentic and localized practice engaging with others in society.329 That vision tries to 
avoid scrupulously any resort to violence, no matter how legitimate it could be.330 Rather 
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realist, in the precise sense, that Gandhi’s theory of non-violent political action – satyagraha – 
was a response to the ‘real’ (i.e., given) constraints of political action, most crucially, its 
propensity to devolve into a cycle of violence. In view of this, he wanted to pay close attention to 
the ‘means’ of acting politically. For a contrary reading of Gandhi as driven by his moral 
convictions first and foremost, see, Raghavan N. Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of 
Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi Oxford University Press, 1973). In Iyer’s reading, in Gandhi’s 
theory, the soul does the heavy lifting. By nurturing, and developing principles of “soul force”, 
one can find possibilities of collective organization of life that does not require the state as the 
guarantor of order. This “life of the soul” is not a developmental idea, that is, it does not require 
educating by an external authority, namely the colonial state. Gandhi claims that this possibility is 
already latent within human beings rather than being a product of historical development. 
Actually, it is the violent practices of the state, and its conception of human action as basically 
self-interested, aggressive, and acquisitive, that inhibits and denies the ability of the soul to play 
its role. In a very different reading from that of Iyer’s, Uday Mehta, has nevertheless suggested 
that Gandhi’s theory of collective action is so radically different from those of modern politics 
that he might just be, “in some crucial sense, […] a deeply anti-political thinker”. Mehta, 
however, does not use “anti-political” in a negative way. He instead seeks to challenge the 
“assumption that all significant transformations must have a political purpose as their cause”. See, 
Uday Singh Mehta, “Gandhi on Democracy, Politics and Ethics of Everyday Life”, Modern 
Intellectual History 7:2 (2010), at 355 – 371.  
 
329 Gandhi claimed for himself a discursive tradition – drawn from the symbolic repertoire of 
Vaishnavaite Hinduism– where competing values could coexist and enter into a dialogue (rather 
than a war) with each other. India was a country of many gods, and new gods could be added to 
the pantheon and live side-by-side rather than driven inexorably to assert their superiority at all 
times. This, according to Gandhi was not something fanciful, but how India has been for 
centuries. Of course there could be frictions and urges of domination within these circles. But that 
was to be dealt with the constant and open-ended process of self-development rather than policing 
by an authority standing outside. The point to remember here is that while Gandhi’s political 
theory was deeply religious, it was never confessional. Its secularism was derived not from 
banishing religion from the public sphere, but letting every religion co-exist without any attempt 
to order them in a hierarchy.  
 
330 The crucial move, as several scholars have suggested, is to decouple violence and legitimacy, 
and hence deny the major strain of political thought justifying authority (e.g., violence to 
maintain order). See, Uday Singh Mehta, “Gandhi on Democracy, Politics and Ethics of 
Everyday Life”, Modern Intellectual History 7:2 (2010), at 355 – 371; Faisal Devji, “Morality in 






than the liberal state that guarantees value pluralism through the law,331 Gandhi sought to 
create a practice of ‘neighbourliness’ amongst individuals who might have different 
values and different gods.332 The practice of the ashram, according to Ajay Skaria, was 
an experiment in fostering just such a community of neighbors.333  His vision did not 
imagine a society without conflicts, but rather proposed a reflective and dialogical 
process of overcoming those conflicts in such a way as to negate the possibility of 
violence – and hence the rationale for the existence of the state.  
His vehement criticism of law and legal institutions follows directly from this 
vision, as something that destroys the conditions of good neighborliness. 334  Gandhi’s 
famous critique of lawyers in Hind Swaraj takes the courtroom as it’s setting, with law as 
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331 This was another important dimension of Hobbesian theory. In the context of the wars of 
religion in his time, Hobbes had argued that any conception of collective existence of human 
beings that is based upon ‘values’ must grapple with the fact that such values are necessarily 
relative. We perceive the world in different ways, and any conception based upon it would lead to 
conflict rather than harmony. What is inherent in picture is a conception of competing values as 
necessarily antagonistic – and hence the need for a sovereign, mechanistic and impersonal – 
guaranteeing security to all. This was as big if not a greater problem for India, fractured as it were 
between several castes, tribes, religions and other communities.  
 
332 Regarding the pantheistic openness of Gandhi’s religious thought, see, footnote 26. As has 
been noted by several scholars, this vision was as vehemently opposed to the exclusive 
nationalism based on a Christianized organized Hinduism as was being developed by V.D. 
Savarkar at that time. Indeed, it was to a Hindu follower of Savarkar’s ideology that Gandhi 
eventually lost his life.  
 
333 Ajay Skaria, “Gandhi’s Politics: Liberalism and the Question of the Ashram”, The South Asian 
Quarterly 101:4 (2002) at 955 - 986.  
 
334 Like most of the other leaders of the Congress, Gandhi was a lawyer. He was admitted to Inner 
Temple in 1888, and called to the bar in 1891. After an undistinguished beginning to his legal 
practice in India, Gandhi got a job as a legal counsel for an Indian trading firm in South Africa in 
1893, where he practiced for two decades. After the first non-cooperation movement, he was 






a (amongst others) way to settle a ‘quarrel’, (tellingly) between a Hindu and a Muslim.335 
An ‘ordinary man’ would have tried to settle their quarrel through negotiations, like a 
good neighbor would. The lawyer, on the other hand, is a ‘stranger’ to his client, who is 
further estranged by the reified and technical language of law. The quarrel, now 
abstracted into the language of a legal dispute can now only be settled with the might of 
the state backing one or the other parties, rather than amicably – and hence law “makes 
brothers enemies”.336 The problem was inherent in the structure of law as a mode of 
dispute settlement. It makes ‘quarrels’, that is a disagreement between two individuals 
familiar to each other, arising out of a specific context to which both of them are a part, 
subject to a verdict based on an abstract set of rules. In liberal theory, the very distance of 
the judge from the particular life of the dispute is what makes a decision just. Yet, that 
very distancing is what makes it problematic for Gandhi, robbing any possibility of 
overcoming through mutual understanding. “Surely the decision of the third party is not 
always right”, he writes. Rather, “[T]he parties alone know who is right. We in our 
simplicity and ignorance, imagine that a stranger, by taking our money, gives us 
justice.”337 The estrangement of justice under a legal regime is mirrored in the political 
estrangement of the society from the state. In the case of India, the rule of the ‘stranger’ 
who promises justice by the virtue of being distant from the society was the very essence 
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335 M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, Ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), at 59. 
 
336 Ibid, at 60.  
 






of its subjugation. And lawyers were the primary enablers.  “The chief thing, however, to 
be remembered” he wrote,  “is that, without lawyers, courts could not have been 
established or conducted, and without the latter the English could not rule.”338 
This critique tells us a lot about Gandhi’s idea of a desirable form of social 
collective, and hence his vision for an independent India. The creative basis of a modern 
nation state, as Benedict Anderson, reminds us, is to reproduce a community whose 
members will “never know most of their fellow-members”.339 In contrast, Gandhi’s idea 
of a society demanded a community where one can engage and sympathize with the 
other, within their situated habitations. Where recognition and respect would be 
embodied and authentic, not mediated through the state and the law. In such a 
community, a practice of self-governance through reflexive ethical self-regulation would 
be possible. And hence, there would be no role for an impersonal actor, its police, its 
lawyers, its parliament340 – no state as we know it.341 It was a vision, in its logical 
extension, for an “enlightened anarchy”.342  
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338 Ibid, at 61.  
 
339  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), at 6.   
 
340 Gandhi, as has been oft quoted, compared the British Parliament to ‘a sterile woman”. 
However, his problem with the British form of parliamentary system was better explained in this 
passage from a letter to Maganlal Gandhi: “It is very difficult to get rid of our fondness for 
Parliament. […] the tyranny of Parliament is much greater than that of Chengiz Khan, Tamerlane 
and others. […] One can withstand the atrocities committed by one individual as such; but it is 
difficult to cope with the tyranny perpetrated upon a people in the name of the people. […] The 
common man in India at least believes that the Parliament is a hoax. Even an extraordinarily 
intelligent man, caught in the meshes of this civilization, loses his sanity in Parliament.” In other 






Such a vision had a difficult relationship with the idea of constitutions and law – 
including, and especially, the one to be formulated by the party he led. His vision for 
satyagraha was doubly inimical to legal and state institutions. Deployed critically as a 
tool for protest, it acted as a way to deliberately and peacefully violate positive legal 
norms, thereby denying their command any authority.343 Indeed, when Gandhi launched 
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power legitimized in the name of the people, that constituted his problem with the institution. He 
was decidedly not an anti-democrat, but very much a critique of parliamentary democracy. M.K. 
Gandhi, “Letter to Maganlal Gandhi”, 2 April, 1910, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 
Vol. 10 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1999), at 473. 
 
341 This claim about Gandhi’s anarchism, though widely accepted and often repeated, requires a 
clarification. He was an anarchist in the broad sense in his explicit opposition to the modern state, 
and his implicit opposition to any hierarchical political authority or organization. Nevertheless, 
his strong focus on positing, and even putting into practice, ordered and disciplined modes of 
collective living puts him within a particular school of anarchism, where the focus is not on 
negating all authority, but positing an alternate way of organizing social forms.  
 
342 The full passage, from the piece titled “Enlightened Anarchy: A Political Ideal” is worth 
quoting in full here. “The power to control national life through national representatives is called 
political power. Representatives will become unnecessary if the national life becomes so perfect 
as to be self-controlled. It will then be a state of enlightened anarchy in which each person will 
become his own ruler. He will conduct himself in such a way that his behavior will not hamper 
the well-being of his neighbors. In an ideal state, there will be no political institution and 
therefore no political power.” M.K. Gandhi, “Enlightened Anarchy: A Political Ideal” (1939), in 
Gandhi’s Experiments With Truth: Essential Writings by Mahatma Gandhi, Richard L. Johnson 
ed., (New York: Lexington Books, 2006), at 134. 
 
343 ‘Civil Disobedience’, one of the most important political actions in the Gandhian repertoire, 
consisted of a planned mass violation of law and courting arrest. The most celebrated such 
instance was Gandhi’s satyagraha against the tax on production of salt by Indians to preserve 
British monopoly on the product. Gandhi peacefully produced salt at the coastal town of Dandi 
without paying a tax and hence broke the law against an explicit warning by the Viceroy, and was 
arrested afterwards. Civil disobedience was meant to be, an organized, planned, and highly 
disciplined violation of specific laws, not an insurrection against the legal system as such. The 
violation of positive laws made the element of self-restraint, as Gandhi stressed time and again, 
extremely important. In this it was a performative assertion of the capacity of moral self-
regulation in opposition to unjust positive laws.  





his first nationwide satyagraha in 1919 against the extension of war time emergency 
powers severely restricting civil rights and punishing political speech,344 it was contrasted 
with ‘constitutional politics’ at the time – which basically consisted primarily of 
petitioning the government through proper channels. 345  Deployed constructively, it 
denied law its role in either mediating social antagonisms, or bringing about social 
change. As Karuna Mantena has argued, it was the very eschewing of the role of positive 
law in transforming society that made Gandhi’s “constructive program” – as he called it – 
non-violent in practice.346  
The basic organizational unit of the “constructive program” was the village. In 
Gandhi’s terms, the Indian village was a site of reflective continuity with India’s past; its 
lack of development a mark of resistance to the corrupting effects of modern civilization, 
brought about by colonialism.347 The village, in its ideal Gandhian form, would be self-
sufficient economically, producing almost all of what it needs, making it autonomous of 
the world outside. 348  It would provide an embedded experience of a harmonious 
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344 The extension, made following the recommendation of the Sedition Committee of 1918, under 
Justice Rowlatt, was popularly known as the Rowlatt Act.  
 
345 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885 – 1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), at 188 – 189. Sarkar 
quotes Gandhi’s letter to Dinshaw Wacha, where he tries to persuade the old moderate Congress 
leader by writing that “the growing generation will not be satisfied with petitions, etc… 
Satyagraha is the only way, it seems to me, to stop terrorism.”  
 
346 Karuna Mantena, ‘Another Realism,’ at 465 – 466.  
 
347 In comparison, the urban centers like Bombay and Calcutta were the “real plague spots”. 
[M.K. Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Polak”, 14 October, 1914, in The Collected Works of Mahatma 
Gandhi, Vol. 10, at 168]. 
 





collective life, a necessary condition for the moral development of the individual. The 
specific ingredients of this imagination of the village was not original to Gandhi. He 
derived it from a widely prevalent circuit of ideas from the nineteenth century onwards, 
the most prominent example of which was Henry Maine’s classic Village Communities in 
the East and West, which Gandhi explicitly referenced several times in his writings.349 
Yet, when he creatively deployed these ideas to propose a vision for independent India 
with the autonomous village as the “nucleus”, it was a radical vision proposing a 
complete severance from the colonial past. At a meeting few months before the 
Constituent Assembly met in Delhi, Gandhi presented the most detailed version of his 
constitutional imagination in an interview. The constitutional unit was to be the village, 
which was to become a republic, self-sufficient and autonomous.350 Each such republic 
would be joined together in “ever-widening, never-ascending, circles”.351 The whole 
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of defending itself against the whole world. […] This does not exclude dependence on and 
willing help from neighbours or from the world. It will be free and voluntary play of mutual 
forces.” [M.K. Gandhi, “Independence’, in Harijan, 28 July, 1946, The Collected Works of 
Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 91, at 325-326]. 
349  For a thorough discussion on the effect circulation of the ideas about Indian village 
communities, and its relationship to Gandhi’s thoughts, see, Karuna Mantena, ‘On Gandhi’s 
Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures,’ in Modern Intellectual 
History 9:3 (2012). Mantena, locates Gandhi’s ideas about the village (and also that of the 
nationalist sociologist Radhakamal Mukherjee) as a contrast and an alternative to the imperialist 
modern state. In making the village a symbolic spatial site of anti-statism, this discourse was part 
of a larger anti-statist, anti-capitalist discourse of the late nineteenth, early-twentieth century. The 
reception of Maine’s idea in India from that of a conservative imperialist thinker to a nationalist 
construction, remains, as Mantena rightly points out, surprising. Nevertheless, this genealogy 
should forewarn us to the limitations of this idea, as we are about to explore.  
 
350 M.K. Gandhi, “Independence,” in Harijan, 28 July, 1946, The Collected Works of Mahatma 
Gandhi, Vol. 91, at 326. For a further elaboration on this plan, see, “Speech at the Meeting of 







structure would resemble an “oceanic circle”, where “the outermost circumference will 
not wield power to crush the inner circle but will give strength to all within and derive its 
own strength from it”.352 In other words, it was to be a loose and non-hierarchical 
federation of village republics, in sharp contrast to ‘pyramidal’ structure of the modern 
state.353  
4.3 The Limitations 
The Constituent Assembly, as Gandhi himself expected it to,354 rejected this 
vision pretty much in its entirety, barring some minor symbolic concessions. This failure 
to shape the post-colonial destiny of India, despite his success as the anti-colonial 
political leader par excellence, was not simply a result of personal ideological preferences 
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352 Ibid.  
 
353 The term ‘loosely federated village republic’, often used to denote Gandhi’s constitutional 
ideas, actually came from the S.N. Agarwal, who in 1946 wrote a Constitution for India on 
explicitly Gandhian principles. [S.N. Agarwal, Gandhian Constitution for Free India (Allahabad: 
Kitabistan, 1946)]. According to Agarwal, “violence logically leads to centralization: the essence 
of non-violence is decentralization.” The basis of Gandhian constitutional thought in this mode 
became decentralized village panchayats. The members of the panchayats would be elected by 
the adults of the village. Above the panchayat came a hierarchy of indirectly elected bodies, 
which would have only advisory powers over them. The concept of the panchayat, not as self-
sufficient republican forums, but as decentralized democratic bodies is the form in which 
‘Gandhian ideas’ were sought to be incorporated in the constitution. In the post-constitutional 
times, Gandhian political ideas would often stand in for decentralized democratic bodies with 
certain limited powers over local state machinery, rather than any thoroughgoing reorganization 
of the political power from the village upward.  
 
354 “Congressmen themselves are not of one mind even on the contents of Independence. I do not 
know how many swear by non-violence or the charkha or, believing in decentralization, regard 
the village as the nucleus. I know on the contrary that many would have India become a first-class 
military power and wish for India to have a strong centre and build the whole structure round it.” 
[M.K. Gandhi, “Independence’, in Harijan, 28 July, 1946, The Collected Works of Mahatma 






between him and the generation of Congress leaders355 who followed him. Neither was it 
a result of his advancing age and withdrawal from active politics.356 It was the result of 
the contradictions inherent to the logic of his political practice. To identify those 
contradictions, we need to focus on two related questions: one, the relationship between 
Gandhi’s political praxis and the material conditions in which he operated; and two, the 
reception of his political idiom amongst the masses.  
4.3.1 Contradictions  
Following Partha Chatterjee, one can say that the central problematic for a 
bourgeois nationalist party like Congress was how to make a plausible claim to speak on 
behalf of the entire nation, i.e., to represent it.357 Historically, that has been the central 
rhetorical device for a politically assertive bourgeoisie in its original, revolutionary guise 
358-- a fact that explains the ideology of ‘Nationalism’ being coeval with the political rise 
of the bourgeoisie.  To succeed in this project, the nationalist movement had to enunciate 
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355 Contra, Granville Austin’s argument in the section titled “The Congress had never been 
Gandhian”, in Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), at 39 – 41.  
 
356 Contra, Dilip Kumar Chatterjee, Gandhi and Constitution Making in India (New Delhi: 
Associated Publishing House, 1984).  
 
357 See, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
 
358 That reading of the bourgeois revolution has been critiqued both from the right – say, 
Tocqueville, or more recently, Hugh Trevor-Roper or Francois Furet— as well as from the left. 
For a comprehensive overview of the several different arguments from the left, see, Neil 
Davidson, How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions? (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
2012). Nevertheless, I do not intend to get involved with that complex historical debate which lies 
well beyond the scope of the work. My statement refers only to the ideological self-presentation 





not just an opposition to the political fact of foreign domination, but also formulate ways 
to unify the society given the various antagonisms inherent therein. A productive – that 
is, one that would be able to produce a new order, not just abolish the old – critique of 
colonial rule in a concrete historical moment therefore required a further elaboration of 
the various forms of exploitation which that rule sustained.  
In Gandhi’s case, generalizing from a wide range of particular interventions, one 
can identify a two part structural form for such an elaboration. First, instances of social 
exploitation or deprivation was translated into a moral failing of an individual, and hence 
second, the resolution of a conflict arising out of that instance should be through 
voluntary gestures, and uncoerced agreements. To generalize even further, he sought to 
overcome conflicts arising out of material conditions by focusing on the conflicts in 
symbolic or rhetorical terms, and not on the conditions themselves. 
Like so many other things, Gandhi embodied this discourse in his person. 
Through his model of self-sufficient, ascetic living, he aimed to produce most of the bare 
necessities he required to survive – including, most famously, producing his own cloth – 
thereby overcoming the exploitation integral to the process of production by withdrawing 
from consumption, at the same time providing poverty with the symbolic veneer of moral 
virtue.  His ashram, formed as a simulation of village communities, was similarly free 
from the stratification and social antagonisms existing in actual village communities.359  
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With regards to property, and the class structure of the rural economy, he adopted 
the concept of ‘trusteeship’.360 Landlords, “must regard themselves, […] as trustees 
holding their wealth for the good of their wards, the ryots [the peasants].”361 Their 
ownership of property should not be under threat, but they should use it for the benefit of 
those whose labor they use and take a “commission”.362 The same language of trusteeship 
was employed with regards to the industrial capitalist.363 Capitalist and labour, landlord 
and peasant, he said, “should be members of a joint family” where the owner of the 
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175. Ambedkar, who unlike Gandhi had grown up in a village, and experienced the degradation 
of its social hierarchies by virtue of being an untouchable dalit – directly attacked Gandhi’s 
version of the village community by asking, “What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of 
ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism?” [B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 4 November 4, 
1948]. 
 
360 A concept that he continued to adhere to – despite his various political experiences – till very 
late in his life, “despite the ridicule that has been poured upon it”. [M.K. Gandhi, Constructive 
Program, its Meaning and Place (Ahmedabad: Navjivan, 1941).] 
 
361 M.K. Gandhi, “Zamindars and Talukdars”, in Young India, 5 December, 1929, The Collected 
Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 48 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 
1999), at 53.  
 
362 M.K. Gandhi, “Interview to Charles Petrasch and Others”, in Young India, 26 November, 
1931, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 54 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 
Government of India, 1999), at 101- 103. A further rationale for the “commission”, which was a 
Gandhian translation of “profit”, was justified by the fact that the superior economic position of 
the rich was the result of their natural “abilities” for “acquiring material gain”, which Gandhi did 
not want to “hinder” [Ibid]. 
 
363 M.K. Gandhi, “Duties of Capitalists”, in Young India, 19 December, 1929, The Collected 
Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 48 (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 
1999), at 110. Gandhi reprinted the speech made by G.D. Birla, one of the most prominent 
industrialists, speaking on how the capitalist performs the duty of “production and distribution” 
for the nation, as a “trustee”, with the note that it was an “ideal that would be difficult for even a 
labour man to improve upon”. Also see, “Interview to Charles Petrasch and Others”, in Young 
India, 26 November, 1931, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 54 (New Delhi: 






means of production “is the head guarding their rights.”364 
Like all families, disputes within should be settled peacefully through 
negotiations, not through use, or the threat of use, of force – i.e., class struggle. The key 
terms were “negotiation”, “voluntary arbitration”, and most importantly, “peaceful.” 
Historians have surmised that Gandhi’s formative experience of organizing his first two 
satyagrahas at Champaran and Kheda – where the particular conditions made inter-class 
alliance more than likely –  informed his view about the possibility for negotiated 
resolutions of class antagonisms.365 Moreover, in Kheda, peasant-proprietors as “property 
owners” were particularly suspicious of “violent revolutions” which made them all the 
more willing to appreciate the logic of Gandhian compromise.366 The threat of ‘Violent 
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365 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885 – 1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), at 183 – 187. Also see, 
Stephen Henningham, ‘The Social Setting of the Champaran Satyagraha: The Challenge to an 
Alien Elite’, Indian Economic and Social History Review 13:1 (1976), at 59 – 73, and David 
Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District, 1917 – 1934 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). In Champaran, there was a confluence of interests amongst both the 
peasants and the money-lender/ merchants against the British planters; while in Kheda, 
(relatively) prosperous peasant proprietors were demanding a decrease in their revenue. The fact 
that Gandhi, who never again organized a local rural satyagraha after these, referred to them as 
late as 1941 as something that should be studied as an example of how peasant movements should 
be organized, supports Sarkar’s point about how these experiences shaped his horizons of 
possibility. See, M.K. Gandhi, Constructive Program, its Meaning and Place (Ahmedabad: 
Navjivan, 1941), the Chapter titled “Kisans”. Similarly, the trade union Gandhi formed on the 
explicit principles of “trusteeship” – the Textile Labour Association – depended heavily on the 
fact of Gandhi’s personal contacts with the mill owners of Ahmedabad. In the rest of the country, 
the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), came to be dominated by the communists till the 
Quit India movement. “If I had my way” Gandhi wrote, “I would regulate all the labour 
organizations of India after the Ahmedabad model”. See, M.K. Gandhi, Constructive Program, its 
Meaning and Place (Ahmedabad: Navjivan, 1941), the Chapter titled “Labour”.  
 
366 See, David Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District, 1917 – 1934 (Oxford: 





revolution’, as a shorthand for militant class struggle – given a concrete form recently by 
the Bolsheviks in Russia – lurked prominently in the background. Gandhi strongly 
opposed such a scenario – “a disaster”367 – and whenever any such outbreak, which 
included even a confrontational posture by the peasants that was not necessarily violent, 
he was prompt to condemn it.368  
4.3.2 Slippages 
The very fact that there arose a necessity for such condemnations show that 
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367 “[T]he impending chaos into which, if the capitalist does not wake up betimes, awakened but 
ignorant, famishing millions will plunge the country and which not even the armed force that a 
powerful Government can bring into play can avert. I have hoped that India will successfully 
avert the disaster”. [M.K. Gandhi, “Zamindars and Talukdars”, in Young India, 5 December, 
1929, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 48 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 
Government of India, 1999), at 53 -54].  
 
368 A representative example is this response by Gandhi to the news that peasants in the United 
Province have started a movement of boycott against the landlords, and consequently being 
repressed by the colonial state: “There is little doubt that the kisans […] are not making wise use 
of their newly-found power, In several zemindaris, they are said to have overstepped the mark, 
taken the law into their own hands and to have become impatient […] They are abusing social 
boycott and are turning it into an instrument of violence. They are reported to have stopped the 
supply of water, barber, and other paid services to their zemindars in some instances and even 
suspended payment of the rent due to them. […] It is not contemplated that at any stage of non-
co-operation we would seek to deprive the zemindars of their rent. The kisan movement must be 
confined to the improvement to the status of the kisans and the betterment of the relations 
between the zemindars and them. The kisans must be advised scrupulously to abide by the terms 
of their agreement with the zemindars, whether such agreement is written or inferred from 
custom. Where a custom or even a written contract is bad, they may not try to uproot it by 
violence or without previous reference to the zemindars. In every case there should be a friendly 
discussion with the zemindars and an attempt made to arrive at a settlement.” It is fascinating 
how Gandhi, a staunch critique of colonial forms of legality, transforms land settlements made 
and maintained by the colonial state into a moral obligation to be “scrupulously” abided. [M.K. 
Gandhi, “Zemindars and Ryats”, in Young India, 18 May, 1921, Collected Works of Mahatma 
Gandhi, Vol. 23 , at 158- 159]. All India Congress Committee session in 1938 passed a resolution 
backed heavily by Gandhi condemning “class war”, specifically in view of increasingly assertive 






Gandhi’s hold on the peasantry, his unique ability for borrowing from their conceptual 
repertoire to create a political language that could persuade them translating the 
nationalist cause in their language, was not as uncomplicated or as “spell-binding” as his 
followers and later nationalist historians would claim.369  
Potentially the most radical slippage happened between his own control over his 
message and even his own image. Shahid Amin, taking as his task to investigate how the 
Gandhian message was seen from the perspectives of the peasant of Gorakhpur in 1921, 
found that “the popular notion of ‘Gandhiji's Swaraj’ in Gorakhpur appears to have taken 
shape quite independently of the district leadership of Congress.” 370  The peasant 
perception of “Swaraj” [i.e., Independence] was of a regime in which “taxation would be 
limited to the collection of small cash contributions […], and [in] which the cultivators 
would hold their lands at little more than nominal rents.”371 Gandhi’s visit, more than 
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369 For the purpleness of prose in describing Gandhi’s charismatic appeal to the peasants, few 
have outdone Nehru. For example, this much quoted passage from his Autobiography: 
“Consciously and deliberately meek and humble, yet he was full of power and authority, and he 
knew it [...] His calm, deep eyes would hold one and gently probe into the depths; his voice, clear 
and limpid, would purr its way into the heart and evoke an emotional response. Whether his 
audience consisted of person or a thousand, the charm and magnetism of the man passed on to it 
[…] This process of ‘spell-binding’ was not brought about by oratory or by the hypnotism of 
silken phrases […] It was the utter sincerity of the man and his personality that gripped; he gave 
the impression of tremendous inner reserves of power.” [Jawaharlal Nehru, Towards Freedom: 
The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: John Day Company, 1941), at 190 – 191].  
370 Shahid Amin, “Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern U.P., 1921 -22”, in Subaltern 
Studies III, Ranajit Guha ed., (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), at 52. What made 
Amin’s timeframe relevant was that it was just after Gandhi visited and gave a speech there, and 
the year before an attack on a police station during the first Non-Cooperation movement lead 
Gandhi to call the whole movement off. Amin studied the history of that whole incident from the 
perspective of the local actors in his book length work: Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: 
Chauri Chaura 1922 – 1992 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  
 





impart any specific plan of action, triggered the political imagination of the peasantry, 
making it possible to think of overturning relations of power and domination that had 
seemed inviolable. And even Gandhi himself was not safe from those imaginative 
possibilities – he became variously a divine figure, a fearsome warrior from whom the 
mighty British were running scared, or a man of miraculous power who could punish 
those who defy him. Police stations and markets were attacked chanting Gandhian 
slogans.372 “Though deriving their legitimacy from the supposed orders of Gandhi”, 
Amin concludes, “peasant actions in such cases were framed in terms of what was 
popularly regarded to be just, fair and possible.”373  
Gandhi’s anxiety about the creative possibilities of popular imagination expressed 
itself in his reflections on the need for ‘disciplining’ the masses. “The nation must be 
disciplined to handle mass movements in a sober and methodical manner”, as it cannot 
afford to be “hysterical or mad”.374 ‘Volunteers’, Congress functionaries to specially 
‘train’ the masses, especially around demonstrations or major events, were to be deployed 
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372 Ibid, at 26 – 27; 54 - 55.  
 
373 Ibid, at 55. Amin’s insight is not applicable only to the specific case of Gorakhpur. The 
instances of creative adoption of Gandhian tropes in the cause of militant peasant struggles were 
numerous. The other common thread amongst all these events were the Congress’ consistent 
distancing of itself, even condemning, all of these struggles. See, Tanika Sarkar, "Jitu Santal’s 
movement in Malda, 1924-1932: a study in tribal protest." in Subaltern Studies IV, Ranajit Guha 
ed., (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), at 136-164; David Arnold, ‘Rebellious Hillmen: 
The Gudem Rampa Risings 1839–  1924’, in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies I (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), at 88 – 142.  
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for this process. Such a training in a technique of control was an imperative for the 
success of the nationalist project. In a telling passage, Gandhi wrote: “Before we can 
make real headway, we must train these masses of men who have a heart of gold, who 
feel for their country, who want to be taught and led. But a few intelligent, sincere, local 
workers are needed, and the whole nation can be organized to act intelligently, and 
democracy can be evolved out of mobocracy.”375 
The political horizon of localized, democratic practices of determining the 
collective forms of living, the promises of a vision we had glimpsed in Gandhi’s thought, 
became severely constricted in practice for the peasants. They had to wait patiently for 
the paternalistic benevolence of the zamindars, or follow meticulously the path of 
‘arbitration’ and ‘negotiation’ both lead and initiated by the a functionary of the 
Congress. Their own political agencies – of acting on basis of principles “popularly 
regarded as just, fair, and possible’, were to be denied, and reined in through a 
hierarchical and ever vigilant forms of control.  
 This limitation was the result of a limitation of Gandhi’s own thought – one that 
can be identified as the lack of a material basis for his ideas. Those ideas were not 
derived out of certain concrete practices (say, like the Agrarian republican ideas 
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375 M.K. Gandhi, “Democracy versus Mobocracy”, in Young India, 8 September, 1920, Collected 
Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 21, at 247. Emphasis added. The same article also has an 
extended list of directions for training of volunteers and techniques of crowd control, whose 
similarity to military planning was noted by Ranajit Guha. [See, Ranajit Guha, Dominance 







discussed in Chapter 1), but as a negation of the colonial discourse. For those ideas to be 
actualized, he needed to have a transformative project – to bring about the conditions that 
could sustain his vision. He understood this problem, and his increasing focus and 
elaboration on the ‘constructive project’ as a way to transform village communities was 
an acknowledgment of it. Despite it being taken up by several Gandhian followers, such 
localized interventions – a village and an ashram at a time – by his own admission had 
produced no demonstrable effect by the time independence came about.376 In lieu of the 
limitations of his transformative agenda of, even Gandhi’s principal achievement, his 
ability to bridge the elite-mass divide in nationalist politics reached its limits. The 
peasants were not unthinking actors of both the colonial and nationalist imagination who 
would alternatively be “hypnotized” by Gandhi, or act “hysterical” contrary to his wishes. 
They were rational actors, though the metric of their rationality was distinct and 
autonomous to the elite conceptual universe.377 As they creatively appropriated Gandhian 
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376 In 1941: “This non-violent experiment is still in the making. We have nothing much yet to 
show by way of demonstration […] It will not drop from heaven all of a sudden one fine 
morning. But it has to be built up brick by brick by corporate self-effort. We have traveled a fair 
way in that direction. But a much longer and weary distance has to be covered before we can 
behold Swaraj in its glorious majesty”. M.K. Gandhi, Constructive Program, its Meaning and 
Place (Ahmedabad: Navjivan, 1941), the Chapter titled “Economic Inequality”. 
 
377 This has been one of the most significant insights of the historiography of the Subaltern 
school. As the initial statement of the subaltern studies collective put it: “ Parallel to the domain 
of elite politics there existed throughout the colonial period another domain of Indian politics in 
which the principal actors were not the dominant group of the indigenous society or the colonial 
authorities but the subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass of the laboring population – 
that is, the people. This was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated from elite politics 
nor did its existence depend on the latter […] The co-existence of these two domains or 
streams… was the index of an important historical truth, that is, the failure of the Indian 
bourgeoisie to speak for the nation.” Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies I (Delhi: Oxford 






tropes, they could no longer be viewed as passive receptors of nationalist ideology. In 
their persistent, rebellious expression of their political subjectivity they simultaneously 
demanded that independence should also include a plan for end of their exploitation and 
threatened Congress’s ability to plausibly speak for the nation – though not immediately, 
but potentially. The signs of this conflict were evident in the slippages of Gandhi’s 
mastery of the masses, and the consequent doubt in the possibility of forming a polity 
through individual self-realization without any hierarchical organization. As Sudipta 
Kaviraj notes, at the last instance, Gandhi failed to create a single hegemonic “common 
sense out of the two conceptual languages which emerged in Indian culture through 
colonialism” – that of the elites and the masses.378 While his success as an anti-colonial 
political leader remains beyond question, he ultimately failed to form through that 
movement a “structural base” for the “foundation of an independent Indian state.”379 This 
failure was the historical context in which the necessity for a transformational 
constitutional imagination arose.  
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Transformational Constitutionalism II 
We have discussed in Part I how constitutions, in their original late-eighteenth 
century incarnations, sought to institutionalize the fruits of a revolution. A revolution 
signifies a break with the old order, and a constitution marks the beginning of the new. 
To quote Bruce Ackerman, in their constitutional imaginations, “American and French 
revolutionaries […] aimed for [a] breakthrough in the world of political meaning.”380 In 
this scenario, “constitutions come in to mark the transition from the “Before” to the 
“After” and, “judicial review appears as a possible (but not inevitable) institutional 
device to prevent collective backsliding.”381 Ackerman goes on to claim that not only did 
the Indian constitution makers follow in the footsteps of the American and French 
revolutionaries, they were the most important example of doing so in the twentieth 
century.382  
Now consider the following passage from a decision by the Indian Supreme Court 
in 1958: “[The Petitioner’s argument] overlooks that our Constitution was not written on 
a tabula rasa, that a Federal Constitution had been established under the Government of 
India Act, 1935, and though that has undergone considerable change by way of repeal, 
modification and addition, it still remains the framework on which the present 
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Constitution is built, and that the provisions of the Constitution must accordingly be read 
in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act.”383 This was not an 
incidental comment by Justice Aiyer, but rather a principle for constitutional 
interpretation that has since been followed in several cases and never been overruled.384  
Neither was the Court wrong in its knowledge of history.385 The provision in question – 
regarding distribution of the power of taxation between the center and the states – as well 
as much of the rest of the Constitution, was substantially, if not entirely, derived from the 
corresponding provision in the Government of India Act, 1935. Yet an explicit rule made 
by the highest court in the land stipulating that the last colonial “Constitutional Act” 
should be considered as a relevant interpretative guide for the Constitution of an 
independent India problematizes any simple narrative of a “new beginning”.  
I have claimed instead that the Indian constitution departed from its American and 
French predecessors by seeking to perform social transformation through a constitutional 
path, rather than provide the imprimatur for the completion of one. 386  If it thus 
complicated the relationship between the revolutionary and the constitutional moment, 
how should one place it in terms of a break from the past? What is the Indian 
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constitutional experience’s relationship to the historical coordinates of “Before” and 
“After”?  
Colonial rule was explicitly a despotic rule. There was near complete subjugation 
of social power by political power. That is, there was near absolute autonomy and 
primacy of the state over the society. Of course, societal conflicts did shape the nature of 
actions taken by the state, but it did so in the form of concerns of governance 
comprehended from the subject position of the colonial administrator and through the 
lens of colonial knowledge, not through any conceivable idea of political representation. 
The justificatory framework for the subjugation was provided by the claim that the 
colonized society was backward and lacked the necessary ability for self-governance. The 
complete denial of agency to the ruled provided unlimited authority to the ruler. The 
language through which colonial rule operated – that of law and administrative directives 
– originated primarily from the necessities of running the state. In time, a class of the 
elites emerged who became educated and well versed in that language, and in the art of 
how to negotiate with the state through it.  
Gandhi’s anti-colonial move was to invert this whole relationship by asserting a 
claim for the radical potential of autonomy inherent to Indian society, temporarily 
subverted by the colonial political domination. Politically, this allowed him to mobilize 
the rural masses, which had remained outside the sphere of colonial education, to the 
anti-colonial cause under the leadership of Congress. This made Congress’s claim to 





democracy a real possibility. Therefore, the alliance forged under the leadership of 
Gandhi between the urban elites who constituted the leadership of Congress and the rural 
peasantry informed the nature of the eventual break from colonial rule. This break can be 
understood as a transition from an unrepresentative absolutist state to a representative 
democratic one.  
At the same time, Gandhi’s demand for an autonomous and self-regulating society 
posited a postcolonial social order without a modern state. His arguments for freeing 
Indian society from the control of the colonial state could also extend to the postcolonial 
variant of the latter, which was precisely what Gandhi’s position was at the eve of 
independence. India had to free itself not just from colonial rule, but from the entire 
conceptual universe of modernity that came to its shore with the British. Otherwise, 
freedom would only be partial and essentially meaningless. It would be “English rule 
without the Englishman.”  
A schism appeared between Gandhi and the leadership of Congress – especially 
Nehru, his chosen successor – on this particular point. They were loyal and admiring 
followers of Gandhi’s political leadership of three decades, and deferent to his 
momentous ability to bridge the divide between elite and mass political consciousness to 
forge a truly popular anti-colonial movement. They acknowledged that it was Gandhi’s 
political leadership that had allowed the Congress to truly claim the mantle of the 
representative body of the Indian people, and have a constitutional vision based on the 





colonial rule. However, they saw that development as a foundation for fulfilling the 
promise of a modern nation state.   
Gandhi’s unqualified critique of Western modernity failed to convince the 
leadership in charge of building the new postcolonial nation. In their mind, it was not 
modernity itself, but the compromised form in which it had come to India that was the 
problem. Colonialism, in their view, had distorted the process of historical progress that 
has been achieved by modern nations elsewhere. Colonial historiography shifted the 
burden of this blocked progress on to the Indian society itself by consigning it to a 
perpetual “waiting room of history.” Gandhi had sought to counter this by shifting from a 
narrative based on history to one based on myth. He conceptualized an abiding and 
harmonious Indian social form that stood proudly outside of history, and wholly rejected 
historicist categories like progress, rather than try to measure up to them. Nehru, in turn, 
rejected this mythical foundation for a new society, which he felt was “completely 
unreal.”387 Rather, he and the founding elite wanted to reclaim India’s place within the 
time of modernity. When the removal of the impediment to the path of progress was in 
sight, the solution was to correct the distortions in, rather than reject entirely, the path of 
development. “The whole question” Nehru wrote in a letter to Gandhi, “is how to achieve 
[a developed] society and what its content should be. […] We have to put down certain 
objectives like a sufficiency of food, clothing, housing, education, sanitation etc. which 
should be the minimum requirements for the country and for everyone. It is with these 
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objectives in view that we must find out specifically how to attain them speedily.”388 
Gandhi’s ideas were entirely inadequate to solving these problems. “I do not understand 
why a village should necessarily embody truth and non-violence”, Nehru continued. “A 
village, normally speaking, is backward intellectually and culturally and no progress can 
be made from a backward environment.” 389  
There were two related set of transitions that the post-colonial nation builders had 
to undertake. On the one hand, they had to transition from an unrepresentative to a 
representative polity. At the same time, they had to change the abject social condition in 
which the colonized subjects resided to one that could provide the basis for proper 
democratic citizenship. The transition from subjects to citizens was not just a question of 
ascribing formal political rights, but one for which the social basis also had to be 
provided.  
The necessity of acknowledging both these tasks was underlined by the 
postcolonial founders. A Congress resolution drafted by Nehru stated that, “the great 
misery of the Indian People are due not only to foreign exploitation in India but also to 
the economic structure of society, which the alien rulers support so that their exploitation 
may continue. [Therefore] it is essential to make revolutionary changes in the present 
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economic and social structure of society and to remove the gross inequalities.”390 On a 
more somber note, B.R. Ambedkar said in his concluding speech to the Constituent 
Assembly, “On the 26th of January, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In 
politics we shall be recognizing the principle of one man, one vote, one value. In our 
social and economic life, we shall, by reason of economic structure continue to deny [this 
principle]. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradiction? If we continue to 
deny it for long, we will do so by putting our democracy in peril.”391 
How was the contradiction that Ambedkar refers to to be resolved and the tasks 
set out in the Congress resolutions accomplished? A non state based model of social 
change through moral regeneration as suggested by Gandhi had so far proven inadequate 
(or even problematic) as our discussion of the limits of the Gandhian project had shown. 
In the mind of the Congress leaders the only body capable of carrying out a project of 
social transformation this ambitious was a modern state machinery. Hence, the point was 
not to completely negate the colonial political order, but to renegotiate its relationship to 
society. The state institutions were to be directed by the prevailing opinions in society 
through a process of democratic representation. At the same time, the state would 
intervene in society with the intention of transforming it. The Constitution became the 
terrain on which this renegotiation was to be mapped. It was to be the mode through 
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which the state-society relationship formulated under colonialism was to be reconfigured, 
rather than inverted.  
In this context we can return to the question of break and continuity. The most 
significant break was to acknowledge the principle of representative government in its 
fullest form, through a universal adult franchise. A right that took more than a century, 
and several mass political struggles, to be granted in full by Western Constitutions was 
affirmed at the very inception of the Indian Constitution, with minimal debate.  
Yet as I have mentioned, this radically new vision, an “experiment the result of 
which no one [is] able to forecast,”392 required an ambitious plan of state intervention to 
transform society. This in turn required a well-organized state apparatus that could carry 
on that task. That apparatus was all available to the postcolonial elite in the form of the 
existing colonial state machinery. The Congress therefore decided to preserve it almost 
intact with the necessary calibration of its raison d’être. Speaking to police officers, 
Nehru reminded them, that under “the previous period of administration,” their “main 
duty was only to keep the state going.”393 Now however, the “major problem for India is 
that of development”, and  “the army and the police […] provide the background because 
they create the conditions in which development is possible.”394 The fact that a large 
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portion of the Indian Constitution was a copy of the Government of India Act of 1935, 
has to be understood in the context of the need to provide this background.395 To the 
charge that the Constitution is an ‘imitation’ of its colonial predecessor, Ambedkar 
clarified that “the provisions taken from the Government of India Act, 1935, relate 
mostly to the details of administration.”396  
Along with the institutional level, we can identify another, deeper, level in which 
continuity with the colonial era existed – the interventionary nature of the colonial state 
and the discourses it produced. Unlike the structure of the institutions where continuity 
was almost absolute (in their functions, personnel, organizations, etc.), continuity at the 
discursive level was more subtle and complex. While a momentous shift occurred in 
terms of the motivations, logic, and ideology undergirding the interventions, the mode in 
which the interventions happened and the conceptual structure within which the 
interventions were conceived often remained derived. The most significant of these for 
our purpose is the understanding that law could be a tool of social transformation, and the 
training in how to translate a social transformative agenda in the language of law. We 
will follow the implications of both in the next Part.  
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 Therefore, within the historical milieu in which the Indian constitution was 
conceived, break and continuity did not exist as two distinct moments, but as two co-
existent moments inseparably linked to each other. Overcoming the colonial order 
required the sublimation of some of its features and ideologies within the new 
constitution. This dialectic was the outcome of the renegotiating the inherited relationship 
between the state and society, and the two central premise of such a renegotiation – 
democracy and social transformation. Renegotiation, rather than a simple act of 
institutionalizing a new order, meant that the constituent assembly was dealing with a 
situation that was, in Nehru’s words, “dynamic, moving, [and] changing”.397 To write a 
constitution in condition of flux, both existing and potential, was the unique challenge 
facing the framers – that is, how to give their vision for India a specific constitutional 
form. How they faced up to that challenge is what we are going to investigate in the next 
part.  
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Words are magic things often enough, but even the magic of words sometimes cannot 
convey the magic of the human spirit. And so [the Constitution] seeks very feebly to tell 
the world of what we have thought or dreamt of so long, and what we now hope to 
achieve in the near future.  
    Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates. 
 
Introduction: Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Social Transformation 
The idea that an independent India should have a constitutional government was 
prevalent amongst the leadership of the Congress from the 1920s onwards, right along the 
time it emerged as the preeminent party of the anti-colonial movement due to the success 
of the Gandhi’s first satyagraha. Congress leaders overwhelmingly understood the term 
‘constitution’ in its liberal sense – as a document that limits the power of the state. Since 
the primary political experience of the movement was repression and a denial of 
democratic representation by a despotic executive, such a conception was entirely logical. 
The aspiration was for India to become a constitutional democracy like the nations of the 
West, where the First World War had finally brought an end to the ‘long nineteenth 
century’ and established the ideological monopoly of constitutional governments without 





In a speech delivered in 1925, Motilal Nehru said that the primary constitutional 
principle for India had to be a limit on the executive power of the government, and its 
accountability to the legislature.398 In 1927, the Madras session of the Congress passed a 
resolution for the drafting of a Swaraj Constitution, and made Nehru the chair of the 
drafting committee. The ‘Nehru Report’ – the first Congress document outlining a 
constitutional structure for an independent India – gave a concrete shape to this liberal 
democratic vision. It provided for universal adult suffrage, an executive accountable to 
the legislature (in accordance with the Westminster model), and a written bill of rights.399 
It also contained a few provision specific to India,400 and incorporated certain social 
rights like social security and living wage.401 An enumerated ‘bill of rights’, protecting 
the rights of individuals against the state, was seen as an “absolutely necessary” part of 
the constitution.402 Thus the aspiration, widely shared by the leadership of the Congress 
in the 1920s and 1930s, was that the Indian Constitution was to be framed in accordance 
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398 Motilal Nehru Speech, September 7, 1925 at the Central Legislative Assembly, in B. Shiva 
Rao, Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol. I, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public 
Administration, 1966), at 41. [Hereinafter, ‘Shiva Rao’]. 
 
399 See, ‘The Nehru Report’, compiled in Shiva Rao, Vol. I, at 58 - 76.  
 
400 For example, Article 4 (xvi), which stated “No breach of contract of service or abetment 
thereof shall be made a criminal offence’, was in reaction to the Workman’s Breach of Contract 
Act, 1859, which was used widely for regressive practices of forced labor, and for disciplining 
labor in general.  
 
401 For example, Article 4(xvii), of the ‘Fundamental Rights’ section: “Parliament shall make 
suitable laws for the maintenance of health and fitness for work of all citizens, securing a living 
wage for every worker, the protection of motherhood, welfare of children, and the economic 
consequence of old age, infirmity and unemployment.” 
 
402 In several resolutions passed by the Congress, most importantly at the Madras Congress of 






with the liberal principles enshrined in the bourgeois constitutions of the West,403 which 
they had studied and adapted from widely. This constitutional structure was not that of a 
republic however, but of a dominion – similar to Australia, Canada, or South Africa at the 
time.404  
From the mid-1930s, yet another notion of the term ‘constitution’ began to 
emerge within the Congress. In 1935, the British Parliament enacted – largely excluding 
Indians from the drafting process – the Government of India Act, which was to serve as a 
new ‘Constitution’ for India. 405  The Act, while expanding the electorate and the 
jurisdiction of the provincial assemblies, nevertheless preserved, even strengthened, the 
powers of the centralized executive headed by the Viceroy. The governors (executive 
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Chatterjee argues, “the legal-institutional forms of political authority that nationalists subscribed 
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404 The demand for dominion status, similar to the settler colonies of Britain, was a centerpiece of 
Congress from the beginning of the twentieth century. In the 1906 session of the Congress, a 
resolution was adopted that read: “This Congress is of the opinion that the system of government 
obtaining in the self-governing British colonies should be extended to India.” In 1908, the new 
Congress Party Constitution began with this Article: “The object of the Indian National Congress 
are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the 
self governing members of the British empire and a participation by them in the rights and 
responsibilities of the empire on equal terms with those members.” [Reginald Coupland, The 
Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problems in India (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1944), at 37].  
 
405 For a detailed account of the making of the Act in the context of the domestic tensions within 
British politics, and the debate around imperial policies, see, Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics 






heads of the province) exercised ‘discretionary powers’ over the representative legislative 
assemblies, which could be dismissed by him at any time. Crucial sectors like the 
military, central bank, railways, and foreign policy, were kept entirely outside the control 
of the legislatures. In other words, it was a highly centralized structure, lead by an 
omnipotent executive, who functioned with no real oversight of the representative bodies. 
Furthermore, the act made no mention of dominion status for India, let alone 
independence.   
The Congress, which had strongly opposed the act at every stage of deliberation, 
was now called upon to define its own constitutional vision in starkly contrasting terms. 
In 1936, the Faizpur session of the Congress passed a resolution, stating: “The Congress 
stands for a genuine democratic state in India where political power has been transferred 
to the people as a whole and the government is under their effective control. Such a state 
can only come into existence through a Constituent Assembly, elected by adult 
suffrage.”406 A constitution no longer signified just a legal document providing for 
representative and limited government; it came to be closely aligned with the notion of a 
sovereign people.407 The Congress had already made explicit commitments to universal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
406 Faizpur Congress Resolution, December, 1936, as compiled in, Shiva Rao, Vol. I, at 83.  
 
407 The concept of popular sovereignty was invoked in its fullest sense by Nehru in a speech in 
the following year. “The Constituent assembly that we demand will come into being only as the 
expression of the will and the strength of the Indian people; it will function when it has sanctions 
behind it to give effect to its decisions without reference to outside authority. It will represent the 
sovereignty of the Indian people and will meet as the arbiter of our destiny.” Nevertheless, 
Congress never dwell much upon the extra-legal aspect of popular sovereignty. Indeed, the 
constituent assembly, when it would come into being later, would be formed under the authority 
of a law passed by the British parliament. [See, Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Speech at the National 





franchise and democratic institutions. These commitments assumed a central role in their 
constitutional vision. As the political rhetoric of this time shows, the integrity of a vision 
for a constitutional structure based on the will of the people and Congress’s claim to be 
the principal representative of the popular voice, found legitimacy from these specific 
commitments. 
While the ‘People’ entered the constitutional arena in theory, Congress was also 
getting a sense of the ‘people’ as voters on the ground, as it fought and won by a 
landslide its first election in 1936. The experience of building an electoral organization, 
alliances, and addressing concerns in meetings and rallies, gave the Congress leaders a 
sense of the challenges the material conditions of the country posed in creating a stable 
basis for a popular government. The ‘People’, some in the Congress began to argue, 
could not be presumed to exist independent of their necessities, especially when those 
necessities were so acute. The social question could not be avoided. In a 1937 speech 
dedicated to demanding the convening of a constituent assembly for Indians, Jawaharlal 
Nehru said, “They cry aloud for succor, these unhappy millions of our countrymen, […] 
We talk of swaraj and independence, but in human terms it means relief to the masses 
from their unutterable sorrow and misery.”408 For these masses, Nehru claimed, voting 
was a “pilgrimage” for the establishment of a new constitution through which “they 
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would themselves have the power to liquidate the poverty that consumed them.”409 A new 
constitutional vision for India, in this telling, necessarily addressed the material 
conditions of Indian society.  
These two ideas of constitution, one in which it was seen primarily as a juridical 
text to constitute and limit state power, and the other where it was a vehicle for solving 
material deprivation in society, never really became two opposing visions fighting for 
supremacy within the Congress. Economic conservatives410 and liberals were obviously 
in favor of the former and the socialists and communists in the favor of the latter. For the 
former, the Indian Constitution should have provided for a limited government in the 
eighteenth century (rather than post-New Deal) American model. To translate such a 
disposition in the terms of this dissertation, it would be constitutionalism minus the 
transformational part. The communists preferred the path shown by Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, while the socialists, not willing to go that far, preferred a strong state and few 
legal or procedural impediments in the path of a thoroughgoing structural transformation. 
Again in the terms of this dissertation, this would be transformational, without the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
409 Ibid, at 87 – 88.  
 
410 It is important to distinguish between economic and religious conservatives in India of this 
time. Religious conservatism, would signify the Hindu nationalists of Jan Sangh, who were in 
favor of a strong brand of ethnic and cultural nationalism, and desired to build India as a Hindu 
state. While their political influence was extremely limited at this time – to be further hampered 
when a Hindu nationalist murdered Gandhi in 1948 – few of their members and sympathizers did 
appear in the Constituent Assembly, most prominent amongst them being Shyamaprasad 
Mukherjee. The economic conservatives, on the other hand, were essentially pro-property rights. 
They would eventually form their own party – the Swatantra Party – in the fifties, as an explicit 
reaction against the Nehruvian project of social transformation. However, at the time of the 
Constituent Assembly, most of these economic conservatives belonged to the Congress Party 





constitutionalism in all but the name. But within the horizon of political possibilities of 
late 1940s India, neither of those groups were organized political movements that could 
mobilize a significant section of the country, and those preferences therefore never 
became a coherent alternative vision. Hence conservatives and liberals acknowledged the 
need for state intervention to correct certain social ills; and the socialists were not only 
strong supporters of (and subsequently active participants in) a democratic system, but 
they also supported the project of drafting a constitution that included adequate checks 
and balance.   
As a result, while one could identify different members in the Constituent 
Assembly who advocated aspects of one constitutional vision over the other, there was 
never a serious debate between two distinct systems as competing alternatives. Instead 
these two visions were held together in a peculiar dialectic of aspirations and possibilities 
— two aspects within the same overarching project of creating a modern democratic state 
by correcting the distortions introduced by colonial rule. The first strand, of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism, was the aspirational element of this vision. It was the 
constitutional structure that the leadership of the Congress sought to eventually establish. 
At the same time, the second strand was reflective of the awareness brought about by the 
experience of mass political organizing, that the material foundations for such a 
constitutional structure was not yet present. The latter did not displace the former, but 
clarified it. And hence there was the need for the constituent process to acknowledge and 
engage with the process of addressing the ‘social question’. The final version of the 





A contrasting comparison with contemporaneous experiments in Latin America to 
make the social question a part of the constitutional design will make this point clear. 
Around this time in the countries in Latin America, the demands of the assertive working 
class resulted in – inspired by the Mexican Constitution of 1917 – the incorporation of 
various social rights onto the existing constitutional architecture of the state created in the 
nineteenth century.411 In other words, these constitutions added the new social concerns 
to an existing constitutional matrix, without altering the fundamental structure of the 
latter.412 That structure, constituted through a previous nineteenth century compromise 
between liberals and conservatives, contained a powerful anti-democratic strain within it 
– manifested by a strong and centralized executive and restrictions on popular 
participation in government.413 The uneasy marriage that came out of these attempts 
meant that the social aspirations of these constitutions remained either unfulfilled, or 
short-lived.414  
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412 See, Roberto Gargarella, ‘Grafting Social Rights onto Hostile Constitutions’, Texas Law 
Review 89 (2011), at 1537 – 1555.  
 
413  For an analysis of the history and structure of nineteenth century Latin American 
constitutionalism, see, Roberto Gargarella, The Legal Foundations of Inequality: 
Constitutionalism in the Americas, 1776 – 1880 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
 
414 This is an old critique of Latin American populism expressed in the language of constitutional 
theory. Gargarella, quotes Arturo Sampay, who drafted the Argentine constitution – a typical 
version of this model – during the rule of Juan Perón. His reflections on the shortcomings of the 
experiment bring the two critiques together. “The Constitutional reform of 1949 was not properly 
conducive to the predominance of the people, [through] the exercise of political power by the 
popular sectors. This was due, first, to the faith that the triumphant popular sectors had in the 





The problem was posed in a different way in the minds of the Indian leaders. In 
the historical moment they inhabited, constitutionalism, democracy, and social justice did 
not arise as a project in a sequential form. Rather they arose not only as coeval demands, 
but also as at the least inextricably linked to, and at the most dependent on, one another. 
The drafting of the Constitution was therefore an exercise in crafting a clear institutional 
statement through a careful calibration of the interrelation between the potentially 
conflicting demands of constitutional government, democracy, and social transformation.  
The terrain of property rights was where the tensions between these three primary 
goals was the most acute, and the calibrations most careful. The constitutional provisions 
dealing with property rights were the ones that took the longest to debate and draft. 
Article 31 – the clause that outlined the constitutional rule regarding acquisition of 
property by the state – took all of three years to draft, and even then it was amended 
within the first year. In other words, it was the property question that demanded the most 
complex and elaborate formulation of the transformational constitutional project. Hence, 
in this part of the praxis, I will focus primarily, though not exclusively, on debates and 
negotiations either directly addressing, or arising out of, the property question. To 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
who did everything possible to prevent the popular sectors achieving actual power that could 
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prepare the ground for that, there is a need to provide a brief sketch of the backdrop in 
which the property question arose and was debated. 
In the minds of the modernizing nationalist elite, the property question was 
overwhelmingly an agrarian question. The social order of the Indian countryside in mid-
twentieth century was both complex and diverse.415 If one glanced over the terrain, one 
would encounter large landlord estates in Bengal, the Indus basin, and the Gangetic 
plains, large peasant cultivators in Madras and Bombay, and a predominance of large 
family holdings in Eastern Punjab and Western India. Each of these had its unique and 
specific legal arrangements – in the forms of legislations, administrative rules, and case 
laws – that governed it. Yet within this composite landscape, we can identify a few basic 
themes that stand out.416 The first such theme is the massive inequality in distribution of 
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problematic nature of trying to generalize the nature of agrarian relations for the whole of India, 
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historians is that the there were different agrarian milieus existing side by side in India, much like 
in the whole continent of Europe, and hence the need for regionally focused studies, which can at 
best speak to each other comparatively. This work is not a work of history, neither does it add 
something to our knowledge of the peasant society. From the point of view of the constitution, 
which necessarily generalized the agrarian terrain, constructing as it were a legal and institutional 
framework for all of India, we need construct certain broad brushed thematic that informed and 
challenged the constitution makers. Those seeking a more nuanced treatment of different peasant 
societies in India, should consult the works mentioned below. A useful discussion on the need for 
regional focus in peasant studies in India can be found in, David Ludden, Peasant History in 
South India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).  
 
416 There exists an extensive body of work that describes the economic landscape of the Indian 
countryside in the decades leading up to the independence. I have reconstructed this brief 
summary and the stylized themes relevant to my project, with reference to the following works: 
David Ludden, An Agrarian History of South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860 – 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); K.N. Raj, ‘Ownership and Distribution of Land’, Indian Economic 
Review 5:1 (1970); Tirthankar Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India: Labour and 





land. By official estimates, in 1951, 17 per cent of land-holdings were less than 1 acre in 
area, and 59 per cent were less than 5 acres, which was below the minimum required for 
a viable, self sufficient farm in most parts of the country. 417  In comparison, the 
Darbhanga estate, the biggest landed estate in the state of Bihar, covered an area of 
1,536,000 acres.418 In terms of proportion of the population, 23 per cent of rural 
households owned no land at all in during this period, and 75 per cent owned less than 5 
acres.419 Therefore, the overwhelming majority of the population who were in villages, 
were either landless or land deprived (that is, one whose own cultivable land was too 
small for subsistence).420 The most significant reason for this was the operations of the 
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India”, in Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 2, c. 1757 – c. 1970, ed. Dharma Kumar 
and Meghnad Desai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 86 – 176; Sugata Bose, 
Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919 – 1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); Eric Stokes, “Agrarian Relations: Northern and Central India”, in 
Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 2, c. 1757 – c. 1970, Ed. Dharma Kumar and 
Meghnad Desai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 36 – 86; David Ludden, 
Peasant History in South India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).  
Sources of specific data and arguments have been cited separately.  
 
417 Government of India, Agricultural Labour Enquiry, Volume I: All India, (Delhi, 1955), at 3. 
The proportion of small and large landholdings varied greatly across regions due to differences in 
colonial land settlements, and climatic reasons. Generally, the wetter, more fertile parts of the 
country, like Bengal, Bihar, and Kerala, had higher concentration of small land holdings, and the 
drier regions, like Punjab, Gujarat, and Central Provinces had a higher concentration of large land 
holdings. This would greatly affect the nature of agrarian politics in the respective regions. 
  
418 Stephen Hennigham, ‘Bureaucracy and Control in India’s Great Landed Estates: The Raj 
Darbhanga of Bihar, 1879 – 1950’, Modern Asian Studies 17:1 (1983), at 36. 
    
419 As per National Sample Survey (1954 -55), cited in, B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern 
India, 1860 – 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), at 78. 
 
420 An overwhelming majority of the rural population – 90 percent by some estimates – were 







land market, inaugurated by the colonial revenue settlements, and accelerated by the 
increasing integration of the Indian agrarian sector to networks of global trade and credit.  
The second major theme is that of different types of production relations existing 
side by side. The large portion of the agrarian workforce was bound by what has been 
called a semi-feudal relation of production, most commonly known as the zamindari 
system, though that was not its exclusive form. It was semi-feudal in the sense that it 
could not “move into full-fledged capitalism because it depends on feudal forms of power 
(caste, patriarchy, and direct coercion) but also could not remain fully feudal because it 
needs and feeds the capitalist economy and modern state.”421 In other words, production 
was conducted with the capitalist market in view, and under the aegis of ‘modern’ legal 
institution, but its functioning fundamentally depended on various ‘traditional’ forms of 
extra-economic coercion and symbols of deference. In Ranajit Guha’s words, the peasant 
was subject to a “composite apparatus of domination,” constituted by political and social 
actors such as landlords, moneylenders, government officials, and the upper castes.422 Yet 
another form of composite labor, combining elements of capitalist credit economy and 
feudal serfdom, was debt bondage, where inability to repay debt would often force an 
individual, and his descendants to be tied to a relation of perpetual servanthood.423 
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Complimenting these relations of production were exploitative labor practices based 
almost entirely on extra-economic forms of coercion, such as the performance of menial 
or degrading forms of labor in the villages by certain lower castes and ‘untouchable’ 
communities. There also existed the widespread practice of forced labor, or begaar, most 
often exercised by the functionaries of the state or local landlords for infrastructural and 
public works projects. The labor force at the plantations and mines, often migrant 
agricultural labor, were forced to work under by the explicit force of the law – in 
particular through the draconian doctrine of criminal breach of contract.424 Existing, 
alongside this were large or medium farmers, the one’s most closely approximating the 
agrarian bourgeoisie of Europe who produced for the market, as well as a flourishing 
market in rural credit, linked outwardly to global networks of finance, and maintained 
inwardly through a familiar apparatus of domination. The extremities of these forms of 
labor – spanning from conditions of bonded servitude to capitalist farmers – each 
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simply an economic exchange between debt and labor, but rather deeply embedded in traditional 
networks of hierarchy, deference, and communal norms.  
 
424 The most commonly invoked law based on this principle was the Workman’s Breach of 
Contract Act, 1859. It went explicitly against the common law principle that a breach of contract 
should be a civil matter, payable by damages, not the curtailing of liberty. The Act was justified 
by maintaining that the laborers would not be able to pay damages, and hence should be forced to 
perform their contract. The contract in question though, was almost always based on fraud and 
misrepresentation to illiterate and poor agrarian workers, who had no recourse, including leaving 
the worksite. The result was a state of bonded labor underwritten by the force of the law. For 
more on the colonial use of the doctrine of criminal breach of contract, see, Michael Anderson, 
‘India 1858 – 1930: The Illusion of Free Labour’, in Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in 
Britain and the Empire, 1652 – 1955, Douglas Hay and Paul Craven eds., (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), and Ravi Ahuja, ‘The Origins of Colonial Labour 






maintained through the composite spheres of politics, culture and economy, constituted 
the extraordinarily uneven terrain of agrarian relations of production in India.  
The third, and last major theme relevant to us is that of underdevelopment. The 
agrarian sector in India, facing variegated factors of social hierarchies, colonial 
distortions, lack of investments, and technological and infrastructural inputs, was stuck in 
a period of stagnation since the late eighteenth century. The average rate of growth in 
agriculture, for the first half of twentieth century was a meager 0.4 percent.425 The 
problem of productivity had a significant impact on food security, and hence food prices, 
from the 1930s onwards. Moreover, it also meant that there was a worrying lack of 
capital accumulation in agriculture. Therefore, agriculture, which employed nearly two-
thirds of the national workforce, only contributed one-fifths of the private capital 
accumulation in the country during the inter-war years.426 Hence, the accumulation of 
agrarian capital, which provided the necessary surplus in the initial stages of industrial 
development in almost all Western countries, was nowhere close to doing so in India. The 
problem of underdevelopment therefore manifested itself through three kinds of 
challenges – poverty, scarcity of food, and an inadequate base for industrial development. 
Inequality, underdevelopment, and differential stages of development – these 
were the three major problems of the post-colonial socio-economic condition that 
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425 Tirthankar Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India: Labour and Livelihood (London: 
Routledge, 2005), at 42.  
 
426  B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860 – 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge 





required remedying. Taken together, the developmental and economic vision that sought 
to address these problems consisted of the Congress’s social transformational agenda. 
Addressing any one of those problems, especially in an urgent manner as promised by 
Congress, required either the violation of certain existing property rights, or 
differentiating between different types of property to regulate and even abolish some 
(e.g., zamindari). At the same time, these violations had to be managed within a system 
that provided security for property rights in keeping with the demands of a democratic 
constitutional system, and Congress’ stated vision about the future of the country. 
Bringing these two strands together within the same constitutional document required not 
only accommodating two distinct ideological positions (one privileging the need for 
social transformation and the other the security of property), but also three distinct 
subject positions – that of the planner (concerned with developmental policy at a 
technocratic level), the lawyer (concerned with doctrinal purity regarding property law), 
and that of the politician (concerned with democratic accountability and stability of 
political rule). In this Part, we will investigate how conflicts and negotiations between 
these different positions shaped the Indian Constitution, and generated the contradictions 








The Constituent Assembly came about on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan, 
accepted by both the Congress and the Muslim League in May 16, 1946.427 Under this 
plan, the provincial assemblies elected the year before were to act as electors for 
members of the Constituent Assembly. This went against Congress’s long standing 
demand for a constituent body formed on the basis of universal adult franchise.428 Under 
the circumstances, an indirect election through the provincial assemblies meant that only 
about 10 percent of the population could participate, indirectly, in the selection 
process.429 Nevertheless, this was viewed as the “only practicable course” since arranging 
for special elections for the purpose of choosing the assembly members would have led to 
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427 The Cabinet Mission consisted of three members of the Labour Cabinet in Britain, who, along 
with the Governor General held repeated and complex negotiations on transfer of power, 
partition, and drafting a new constitution with Indian leaders, from March to June, 1946. From 2 
September, 1946, an interim government headed by Nehru took charge at the center. 
  
428 Made as far back in 1928, in the Nehru Commission Report, and part of Congress’ official 
platform ever since.  
 
429 Under the voting rules in place for the election to the provincial assembly, proposed by the 
Simon Commission Report, and enacted by the Government of India Act, 1935, the right to 
franchise had a property requirement, thereby excluding most of the population. Sumit Sarkar, B. 
Shivarao, and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay all suggest the amount to have been about 10 percent of the 
population. Granville Austin, however, claims that it would have been closer to 28 percent. See, 
Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885 – 1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), at 427; Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partitition: A History of Modern India (New Delhi: Orient 
Longman, 2004); Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), at 5. The proportion was one member per a million 






a “wholly unacceptable delay”.430 The overwhelming majority that the Congress enjoyed 
in the Provincial Assemblies, and the exit of the majority of the Muslim League members 
from the Assembly after Partition, meant the Congress had de facto control of the 
Assembly.  
The Congress sought the inclusion of eminent public figures, including political 
opposition, who were not members of the party. 431 This included influential members 
like K.M. Munshi,432 A.K. Ayyar,433 N.G. Ayyangar, H.M. Kunzru, and of course, B.R. 
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430 Sumit Sarkar claims that “the prospect of achieving early power through negotiation” is what 
made the Congress agree to the Cabinet Mission Plan. [Sumit Sarkar, “Indian Democracy: The 
Historical Inheritance”, in Atul Kohli ed., The Success of India’s Democracy, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001), at 34.] It is unclear, as with all counterfactuals in history, 
what would have happened if the Assembly was elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. 
One can only wonder whether such an election, where the drafting of the Constitution was an 
explicit stake, would have produced smaller political grouping, or crystallization of issues 
through the process of campaigns. On a different note, whether this constituted a lack as far as the 
Constituent Assembly was concerned was a point raised several times during the debates, most 
strongly during the debating of the amendment clause. H.V. Kamath, a leftwing member of 
Congress, said that it was “illogical” to have a strong amendment clause since the Assembly that 
was elected by only a small part of the population should not seek to entrench its views against a 
Parliament that would be elected by all.  
 
431  A telling absence from the Assembly was that of the Congress socialists – an official faction 
within the Congress— partly a result of their own indecision as to whether to join the Assembly 
or when to do so. There was one representative of the Communist Parties who lost his place after 
the reapportionment of the seats from Bengal following Partition.  
Consequently, these were the two groups who were the most persistent critique of the 
Constitution from the outside. Per Ambedkar: “The condemnation of the Constitution largely 
comes from two quarters, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party.” B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 
November 25, 1949. 
 
432 Munshi, a well-known lawyer from Bombay, had previously been a member of Congress. He 
was a member of Congress until 1941, when he officially resigned from the party. Munshi would 
be one of the most consistently liberal voice in the Assembly, and one who argued for, 
successfully, the broad powers of judicial review included in the Constitution. He would later 
become one of the founding members of the Swatantra Party, perhaps the only avowedly pro-






Ambedkar, who was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee. As significant as these 
gestures were, there is little room to doubt the control of the Congress leadership on the 
process of drafting. Ambedkar in his concluding speech to the Assembly acknowledged 
as much, saying: “It is because of the discipline of the Congress party that the Drafting 
Committee was able to pilot the Constitution in the Assembly with the sure knowledge as 
to the fate of each article and each amendment.”434 Four years later, he would describe 
that ‘discipline’ in less charitable terms –  “People always keep on saying to me: oh, you 
are the maker of the Constitution. My answer is I was a hack. What I was asked to do, I 
did much against my will.” 435  The Congress leadership, who presumably ‘asked’ 
Ambedkar to do what he had to, was made of the quartet Granville Austin had described 
as the “oligarchy”.436 Amongst them the two most influential were Jawaharlal Nehru and 
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433 Perhaps the most well known legal professional in an Assembly that was filled with lawyers, 
Ayyar had been the advocate general of Madras, and acted, until he joined the Assembly, as a 
standing counsel for the zamindars of the Madras Presidency.   
 
434 B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, November 25, 1949.  
 
435 From Ambedkar’s speech at the Proceedings of the Council of States, September, 1953. 
Quoted in, Aditya Nigam, ‘A Text without an Author: Locating the Constituent Assembly as an 
Event’, in Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, ed., Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), at 119.  
Ambedkar’s suggestion of the veto power held by the Congress leadership over the final version 
of any draft found explicit expressions even on the floor of the Assembly. During the concluding 
debates about the Draft Constitution, Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla said: “I remember that many 
sections of our Draft Constitution had to be recast as many as seven times. A draft section is 
prepared according to the best in each of the members of the Drafting Committee.[…] Then it is 
considered by the biggest bloc, the majority party in the House – I refer to the Congress 
Parliamentary Party, who alone can give the imprimatur of adoption in this House. And 
sometimes we found that they made their own recommendations which had to be put into the 
proper legal and constitutional shape by the members of the Drafting Committee.” [CAD, 21 
November, 1949]. 
 
436 According to Austin, they were Jawaharlal Nehru, Ballabhbhai Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam 





Vallabhbhai Patel, who were respectively the Prime Minister and the Home Minister of 
the interim government at the time.437 Given that they had related but distinct spheres of 
influence and very different sets of belief, the near equal influence of the two meant that 
there was a complex interplay of forces, making the process more dynamic and open to 
negotiations than Ambedkar’s statements would suggest.438  
5.1 Of Consensus and Conflict: Theorizing Indian Politics  
5.1.1 Consensus and its Limits 
Congress’s ability to act as a mediating institution between the different interest 
groups in society, and its internal mechanisms for resolution of conflicts, gives rise to an 
idea of the postcolonial ruling elite both democratic and consensual – which in turn fits 
perfectly with the allusions of the ‘constitution as a compromise’ narrative. In political 
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437 Nehru, the democratic socialist in spirit if not in action, was the national leader of the party: 
the one who controlled the machineries of the government, and enjoyed the popular support of the 
country. Patel on the other hand was the man who had a greater sway over the party organization, 
and the one around whom the more conservative elements consistently converged during any 
debate. 
 
438 The mechanism for maintaining ‘discipline’ – in Ambedkar’s phrase – was the meetings of the 
Congress Assembly Party (CAP) that was a (crucially) non-public forum open to all those elected 
on Congress tickets to the Assembly, which included nearly 3/4th of all the members. The forum, 
was a place to discuss and decide upon the most contentious of the provisions, and where the 
opinion of the leadership could be expressed freely. However, evidences suggest that members 
not party to the leadership, like Ayyar and Ambedkar himself, would often have the chance to 
make their case. In other words, the CAP was not meant to be in the model of disciplined party 
organizations seeking to whip up votes, but one where members could negotiate and air out their 
thoughts in confidence. At an individual level, the assembly debates themselves show the 
willingness of both Patel and Nehru to engage with contrary viewpoints and even accede to many 
of them without trying to enforce their views. Nehru’s behavior during the amendment clause 
debates, and Patel’s during the expropriation debates, demonstrate this. This was not down to 
simply their magnanimity as leaders, but the real constraints of negotiating the complex and 
competing interest as a part of the constitution making process. This is one of the points I will 






science scholarship, this view leads to a notion of an implicit tendency for negotiated 
centrism in the two main political institutions in India – the state and the party.439 This 
line of thought found its most systematic exposition in the works of Rajni Kothari, who 
claimed that India had a “one party dominance”, as opposed to a “one party rule”.440 
Congress, he argued, was a “party of consensus” that functioned both through an “in-built 
corrective through factionalism within the […] party” as well as a “latent threat from 
outside”.441 The latter came from the marginal parties and organized interest groups 
outside of Congress. While these groups almost never had the realistic opportunity to win 
power, they gave voice to demands from outside of Congress, which at times overlapped 
with those of particular factions, resulting in realignment of the power within the party. In 
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439 Apart from Rajni Kothari, who is discussed in the next line, this narrative – coming out of 
what can be called an “institutional” view of politics – found initial expressions in the works of 
W.H. Morris-Jones, who characterized the political system in India as “dominance coexisting 
with competition but without trace of alteration”, and Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph. See, 
Wyndraeth H. Morris-Jones, “Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party 
System”, in W.H. Morris-Jones, Politics Mainly Indian (Madras: Orient Longman, 1978); W.H. 
Morris Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 
1964); W.H. Morris Jones, ‘The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance’, in Modern 
Asian Studies 1:2 (1967), at 109 – 132, and Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In 
Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1987). For yet another take on these lines, see, Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New 
Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967). For one of the 
first detailed study of the mechanisms of the intra-party conflict resolutions, focusing on the state 
of Uttar Pradesh, see, Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1965). 
 
440 Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress ‘System’ in India’, in Asian Survey 4:12 (1964), at 1161 – 1173. 
Also see, Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little and Brown, 1970). 
  
441 The main characteristic of this ‘in-built’ mechanism according to Kothari was that it was 






other words, there existed a moderating and democratic dynamic through the “mobility 
and life of the internal power structure of the Congress.”442  
The picture of consensual centrism held sway until the 1970s, when irrevocable 
tensions between different organs of the state (Supreme Court versus Parliament) and 
within the party (Indira Gandhi v. leaders of local units), led to a full-blown crisis. 
Outside the establishment, militant peasant and urban movements against the state arose, 
and were repressed with extraordinary brutality, while the old Congress socialist 
Jayprakash Narayan returned from decades of retirement to lead a popular movement 
against the Congress. Indira Gandhi, to the slogan ‘Indira is India’, finally declared 
emergency rule. As a dictatorial leader used the repressive apparatus of the state to her 
full use, the ‘consensus’ model had to be reconsidered. 
One of the more important of such reconsiderations was Sudipta Kaviraj’s 1988 
essay ‘A Critique of Passive Revolution’.443 In it, Kaviraj productively used Antonio 
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442 Ibid, at 1165.  
 
443 Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘A Critique of the Passive Revolution’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23: 
45 – 47, (1988), at 2429 -2443. Kaviraj’s contribution, while the most relevant for our purpose, 
was part of a larger intellectual milieu trying to rethink the nature of the Indian state, and the 
legacy of the nationalist movement. The subaltern studies collective—explicitly taking their 
central conceptual category from Gramsci – through a new historiography, questioned the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie gained through the nationalist struggle, and turned their attention to 
the varied tradition of popular protests, and their organization and ideological forms in contrast to 
the dominant bourgeois claims of consensus. Partha Chatterjee, a founding member of that 
collective, wrote an intellectual history of Indian nationalist thought in 1986, which sought to 
interrogate, “much that has been suppressed in the historical creation of the nation states”, to 
“subvert the ideological sway of a state that falsely claim to speak on behalf of the nation.” See, 
Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). Ranajit Guha, the founding figure of the collective, makes 





Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to challenge the centrality of ‘consensus’ as a concept in 
mainstream theorizing of Indian political developments. Instead, he proposed an 
alternative narrative that focused on conflicts and their strategic resolutions. To do so, he 
began with the problem, so to speak, of the hegemony of the Indian elite.   
5.1.2 The Problem of Hegemony I: Ethico-Political 
Hegemony – to start with the simplest definition – is when the elites rule with the 
consent of the masses. Consent does not mean the complete absence of coercion, since 
for Gramsci coercive forces remain “permanently organized”, perpetually underlying 
consent.444 How is hegemony established and maintained? When, according to a crucial 
passage in the Prison Notebooks, the dominant group masters the idiom in which to speak 
for all of the groups, when its own development and interests is “presented, as being the 
motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the ‘national’ energies.”445 
When this happens, then ideally the “the dominant group is coordinated concretely with 
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Hegemony. Again taking his main conceptual categories from Gramsci, Guha argued that the 
bourgeoisie in India had failed to produce a rule based on persuasion (that is a successful 
hegemonic project) and instead continue to rule by domination, much like its colonial 
predecessor, if in a new ideological language. See, Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: 
History and Power in Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
 
444 Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), at 136. Also, see Ranajit Guha’s discussion on the relationship between coercion 
and hegemony in Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial 
India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially 20 -23.  
 
445 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 






the general interests of the subordinate groups”,446 i.e., the dominant group is able to 
create a framework – both material and discursive – that can incorporate and be 
responsive to the interests of the subordinate groups. 447 Furthermore, “the life of the 
State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable 
equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and 
those of the subordinate groups.”448 This last point is of particular import for our 
purposes, since it refers to the constitutional and legal system (“on the juridical plane”) 
that organizes social contestation in such a way that it is carried out, and resolved, within 
an established set of institutions.449  
Gramsci outlines two distinct paths through which a class can attain a hegemonic 
position, which Chantal Mouffe terms “expansive hegemony” and “transformism” 
respectively.450 The former occurs when consensus is achieved through a truly popular 
mobilization, where the interests of the masses actively informs and shapes the views of 
the dominant class, and where the participation of the masses in the process makes their 
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446 Ibid.  
 
447 This can happen either through the leadership of a genuine popular mobilization, or through 
partial incorporation of the demands of the subordinate groups, a distinction which we will 
address shortly.  
 
448 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, at 182.  
 
449 Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, at 137.  
 
450 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci’, in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, 






consent a genuine and active one.451 It is important to remember that the “content” of 
hegemony is to be “predominantly of an economic order.”452 That is, it should involve 
“reorganization of the structure and the real relations between men on the one hand and 
the world of the economy or production on the other.”453 
 The principal aspect of a successful (in the above sense) hegemonic class is the 
subjective role it plays in creating a new Weltanschauung – which can be identified as 
their “intellectual and moral leadership”.454 To do so, the hegemonic class has to 
overcome the two evils that often plague the elites in their relationship to the masses – 
separateness and incomprehension.455 They would have to, in a genuine and concrete 
way, speak with and for the people. In other words, the hegemonic class must have the 
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451 For Gramsci, the archetype of such a scenario were the Jacobins, who did “not only create a 
bourgeois government”, but also, in their role as leaders of a popular revolution, established the 
bourgeoisie as a “hegemonic class”, giving the new bourgeois state a “permanent basis” within 
the popular imaginaire. They were able to subordinate the ‘countryside’ to the ‘city’ through an 
organic relationship, that is, through garnering active consents of the peasants. Gramsci, Prison 
Notebooks, at 79. For a critical analysis of Gramsci’s reading of the French Revolution, see, Paul 
Ginsborg, ‘Gramsci and the Era of Bourgeois Revolution in Italy’, in Gramsci and Italy’s Passive 
Revolution, John Anthony Davis, ed., (London: Croom Helm, 1979).  
 
452 Ibid, at 263.  
 
453 Ibid, at 263. To give an example, the failure of the Piedmont bourgeoisie was to solve the 
peasant question through land reforms. On the other hand, the English bourgeoisie had solved it 
through the process of depeasantization through enclosures and industrial revolution, while the 
French revolutionaries did so through making peasants into small holders, who became pillars of 
the French state. 
 
454 Ibid, at 57.  
 
455  Nadia Urbinati, “From the Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of 






ability to create a new language able to represent as well as mould the aspirations and 
claims of the masses—creating a “national-popular” will.456  
As we had seen from our discussions at the end of Chapter 4, despite Gandhi, the 
Indian elite were not successful in fully overcoming their distance from the peasant 
masses – remaining unable to create a new language of politics that could represent the 
view of the peasants regarding what is “just, fair, and possible”.457 Hence, there was an 
inability on the part of the Indian elite in general, and Congress in particular, to create a 
common meaningful framework for a new social and political order through the anti-
colonial struggle can be understood as a failure on their part of establish an expansive 
hegemony of the ethico-political type.  
5.1.3 The Problem of Hegemony II: Material 
The subjective element of leadership has justly received more attention in studies 
of the concept of hegemony.  However, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition is 
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456 Ibid, at 133. The hegemonic class, Gramsci said, should be at once the “organizer” and the 
“active, operative existence” of such a will. The question of the nature of this “organic unity” has 
been a focus of Gramsci’s critics who have argued that this is a potentially totalitarian expression 
that subsumes all pluralities and particularities. However, there have been persuasive arguments 
made to show that Gramsci understood this as a combination of spontaneity and constructivism, 
of a genuinely democratic process where opinions and views are shaped and in turn gets shaped 
in both directions. For a more detailed exposition of this reading, see, Anne Showstack Sasson, 
Gramsci’s Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), and, Nadia Urbinati, “From the 
Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Subordination and Hegemony”, Political 
Theory 2: 3 (1998), at 370. 
 
457 The phrase, also quoted in Chapter 4, is from Shahid Amin, “Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur 
District, Eastern U.P., 1921 -22”, in Subaltern Studies III, Ranajit Guha ed., (New Delhi: Oxford 






supplied by economics – to be understood in terms of the position of the class with 
respect to the material conditions of production.458 To quote Gramsci: “for though 
hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic. Must necessarily be based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic 
activity.”459 Adam Przeworski, pursuing this notion of a “decisive function”, suggested a 
materialist understanding of hegemony of the capitalist class within advanced capitalist 
economies.460 He sets out to interrogate the paradox of European social democracies, 
where working class parties had won elections democratically, yet were unwilling to 
challenge the fundamentals of the capitalist mode of production. This paradox, he 
suggests, could be explained by a refined version of the ‘structural dependence of the 
state on capital’ thesis, which argues that the private ownership of productive resources 
limits the possible outcomes of a democratic process. 461 Private ownership means 
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458 The ‘not sufficient’ part should be stressed, since it was the crux of Gramsci’s critique of the 
Piedmont bourgeoisie, who had the necessary material condition to succeed, but failed because of 
the nature of their intellectual-political leadership.  
 
459 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, at 161. 
 
460 Przeworski first advanced this thesis in his book Capitalism and Social Democracy, and then 
refined it further via quantitative analysis in a series of essays with Michael Wallerstein. See, 
Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), and Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, ‘Structural Dependence of the State on 
Capital’, The American Political Science Review 82: 1 (1988), at 11-29. He would subsequently 
also go on to propose a separate model examining the constraints on European social democratic 
parties from the point of view of electoral demographics. See, Adam Przeworski and John 
Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago:  University of Chicago  Press,  
1986).  
  
461 The most well known version of this thesis was suggested by Nicos Poulantzas, and Charles 
Lindblom. Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 
1973), and Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Przeworski 
and Wallerstein refined this thesis to suggest that while this was not always true in a static 





investment decisions are private, and since the party in power depended on continued 
investments both for electoral gains and state stability, they were not willing to extend 
their redistributive agenda beyond a point that would – in Gramsci’s phrase – “touch the 
essential.” 462 Przeworski argues that under such a condition of dependence, the present 
material interest of the capitalist (profit) appears as the future universal interest of the 
whole society (growth). For example, take the oft-heard argument that if wages are to 
increase in the future, one must leave the job of organizing production to those who 
knows how to grow it the best. The trade-off that at present looks to be between two 
particular interests – wage increase for workers versus profit for capital – is actually a 
trade off between a present particular interest (consumption) versus a future universal one 
(growth through investment). The material aspect of hegemony in a capitalist democracy 
therefore can be expressed through this formulation: “Appropriation of profit by 
capitalists is a necessary condition for the future realization of interests of any group.”463  
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it did hold in a dynamic way, where investment flows dropped often in anticipation of 
redistributive policies. At any rate, while there was a flexible spectrum for redistributive policies, 
there was a constraint in the absolute sense that constituted the outer limit of redistributive 
ambitions. See, Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, ‘Structural Dependence of the State 
on Capital’, The American Political Science Review 82: 1 (1988), at 11-29. 
  
462 “The leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no 
doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential.” Gramsci, Prison 
Notebooks, at 161. In other words, the material aspect of hegemony performs a double function. 
First, it limits the number of groups that can successfully claim to be hegemonic; and second, it 
delineates the limits of the hegemonic consensus (“the essential”) beyond which the hegemonic 
group cannot allow it to proceed, and consent might turn into domination.  
 
463 Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 






Colonial rule meant that the developmental trajectory of Indian industrial capital 
was heavily determined by the needs and policies of the metropolitan economy.464 For 
most of colonial history, agriculture and trade465 provided the surest return on investment, 
and the focus was on exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods from 
England. Development of indigenous industrial capital under this condition remained 
weak, sporadic,466 and informal.467 Therefore, capital in India was not in a position where 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
464 This, in the global context of colonial developmental economics is known as the ‘dependency 
theory” – that is the path of development of colonized countries was dependent upon the 
developmental needs of another country, which dominated the former politically. Nationalist 
economists, even before independence, had formulated a rougher version of this, focusing 
primarily on the concept of ‘drain of wealth’, that is, the transfer of surplus from India to Britain, 
due to the unfavorable balance of trade situation, where India acted as the exporter of cheap raw 
materials, and a captive market for British manufactured goods, imported without any tariff. This, 
argued the nationalist historians, hampered the process of indigenous capital accumulation in 
India. See, Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (Lodon: S. Sonnenschein, 
1901). After independence, within the larger context of debates about third world growth, Amiya 
Bagchi refined the thesis of dependent development for the particular historical context of India 
to formulate a theory of “colonial mode of production”. Colonial rule, he argued, successfully 
channeled Indian economic activities to serve two primary needs of metropolitan capital – supply 
of cheap raw materials, and a circumscribed form of industrial development mostly owned by or 
dependent on European capital. See, Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Private Investment in India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). More recently, certain economic historians have 
criticized this narrative claiming that it gave undue primacy to political factors, and not enough to 
various indigenous economic factors. These scholars though have not suggested an alternative 
compelling narrative explaining the nature of growth and underdevelopment of Indian capital 
during colonial rule. See, Tirthankar Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India: Labour and 
Livelihood (London: Routledge, 2005).  
 
465 The first instances of significant capital accumulation by Indian actors outside the sphere of 
agriculture happened through the trade of opium to China and the supply of cotton to Lancashire 
during the disruptions caused by the American Civil War by merchants based in Bombay. From 
this point onwards, Bombay (along with Ahmedabad) would emerge as the main center for Indian 
capital, while Calcutta remained the primary base for European capital in India.  
 
466 The First World War, which lead to a fall in imports, and a consequent need for local 
procurements, was instrumental in rise of Indian industrialist, though still concentrated in a 
handful of sectors. The most significant of which were cotton textiles industry in Gujarat and 






its interests could appear, simply by virtue of its place in the economy, as the universal 
interest of the nation. This created a situation where, capital was crucially dependent on 
the state for the process of its reproduction.468 On the other hand, this in turn allowed for 
an extensive intervention of the state in the economy, paving the way for the idea of a 
‘developmental state’, and by necessity breaking down the wall between politics and 
economy posited by liberal constitutionalism.  
5.1.4 The Concept of Passive Revolution and the Critique of the Consensus Model 
According to Kaviraj, in lieu of an expansive hegemony of the elite, what we see 
in India is an “enormous programme of a capitalist ‘passive revolution’”469 – that is, a 
deliberate project of ‘revolution without revolution’. Gramsci’s use of the term was in the 
context of his analysis of the Risorgimento, where the liberals, lead by Cavour, conducted 
a ‘revolution/ restoration’. 470  Instead of an organic link established with the expression 
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467 A large portion of indigenous capital formation in India was concentrated in speculative 
activities, and in local agrarian credit networks – especially in money lending. The problem of 
raising capital in India was not due to cultural reasons – as certain British economists like to call 
it, the ‘shyness’ of native capital, which was a curious phrase to use in conjunction with capital—
but due to the opportunities for economic growth in the industrial sector.  
 
468 Kaviraj, ‘Critique of the Passive Revolution’, at 2430. For a similar argument regarding 
‘capitalist passive revolution’ as the analytical category for the initial years of the post-colonial 
state, see, Partha Chatterjee, ‘The National State’, in Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), at 
200.  
 
469 Kaviraj, ‘Critique of the Passive Revolution’, at 2432.  
 
470 For a detailed discussion of the specificities of Italian history that Gramsci drew upon, and 
how that shaped his theory of the passive revolution, see, John Anthony Davis, ed., Gramsci and 






of subordinate classes to inaugurate a wholly new and popular beginning, their demands 
were granted in “small doses, legally, in a reformist manner”;471 with the absorption of 
the “active elements” of the subordinate classes, ensuring that their opposition could be 
neutralized.472 The basic framework of a revolution from above, and its main tenets we 
just mentioned, does indeed speak to the Indian case.  For example, in terms of agrarian 
reforms, only the worst forms of excess and exploitative relations were sought to be 
eliminated – through abolition of zamindari, or regularizing certain tenancy rights – 
rather than any attempt at a structural change, say, a program of “land to the tiller”, 
whereby property rights would be granted to the one who actually labored on the land.473 
In the case of caste, only the most obvious and egregious practices, like untouchability, 
was prohibited, while the demands of certain Dalit leaders for an abolition of the caste 
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471 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, at 119.  
 
472 Ibid, at 58 – 59. Passive revolution expresses a ‘blocked dialectic’. In the case of an expansive 
hegemony, the bourgeois leadership through a dialectical synthesis with the popular aspect of the 
revolution transcends its own narrow class position to express its agenda in terms universal. The 
French revolution being the example Gramsci kept going back to, one can say that the language 
of Enlightenment in that instance was such a language, which expressed – as Marx would later 
argue – the particular interests of the bourgeoisies as universal rights of man. In the case of 
passive revolution, the dialectic only develops to the point that the thesis (the passive 
revolutionary class) “absorbs” the “so called representatives” of the antithesis (the popular aspect) 
– in order “not to […] be transcended in the dialectical opposition.” [Prison Notebooks, at 110]. 
 
473 ‘Land to the tiller’ was the most radical of all the land reform demands, claiming that those 
who worked on the land, should be the ones to own it. It explicitly drew on the relationship 
between laboring and property, and based itself on a coherent argument for eliminating the 
distance between cultivation and ownership. In this, it was the most threatening of all the 
demands to the existing structure of property relationship and the dominant classes within the 
agrarian system. As Ronald Herring has argued, that the reluctance of the Indian elites to pursue a 
program of land to the tiller explains the failure, or the insincerity, of the Indian state regarding 
land reform. See, Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian 






system itself was ignored.474 Similarly, while bonded or forced labor, the most blatantly 
abusive labor practice, was prohibited,475 no structural change was attempted to address 
the question of unfreedom of labor in general.   
Scholars like Kaviraj, Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit Guha and others, sought to use 
the concept of ‘passive revolution’ has primarily as a tool of critique to challenge the 
claims of nationalist historians, and liberal political theorists that Congress enjoyed an 
expansive hegemony built through the anti-colonial movement. Instead, they sought to 
highlight the lack of a genuine social consensus, and the fragile and contingent nature of 
the elite-mass alliance, within the post-colonial political constellation. Highlighting those 
factors provided an alternative explanation to the political moves of the elites based on 
conflicts or constraints, that challenged the dominant nationalist claims of high-minded 
idealism and “philanthropic politics”.476  
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474 For a version of the latter, and a contemporaneous critique of the passive revolution from the 
point of view of caste, see, B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, Mulk Raj Anand ed., (New 
Delhi: Arnold Publishers, 1990). Art. 17 of the Constitution, abolished the practice of 
untouchability. It reads: “Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden 
The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law.  
 
475 Art. 23 (1) of the Constitution, which states: Traffic in human beings and begar and other 
similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an 
offence punishable in accordance with law. However, Art. 23 (2) provided an exception to this, 
stating: Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for 
public purpose. This was inserted to prevent legal challenges to practices of prison labor, and 
compulsory conscription to armed forces.  
 
476 Sunil Khilnani, ‘The Indian Constitution and Democracy’, in India’s Living Constitution: 






Within this specific context – that is, of the particular way in which the concept of 
passive revolution was deployed in India, and not its wider resonances – there are two 
outcomes of this critique of the claim about the hegemony of the elite that is relevant to 
our purpose. First, it highlights a certain lack or deficiency in the nationalist struggle, and 
hence recasts the project of post-colonial nation building as not something that grew 
organically out of a new popular consensus, but that had to be a deliberate project, and 
one that was crucially a continual process rather than a triumphant new beginning. 
Second, in the place of analysis of broad ideals as a guide to the actions of the nation-
builders in the post-colonial period, it highlighted the conflicts and alliances within the 
political constellation, and the constraints and calculation that imposed on the political 
actors. These points would provide the basis for my critique of the dominant 
understandings of the Indian Constitution and serve as a starting point for my own 
reconstruction of the constitutional formulation. At further stage, I will then need to go 
beyond the conceptual repertoire of ‘passive revolution’ to reach a complete 
understanding of the Indian constitutional form. But first, the critique.  
5.1.5 The Terms of a Critique of the Constitution 
Bruce Ackerman, in an essay analyzing different types of constitutional 
experiences, argued that the Indian Constitution was a paradigmatic example of a 
“triumphalist” constitution.477 The triumph in question was that of “popular sovereignty”. 
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“The Congress Party”, Ackerman argues organized an enormous amount of focused 
political energy amongst millions of Indians”.478 The moment of independence was a 
clear triumph of the principal of popular sovereignty that was thereafter reflected in the 
Constitution. As independence drew nearer, “Gandhi and Nehru rejected the hegemonic 
party model, and supported a serious effort to write a constitution memorialize the 
fundamental commitments of the Indian people’s breakthrough into independence.”479 
Sarbani Sen, expanded this thesis into a book length exposition of the Indian Constitution 
as “an expression by the framers of the primacy of the idea of popular sovereign power as 
a basis of new polity.”480 Sen argues that as a result of “the Indian leaders followed the 
American revolutionary prototype in affirming the independent value of politics”. 481 The 
problem with the Sen-Ackerman line of argument is two fold. First, as we saw, the anti-
colonial movement did not produce unified popular engagement around “abstract 
principles”. Sure there was a broad popular mobilization, and “independence” and 
“democracy” was a widely shared value. But there also existed a lack of a common set of 
convictions as to what it meant in practice. These were not just interpretative differences, 
but one that manifested itself in real political conflicts.  In other words, there was a lack 
of hegemonic consensus around certain values. In which case, the analysis of the 
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478 Ibid.  
 
479 Ibid.  
 
480 Sarbani Sen, Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Transformation: The Constitution of India 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 36. Sen contends that this was a result of the anti-
colonial movement. “The political leadership challenged the colonial regime by theorizing on 
abstract principles of government, and initiated popular engagement in considering these issues.” 
[at 33].  
 





constitution making process cannot just end with the assertion of those values, but has to 
also take into account the conflicts and negotiations as to how to embody those values in 
a political order. Second, failing to do so leads to a highly distorted reading of the 
constitutional formulation. Just to take an example that we will discuss later, the 
Ackerman-Sen argument cannot explain the flexibility of the amendment process which 
was argued for not on familiar democracy versus constitutional constraint lines, but on 
the basis of greater flexibility to deal with a transitional and fluid situation.  
If this version of triumphalism is based on ignoring history and its challenges, 
there exists another closely related version that is based on a revisionist version of 
history. This line of argument, arising out of what could be called a liberal 
reinterpretation, denies the significance of the necessity of incorporating a social 
transformative agenda in the Constitution. Ramchandra Guha’s recent and widely popular 
history of post-independence India could be seen as a paradigmatic example of an 
argument of this kind. Guha describes the Constitution as “in essence, a liberal humanist 
credo”. The constituent assembly is viewed as an arena where visionary statesmen 
practiced moderation and upheld abiding liberal principles. 482  The constitutional 
peculiarities and subsequent crises should be understood as individual ideological 
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482 Guha quotes approvingly the observation that “it constitutes a sharp swing from the extreme 
right in political thinking – yet yields noting to the radical concept of the extreme left.” However, 
the generic categories of “extreme right” and “extreme left” makes little sense as a analytical 
categories for understanding the actual historical contestations that were shaping the constitution 
(unless Guha considers a moderate program of land tenancy reform radically left wing). He 
further expands on this theme in his new book, Ramachandra Guha, Patriots and Partisans (New 






preferences of members (say, Nehru and socialism) and a mark of decline in institutional 
ethos, respectively. This narrative therefore ahistoricizes the founding moment to bestow 
it with virtues that it did not posses (it would be a rather curious liberal credo that would 
sanction preventive detention without trial, or deny due process protection to property 
rights), and overlook the very real challenges and contradictions it contained. 
A subtler version of the liberal case makes a more interesting claim. The 
argument is not that the Constituent Assembly members, contrary to the historical 
evidence, should be hailed as stalwarts of classical liberalism. Rather, the argument is 
that the nature of the Constitution as revealed in its subsequent practice can and should be 
interpreted along the lines portrayed in liberal constitutional theory.483 One can rephrase 
these arguments as saying that while the social transformative agenda was a factor during 
the making of the Constitution, it did not affect the end product to a great extent. The 
implication is that the Constitution came out more or less on liberal lines and one can 
treat the transformational element as more of an embellishment that can be (and perhaps 
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483 Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s various essays on the Constitution, Sudhir Krishnaswamy and Madhav 
Khosla’s recent book, and Rohit De’s unpublished dissertation make different variations of this 
claim. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty’, in Public 
Institutions in India: Performance and Design, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Devesh Kapur eds. (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 158; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Inner Conflict of 
Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic Structure’, in India’s Living Constitution: 
Ideas, Practices, Controversies, Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan eds., (London: Anthem 
Press, 2002); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty’, Journal of Democracy 
18:2 (2007), at 70; Madhav Khosla, The Indian Constitution, Oxford India Short Introductions 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and 
Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Rohit De, The Republic of Writs: Litigious Citizens, Constitutional Law 
and Everyday Life in India, 1947-1964, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Princeton University, 






should be) interpreted away. There are two claims being advanced here. The first type of 
claim is based on an a priori deduction of what a constitution should be. That deduction 
is then used retrospectively to determine what the Indian Constitution is.484 Consequently 
this claim treats characteristics that do not fit within that concept as either a deviation or a 
corruption, which has no salience beyond the particular political contingencies of the 
years 1947 to 1950. Secondly, there is the argument that a failure to carry out such 
revisions and hold on to the vestiges of the transformational constitutional form is not 
only bad constitutional theory, it is dangerous constitutional practice.485 This latter 
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484 Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s argument regarding strong constitutional entrenchment provisions is an 
example of this. Mehta argues, following well-established theoretical precedents (e.g., Stephen 
Holmes) that strong entrenchment provisions are not limiting, but enabling of democracy. The 
problem with this argument is not its theoretical merit, but the fact that the Indian framers 
explicitly discarded strong entrenchment provisions. Mehta therefore builds his argument around 
the Basic Structure doctrine promulgated by the Keshavananda Bharathi decision. I am of the 
opinion that the Keshavananda Bharathi decision was a fundamental shift in the concept of 
transformational constitutionalism, and hence reflects a constitutional break, rather than the 
embodiment of the original constitutional vision. Mehta, on the other hand would argue that it 
actually makes explicit what is inherent in all good constitutions, and hence by extension, the 
Indian Constitution. A similar argument can also be found in Sudhir Krishnaswamy’s book length 
study of the Keshavananda decision. These arguments therefore do not seek to trace the 
historicity of both the original constitutional vision, and the Keshavananda court’s radical 
reinvention of it through an immanent process of how the internal contradictions of a 
transformational constitution played out over three decades. It does it through an a priori 
deduction of importance of entrenchment provisions in constitutions. See, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 
‘The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic Structure’, in India’s 
Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, Controversies, Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan 
eds., (London: Anthem Press, 2002), Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in 
India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), and 
Stephen Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy’, in Constitutionalism and 
Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
at 195 – 240.  
 
485 For example, consider Madhav Khosla’s opinion about the treating different socio-economic 
groups differently, something that is a central element of transformational constitutionalism. 
Khosla believes that, “The practice threatens diluting national citizenship, creating compulsory 
identities, and inhibiting an understanding of which principles govern us. The risk, the ultimate 





argument is reflective of a larger intellectual climate in contemporary India where it is 
often assumed that the country should now (even if belatedly) realize that it is time to let 
a proper version of political (and also economic) liberalism to flourish.  
Both the triumphalist and liberal versions deny in their own ways the demands 
that their conditions made on the framers of the Constitution. In their own ways, either 
misrepresent or deny the role of history in analyzing the Indian Constitution. Rather their 
focus is on abstract principles derived a priori. Whatever the flaws of the Indian 
Constitution, at the very least, it was borne out of a reflection on the historical condition 
of its creation. Any debates of the constituent assembly bear innumerable evidence of that 
reflection. Hence, it is important that in our analysis of that creation we take those 
reflections seriously, and accurately represent the specificity of the historical moment in 
which they were conceived. Without such an analysis their work seems as a series of 
petty compromises and theoretical errors that should be subsequently set right, rather than 
instantiations of concrete struggle, the basic context of which has lost none of its 
relevance in our time.  
As indicated above, the work of the scholars who have outlined the problems with 
elite hegemony in India provide us with an outline of that struggle, in all its historical 
complexity. However, that body of scholarship has paid little attention to the Constitution 
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abandoned since they threaten to become “exceptions to rules”. However, no argument is offered 
based on a historical understanding of Indian social and political developments to support the 
claim that these differential treatments have lost any real salience. Madhav Khosla, The Indian 






as an object of analysis. 486  As an implication of that neglect, the constitution appears in 
its liberal incarnation in their work, to be critiqued as an idea. Relatedly, when they 
consider it as a formal system, it appears as instrumental to the project of passive 
revolution. They contend that the passive revolution creates a need to make certain 
concessions in the Constitution,487 but do not provide any further understanding of how 
those needs were incorporated within a constitutional structure. However, what we are 
studying here not a mere translation of the passive revolutionary agenda into any 
institutional form. Rather, the framers sought to mediate a process of necessary social 
change through a constitutional form. That form has its own history, precepts, and 
conventions.488 One has to be careful as to not to reify those precepts into abstract ideals, 
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486 One notable exception is an essay by Nivedita Menon. However, Menon only focuses on the 
first amendment, rather than the constitution making process, or the constitutional text as such. 
See, Nivedita Menon, “Citizenship and the Passive Revolution: Interpreting the First 
Amendment”, in Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, ed., Rajeev Bhargava (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
 
487 What Kaviraj calls in his essay, “looser reformistic advisory clauses, and based on some 
necessary illusions of bourgeois power.” Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘A Critique of the Passive Revolution’, 
at 2430. 
 
488 This formulation of my approach is inspired by E.P. Thompson’s statement about undertaking 
a critical analysis of English legal tradition. Thompson said, “Even if we agree that law mediates 
class relations, it is not the same thing as saying it is class relations translated into other terms. 
Because law, like every other such mediating institution, has its own logic, its own independent 
history and forms. And one has to be attendant to those forms if one has to say something 
meaningful as to how law acts as a mediating institution.” E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters 
(New York: Pantheon, 1975), at 259. I take this basic insight of Thompson, and then expand it in 
the context of the Indian constitution to suggest an immanent critique of the constitution. Douglas 
Hay, one of a group of English historians inspired by Thompson took up this challenge to 
produce fascinating analysis of seventeenth and eighteenth laws of property and crime. His work 
has also been influential in conceiving my own methodological approach toward the Indian 
Constitution. See, Douglas Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, in Albion’s Fatal 
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (London: Verso, 2011), at 17 -64, 
Douglas Hay, ‘The State and Market in the 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr. Waddington’, Past and 





but at the same time one cannot ignore them altogether. Instead, one has to be attentive to 
the history of the development of those precepts, how the framers themselves understood 
them, and the formal constraints they put on their project. Therefore, an analysis of the 
Indian Constitution on its own terms – both historical and formal – would require one to 
specify how the necessities and antagonisms related to the project of making a 
constitution were ultimately negotiated within the formal possibilities of writing a 
constitution. Answering criticisms in the Assembly that the Constitution looked too much 
like other Constitutions, Ambedkar reminded his critiques with a degree of vehemence 
that it is a constitution they were drafting after all, saying, “what the scope of a 
Constitution should be has […] been settled.” Not too many days before in the same 
Assembly, answering criticisms that the Draft Constitution looked too little like other 
constitutions, Nehru reminded his colleagues with a similar degree of certainty, that “we 
have bigger decisions to take, graver choices before us, than those of lawyers’ making”. 
None of those statements can be ignored in studying the making of the Indian 
Constitution. The “bigger decisions” had to be expressed in a specifically constitutional 
language, and “settled principles” had to be reinterpreted (but never rejected) in light of 
those decisions. Together, the constituted the contingencies of the origin of the Indian 
Constitution. In what follows, I will describe the formulation of the Constitution in the 
context of such contingencies, and will delineate the contradictions that emerge from it.  
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5.2 Constitution Making and its Contingencies 
5.2.1 “Dangers of insurrection and bloodshed” 
For the Indian framers, one of the challenges was how to do a revolution (through 
the Constitution) to avoid a revolution (on the ground).489 Or, to see it from another 
angle, how to transpose (the threat of) a revolution, into a controlled and procedurally 
guided transformation – “a peaceful transference of society”.490 Unlike the American 
founders, who spoke of being faithful to the “late revolution”491, Indian framers spoke of 
revolution in the assembly – and they spoke of it often – as a future occurrence. “If the 
Constitution holds up, blocks, the future progress of our country”, warned H.V. Kamath, 
“I dare say that the progress which has been thus retarded will be achieved by a violent 
revolution: revolution will take the place of evolution.”492 The term always carried a 
double sense – a threat, and a necessity. “I feel that in the event of a crisis, when the 
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489 As Nehru said a decade later: “I want you to realize that we are passing through a big 
revolutionary period in our history. There has been none bigger. People seem to think of 
revolution as a big war, or a big internal struggle, violent struggle. Rather, revolution is 
something which changes the structure of the society, the lives of the people, the way the live and 
the way they work. That is what is happening in India.” Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Address to the 
Conference of the Inspectors General of Police at Delhi, January, 1962’, in Nehru on Police, B.N. 
Mullik ed., (Dehra Dun: Palit and Dutt, 1970), at 27- 28.   
 
490 Purnima Banerji, CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
 
491 “We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest 
characteristics of the late Revolution”.  James Madison, ‘Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessment’, in The Founder’s Constitution, Vol. 5, Philip B. Kurland and Ralph 
Lerner eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Document 43. 
 






country is confronted with dangers of insurrection and bloodshed”, said Brajeshwar 
Prasad, “power must vest […] to change the very basis of society.”493 
A fear of the “dangers of insurrection and bloodshed”, was an incidental 
byproduct of passive revolution. The decade preceding the constituent assembly was a 
decade of increasing radicalization of peasant and labor politics, which while never 
challenging Congress’s dominance in the political landscape, did constitute a cause for 
concern. The depression in agrarian economy from 1931 onwards had seriously worsened 
the condition of the peasants. Congress, with its support in the villages through the 
Gandhian movement, legitimately considered itself a ‘kisan party’ (the party of the 
peasants) but a rift developed after it assumed control in the provinces, and failed to 
move significantly on its promises of land and tenancy reform, and in some cases arrived 
at a rapprochement with landlords.494 The alliance of Congress with the Kisan Sabha, the 
powerful organization of peasants and farmers that boasted upwards of half a million 
members at the end of the thirties, ended at this time, and the Sabha adopted a red flag as 
their symbol as they took a decisive turn leftward.495  In just 1946, the year the 
Constituent Assembly convened, major militant peasant movements broke out in Bengal, 
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493 Brajeshwar Prasad, CAD, 10 September, 1949. Emphasis added. 
 
494 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885 – 1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), at 362 – 365. 
  
495 See, Stephen Henningham, Peasant Movements in Colonial North India: North Bihar, 1917 – 
1942 (Canberra: ANU, 1982), and Walter Hauser, "The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, 1929-42; a 






Maharashtra, Travancore, amongst others.496 In the Telengana region of the state of 
Hyderabad, the peasant movement turned into an armed struggle – the biggest such 
struggle in Indian history – continuing all the while the Assembly was in session.497 1946 
- 47 was also a period of intense labor agitation. Successful strikes took place in textile 
mills, ports, railways and trams, coalmines, and postal services, worrying both business 
leaders and the political establishment.498 Sumit Sarkar quotes the Director of Intelligence 
Bureau: “The labour situation is becoming increasingly dangerous […] I am satisfied that 
a responsible [Indian] government, if one can be achieved, will deal more decisively with 
labour than is at present possible.”499  
These movements did not lead to a coherent mass revolt against the nationalist 
leadership, but they were not in keeping with – and at times in explicit contrast to – the 
policy of the Congress leadership. Even when they were under the Congress banner, like 
the Quit India movement, where the imprisonment of the top leadership of Congress lead 
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496 See, Adrienne Cooper, Sharecropping and Sharecroppers Struggle in Bengal, 1930 – 1950, 
(Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1988); Robin Jeffrey ‘India's Working Class Revolt: Punnapra-Vayalar 
and the Communist "Conspiracy" of 1946’, Indian Economic & Social History Review 18, 
(1981), at 97-122; D.N. Dhanagare, Peasant Movements in India, 1920 – 1950 (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
 
497 Ibid, at 183 – 207.  
 
498 For details on labor activism in this period, and its political implications, see, Rajnarayan 
Chandavarkar, Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the Working 
Classes in Bombay, 1900 – 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Morris David 
Morris, The Emergence of Industrial Labor Force in India: A Study of Bombay Cotton Mills, 
1854 – 1947 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), Chapter 10; Sumit Sarkar, Modern 
India: 1885 – 1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1983); Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: 
The Erosion of Colonial Power in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000).   
 






to rapid radicalization– leading to sabotage of infrastructure, guerilla wars, and even 
short-lived ‘free zones’ – revealing clear signs of the tensions on the surface of popular 
politics. The general sense of political and social unrest around the country, telegraphed 
to those inside the assembly, that, “These down-trodden classes are tired of being 
governed. They are impatient to govern themselves.”500 Therefore, Ambedkar added, 
“this urge for self-realization in the down-trodden classes must not be allowed to devolve 
into a class struggle or class war […] That would indeed be a day of disaster.”501 This 
particular variant of the threat was due to the then global prominence of the Bolshevik 
model in Soviet Union. The members of the Constituent Assembly, be they of the right or 
the left, were against a Soviet style political system. They were all, without exception, 
committed to democracy and certain liberal values. What (self-professed) socialism 
meant to many of them, including Nehru, was strong state intervention in the economy, 
and regulation of private capital, not a “dictatorship of the proletariat”. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the Communist Party had remained outside the constituent assembly, and 
emerged as one of its strongest critiques,502 explains why the revolutionary menace 
invoked in the assembly often had a particular color.503   
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500 B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 25 November, 1949. 
 
501 Ibid.  
 
502 As Ambedkar noted in his concluding speech to the Assembly: “The condemnation of the 
Constitution largely comes from two quarters, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party.” 
[B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 25 November, 1949].  
 
503 For example: During the debate on the property clause, Nehru claimed that a failure to do land 
reform would mean “red revolution and nothing else”. Brajeshwar Prasad, defending preventive 





Nehru’s speech to the Assembly proposing the final version of the property clause 
after years of intense debate inside and outside the assembly is the most cogent summary 
of the relationship between a transformation through the Constitution and the specter of 
revolution, as seen by the framers themselves. When one thinks of property relations in 
India, Nehru said, one is “thinking of something which is dynamic, moving, changing 
and revolutionary”.504 Whether the constituent assembly chooses to deal with it or not, 
“these may well change the face of India either way […] it is not a static thing.”505 The 
most important thing to remember, at this historic juncture, is that, “It is something which 
is not entirely, absolutely within the control of law and Parliaments. That is to say, if law 
and Parliaments do not fit themselves into the changing picture, they cannot control the 
situation completely.” 506  Transformational constitutional imagination, with all its 
attendant complexities, was a task that the Assembly could not afford to avoid. To those 
critics of the property clause, who had argued that it moves away from well-established 
liberal principles for constitutional protection of property, Nehru had a word of advice. 
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existence of all the institutions of our modern life” [CAD, 11 September, 1949]. Naziruddin 
Ahmed laid out the choices before the nation in rather dramatic Manichean terms: “Which way to 
proceed is the question, to proceed as the Communists have done or to proceed along the road 
that the entire civilized world has followed?” [CAD, 17 September, 1949]. Also see, Granville 
Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1972), at 95. For an interesting parallel in the case of the Mexican Constitution, see, Barry Carr, 
‘The Fate of the Vanguard under a Revolutionary State: Marxism’s Contribution to the 
Construction of the Great Arch’, in Everyday Form of State Formation: Revolution and the 
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent eds., (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1994).  
 
504 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
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While this might not live up to their ideal notion of protection of property,  “it is a better 
way and a juster way, from their point of view, than any other way that is going to come 
later. That way may not be by any process of legislation. The land question may be 
settled differently.”507 
5.2.2 Permissible Limits 
Faced with this scenario, the constitution needed to allow for, in the words of 
Purnima Banerji, “those minimum necessities with which we can change things.”508 Such 
a request though, was deceptive in its simplicity. At what point, one can ask, can a 
constitution meant to be an enduring framework – a higher law – allow for “necessities” 
to “change things” before it stops being a constitution?509 Or, in the relevant context of 
contemporaneous post-colonial states, what would make India a constitutional state, and 
not a dictatorship with a developmental rhetoric?510  In other words, the challenge was to 
sincerely accommodate the agenda of change within a language of constitutionalism. I 
will take up the implication of this translation, from the point of view of legal theory and 
constitutional jurisprudence, more fully in the next chapter. But one can get a vivid sense 
of the nature of this problem from the debates in the assembly.  
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507 Ibid.  
 
508 Purnima Banerji, CAD, 24 November, 1949.  
 
509 As the Congress leader P.C. Deshmukh said in regards to the property clause, “It is not at all 
easy to determine, where the limit may be set or where the line should be drawn.”P.C. Deshmukh, 
CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
 
510 As Kaviraj puts it, the Indian elite did not exercise “a simple coercive strategy on the lines of 






An existing consensus about social and political order provides the firm ground 
on which the constitutional thought can erect its structure. In the case of India, where 
such consensus was not yet reached, the need to continuously absorb potentially 
destabilizing antagonisms, all the while maintaining the viability of the system, meant 
that the constitution had to be open to continual future shifts and realignments. The 
general way in which this problem was sought to be solved was by denying any right an 
absolute status. Rights are generally qualified through constitutional practice in any 
instance. But in the case of, say the American Constitution, those qualifications happened 
through judicial interpretation and the development of constitutional jurisprudence. The 
Indian framers felt that given the conditions of India, waiting for those qualifications to 
be developed through constitutional practice could be a risk.511 Hence, they sought to 
qualify the rights in the Constitution itself, and do it in such a way that the scope of the 
qualifications themselves was open to future adjustment through legislation. In the 
fundamental rights section, the classical negative form of declaring any right (“The state 
shall not…”) was followed by – within the same article – a clarification technically called 
“permissible limits”, granting leeway for state actions that might be construed as a 
violation of that right (“Nothing in this article shall prevent the state…”).512 So, for 
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511 To quote Rajendra Prasad: “The present conditions of the country and tendencies which are 
apparent have necessitated [the qualifying] provisions which are also based on the experience of 
other countries which have had to enforce them through judicial decisions, even when they were 
not provided for in the Constitution.” Rajendra Prasad, CAD, 26 November, 1949.  
 
512 From the very first amendment to the Constitution, in 1951, there has been numerous additions 
to the list of permissible limits. The general formula for judicial review is that once a state action 
is prima facie – that is, on its face – construed as a violation of a right, the state has the burden of 
proof to show how the act falls within the purview of one of the limits. This test, as well as 





example, the right of free speech (Article 19 (1)(a)) was followed by permissible limits 
(Article 19(2)) for “security of the state”, “public order”, “morality”, and “decency” 
amongst others. 513  The right to form associations (Article 19(1)(c)) is subject to 
permissible limits on the grounds of “public order” or “morality” (Article 19(4)). Article 
19(1)(f), guaranteeing the right to “acquire, hold, and dispose of property” had a similar 
structure 514 – Article 19(5) laying down permissible limits on the rather broad ground of 
“interests of the general public”, and a historically specific one in the context of 
“protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.”  These clarifications were – to put in 
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Supreme Court decisions: Sagir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 728; Vrijlal v. 
State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 129; Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 
748.  
 
513 Art. 19 (2), as it stands now, after the First and Sixteenth Amendments, reads: Nothing in sub 
clause (a) of clause (1) [which is the right to freedom of speech and expression] shall affect the 
operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or 
incitement to an offence.  
 
514 This was a general protection for holding property, it referring to the right to hold and acquire 
property in general, which is a necessary condition for the functioning of a capitalist economy. 
For example, according to H.M. Seervai, the rights under Article 19(1)(d) to (g) – which affirms 
freedom of trade and commerce, freedom of movement, and freedom to settle anywhere in India, 
along with property –  are interdependent, and guarantees the unity of India. One cannot exercise 
one’s right to settle anywhere in the country say, if one cannot own a house or a business there, 
and the same goes for commerce etc. In other words, the implication of this reading is that these 
clauses together go towards guaranteeing the creation and protection of a unified national 
economic space within which capital can move around smoothly and without facing barriers. 
[H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. II, (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing 
Company, 1997), at 1358 – 1359]. For a recent discussion of the history of the nationalist 
imagination in terms of an unified and homogenous economic space, see, Manu Goswami, 
Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004). Art. 19(1)(f) was deleted by the 44th Amendment in 1978, by the first non-Congress 
government. Right to Property in the Indian Constitution now exists outside of Part III – that is 






the familiar language of constitutional theory – a mechanism to dilute the nature of 
precommitments, and make their scope amenable to future necessities and 
negotiations.515 Illustrating the difficulty of writing such leeway into a constitution, 
questions were raised in the assembly as to how was it to be a ‘negotiation’ and not 
simply an assertion by the government.516 Thakur Das Bhargava sought to put the “soul” 
in these articles by suggesting the inclusion of the term “reasonable” before the term 
“restriction.”517 The idea, correct as it turned out, being that the ‘term’ reasonable would 
give the courts a point of entry into any future debate about restriction of rights – 
constituting a novel invocation of separation of powers, by way of the common law test 
of reasonableness.518 Nevertheless, the general structure was, in keeping with the fluidity 
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515  For the seminal argument regarding constitutions and precommitments, see, Jon Elster, 
Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).  
 
516 See, for example, the speeches by Mahboob Ali Baig, and Sardar Hukam Singh, CAD, 30 
November, 1948. This was the reason some of the more expansive drafting of the permissible 
limits were rejected. For example, B.N. Rau suggested  the addition of a blanket provision at the 
end of the Fundamental Rights section, stating: “the State may limit by law the rights guaranteed 
by sections 11, 16, and 27 whenever the exigencies of the common good so required”. This failed 
a vote in the Fundamental subcommittee. Shiva Rao, II, at 151 – 152.  
 
517 Amendment moved by Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, CAD, 1 December, 1948. 
 
518 The speech moving the amendment is worth excerpting at some length to illustrate the 
argument: “What would happen to the Fundamental Rights if the legislature has the right to 
substantially restrict the Fundamental Rights? […] Are the destinies of the people of this country 
and the nationals of this country and their rights to be regulated by the executive and by the 
legislature or by the courts? This is the question of questions. The question has been asked, if the 
Legislature enacts a particular Act, is that the final word? If you consider clauses (3) to (6) you 
will come to the conclusion that, as soon as you find that in the Statement of Objects and Reasons 
an enactment says that its object is to serve the interests of the public or to protect public order, 
then the courts would be helpless to come to the rescue of the nationals of this country in respect 
of the restrictions. My submission is that the Supreme Court should ultimately be the arbiter and 
should have the final say in regard to the destinies of our nationals. Therefore, if you put the word 
'reasonable' here, the question will be solved and all the doubts will be resolved […] If you put 





of the situation, not to grant absolute status to any right, and allow for (somewhat 
constrained) future negotiations.  
5.2.3 Amendment  
The need for plasticity, and its possible conflicts with the notion of 
constitutionalism, comes to focus most distinctly with regards to the system for amending 
the Constitution. From the beginning, there were two major views regarding 
amendments. The first group held that constitutions should be difficult to amend, and 
wanted to adopt something akin to Article 5 of the American Constitution – requiring a 
super majority in both houses of the legislature, and subsequent ratification by a majority 
of the state assemblies. Munshi, Ayyar, and Ayyangar, in their suggestions to the drafting 
committee expressed this view. 519  The Constitution, this view maintained, “is a 
fundamental document”, and if no limitation was imposed upon the authority of the 
organs, there will be complete tyranny and complete oppression.”520   
The second group, wanted amendments via a simple majority of the parliament. 
The two primary proponents of this view would be Nehru and B.N. Rau. Rau, a 
consummate former bureaucrat, was not a member of the assembly, but had an enormous 
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the public and secondly whether the restrictions imposed by the legislatures are reasonable, 
proper and necessary in the circumstances of the case. […] Otherwise Article 13 [the future 
Article 19] is a nullity.” [Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, CAD, 1 December, 1948]. 
 
519 Shiva Rao, Vol. IV, at 360 - 370. It was also the argument made by the editor of the Indian 
Law Review, the most respected legal journal of the time, and prominent members of the Calcutta 
Bar, in a deposition to the drafting committee. 
 






influence on the drafting process in his role as a ‘constitutional adviser.’ Rau suggested 
that the Constitution should have a ‘removal of difficulties’ clause – a concept that he 
borrowed from S. 310 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which had given the Crown 
the power to modify the act to remove any difficulties that might arise in the process of 
transition that was not foreseen at the initial stage.521 This ‘transitional provision’, he 
argued, would be temporary – for an initial period of 3 to 5 years.522 In an article he wrote 
in 1948 in support of his position, Rau argued that the justification for the transitional 
clause lay in “the rapidly changing conditions of India”, and economic and political “state 
of flux”.523  
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521 The relevant portions of S. 310 of the Government of India Act, 1935, read:  
310: Power of His Majesty in Council to remove difficulties 
(1)Whereas difficulties may arise in relation to the transition from the provisions of the 
Government of India Act [of 1919] to the provisions of this Act […]: 
And whereas the nature of those difficulties, and of the provision which should be made for 
meeting them, cannot at the date of the passing of this Act be fully foreseen:  
Now therefore, for the purpose of facilitating each of the said transitions His Majesty may by 
Order in Council—  
(a) direct that this Act and any provisions of the Government of India Act still in force shall, 
during such limited period as may be specified in the Order, have effect subject to such 
adaptations and modifications as may be so specified; 
(b) make, with respect to a limited period so specified such temporary provision as he thinks fit 
for ensuring that, while the transition is being effected and during the period immediately 
following it, there are available to all governments in India and Burma sufficient revenues to 
enable the business of those governments to be carried on; and 
(c) make such other temporary provisions for the purpose of removing any such difficulties as 
aforesaid as may be specified in the Order. 
 
522 Rau got the idea of the temporary limit from Article 51 of the Irish Constitution, which had a 
similar provision to be applicable for 3 years. In his trips to Ireland and America – the latter at 
that time especially aware of the problems of a rigid amendment clause – Rau received further 
validation for his ideas. See, Benegal Narsinga Rau, India’s Constitution in the Making (Bombay: 
Allied Publishers, 1963), at 96.  
 
523 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi: Oxford 





This was in keeping with the views of Nehru, who had separately reminded the 
assembly that, “We are passing through a tremendous age of transition. That […] has to 
be repeated and to be remembered lest in forgetting them we land ourselves in great 
difficulties and in crisis. When we pass through great ages of transition, the various 
systems – even systems of law – have to undergo changes”. 524  With regard to 
amendments, he had gone one step further than Rau and argued that the Constitution 
should be amendable “in the process of ordinary lawmaking” in general. To the 
arguments made by Rau, Nehru added another specific one. A future parliament elected 
by all, should have the right to “make such changes as it wants to” to a constitution 
drafted by members chosen via a limited, and indirect, suffrage.525 “Ultimately”, he 
claimed, “the whole Constitution is a creature of the parliament”. 526 Ambedkar countered 
the last point, by arguing that “power and knowledge do not go together.”527 While the 
future parliament might have more of the former, the body of experts and statesmen 
gathered together in the Assembly might have a better sense of the complex task of 
drafting a constitution that was both flexible, and restrictive. He was “frank enough” to 
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524 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
 
525 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 8 November, 1948. It should also be noted that the Constitution did 
not require a ratification procedure to come into effect. All it required for adoption was passage in 
the Assembly.  
 
526 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949. 
 






suggest that the Assembly, “such as it is, has probably a greater modicum and quantum of 
knowledge and information than the future Parliament is likely to have.”528  
Nehru’s view had found support from some in the Assembly,529 but did not carry 
the day in its entirety.530 Eventually, the drafting committee settled on a three-tiered 
system of amendments. Certain clauses, a relatively small number, could be amended by 
a simple majority of Parliament. The vast majority of the provisions would require a 
super-majority (two-thirds) of both the houses of Parliament, but no ratification by the 
state assemblies. The latter was mandated for only a small number of provisions that 
dealt with the federal structure and the distribution of power between center and states.  
Nehru’s failure to get an expansive amendment clause, Granville Austin surmises, 




529 Of which H.V. Kamath’s have been the most well known, quoted several times by the Courts: 
“When a storm breaks out, it is the flexible little plants, blades of grass that withstand the storm. 
They do not break because they bend, they are flexible. But the mighty trees that stand rigid 
break, and they are uprooted in a storm. Therefore, I fear that when a social storm is brewing, if 
we want to resist that storm, this is not the way to proceed about it. You must make the 
Constitution flexible, and able to bend to social change. If it does not bend, people will break it.” 
H.V. Kamath, 12 September, 1949.  
 
530 Years of Congress dominance in both the Centre and the States meant that the Amendment 
clause proved to be more than flexible. By last count, the Constitution has been amended 98 times 
in its 63 years of existence. However, a substantial number of those amendments did not make 
any major changes in the Constitution, and many are of an administrative nature. The 
amendments of the property clause, however, would be a whole other issue. Starting within the 
very first year of the Constitution, when the constituent assembly was still functioning after 
changing its name to a legislative assembly, a back and forth between the parliament and 







who did not always see eye to eye with him.531 That resistance showed, as we will discuss 
in Section 5.3, the importance of a delicate balance of interests for the whole system to 
function. The suggestion of a carte blanche to the Parliament did not only bother those 
like Munshi who were coming to it from a textbook liberal point of view. It also ran into 
resistance from those who, in the context of factious coalition of interests within the 
Congress, refused to grant complete and unquestioned power to any branch of the 
government.  
5.2.4: Executive Power and Civil Liberties 
The flexibility granted to the legislative sphere – facilitating future contestations 
required by the logic of a democratic transformation – had a necessary counter-point in 
the design of executive powers. This has been an aspect of the drafting that has received 
relatively scant scholarly attention.532 In place of the talk of elasticity and negotiation for 
the former, order and effectiveness was the dominant theme for the latter. These were not 
necessarily contradictory arguments, rather they both flowed from the logic of 
constitutionalism. The need for a powerful executive arose in two principal ways from 
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531 Austin, Cornerstone, at 264.  
 
532 While there has been a lot of works on the state of civil liberties in India today, no 
comprehensive study of the history of the drafting of these provisions exist. Uday Singh Mehta’s 
provocative writings on the Constitution provides a couple of interesting theoretical insights, 
which I will refer to, on this matter. However, he does not refer to the provisions in question, or 
go into the issue of civil liberties at length. See, Uday Singh Mehta, ‘Indian Constitutionalism: 
The Articulation of a Political Vision’, in From the Colonial to the Postcolonial, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). Recently, Arudra Burra has undertaken a comprehensive work on freedom of speech under 
the Indian Constitution. His unpublished paper on the topic, ‘Arguments from Colonial 






that logic. First, the vehicle of the transformation was to be the state, and hence it had to 
be well organized, and administratively capable of the task. Second, political challenges 
had to be channeled into the structure laid down by the Constitution, whereupon there 
was flexibility to assimilate it. A strong executive was required to both repress and 
disincentivize resistance outside the constitutional structure. In other words, a 
transformational constitutional project required two things which only an organized and 
powerful executive could deliver: a body capable of carrying out the change, and a 
mechanism by which other – non-constitutional – methods for demanding change could 
be forced into a constitutional path. We can call this the need for organization, and the 
need for order, respectively.  
We have already discussed before how preserving the entirety of the colonial state 
apparatus intact was motivated by the need for a well-organized executive machinery. 
Colonial ‘constitution’, as we had shown in Chapter 3, was shaped more than anything 
else by the need for administrative cohesion and organization. That became an important 
– if certainly not the definitive – aspect of the post-colonial constitution, which laid out in 
great detail the structure and relationship between different administrative bodies, whose 
job was to “assist” the elite in their “tremendous undertaking.”533  
The other issue, that of order, had increasingly become a significant concern for 
the Congress since it took over the interim government. In parts, the gruesome specter of 
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violence unleashed by the partition brought it to the fore.534 But it had a more general 
basis. For transformational constitutionalism to function, society had to “hold fast to 
constitutional methods of achieving [the] social and economic objectives.” 535 
Consequently, it “must abandon the bloody methods of revolution”.536 The latter, for 
Ambedkar, included the Gandhian methods of resistance, which also had to be eschewed 
despite their refusal to make any revolution bloody.537 Because, “where constitutional 
methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods.”538 
The possibility of transformation through constitutional means depended, in parts, on it 
being the only feasible mean of transformation. The different contending groups in 
society had to be swayed to pursue their causes within the framework of the 
Constitution.539 Given the condition of flux, and the lack of ‘constitutional morality’540 – 
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534 A.K. Ayyar, a member of the Fundamental Rights subcommittee, wrote in a letter to B.N. Rau: 
“The recent happenings in different parts of India have convinced me more than ever that all 
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution must be subject to public order, security, 
safety, though such a provision may to some extent neutralize the effect of the rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution”, quoted in Austin, Cornerstone, at 70.  
 
535 B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 25 November, 1949.  
 
536 Ibid.  
 
537 “It means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and 
satyagraha.” Ibid.  
 
538 Ibid.  
 
539 The  issue of labor – one of the major concerns of the elites before independence – was a good 
example of this shift. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provided for an array of progressive 
rights for the workers. However, it also created for a system of ‘recognized unions’, compulsory 
arbitrations, a specialized administrative and judicial machinery (tribunals) dedicated to 
maintaining an overwhelming role of the Central government in maintaining peace between 
capital and labor. The point was not to repress conflicts, but to make sure that they are channeled 






in other words, the tenuousness of the hegemonic project – one could not take that 
possibility for granted. Such a presumption could be, as Patel – by then in charge of 
internal security— never tired of saying, “a dangerous thing”.541  This led to, according to 
some critiques, a constitution whose rights have been “framed from the point of view of a 
police constable.” 542 The most glaring example was giving constitutional status to 
‘preventive detention’543 –where individuals were imprisoned without the commission of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
540 “The question is, can we presume such a diffusion of Constitutional morality? Constitutional 
morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realize that our people have 
yet to learn it.” B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 4 November, 1948.  
 
541 ‘Proceedings of the Meeting, 21 April, 1947’, in Shiva Rao, Vol. II.  
 
542 Somnath Lahiri, CAD, 29 April, 1947. Lahiri was the only communist member of the 
assembly (though only for a short period). His observation was more than an intellectual critique, 
since within his short tenure though, his house got searched and possessions seized, a fact that he 
tried to bring to the attention of the Assembly with little success. His was not an isolated 
experience. Maulana Hasrat Mohani, recounted the experience from Kanpur in bringing to light 
the necessity for having strong civil liberties provision in the Constitution:  In particular I would 
tell you about Kanpur city which I represent. The U. P. Government there have singled out the 
Socialists, the Communists, Independent-Socialists,--including Muslims—Forward Blockists and 
even those who were suspected of standing against them as rival candidates in the elections and 
put restrictions on them, and on one plea or the other they were brought under the provision of the 
Defence of India Act. Some were branded as Goondas, others were stamped as Communists, 
there were others who were told that they were supporting Hyderabad and collecting funds. There 
were yet others who were told that they were connected with those members of the Communist 
Party who are working under ground and they were sent to jails.” Maulana Hasrat Mohani, CAD, 
2 December, 1948. Therefore, not surprisingly, the strongest critics of the civil rights provisions 
in the Constitution were the Socialists outside the assembly. Ambedkar, however, took an 
uncharitable view of these criticisms, saying, “the Socialists want that the Fundamental Rights 
mentioned in the Constitution must be absolute and without any limitations so that if their Party 
fails to come into power, they would have the unfettered freedom not merely to criticize, but also 
to overthrow the State.” B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 25 November, 1949.  
 
543 Art. 22 allowed for preventive detention in a negative fashion – by specifying its maximum 
duration. However, it also allowed the Parliament to make laws providing for longer periods of 
detention. Art. 22(4) said: No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention 
of a person for a longer period than three months unless (a) an Advisory Board consisting of 
persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has 
reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion 





a crime and without trial – a much-abhorred practice of the colonial government that 
Congress had specifically protested against.544  
There were criticisms about this from some members of the assembly, many of 
whom have had firsthand experience of the repressive laws of the colonial state.545 
Members listed the repressive laws that would be sanctioned under the new 
constitution,546 and complained that the Constitution just places “an Indian bureaucracy 
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(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be 
detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention 
without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub 
clause (a) of clause (4). Preventive detention was the cause of the first major case to come to the 
newly formed Supreme Court, just a few months after the adoption of the Constitution, when the 
communist leader A.K. Gopalan challenged his detention under the Preventive Detention Act, of 
1950. The court, which as we would see would subsequently be rather willing to challenge 
legislations regarding property expropriation, refused to strike down the law. See, A.K. Gopalan 
v. The State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27.  
 
544 Preventive detention was first introduced by the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation III, in 
1818, and subsequently expanded to the rest of India. It was a part of the infamous ‘Rowlatt 
Acts’, against which Gandhi had launched his first nationwide satyagraha. For a detailed 
discussion which takes into account not just the Constitution, but several criminal law measures, 
see, Anil Kalhan, Gerald P. Conroy, Mamta Kaushal, Sam Scott Miller, and Jed S. Rakoff, 
‘Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in India’, Columbia Journal 
of Asian Law 20:1 (2006), at 93 – 234.  
 
545 These protests were generally from members who did not hold any position in the either the 
central or the provincial governments, and tellingly, some members of the minority Muslim 
community. See, for example, Kazi Syed Karimuddin, and Maulana Hasrat Mohani’s speech at 
the assembly, CAD, 2 and 3 December, 1948. Other members opposed to the degree of protection 
afforded to civil liberties in the Constitution, at various stages, were K.M. Munshi (perhaps the 
most prominent voice on this issue), Thakur Das Bhargava, Hukam Singh, Bakshi Sir Tek Chand, 
and R.K. Sidhwa.  
 
546 H.J. Khandekar mentioned the Goonda Act, Defence of India Act, Essential Services Act, and 
Public Safety Act, amongst others, as well as the infamous s.144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
which gives wide ranging ‘emergency’ powers to the local executive officers. The latter, 






in the place of a British bureaucracy.”547 Many of them suggested amendments to rectify 
it – like protection against illegal search and seizures, and against capital punishment – 
which were all defeated in the Assembly.548  
Since, one of the major pillars of Congress’s constitutional demands under 
colonial rule was the elimination of repressive executive powers,549 what were the 
reasons offered for this change in attitude?  One line of argument, of a more technical 
variety, was offered by Ambedkar and Ayyar, who suggested that limits on rights was a 
feature of all constitutions, including the famously liberal American one. Whereas those 
limitations have been formulated through years of judicial pronouncements, the Indian 
framers sought to incorporate them in the text itself for the sake of clarity.550 However, 
that does not fully explain either the need to put down express limits on rights in the 
Constitution, and the wholesale incorporation of repressive colonial laws, as well as 
subsequent laws about censorship, etc. For that, a more substantive claim could be 
detected from the arguments made in the Assembly debates. Freedom, it was argued, has 
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547 Maulana Hasrat Mohani, CAD, 2 December, 1948. 
 
548 For example, the following provision was suggested by Kazi Syed Karimuddin for inclusion: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized." CAD, 3 December, 1948. Against this, Iyer, 
suggested that “under Indian conditions, and the distance of the interiors’, preparing a warrant 
might take such a long time that the case might be lost”, a point supported by Patel, who said – 
not surprisingly –  that such a provision would be “a dangerous thing”. For a summary of the 
debates on civil liberties in the Assembly, see, Austin, Cornerstone, at 68 – 75, and 101 – 112.  
 
549 See, for example, the discussions of the Nehru Report in Chapter 5.  
 






become a settled issue once the colonial regime was deposed, and the executive brought 
under the control of a democratically elected legislature.551 Such a closure was central to 
the claim of a project that sought to channel all transformational aspirations within the 
constituted order. Certain questions had to be considered closed, and one had to proclaim 
that with the end of colonial rule, “it is wrong to regard the State with suspicion.” Since, 
“today it is in the hands of those who are utterly incapable of doing any wrong to the 
people”. 552 This is what Uday Mehta has called the ‘irony’ of the fate of freedom in the 
Constitution – that freedom became a “subsidiary concern” at the very moment one 
became free from colonial subjugation.553 What Mehta does not pursue is how this 
‘irony’ was a necessary condition of possibility for a transformational constitutional 
project to proceed.554 If transformation had to be achieved within the framework of the 
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551 On the significance of the latter, see, B.R. Ambedkar, CAD, 4 November, 1948.  
 
552 Brajeshwar Prasad, CAD, 2 December, 1948.  
 
553 Uday Singh Mehta, ‘The Social Question and Absolutism of Politics’, Seminar 615 (2010). 
Also see, Uday Singh Mehta, “Constitutionalism”, in The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, 
ed. Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010): 15, 
and Uday Singh Mehta, ‘Indian Constitutionalism: The Articulation of a Political Vision’, in 
From the Colonial to the Postcolonial, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew 
Sartori eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
 
554 Mehta, builds his argument on Arendt’s “trenchant insight” that whenever political power 
concerns itself with solving social inequities, it tends towards political absolutism, which he feels 
has been the case in India. In other words, he takes Arendt’s distinction between freedom and 
necessity, and the danger that awaits when constitutionalism aligns itself with the latter as the 
theoretical premise for his argument. What this misses is the difficulty of maintaining that 
distinction in India. The nature of ‘necessity’ – that is, the concrete condition of the Indian society 
– made any unproblematic deliberations on purely the question of freedom in the constituent 
assembly an unviable proposition. It is open to argument whether Arendt’s distinction could hold 
in any modern society except that of America, with some necessary ideological contortions 
exclude institutions like slavery as a legitimate issue for deliberation. In the case of India though 
it can be said with certainty that such a discourse of freedom, which would exclude the social 





Constitution, contestations and dissents had to be expressed within that framework, not 
towards it. On the one hand, the framework itself needed to be modified – through 
universal franchise, and legislative flexibility – to incorporate such contestations. On the 
other hand, any political expressions unwilling to do so, had to be effectively dealt with. 
Transformational constitutionalism – most certainly – required its police.  
5.3 The Elites, their Divisions, and the Constitution 
So far I have discussed the praxis of transformational constitutionalism from the 
point of view of the fragile and contingent nature of the elite-mass relationship. The 
broad term ‘elite’, however, needs to be refined in the Indian context, to specify the 
composition, and the dynamics of alliance and competitions amongst the different 
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Mehta says, was willing to accept the social condition as it is, with certain self-corrections. The 
failure of Gandhi (as we have argued in Chapter 4) as well as the absence of the vision Mehta 
espouses, was not because of some ideological proclivities, or corruptions brought about by 
power, which one can subsequently wish away. It was a product of the social historical conditions 
of India, a condition within which transformational constitutionalism arose. See, Uday Singh 
Mehta, “Constitutionalism”, in The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, ed. Niraja Gopal Jayal 
and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 15, Uday Singh Mehta, 
‘Indian Constitutionalism: The Articulation of a Political Vision’, in From the Colonial to the 
Postcolonial, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori eds., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), and Uday Singh Mehta, ‘The Social Question and Absolutism of 
Politics’, Seminar 615 (2010). Anuj Bhuwania, in his unpublished dissertation thesis extends this 
Arendtian critique of the Indian Constitution with regards to the ‘Public Interest Litigation’ 
jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court. Bhuwania implies that the massive judicial overreach 
into various state functions, which rightly needs to be criticized, are a result of the Indian 
Constitution prioritizing the question of necessity to the detriment of freedom. Anuj Bhuwania, 
Competing Populisms: Public Interest Litigation and Political Society in Post-Emergency India, 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Columbia University, 2013). For an interesting theoretical 
reading (not in the context of India) that reconfigures Arendt’s ‘sociological deficit’ to offer a 
reading of her arguments that would make a democratically determined regime of social rights 
possible, see, Jean Cohen, ‘Rights, Citizenship, and the Modern Form of the Social: Dilemmas of 






groups. That would, in turn, further refine the analysis of transformational 
constitutionalism structure developed so far.  
Any class-based analysis of the post-colonial Indian state faces a principle 
challenge. The weakness of the capitalist class (i.e., industrial and mercantile capital) in 
the economic sphere, and the persistence of pre-capitalist forms of political associations, 
made a simple determination of capitalist control of political power untenable. Marxist 
scholars in India developed a ‘coalitional model of class domination’ whereby they 
argued that the capitalist class, due to its historic weakness, had to share power with other 
dominant classes – especially the landowning elite.555 Kaviraj, to return to his essay, 
adopted this model with some notable readjustments. The long term ruling coalition, he 
argued, consisted of three distinct social groups – the industrial capitalist, the landed 
elites, and the bureaucratic managerial elite.556 Independent dominance of any one of 
these classes was never a concrete historical possibility. Hence the coalition was not an 
incidental fact, or an accident, it was the very condition of elite dominance, which would 
otherwise be destabilized. This fact provided a centripetal constraint on the coalition, but 
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555 This model was given a sophisticated form by the economist Pranab Bardhan, with a specific 
focus on the slow rate of growth of the Indian economy. Bardhan identified three ‘dominant 
proprietary classes’ – namely the industrial capitalists, landed elite, and a professional elites. See, 
Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). For 
a shorter version of the coalition thesis, with a focus more on its implications for democracy, see, 
Pranab Bardhan, “Dominant Proprietary Classes and India’s Democracy”, in India’s Democracy: 
An Analysis of Changing State Society Relationships, Atul Kohli ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). For yet another treatment of the coalition model, see, Achin Vanaik, The 
Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India (London: Verso, 1990).  
 
556 Kaviraj, ‘Critique of Passive Revolution’, at 2431. As we can see, the social groups of Kaviraj 
are similar to the dominant classes in Bardhan. There are some differences, despite overlaps, 






not a frictionless unity of purpose. The latter was not possible since meaningful 
differences existed in the interests and expressions of these classes. Each potential 
political move – even if for a supposedly common end – could have differential impact 
on the respective positions of the classes, and hence viewed differently by them. As 
independence drew near, and the general goal of winning freedom from colonial rule 
gave way to more particular struggle for determining the structure of new political 
institutions and allocation of resources, these tensions were heightened and significant 
realignments were called for. 557  As a resulted, intense negotiation and bargaining 
amongst them was a central feature of the coalition. Several such engagements were 
taking place in the initial decades of independent India with regards to different pieces of 
economic and social policy.558 The drafting process of the Constitution was similarly 
marked by intra-coalition negotiation between the dominant classes.  
Yet, the Constitution was a very different object for such wrangling. It did not 
allocate substantive outcomes in the way a piece of legislation or policy document did. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
557 Ibid, at 2432.  
 
558 One can get a detailed picture of such negotiations, and their outcomes, regarding five-year 
plans, industrial policies, and agriculture policies. See, Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of 
Development in India (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Ashutosh Varsney, Democracy, Development, 
and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) [specifically for agricultural policies]; and Achin Vanaik, The Painful Transition: 
Bourgeois Democracy in India (London: Verso, 1990). Though they do not take up the ‘dominant 
class coalition’ model, Rudolph and Rudolph also provide a picture of claims made by organized 
“demand groups”, and negotiated resolutions of those demands. However, the Rudolphs, as we 
have noted earlier, focus on the ‘centrism’ of these demands, and tend to overestimate the ability 
of the state to seamlessly accommodate and control all of the demand groups. See, Lloyd I. 
Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the 






Rather, it set out a mediating mechanism for future bargaining over substantive resources. 
In other words, a negotiation over a constitution was a negotiation about a framework of 
negotiations, which was simultaneously more complex and had higher stakes attached to 
it. What complicated the picture further, in the context of India, are three facts we have 
already mentioned (though the sequence is for the sake of analytical clarity, not reflective 
of actual historical development). First was what I have termed the centripetal constraints 
of the coalition. The inability of any group to claim individual superiority made them 
unable to leave the coalition or afford to lose any other group. In terms of constitution 
making this implied an inability to propose a separate system of rule, either constitutional 
or otherwise, than the one being hammered out inside the assembly. In other words, 
neither group was able or had the desire to lead either a revolution or a coup. Second, 
India was to be a democracy, and it was a democratic constitution one was negotiating 
about. This meant every negotiating move was double natured – that is, it had to be 
conceived and expressed in terms of both the position of a dominant class within the 
coalition, as well as their respective relationship to the masses outside the coalition. The 
third fact, following from the second, was that the nature of the relationship between the 
elite coalition and the masses at large had necessitated a transformational constitutional 
vision. This, as we have seen had pushed the Constitution towards flexibility and need for 
accommodations, and made the process of finding guarantees about preservation of 
substantive interests an even trickier task.  
The combination of all these factors constituted a ‘field of force’ within which the 





stability of the political rule of the elites made them accept the need for a 
transformational constitutional vision. However, disagreements about the particular 
substantive questions within that broad vision lead to intense negotiations about the 
specific way in which it was to be expressed in the form of a written constitutional 
document. In other words, while the weakness of the hegemonic project in India gave the 
constitutional imagination its unique form, the nature of the inter-coalitional negotiations 
gave the constitutional document its specific textual form. The intensity of the 
negotiations increased when there were major differences in position on a substantive 
point. No substantive question had more contending interests in play than property rights. 
And the debate over the property question affected the way most of the Constitution was 
shaped. Therefore to take a closer look at that we need to first get a brief sense of where 
each of the dominant classes were situated on that question.  
5.3.1 The Managerial Elite 
Of all the dominant groups, the managerial – bureaucratic elite are of a distinct 
kind. They do not constitute a class by virtue of their place in the production chain, or 
due to their ownership of certain material resources.559 Rather, their subject position 
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559 Pranab Bardhan, argued that the ‘professional elite’ – which has substantial overlaps with the 
managerial –bureaucratic classes we are discussing here, could be distinguished by virtue of their 
accumulation of the social capital through education. Education, he said was a scare resource in 
India [the “scarcity value of education” in his terms] and attached to significant material gains, 
and could be the basis for distinguishing a class. Bardhan’s category though, is too economistic 
for our purposes, and his main concern – the rise of a ‘rentier bureaucracy’ which hampers the 
process of accumulation in the economic system – is not of immediate relevance to this work. 
What I am focused on is the distinctive political vision brought to play by those who were 
directly concerned with the running of the state, and for planning of the economy of the nation. 





derives from their role in managing the state and the political institutions. The focus on 
the category of the managerial elite comes from the realization that in increasingly 
complex societies, the organization of the economy as a whole and the stability of the 
state gave rise to a set of concerns distinct from those of owners of capital and their need 
for making profit. The concern for making viable the capitalist social order could often be 
in variance with the immediate interests of the capitalist class, and the ability of the 
managerial elite to act (in a relative sense) freely increased in times of crisis or transition, 
when the viability of the order was most challenged. The variance should not make one 
think that the two groups were opposed, or that their interests could be understood 
independently of one another. The eventual goal was to ‘rationalize’ the capitalist system, 
not to replace it. The ‘consciousness’ of the managerial elite arose out of their position, – 
both institutional as well as intellectual – that forced them to reflect upon the 
requirements of maintaining the long-term viability of the socio-political order. That 
consciousness was therefore shaped by the particular form in which those necessities 
made themselves felt – the nature of the social antagonisms, economic activities, and 
political mobilizations that marked the historical terrain on which the managerial elites 
were called upon to act.560 
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ownership of a specific productive resource. In other words, in line with the ‘state autonomy’ 
theorists discussed below, it is concerned with how politics functions in a given economic 
context, rather than how economic position gives rise to political issues. See, Pranab Bardhan, 
The Political Economy of Development in India (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).  
 
560 A theoretical treatment of how the state managerial ‘consciousness’ is formed can be found in, 
Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: 






In the specific context of India, the managerial elite responded by proposing a 
model of ‘development’ for the nation. Development had two goals – to modernize the 
economy and correct the sporadic and uneven nature of capital accumulation through 
explicit and planned state intervention, and to ameliorate conditions of inequality and 
scarcity that could jeopardize the stability of the state. In short, the twin objectives of 
production and alleviation. These objectives shared a complicated relationship. On the 
one hand, an increase of production would provide a supply side solution to the problem 
of scarcity and material deprivation, 561  and more fundamentally also free a vast 
proportion of the labor force from pre-capitalist forms562 of domination and dependence. 
On the other hand, historically speaking, social transformations of this scale caused 
displacements and instability that required enhanced and continual use of state power and 
repression to counter. The distinct problem for India was that, unlike much of the 
Western world, it had to manage this transformation within a democratic set up.563 What 
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561 To quote Nehru: “The poverty of people presents a big problem. Two or three hundred years 
ago there was no way of removing such poverty in any country. The result was that most people 
were poor and some people, probably a handful, were rich. […] This was so because before the 
industrial revolution, there was no way of dealing with the problem of poverty, there was no way 
of producing sufficient wealth.” Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘speech at the AICC Youth Training Camp 
held in New Delhi in September, 1955’, in Towards a New Revolution, (New Delhi: Indian 
National Congress, 1956). 
 
562 The basic distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist, in the sense it is being used here, is 
that under pre-capitalist forms of production, surplus is extracted from the labor using extra-
economic forms of domination, rather than in a purely economic way (e.g., wage contracts under 
capitalism).  
   
563 Nehru, again: “We have to face the problem of a heavily populated underdeveloped country, 
which is trying to make good in a democratic and peaceful way. On no account are we prepared 
to adopt the methods of violence or any other methods which we consider utterly wrong. That is 
not only a principle we stand by but good practical politics, because methods of violence would 





was required in this condition was a mechanism of planning – helmed by ‘experts’— 
whereby intervention could be made in a deliberate and meticulous fashion to rearrange 
and fix different aspects of the social process to arrive at the intended outcome. The 
Planning Commission, championed by Nehru, was intended to be exactly such a body.564  
The managerial elite was not hostile to the concept of private property in any 
sense. Indeed in agriculture their plan was to strengthen the incidence of property 
ownership by promoting peasant proprietorship, and in industry, they “welcomed the 
goodwill of the industrialists of the country”.565 Rather, their argument was that property 
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‘Presidential Address, 59th Session of the Indian National Congress at Kalyani, January, 1954’, in 
India’s Independence and Social Revolution (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1984), at 115.   
 
564 A thorough political history of state planning in India can be found in Francine R. Frankel, 
India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978). For a description of the planning experience as narrated by someone who was 
institutionally a part of it, see, Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Development Planning: The Indian 
Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); for a critique of planning from a neo-classical 
economic point of view, see, Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai, Planning for 
Industrialization: India's Trade and Industrialization Policies, 1950-1966, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970); for a critique from the left-Gramscian point of view, see, Partha 
Chatterjee, ‘The National State’, in Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial 
and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), at 200. 
  
565 Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at the Constituent Assembly Legislative, 17 February, 1948.  
The first Industrial Policy, framed in 1948, strongly emphasized the importance of private 
ownership of capital, and limited state ownership to only a few sectors: railways, arms and 
ordnance, and atomic energy. In a few other sectors, it emphasized the need for the state to start 
new ventures (rather than nationalizing existing ones), which were coal, iron and steel, minerals, 
telephone and telegraph, shipbuilding etc. This model has often been described as “mixed 
economy”, a phrase which also made its first appearance in this appearance in this document. The 
basic tenet of mixed economic model was that private capital would be allowed to function more 
or less undisturbed in intermediate and consumer goods, while the state would invest in 
infrastructure and basic heavy industries  with high investment needs and long gestation periods. 
[Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy, 6th April, 1948, Paragraph 3, reprinted in, 
Government of India, Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission, 1949-50, Vol. 1., (New Delhi, 






rights had to be understood within the context of the needs of the whole economy, not as 
a mechanism to entrench particular existing interests. What concerned them was how the 
protection for property rights in the Constitution could be qualified sufficiently to avoid 
this possibility, without jettisoning it entirely. The crucial issue here was the possibility 
of the judiciary getting involved in determining the validity of specific claims of property 
protection. The mistrust of the judiciary was not due to who they were or what class they 
belonged to. Rather it was the subject position that they had to adopt as a part of their 
jobs. Judges, by necessity, had to think like lawyers, not planners. The fear was that they 
would have to decide a particular case in front of them by applying general rules, rather 
than being aware of the different moving pieces of the broader economic puzzle. In other 
words, they would, by virtue of their job description, focus on a single incidence of 
exchange, rather than the broader framework in which exchanges take place. The wall 
between law and policy that the liberal theory of constitutional adjudication had fought so 
hard to erect, is what made the state managers and planners weary of judges having a say 
over their initiatives. At the very least, challenge in courts would definitely delay reforms 
by forcing laws to be redrafted, administrative actions changed, and the process 
continually questioned through litigations. From their point of view, delay was 
potentially perilous. Speed was not only preferable, 566 it was an imperative. Addressing 
the Parliament just a year after the Constitution was adopted, Nehru said, “Now, are we 
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566 “We are trying to catch up, as fast as we can”, Nehru wrote to a Congress leader skeptical of 
all the developmental activities, “with the Industrial Revolution that happened long ago in the 
West.” As quoted in, Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 






to wait for this delaying process to go on and for this process of challenge in courts of 
law to go on for month after month and year after year. [Certain politicians] have said 
“Why not wait for this court or that court to decide?” I want to tell them that a few 
million people have waited for too long a period. There is not going to be much more 
waiting by these millions outside. And these people who talk about waiting, do not know 
what is stirring the hearts of those millions outside.”567 Therefore, it was important to 
make sure that, “within limits no judge and no Supreme Court can make itself a third 
chamber”.568     
Along with Nehru, the person who exemplified this vision during the drafting 
process of the Constitution was B. N. Rau. Rau, was a former judge and a former member 
of the Indian Civil Services, and had been awarded a knighthood for his dexterity during 
the complex late years of the Raj, which crucially included a role (albeit marginal) in 
negotiating the Government of India Act, 1935, and then implementing it.569 Rau in his 
role as a “Constitutional Adviser”, prepared detailed notes and made important 
suggestions for the phrasing of specific articles.570 He studied different Constitutions, and 
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567 Jawaharlal Nehru, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XII – XIII, Columns. 8814 -20 (16 May, 
1951). 
 
568 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
 
569 Rau was involved in the negotiation process as an emissary of the Assam Government to the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee in London. His acuity meant that his influence went beyond that 
narrow brief. As a member of the Reforms Office of the Government of India, he played an 
important role in implementing the Act. Also, speaking of tricky constitutional assignments, Rau 
played a major role in the legal aspect of the complicated story of Kashmir’s accession to India.  
 
570 Rau’s role in the framing of the Constitution – in which he was arguably as influential as any – 





visited different countries, focusing especially on the practical implications of the 
different drafting choices for the same article. On one such trip to the United States, he 
met Justice Felix Frankfurter – a close ally of Roosevelt during the New Deal days, and 
subsequently appointed by him to the Supreme Court – who warned him about using the 
phrase ‘due process of law’ as a clarificatory phrase for the state’s power to violate 
private property rights.571 From the beginning of the century to the thirties– often known 
as the Lochner era – the United States Supreme Court read the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to strike down progressive labor and regulatory laws, upholding the 
absolute freedom of contract, leading to the confrontation between Roosevelt and the 
Supreme Court.572 This was precisely the kind of situation that scared people like Rau or 
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would hopefully fill this gap in scholarship. Elangovan curiously concludes that Rau embodied a 
liberal constitutional vision, and was disappointed that it could not be fully realized in India. My 
own study of Rau’s interventions, especially on the property clause, the amendment clause 
(mentioned earlier) and the fundamental rights provisions, show that he embodied a state-
managerial perspective, focusing on how to make sure that the ability of the new government to 
helm the transition was not curtailed or hampered by abstract proclamations. For example, see his 
suggestion for a blanket provision allowing the curtailment of fundamental rights “whenever the 
exigencies of common good” required so that I mentioned earlier. See, Arvind Elangovan, A 
Constitutional Imagination of India: Sir Benegal Narsing Rau amidst the Retreat of Liberal 
Idealism: 1910 - 1950, PhD Dissertation, (University of Chicago, 2012). For Rau’s role during 
the Government of India Act, see, Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 
1935 India Act: The Last Act of the Raj (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). Insights about Rau’s ideas 
about the Constitution can be found in his own book about the drafting process: Benegal Narsinga 
Rau, India’s Constitution in the Making (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1963). 
 
571 Austin, Cornerstone, at 103.  
 
572 The era takes its name from the case Lochner v. New York, which was paradigmatic of the 
attitude of the American courts from after the Civil War right up to the mid 1930s, where they 
repeatedly struck down progressive legislations, especially labor laws, as violating the freedom of 
contract and security of property. For this purpose, they read the Fifth Amendment guarantee of 
‘due process’ expansively to hold that it contains within it protection for those two sacrosanct 
principles. Hence even if a law passed by a majority in the legislature, it could not violate the 
right to property and contract as guaranteed by the due process clause, and policed by the courts. 





Nehru. After visiting America, Rau wrote, how his acquaintances there had “drawn 
attention to the dangers of attempting to find in the Supreme Court – instead of the 
lessons of experience – a safeguard against the mistakes of the representatives of the 
people.”573 The “lessons of experience” is what the managerial elite wanted to privilege, 
rather than any abstract ideas of rights, during the difficult times of transformation.  
5.3.2 The Industrial Capitalists 
The Indian capitalist class was not a natural repository of nationalist sentiments. It 
did not, till very late, see its own interest aligned with the independence of the nation. 
Capital is rather adaptable to different political regimes, and finds ways to adjust and 
carry on the business of making profits – Indian capital under colonial rule in the 
twentieth century574 was no different.575 The support of the industrial capitalists for the 
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violating the freedom of contract. It is not difficult to see why this caused grave concern to Rau 
and the Indian framers. See, Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905). For a concise survey of the 
jurisprudence of this era, see, William E. Forbath, ‘Politics, State Building, and the Courts, 1870 
– 1920’, in The Cambridge History of Law in America, Vol. II: The Long Nineteenth Century, 
1789 – 1920, Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg eds., (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), at 643 – 695. For a more detailed treatment, see, Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law 1870 – 1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992).  
 
573 B.N. Rau, Constitutional Precedents, at 23, as quoted in Austin, Cornerstone, at 103.  
 
574 The story of the nineteenth century, where the colonial state actively discouraged, even 
hampered Indian entrepreneurship, have been discussed briefly in Chapter 3.  
 
575 Indeed, some of them received express support from the colonial administration, an example 
of this being Tata, the most well-known of all Indian business houses. A big reason for the 
survival and growth of Tata Steel in its initial years was large procurement contracts from the 
government (mainly the railways) especially during and after World War I. Not only Tata, but 
many of the other big entrepreneurs depended on Government procurement and friendly 





national movement was mostly strategic, contingent, and at times partial, which changed 
to a more wholehearted support by the late 1930s.576 As Congress became the party of 
government, this relationship solidified, to the point where G.D. Birla, the most 
prominent of the business leaders, told Nehru, “there is a much larger field of agreement 
between your government and ourselves than between any other section of the 
society.”577 Apart from the usual benefits that accrue to domestic capital from being free 
from foreign rule – e.g., protective trade policy, monetary policy,578 market regulations – 
the weakness of Indian capital meant that it was especially reliant on the state for its 
growth, beyond the usual functions of maintaining law and order. Indian capitalists were 
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piecemeal patronages, there was a need for a greater Government intervention to both boost 
capacity and demand, which was not forthcoming.    
 
576 Indian historians, who have studied the complicated question of the relationship of the Indian 
capitalist class with the nationalist movement, generally agree that a simple relationship – either 
of support or opposition – cannot be surmised, till the 30s. During the 30s and 40s, the general 
economic mismanagement of the colonial regime, the running of fiscal and monetary policies in 
the interests of London, and the growing sense that independence and Congress rule was more a 
question of when rather than if, made an increasingly larger section of the capitalist class realize 
the need to stand by Congress. In short, Indian capital realized by the 1930s that the colonial state 
–  primarily concerned with protecting British interests both economically and politically –could 
not satisfy the need to increase the level of industrial production in India. 
    
577 Ghanshyam Das Birla, Proceedings of the Annual Sessions of FICCI, 1951, at 32. 
  
578  Monetary policy was of especially major concern, since during the war, the colonial 
government had attempted to fund the cost of the war through an inflationary monetary policy, 
causing massive inflationary pressure on the economy, which had not seen concurrent growth in 
wages and production, since the money was mostly used to pay debt incurred by the rising cost of 
defense. The devaluation of the currency was especially unwelcome to an Indian capitalist, hardly 
any of who made their profits from exports. In 1938, Walchand Hirachand said at the meeting of 
FICCI that, “In India, unfortunately, the administration not being in national hands, there have 
been no readjustments in either the currency or the tariff policy of the Government of India whose 
currency policies has always been subordinated to the interests of Great Britain.” Presidential 
speech in FICCI, 1933, as quoted in Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making 






willing to consider, 579  and then subsequently put forward their own ideas for an 
interventionist role of the state in the economy. 580  In 1942, some of the biggest 
industrialists in India came together to author a development plan, which was published 
in 1944. The ‘Bombay Plan’, as it was popularly known, acknowledged that state 
intervention was “an indispensible feature” of their plan, and that “an enlargement of the 
positive as well preventive functions of the state is essential to any large scale economic 
planning” whose “implications must be fully admitted.”581 The most significant such 
implication they were willing to admit, was that as a result of this plan, “practically every 
aspect of economic life will have to be so rigorously controlled by government that 
individual liberty and freedom of enterprise will suffer a temporary eclipse.”582 Certain 
contemporary scholars, echoing older communist critics of the plan, have argued that the 
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579  In 1938, Congress set up a National Planning Commission (NPC) under the leadership of 
Nehru for devising a development plan for the future of the Indian economy, with a specific focus 
on industrialization. Three prominent members of the business community joined the NPC. 
Nehru, aware of the paradoxical nature of business willing to join such an endeavor, wrote: “[Big 
business’s] outlook on many matters, especially financial and commercial, was definitely 
conservative […] yet the urge for rapid progress […] was so great that all of us were forced out of 
our grooves and compelled to think on new lines.” Jawaharlal Nehru, First 60 Years, at 693, as 
quoted in David Lockwood, “Was the Bombay Plan a Capitalist Plot?”, in Studies in History 28:1 
(2012), at 107. 
 
580 David Lockwood has argued that the Indian bourgeoisie from the 1930s onwards has steadily 
evolved towards favoring greater state intervention. See, David Lockwood, The Indian 
Bourgeoisie: A Political History of the Indian Capitalist Class in the Early Twentieth Century 
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012).  
 
581 Purshotamdas Thakurdas et al, Memorandum Outlining a Plan for Economic Development for 
India (London: Penguin Books, 1944), at 87, 90 – 91. [hereafter, ‘Bombay Plan’]. The goal of the 
plan was to double per capita income in fifteen years, and reduce poverty. Its prescription 
included a focus on large industries, especially capital goods and infrastructure, a Keynsian 
model of deficit financing to spur growth, land reform, and reduction of dependence on foreign 
capital.  
      






plan was disingenuous, since the Indian capitalist class had no intention of weakening the 
role of private capital in the economy. However, critiquing the most prominent members 
of the capitalist class for not advocating socialism proper is quite absurd.583 What is to be 
understood is that at the time of making the Constitution, the Indian capitalist class was 
willing to face the realization that long-term benefit of capital lay in accepting certain 
restrictions on the individual freedom of capitalists. Obviously, there arose conflicts 
between these two notions of interests, and the capitalists would protest individually and 
collectively, every time governmental intervention would clash with their ability to make 
profits.584 Nevertheless, the plan itself was not disingenuous.585 The fact that it was a 
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583 This is one of the central claims of Vivek Chibber’s book, Locked in Place. Chibber claims 
that the Bombay Plan was a scared reaction by the capitalists to the specter of mass movements of 
the early 40s, and the capitalists were never serious about being part of a state controlled 
economy. David Lockwood has effectively countered the specific version of history Chibber 
relies upon for this claim. But more broadly, his argument is based on an assumption that a 
‘capitalist plan’ meant that the capitalists were not serious about a developmental state, which 
they sought to “block” instead. This underestimates the opening that the weakness of capital 
provided to the state, and something that from our perspective had a fundamental effect on the 
way the Constitution was structured. Chibber has used this point to build his larger argument 
about the weakness of the Indian developmental state in comparison to South Korea. However, 
the crucial point he fails to note in this regard is that there was a constitutional democracy in only 
one of them. As I have argued, transformational constitution, was both transformational, and a 
constitution. The effects of the latter could not be used to discredit the former. See, Vivek 
Chibber, Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), and David Lockwood, “Was the Bombay Plan a Capitalist 
Plot?”, in Studies in History 28:1 (2012), at 99 – 116.  Chibber’s arguments echo 
contemporaneous criticisms of the plan by communists and socialists. As Amal Sanyal noted: 
“The Communist Party of India criticized it for not taking up the question of income 
redistribution before denouncing it simply as a plan for building capitalism. The Radical 
Democratic Party declared that the plan “frankly postulates a dictatorship of big business.” Indian 
Trotskyites considered that the bourgeoisie had been “frightened out of their wits by the 
revolutionary energy of the masses in 1942” and was now trying to “by-pass political power 
through an economic weapon.” [Amal Sanyal, ‘The Curious Case of the Bombay Plan’, 
Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences (2010), at 21]  
 
584 As can be expected, the initial years of planning brought strategic resistances from the 





bourgeois plan – only reinforces the point that the Indian bourgeoisie required a 
deliberate plan, one that was centered around the state’s ability to direct and develop the 
economy.586 This meant foregoing the demand for an abstract or absolute protection for 
property in the Constitution. Rather than separating property rights from political power, 
the material dependence of Indian capital on the state meant that they had to be open to 
property being deliberated on and determined by the political authority.    
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business was welcomed, but anything that led to the regulation or restriction of that sector was 
opposed.” He further adds, that “Resolutions were passed [by the business groups] opposing 
controls, government was criticized for its “doctrinaire adherence to the efficacy of controls,” and 
reliance on private enterprise was urged for industrial development. This stance would remain 
unchanged throughout the planning period, but any criticisms voiced against the government at 
this time was low key.” The reason it was low key was despite obvious conflicts, the interests of 
the managerial elite and the capitalist class never was completely opposed to each other. [Baldev 
Nayar, ‘Business Attitudes towards Economic Planning in India’, Asian Survey 11:9 (1971), at 
856]. 
 
585 The Fiscal Commission, based on a survey conducted amongst businessmen in 1949, reported 
a “preponderance of opinion amongst all the witnesses in favour of an organization for the overall 
planning of the economic activities of the country”. [Government of India, Report of the Fiscal 
Commission 1949, at 254.] 
 
586 It should be kept in mind that the Bombay Plan did not exhaust the number of ways in which 
the state could intervene under the logic of development, or even the kinds of such interventions 
that would be welcomed by capital. For example, here’s Jagjivan Ram, the Labour minister, 
defending the role of the state as a compulsory mediator in conflicts between labor and capital, in 
‘developmental’ terms: “No useful purpose will be served by quoting examples from the UK and 
the US. We want to encourage that but we cannot shut our eyes to the realities of the situation, 
namely, the condition of the working classes of this country and the magnitude of the illiteracy 
and ignorance that is prevalent among a very large section of them and more than all these the 
fact that so long the working class movement in this country has been a movement for the 
working class but not by the working class. As soon as the working class movement in this 
country becomes a movement of the working class, by the working class, for the working class it 
will be possible to encourage collective bargaining and it will be possible for the Government to 
withdraw itself completely from the disputes between employers and employees.” [Parliamentary 
Debates, Vol IV, No. 4, 2581-2582]. For a critical account of State intervention in labor 
movements, see, Emmanuel Tietelbaum, “Was the Indian Labor Movement Ever Co-Opted? 
Evaluating Standard Accounts”, in Whatever Happened to Class? Reflections from South Asia, 







However, this did not mean they were willing to go along with any decision on 
private property that a future parliament might make. Socialism was a persistent fear for 
the capitalist, a fear stoked by socialistic overtones of Nehru’s rhetoric and the socialist 
faction within the Congress.587 Therefore, too much of a weakening of constitutional 
protection for property rights – even if meant for land reform – made them uneasy. They 
wanted to ensure that the expansive state powers regarding property rights would be a. 
limited to land reform, a cause they supported, if not passionately588 and b. have a clear 
procedural certainty attached to them to ward off any sudden socialist urges. In recent 
decades in India, a confident capitalist class had demanded a more classically liberal 
treatment of property rights in the Constitution. In the time of founding, the industrial 
bourgeoisie, lingering particular objections notwithstanding, accepted the general tenets 
of the transformational constitutionalism. Their effort was directed to tailoring its scope 
to make sure that the direction of the transformation was not an open question.  
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587 In 1936, after a speech by Nehru in the Lucknow Congress embracing socialist principles, 21 
prominent industrialists – including Hirachand and Thakurdas, later members of the Bombay Plan 
group – released a statement denouncing Congress’s espousal of socialism. However, this did not 
mean that the capitalists gave up on the Congress. Rather, they actively built a closer relationship 
to, and support of, the Congress Right, like Patel. Furthermore, there was always a sense amongst 
the most politically canny of the capitalist that Nehru’s bark, so to speak, was much worse than 
his bite. In a letter to Thakurdas, Birla wrote: “Jawaharlalji seems to be like a typical English 
democrat […] out for giving expression to his ideology, but he realises that action is impossible 
and so does not press for it”. In his reply, Thakurdas wrote: “I never had any doubts about the 
bonafides of J., only I feel that a good deal of nursing will have to be done to keep J. on the right 
rails all through.” [Quoted in Sumit Sarkar, Modern India,  at 345 – 346].  
 
588 On land reform, the Bombay Plan said that “the state should take over the landlord’s 
function”, and that the final aim was “the establishment of a class of peasant proprietors”. 
[Bombay Plan, at 39 – 40, and 82]. However, the Bombay Plan in general was not too concerned 






5.3.3 The Land Owning Elite 
The land owning elite was the most complex of these classes to analyze. They 
were internally differentiated amongst two major groups – the landlords or zamindars, the 
semi-feudal owners of estates, in general minimally involved in the productive process 
and concerned primarily with extracting rent; and the big peasant who owned and 
cultivated his own land, often with hired labor. What distinguished the two was not 
merely the amount of land they held (though the size of certain zamindari estates did 
make them stand out), but their relation to the productive process. The zamindars 
represented an anachronistic economic form (semi-feudalism) that had failed to evolve 
with the times – captured by the wide circulation of the term ‘absentee landlord’, that is, a 
landlord who is merely a rent seeker. Their distance from the process of cultivation made 
them a major hindrance to the need for increased agricultural production. Related to this, 
zamindari also had a crucial political dimension, as the intermediary in the revenue 
collection mechanism of the state. This latter function, justifiably, marked the landlords 
out as explicit collaborators of the colonial regime, a role they had embraced fully by 
forming political associations that had backed the colonial regime against the nationalist 
movement.589 In both these senses – absentee owners, and revenue collectors – the 
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589 Hence Nehru, in 1937. “How carefully and lovingly the government had nursed the great 
vested interests of India, encouraged the big landlords and the communalists, helped them to 
organize themselves to oppose us, and looked confidently for success in its evil venture!” 
Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Speech at the National Convention of Congress Legislators’, March, 1937, in 
Shiva Rao, Vol. I, at 87. It should be mentioned though that the Congress, after an all too brief 
moment of aligning with peasant organizations like the Kisaan Sabha, took a policy of 
accommodating zamindars in parts from 1937 onwards, weakening the actual provisions and 





zamindars were understood as “intermediaries” standing between the cultivators and the 
state, something the Congress expressly promised in their election manifesto of 1945-46 
to eliminate.590 As the rhetoric of the state shifted from revenue stability to maximization 
of production, zamindari as a system became untenable. Obviously zamindars could 
survive by transforming themselves – as most of them did through legal and dubious 
means – into big farmers,591 but they could not survive qua zamindars. Hence, the general 
consensus was that the specific bundle of rights that constituted zamindari, in its narrow 
juridical sense, must be abolished. Zamindars had several voices in the constituent 
assembly, and they would attack the property provisions from a liberal point of view as 
being discriminatory between different types of property. Raja Kameshwar Singh of 
Darbhanga, an estate that occupied two whole districts of Bihar, called the clause 
“vicious because it treats one section of the Citizens of the Indian Union differently from 
another.”592 Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh – who had previously instituted the most 
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remained however, and Congress legislatures passed laws of various strength to that effect in the 
1940s and 50s.  
 
590 The Congress’ Election Manifesto promised: “The reform of the land system which is urgently 
needed involves the, removal of intermediaries between the peasant and the State. The right of 
such intermediaries should therefore be acquired on payment of equitable compensation.” [A. 
Moin Zaidi, ed., A Tryst with Destiny: A Study of Economic Policy Resolutions of the Indian 
National Congress Passed During the Last 100 Years (New Delhi, Indian Institute of Applied 
Political Research, 1985), at 51.]  
 
591 One of the most common such dubious means was to parcel out the property into smaller plots 
and register them in the names of family members and associates.  
 
592 “Does it behoove” he asked, “such an august Assembly as this to discard principles and 
disfigure the, edifice which is sought to be built on the four pillars of Justice, Liberty, Equality 
and Fraternity, by introducing iniquitous discrimination?” Raja Kameshwar Singh, CAD, 12 






famous legal challenge to zamindari abolition acts, going all the way to the Privy Council 
only to lose 593 – made a similar argument about the equivalence between zamindari and 
other kinds of property by saying that many zamindars have purchased their land, and 
should therefore be treated equal to any other economic transaction.594 Their ideological 
coherence notwithstanding, a simple defense of zamindari was no longer a viable option. 
Rather, the specifically anachronistic nature of their property rights underscored the 
inability of the Constitution to deal with property in a simple and uniform manner.  
The big peasants had an ambiguous relationship to land reform. They were no 
friends of the zamindars, against whom they have organized and fought for a long time. 
The zamindar’s right in law to collect rents did not necessarily translate into a control of 
the local resources – labor, capital – needed for production; their large estates making this 
difficult. The big peasants, often large tenants of the zamindars, were often the ones who 
controlled the bulk of the labor, capital, and operational aspects of the cultivation on the 
ground, and generally were responsible for expanding cultivation and increased 
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593 Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, AIR 1946 PC 127. He challenged the zamindari 
abolition act passed by the Provincial Legislature in United province on the grounds that 
legislature could not revoke a grant made by the Crown. The Privy Council said that if the 
legislature had the jurisdiction to legislate (which they did), and there was no express 
constitutional prohibition (which there wasn’t), the grant of the crown did not come in the way. 
The case became well known as the Supreme Court of independent India often cited this case in 
support of the proposition of legislative authority in lieu of express constitutional prohibitions. 
See, Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504; Maharaj Umegsingh v. State of 
Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 540 and Surya Pal Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1952 SC 252. 
  
594 Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh, CAD, 12 September, 1949. One cannot but help note, that the 
inheritors of feudal rights granted by the colonial regime on Whiggish liberal principles were at 
the end defending those rights on expressly liberal grounds of non-discrimination, brought the 






commodity production. Hence their struggle against the zamindar was a struggle 
regarding different forms of control – one dependent upon the laws of the colonial state, 
versus one arising out of the control and mobilization of local resources.  
Therefore, the peasant elite became the ‘main beneficiaries’ of the zamindari 
abolition by finally being free from both the competition for political domination, as well 
as the burdensome rents under zamindari. In the process they became, the “principal 
upholder of the Congress raj in the countryside”, a new “Pillar of the State”.595 Indeed, 
much of the Congress organization in the rural areas was dominated by this group. It was 
precisely this rise to unquestioned political and social dominance in the countryside that 
made the peasant elite an enemy of sweeping land reform. The peasant elite themselves 
had a relationship of domination to the social strata below them – the small holders, the 
share croppers, and the landless agricultural labor.596 Significantly, this relationship was 
sustained by a variety of extra-economic forms of coercion and subjugation. As Ronald 
Herring has observed, in India “land was thoroughly commoditized, but labor remained 
tied to its social moorings of humiliation and subordination.”597 Therefore, the peasant 
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595 Eric Stokes, “Agrarian Relations: Northern and Central India”, in Cambridge Economic 
History of India, Vol. 2, c. 1757 – c. 1970, Ed. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 36 – 82.  
 
596 The small holder, was someone who owned land at or below the subsistence level; the share 
cropper, worked on someone else’s land through some established relationship, legal or 
customary; and the landless, were someone who labored on someone else’s land for a 
compensation. These classes were both fluid and porous. Most small holders, to complement their 
meager incomes, would be have to work on someone else’s land, either as a tenant, or for wage. 
The share of the share cropper would often be at the same rate as that of a wage labor. 
 
597 Ronald J. Herring, ‘Contesting the “Great Transformation”: Local Struggles with Markets in 





elite was in no way sympathetic to a general plan of capitalist transformation that could 
destabilize their complex network of control and coercion. More specifically, they 
formed a robust opposition to any radical demand for agrarian reforms that called for 
major structural shift in property allocation in land – like land to the tiller, or co-operative 
farming. Ashutosh Varshney shows that Nehru and the managerial elite preferred an 
‘institutional’ form of agrarian reform, which argued that a change in agrarian 
landholding pattern was key to increasing agrarian production. 598  In contrast, the 
landowning elites preferred a model of ‘technocratic’ solutions to increase production 
that argued for a series of state backed provisions in the form of price support, subsidies, 
and technological input.599 It is obvious why the landowning elites preferred the latter, 
providing state benefits without disturbing their property relations. Their political power 
meant that it would be the ‘technocratic’ fixes that would win out in the long run,600 as 
any ambition for ‘institutional’ reforms failed in India with one or two notable 
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Nina Bhatt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), at 242. For a more detailed demonstration 
of the various forms of extra-economic coercion, see, Ronald J. Herring, ‘Embedded Production 
Relations and Rationality of Peasant Quiescence in Tenure Reform’, Journal of Peasant Studies 
8:2 (1981), at 131 – 172.  
 
598 Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles 
in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), at 11 -12. For a description and defence 
of structural change in agrarian property relations the context of Latin America – another terrain 
marked by peasant struggles and inequality of agrarian property, see, Alain de Janvry, The 
Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1981), especially chapters 4 -6.   
 
599 Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside, at 12 -14.  
 
600 The so- called technocratic fixes held sway in India from the mid 1960s onwards, and continue 






exceptions.601 However, at the time of framing the Constitution, the landowning elite 
faced a problem in embedding their position in the Constitution.  
Unlike the managerial elites, or the industrial capitalists, the landowning elite 
lacked the language of universality through which they could posit their interests as 
‘national interests’ – as the former classes have done with regards to arguments about 
‘development’, ‘planning’, or ‘stability’. Lacking an “alternate coherent vision to 
offer”,602 their efforts in terms of the Constitution were directed towards slowing down of 
the transformational pressure. They could not repudiate the transformational vision, but 
they wanted to make sure that it was sufficiently controlled. Patel, as the voice of the 
Congress ‘right’, was the leader of this faction,603 creating a formidable obstacle in the 
path of a more thoroughly reformist vision.  
There was another significant aspect of the landowning classes. Their influence, 
and sphere of interests, was necessarily local as opposed to national. The managerial elite 
and the industrial capitalist class both were interested in, and expressed their vision, in 
national terms. The pattern of land holding varying widely across India, the nature and 
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601 Ronald Herring’s work remains one of the most thorough and critical analysis of this failure. 
See, Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South 
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
 
602 Kaviraj, ‘Critique of Passive Revolution’, at 2431.  
 
603 This faction has often been described in older Marxist scholarship as a ‘petit-bourgeois’ 
faction, for their over-riding focus on preserving their immediate, particular property rights. 
While elegant in this present context (enlightened bourgeoisie versus petit-bourgeoisie), such a 
description is ultimately reductive. Rather than understanding their views regarding property as a 
historically specific political move within a given constellation of ideas, it takes it as an essence 






composition of land owning elite – and therefore their immediate interests – were local in 
nature. Furthermore, because of their control of resources in the countryside, their 
influence was drawn from their ability to mobilize voters on the ground, and less on 
national factors like developmental planning (managerial elite) and economic growth 
(industrial capitalists).604  This geographical variation in interests and influence had a 
major impact on their negotiating strategy regarding the Constitution, especially with 
regards to issues of federalism.  
5.4 The Three Strata of a Transformational Constitution 
If the need for a legalized revolution in India had produced the rationale behind 
transformational constitutionalism, the negotiation amongst these disparate, but allied 
positions produced the distinctive form in which a transformational constitution was 
drafted for India. In understanding how, we can start by situating the latter along a simple 
binary – the points of convergence, and the points of divergence.   
5.4.1 Imagination 
“Bigger decisions to take, graver choices before us, than those of lawyers’ making”  
–  Jawaharlal Nehru 
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604 The detailed study of this geographical variation can be found in: Ashutosh Varshney, 
Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India: The Politics 






The first important point of convergence was regarding the system of 
constitutional democracy. The Constitution, as indicated in the preceding pages, was 
framed around an acceptance of a democratic system from the very beginning. 
Understood as the specific form of constitutional democracy devised by the framers, the 
foundational assumption for such a project referred to the condition of possibility for the 
stability and viability of a democratic political order. This meant in turn that democratic 
basis of the new political order mattered to the members of the dominant coalition, and its 
varied implications were adhered to. However the commitment to a democratic ideal 
cannot be understood divorced from the constraints put on the elites by the history of the 
anti-colonial movement, and their positions in the social order. The oft-repeated 
wonderment at the stability of the Indian constitutional democracy in a divided society 
could be understood from another perspective. The fractured nature of the elite coalition, 
as well as their inability to stake out an independent claim for political dominance, 
heightened the importance of the constitutional system in the crucial years of its 
formation.605 The confluence of ideological commitments, and historical necessities 
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605 I want to stress this point for two reasons. First, because understanding democratic consensus 
in India exclusively as an ideological preference leads to mystification of ideas and ignores the 
way they are shaped and determined by the historical condition of their production. More 
importantly, it fails to sufficiently answer the question why every social group acquiesced to 
following democratic norms. Thereby, by extension, it fails to account for the various ups and 
downs in the career of democratic ideals in India, except pointing fingers to failure of individuals 
to live up to it (e.g., the failure of Indira Gandhi to be a democrat). Hence, while not minimizing 
the extent to which the framers esteemed democracy as a value, a point that I have already made, 
it is also important to look into the structural reasons which made the different social groups 
agree to a democratic system. This argument is similar to the claim advanced by Adam 
Przeworski that democratic culture basically symbolizes an equilibrium, where there is too much 
at stake for any one party to turn against it. However, my argument differs from Przeworski in 
one crucial element. He identifies this equilibrium as an endogenous character of developed 





meant that democracy emerged as a central point of agreement amongst all sections of 
society involved in debating the Constitution.    
The other significant point of convergence was an acceptance of the notion of 
transformational constitutionalism. The need for the state to intervene and change society 
in a gradual and controlled manner, and more specifically a need for embedding that 
agenda within the Constitution was something that all of the dominant classes accepted. 
Neither of the classes, as we saw, could make an argument that the present social 
conditions were not a subject of concern. All of them had potentially something to lose if 
those conditions lead to instability and upheavals. Furthermore, none of the groups could 
mobilize the masses on their own behind an alternative vision for changing society. In 
other words, they all had a stake in a constitutionalized transformation. Hence, despite 
their major disagreement about the specific elements, they all converged on the basic 
point that achieving social transformation should be a central goal of the constitutional 
design. This agreement that the Constitution should be transformational, provided a point 
of departure from existing constitutional visions we have discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Without an agreement of all the dominant groups, such a vital concept could not have 
become the central element of the constitutional design for India.  
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was a need to lay down such definite protocols. The Constitution in India determined the specific 
sense of what it means to adhere to democratic principles, which the elites agreed to for structural 
reasons, amongst others. See, Adam Przeworski, ‘Democracy as an Equilibrium’, Public Choice, 






If we add this agreement regarding constitutionalized transformation to the prior 
consensus around democracy, we can arrive at a concept of the fundamental agreement 
about the constitutional design. In could be stated in the form: to achieve social 
transformation through a democratic constitution. Within the design of the Indian 
Constitution, this fundamental agreement constituted the stratum containing the 
constitutional imagination.  
5.4.2 Promises 
“a body of doctrines to which public opinion can rally”  
– K.M. Munshi 
Around this core agreement, there were further peripheral sets of convergence on 
more specific points. These constituted the stratum of constitutional promises. By this, I 
do not mean that these were concrete guarantees embodied in the Constitution. Rather 
they expressed the broad outlines of what should be some of the most salient elements of 
a constitutional system. We can understand them as agreements expressed in the form: 
the Constitution should provide for / should prohibit. For example, ‘the Constitution 
should provide for equality before law’; or, ‘the Constitution should prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of caste’. As opposed to the constitutional imagination, which 
could be derived from the entirety of the constitutional history and design, the 
constitutional promises can be gleaned from specific convergences on desired values 





Some of these promises were in the nature of principles – unity of the country, 
legislative control of executive, equality before law, non-discrimination (except regarding 
different classes of property), judicial review, religious diversity, right of trial, etc. While 
some others were specific to particular concerns – ending untouchability and certain 
forms of caste discriminations, certain kinds of fundamental rights (freedom of speech, 
movement, etc.) with qualifications (the agreement here was that there should be some 
qualifications, not what those were), etc. How these promises should be expressed was a 
wholly different question on which often there was little agreement. Some were expressly 
guaranteed and institutionalized in the Constitution. For instance, judicial review, which 
not only was clearly expressed in a constitutional provision (Article 32), but was further 
strengthened through provisions guaranteeing judicial independence. Some were 
expressly guaranteed, but only temporarily. The provision regarding affirmative action 
that was (and still is) required  to be renewed every ten years is one such example. 
However, in both those cases, one can make a distinction between their institutionalized 
form, and their nature as a constitutional promise. By the latter I denote not the details of 
the powers of judiciary, which will only be properly known by a legal practitioner, but 
the broad claim that ‘the constitutional guarantees a recourse to an independent 
judiciary’. This point will become clearer when we discuss the stratum of constitutional 
text in the following section.  
A whole class of issues were agreed upon (or could not be disagreed upon from a 
strategic point of view) without an agreement as to how to actualize them. They formed 





set of positive obligations of the State.606 These included provisions of social welfare like 
reducing income inequality,607  right to work and education,608  providing affordable 
healthcare,609 living wage for workers610 etc. It also contained a promise to create a 
uniform civil code for India, relevant in the context of separate laws with respect to 
matters like marriage and inheritance for different religious communities.611 There was a 
nod to Gandhian principles in a provision mandating the state to set up and empower 
village panchayats.612 Taken together, the Directive Principles provide a fascinating 
panoply of the vision that some of the framers had of a future India. However the major 
question was, in what form to include them in the Constitution. The crucial idea came 
from B.N. Rau, who suggested that the drafters avoid the “controversial ground” of 
making these principles judicially enforceable and instead “set out the positive rights 
merely as moral precepts for the Authorities concerned and to bar the jurisdiction of the 
[…] courts.”613 While some members disagreed with this idea, significantly none of them 
were from the governing Congress party. Eventually, Rau’s suggestions were accepted 
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606 The idea for this part and the name “Directive Principle” came from the Irish Constitution. 
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613 Rau, Constitutional Precedents, at 11. Rau’s entire suggestion on Directive Principles is 






and it was explicitly stipulated that “the provisions […] shall not be enforceable by any 
court”. 614 The way the Directive Principles were drafted, and the little substantive debate 
that took place regarding the provisions, reflect how their non-justiciability freed the 
members. The language of Part IV is clear, declarative, and without the provisos and 
qualifications that mark the rest of the Constitution. Some who were more critical of the 
entire exercise, felt that the Directive Principles were “a veritable dust-bin of sentiment”, 
that seemed “to be sufficiently resilient as to permit any individual of this House to ride 
his hobby-horse into it”.615  K.M. Munshi, defending the inclusion of the Directive 
Principles in the Constitution despite their non-justiciability argued that “even the non-
justiciable rights have to be announced”, since “they are a body of doctrines to which 
public opinion can rally.”616 The latter part of Munshi’s statement, though referring to 
only the Directive Principles, is a crucial description of the role the stratum of promises 
play within the constitutional discourse.  
The broad declaratory nature of the promises meant that they were (and remain) 
open to various interpretations as to what they meant in practice. The very openness of 
the promises made them significant in another way – as providing the language for a 
political discourse of the Constitution. Indians – unlike, say, many Americans – do not 
generally know any of the provisions of the Constitution by heart. However, that does not 
mean that the Constitution does not form a part of the Indian public discourse. For 
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example, one can either say that a certain policy violates Article 25 of the Constitution, or 
one can say that it goes against the guarantee of religious freedom provided in the 
Constitution. The former would be a legal statement made by a lawyer or a judge, ideally 
followed by legal reasoning, precedents etc., as to why that would be the case. The latter, 
would be a political statement, made as a part of a public debate opposing the policy. It is 
important to clarify that this is not just an argument about how people speak about the 
Constitution.  Rather, the way the Constitution appears in the Indian public discourse is in 
the form of constitutional promises. The open nature of the constitutional promises, and 
their continual invocation in the public sphere, makes it the stratum of the Constitution 
that is most rich in interpretative possibilities, as well as often commanding a great 
degree of normative weight. In its openness it performs a crucial function of absorbing 
social conflicts – providing avenues through which various demands in society could 
redefine itself as a constitutional claim. This is why even enumerating the promises – a 
task attempted several times, most often during major constitutional conflicts617 – is a 
political task that reveals the aspirations and ideology of the political actors attempting to 




617 The most significant such attempt would be by the Supreme Court in the Keshavananda 
Bharathi decision. Even the different judges in the majority could not agree as to what constitutes 
the fundamental promises of the Constitution. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has 
invariably suggested different lists, as well as different interpretative tools for doing so in a 







“no better than ‘The Motor Vehicles Taxation Act’”  
– G. Durgabai 
Around these two strata of core and peripheral convergence, was the space where 
the divergences appeared. An agreement about the transformational constitutional vision 
meant by its very nature, that the Constitution could not merely preserve or entrench 
certain rights or privileges. Instead, a degree of uncertainty about the outcomes of future 
disputes was inherent to a constitutional structure committed to dealing with a society in 
flux, as well as creating mechanisms to incorporate new demands that might arise. This 
caused unease for the classes that had substantial interests worth defending.  
Paradoxically, the very thing that had forced their hands to accept a 
transformational vision is what made them uneasy about its final outcome. The need to 
channel the political claims of the masses within a constitutional structure and avoid 
popular upheaval made them commit to the Constitution being constructed around a 
transformative agenda. However if that project succeeded in ways they did not expect, 
and democratic popular mobilization did successfully take place within the constitutional 
terrain, that very same Constitution could be deployed to bring about transformative 
outcomes that could be highly adverse to their positions. In other words, if the threat of 
unconstitutional popular upheavals meant that these dominant classes could not deny the 
need for social change, the possibility of constitutional popular mobilizations meant that 
they wanted as much precision and certainty as possible as to how it would be achieved. 





‘through a constitutional path’ part of the equation was strengthened – to make it as 
certain as possible that what is being created is not a recipe for a ‘revolution that is 
constitutional’, but ‘social change mediated by the constitution’.  
  This entailed a focus on the procedural aspect of transformational 
constitutionalism – the words, phrasing, steps, the relevant decision making bodies, the 
system of appeal, etc. This is where the bulk of the deliberations in the Assembly took 
place, drafting and redrafting (and then amending) the provisions several times. These 
things mattered in two major ways. First, it ensured by its design that decisions will have 
to pass through multiple forums. In this way it tried to replicate, in procedural terms, the 
coalitional element that marked the moment of founding, and made negotiation on all 
major questions mandatory. This helps one understand the intense negotiations on 
questions such as the allocation of power amongst the state and central governments,618 
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618 As mentioned before, different classes had different levels of influence over local and central 
governments. The land owning class by this time have been able to assert their influence over 
local machineries of power, while the managerial elite still held sway over the apparatus of the 
central government. The interests of the industrial capitalists were best served by the latter in 
terms of developmental goals, and sometimes served by former in terms of local protection and 
resource management issues. The Constitution followed a mechanism contained in the 
Government of India Act to distribute legislative and executive competences via listing them in 
three lists contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution – an “Union List or List I”, a 
“State List of List II”, and one which listed items that will fall within the competence of both the 
state and the central government, called the “Concurrent List or List III”. “Industry” was in List I 
and Agriculture under List II. The distribution of the powers in the lists, and the debates about 
them in the Assembly could be an interesting study in itself explaining the intersection of 
different interest groups with the structuring of federalism in India. To see the extent to which the 
federal distribution of power determined the course of a major transformational agenda like land 
reform, see, Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in 
South Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in 
India: The Politics of Reform, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),  and Aseema 
Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan 





the precise scope and power of the Planning and Finance commissions,619 detail rules 
about the organization and operation of the bureaucracy,620 and both the process of 
selection and powers of the President (where Patel succeeded in winning a major political 
battle with Nehru to institute a fellow member of the Congress right, Rajendra Prasad as 
the first occupant of the post).621  
The second way in which the phrasing mattered refers to the role of law and the 
judiciary. One cannot predict substantive outcome in a democratic process. In the 
particular context of a transformational constitution, neither can one guard against 
adverse outcomes through absolute entrenchment provisions in a constitution. The 
certainty the elite were anxious about was sought in the nature of law, or to put it more 
precisely, legalisms. If the precise legal meaning of provisions could be fixed, then the 
outcomes of constitutional disputes, decided by legal professionals, could be controlled 
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619 The Planning Commission was a potentially contentious body – made of ‘experts’ and 
potentially influencing economic policy in an extremely significant way. It was finally decided 
that “Planning” would be put under “Concurrent List”.  
 
620 Part XIV, and XIVA, lays down detail rules about appointment, instruction, operation of the 
bureaucratic ‘services’ and tribunals, while Part XI lays down the rules for determining the proper 
legislative and administrative relationship between central and state governments. Numerous 
subsequent litigations on provisions contained in these parts have produced an extraordinarily 
complicated arcana by which the Indian state functions.  
 
621 The debate was on two points: A. the precise nature in which the President was to be elected, 
and B. his scope of his powers to act independently of the recommendation of the Union Cabinet 
(who had to be a members of parliament) lead by the Prime Minister. This mattered because as 
someone selected by (as it was ultimately decided) the votes of both the members of parliament 
and members of state assemblies, the President could provide an important veto point against 
excessive actions by either. In the initial years, as Patel had rightly thought, the President could 
serve as a representative of the party (Congress) checking the actions of the central legislature 
over which Nehru held sway. Finally, a set of rules was incorporated in Part V, Chapter I, and 






from veering too wildly away into directions unforeseen. The fact that the framers held 
such a view of how law functions was in some respects the result of a mixture of their 
experience under colonial law and their training in English legal tradition. Colonial law, 
as have been discussed in Chapter 3, did not embody any higher value or norms 
organically derived from society, but provided a language for administrative coherence 
and precision. Consequently the colonial judges – many of whom were now to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court and High Courts – and lawyers decided and argued 
primarily on the basis of internal construction of statutes, ordinances and directives, 
rather than on the basis of principles of common law, or some higher norm. With regards 
to the English legal tradition, as drafters of a legal document they were not drawing upon 
on the conventions of common law – the so called ‘judge made law’ – that had over 
centuries imperceptibly made changes to legal concepts under the veneer of continuity, 
but that of statutory law, where precise drafting could make legal meanings fixed. It was 
the latter, rather than the former, that had made its way across to the colonies in a 
significant way. Under colonial rule, India witnessed some of the most ambitious 
attempts at legal codification much before they were tried in England. Raised in that 
tradition the Indian framers believed, like Sir James Fitzjames Stephens – someone who 
had lead one such codification attempt –– that in drafting it was possible “to attain a 
degree of precision [whereby even] a person reading in bad faith cannot 
misunderstand”. 622  “It is all the better” he added, “if he cannot pretend to 
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misunderstand”.623  In their anxiety to exclude the possibility of any such feigned 
misunderstandings, the framers focused intensely on the words and phrases used to 
translate their ideas into a constitutional text overwhelmingly from the point of view of a 
future judge. ‘Legal opinions’ were sought from eminent lawyers in the Assembly, 
precedents from other countries with similar phrasings were studied, and even an entire 
clause was added providing definitions of words used (Article 366). Certain amendments 
moved in the Assembly suggested changes to punctuations, which as any lawyer knows, 
is no small matter.624 Never in the history of constitution making has the framers litigated 
their own creation to this extent. In this respect it was, as Brajeshwar Parasad lamented, a 
“lawyer’s constitution”. 625  As a result, the transformational constitutional vision 
underwent a complex legalistic presentation – the massive, dense document full of 
legalese that a first time reader encounters. Within the constitutional structure, this 
presentation constituted the third stratum, containing constitutional text.   
One can explain the distinctions between these three strata through the issue of 
compensation for acquisition of property by the state, which will form the basis of the 
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approvingly, in a chapter titled “Interpretation of the Constitution” by H.M. Seervai, in his 
monumental work of formalistic commentary of the Indian Constitution that has served as the 
benchmark for constitutional interpretation for Indian legal professionals for over five decades. 
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. I, (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing 




624 For example, this amendment moved by Naziruddin Ahmed: “I beg to move: "That with 
reference to amendment No. 56 of List I, in the Third Schedule, in Form I of the Declarations, the 
comma […] after the word 'favour' be  deleted." Naziruddin Ahmed, 26 August, 1949.  
 





next chapter. The necessity of social transformation implied by the constitutional 
imagination meant that the state would have to intervene in existing property 
entitlements. As we have seen, this broad fact was acknowledged by every group of the 
society.  
A year before independence, Congress made the specific promise in its manifesto 
that there would be A. acquisition of property for the purposes of land reform, and B. 
such acquisitions would be compensated. This same promise, of ‘compensated 
expropriation for land reform’ was repeated multiple times in the Assembly. In other 
words, the framers made a specific assertion that the right of the state to acquire private 
property will be justified not just for particular instances (like building infrastructural 
project, which was included in the traditional common law doctrine of eminent domain) 
but for the wide ranging purpose of bringing about a new regime of proprietary relation 
to land.  At the same time they also asserted that it would not be a mass expropriation of 
property in the style of Soviet Union. It would follow a procedure and the owners would 
get something in return. This constituted a constitutional promise with regard to property 
rights. In the subsequent decades, this promise would be invoked in various ways in the 
intense political debate around the question of land reform. Those pushing for land 
reform would focus more on the first part of the promise. They did not deny the 
compensation part, but argued that it should not be substantial. On the other hand, 
zamindars and pro-property political groups (e.g., the Swatantra Party, which would be 





property for the purposes of social transformation, but stressed on the centrality of the 
promise to provide compensation.     
Therefore, the compensation question was hardly settled at the level of the 
constitutional promise, though that level did provide the claims around which political 
opinions would rally. There were several questions still unanswered which could have 
serious effects on those who held substantial proprietary interests. For example, what 
would be the quantum of compensation? Who determines the amount? By what 
principle? On what grounds can one questions the adequacy of that determination? What 
are the recourses for those who disagree with the determination? What is the form in 
which the compensation is to be paid? And so on. Therefore, an intense and lengthy 
debate ensued in the constituent assembly regarding exactly how the notion of acquisition 
and compensation should be drafted. In other words, how should the constitutional text 
embody those concepts. We describe in detail that debate in the following chapter, but 
suffice it to say, the end product was an extremely complex procedural formula – based 
on the experience of land acquisition under the Government of India Act – that 
constituted Article 31 of the Constitution.  
While in its imagination the Indian Constitution departed from established 
understandings of what a constitution can be, in its legalistic presentation it returned to 
familiar traditions of legal and constitutional constructions – derived and learned. In 
between the two lay the promises, which were a mixture of recognizable constitutional 





strata of imagination, promise, and text, emerge as an outcome of the task of formulating 
a constitution for India within a particular historical condition. The Indian Constitution 
has to be understood as a totality of these three strata. An analysis that focuses on only 
one over the other would reveal only a partial or distorted picture of the Constitution. For 
example, a legalistic-formalistic study will only focus on the constitutional text. Since the 
texts are products of specific and disparate negotiations that reveal a coherent design only 
within the context of the constitutional imagination and the constraints within which that 
imagination was embodied in the constitutional document, such a work fails to provide a 
consistent picture of the constitutional structure as a whole from the document itself. 
Instead it takes the aid of subsequent judicial interpretation to supply that coherence, 
thereby replacing the original constitutional vision by a sum total of judicial decisions. 
On the other hand, a study that only focuses on the imagination and promises will 
conclude with a highly optimistic picture of the Constitution, claiming that it provides an 
unproblematic synthesis of a transformational agenda and a constitutional structure. Such 
a claim would miss the limits introduced on that agenda by the strata of constitutional 
text, and hence unable to explain the constitutional conflicts that we will study in the next 
chapter.  
However, the salience of delineating these three strata within the Indian 
constitutional form goes beyond the relative merits of methods of analyzing the 
Constitution. We study moments of origins because they determine in some degree the 
possibilities and obstacles we face in our present. Hence a further value of this exercise 





interpretation, which forms the basis of a constitutional practice. Seen from this point of 
view, one needs to focus on the relationship between the different strata. What becomes 
apparent then is that these three strata exist in an uneasy cohabitation within the project 
that is the Indian Constitution. Promises bristle at the shackles the text puts them under, 
and then at times joins hand with the text to open up possibilities for constitutional 
remedies unknown in other jurisdictions. The imagination threatens any easy 
determination of the coherence of the text. And promises find new lives as the demand of 
the imagination is felt through them. The continual tension between the imagination, 
promise, and text of the Indian Constitution constitute a set of contradictions at its heart. 
Contradictions, as I have shown in this chapter, that were the result of writing a 
constitution under an extraordinary set of circumstances – both ideological and material. 
These contradictions, and the continual attempts to resolve it, have been both productive 
and limiting. Our study of the formulation of the Indian Constitution ends with locating 
such contradictions. Their development has to be traced through the subsequent conflicts 
in constitutional practice. In the final chapter, I will take a look at the most significant 













The uneasy co-existence within the transformations constitutional form of the 
three different strata generated a set of contradictions. In this chapter we shall explore 
one such contradiction, through the conflict that arose between the judiciary and the 
Parliament in the first decade of independence on the question of compensation for 
expropriation of property. The Court’s refusal to accede to the legislature’s determination 
of the compensation payable for acquiring property generated one of the more heated 
debates about the Constitution at the time.  Scholars have generally tried to understand 
the debate mostly through criteria external to the Constitution itself. On one hand, the 
ones more sympathetic to the legislature’s case have argued that the judges had a bias 
towards protecting property, or that they failed to understand the transformational nature 
of the Constitution due to their ideology. On the other hand, more formalistic legal 
scholars have blamed the legislature for passing laws that were obviously flawed, or even 
the Constituent Assembly for imprecise drafting. In contrast, I will try to show in this 
chapter that the conflict that arose on the compensation question have to be understood 
immanently, as being the result of an inherent contradiction within the constitutional 
form, especially between the constitutional imagination and the constitutional text.  
There are several reasons for focusing on this particular contradiction as the 
subject of our investigation. First, not only was it the first constitutional conflict of 





Consequently, its outcome would significantly reshape the constitutional structure. 
Second, it refers to one of the central aspects of transformational constitutionalism – the 
ability of the State to intervene and change the existing property structure. Finally, it 
allows us to get a sense of some of the limitations of the project of transformational 
constitutionalism – that is, the limitations of legalizing revolution.  
I will first undertake a brief survey of the development of the principle of 
compensation within the common law tradition, followed by the drafting of Article 31, 
which dealt with compensation in the Constitution. The rest of the chapter will follow the 
subsequent constitutional conflict by looking at some of the major judicial decisions, and 
the Parliament’s response to them.  
6.1 Compensation in Common Law 
The principal of ‘just’ or ‘equivalent’ compensation was asserted by William 
Blackstone. Blackstone, in his magisterial four volume Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, had set out to create a  “new science of English law”,626 from the disparate 
principles that emerged from the bourgeois revolution of seventeenth century, in other 
words, create a comprehensible whole revealing a plan from the fruits of specific 
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626 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation on the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003), at 297.  As Berman adds, “the 
methodology of the modern English legal treatise […] consummated by Blackstone, also bore a 
strong relationship to the new methodology of the second scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century.” [at 301]. For a critical analysis of the structuring of Blackstone’s treatise, see, Duncan 







battles.627 Under the power of eminent domain, Blackstone wrote, the legislature can take 
an individual’s property, “not by arbitrarily depriving the party of his property, but by 
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.”628 
What Blackstone was giving voice to was the English revolution’s rejection of an earlier, 
monarchical conception of eminent domain. Under the earlier notion, property rights in 
all lands ultimately vested in the King, and the present owner only held it as a grant from 
the king. Hence the power of eminent domain was merely an exercise in revoking that 
grant, thereby not requiring any compensation. Through Magna Carta, the baronial 
powers had already sought to limit this power by stating that such expropriation must 
happen through legal channels or through a judgment of their peers.629 This curtailed the 
absolute nature of the monarchical power, which was the main apprehension for the 
feudal lords resistant to losing their titles on a whim. Compensation, understandably, was 
not a concern for feudal power, since feudal rights could not be reduced to a simple 
money value. For the bourgeoisie, viewing land as a commodity, compensation was not 
just an incidental issue regarding eminent domain, but the central concern. Hence in their 
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627 Blackstone’s purpose, as he wrote, was to: “mark out a Plan of the Laws of ENGLAND, so 
comprehensive, so that every Title might be reduced under some one of its general Heads, which 
the student might afterwards pursue to any Degree of Minuteness; and at the same time so 
contracted, that the Gentleman might with tolerable Application contemplate and understand the 
Whole.” [William Blackstone, An Analysis of the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1771), at iv].  
 
628  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (in one volume), W.M. 
Hardcastle Browne, ed., (St. Paul, West Publishing, 1897), at 44. 
  
629 Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta says:  No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful 






struggle against absolutist pretensions of monarchical power, the ascendant bourgeoisie 
of the seventeenth century insisted on a ‘just compensation’ for any expropriation of 
property. Therefore, the concept compensation for expropriation, from its inception, 
contained the concept of equivalence – one of the core assumptions for the functioning of 
a market economy based on exchange. In expropriating property, Blackstone maintained, 
“The public is now considered an individual, treating with an individual for an 
exchange.”630  In this scenario, all eminent domain amounts to, “is to oblige the owner to 
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price.”631  
In its historic origin, this restriction on eminent domain reflected the worry of the 
English gentry about the king interfering with their enjoyment of land. Its demand for 
“full indemnification” as a protection from such interference was framed within a 
predominantly agrarian concept of property rights in land.  To return to Blackstone, 
property was “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”632 Corresponding legal concepts, like that of nuisance in tort law that 
provided for wide ranging claims of damage from the mere fact of any interference – 
even if indirect or unintended— with one’s property, arose out of the same notion of 
absolute dominion. However, this theory came into conflict with the demands of 
economic development. Early nineteenth century America, with its adherence to common 
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law doctrines, and need for developing an underdeveloped country rapidly was the setting 
where this conflict unfolded.  
The strong anti-statist suspicions of the American founders meant that the idea of 
“just compensation” for expropriation never faced a serious challenge in theory, and was 
gradually enshrined as a statutory and constitutional principle in most states. However, in 
practice it came into conflict with the needs of development in two significant ways. 633 
First, certain infrastructural necessities of a modern capitalist economy – railroads, 
highways, canals, bridges, etc. – necessarily required encroachment of private lands. 
Second, the kind of activities an aspiring capitalist economy generated, depending on 
circulation, speed, and movement, inevitably caused incidental damages to a person’s 
property, or at least to his ability for absolute enjoyment of it.  For example, a farmer’s 
land downstream from an industry, or a land adjacent to a railroad track. A full indemnity 
and its related concept of absolute dominion over property produced enormous strains on 
both entrepreneurs and governments of what was then a capital scarce country. 
Developers, both public and private, often complained how they were unable to execute 
their projects in the context of such a burden. Morton Horwitz has shown that to resolve 
this conflict American courts in the first half of nineteenth century devised several 
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633 While we are focusing on this conflict only with regard to the compensation question, for a 
more wide ranging discussion regarding the conflict of the needs of economic growth and 
constitutional protection of property, see, James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A 






methods to alter the common law doctrine of compensation. 634  With regards to taking of 
land, the courts allowed a wide leeway with regards to expropriation which the 
government argued was for “public interest”, which was generally understood as 
economic growth. While compensation was always provided, the courts allowed the 
government to deviate from market value of the land by making adjustments for 
“speculations” (i.e., increase in the price in anticipation of the development project), 
“improvement” (i.e., increase in price because of the development), etc. With regards to 
incidental damages, courts rejected the nuisance doctrine in favor of the doctrine of 
negligence, which required the plaintiff to show that the damage arose out of a specific 
fault or dereliction of duty on the part of the defendant. This was, in essence, a 
replacement of a tort conception (damage for any wrongs caused) with one of contract 
(that one should only be responsible for an act of one’s will), the latter being the product 
of a more contemporary market economy. In terms of determining an amount, the role 
juries had in assessing the damages was steadily reduced and handed over to commission 
of experts. Furthermore, government agencies were often provided an indemnity from 
damage claims for incidental harms caused, which was at times extended to private 
corporations engaged in public works projects. The cumulative result of these 
developments was a drastic reduction of the burden of compensation on nascent 
capitalists and governments promoting developmental projects. In effect, it was a transfer 
of wealth to those actively engaged in developmental activities, from those injured by it. 
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University Press, 1977), Chapter III. For a similar argument, also see, James Willard Hurst, Law 
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To quote Horwitz, “In an underdeveloped nation with little surplus capital, elimination or 
reduction of damage judgments created a new source of forced investment, as landowners 
whose property values were impaired without compensation in effect were compelled to 
underwrite a portion of economic development.”635 
However, these moves were in the end only a temporary weakening of the 
principle of ‘just compensation’ in practice, rather than a repudiation of it in theory. An 
expansive notion of public interest meant that eminent domain could very easily be 
mobilized in favor of a redistributive agenda of a different kind, not in favor of capital 
but against it.636 The deviation from the principle of ‘just compensation’ that could act as 
a bulwark against such an agenda637 had always caused certain discomfort amongst the 
legal and political elites. After 1840s, with a rise in progressive taxation by the states, “a 
widespread fear of legislatively authorized redistribution of wealth began to overshadow 
the enthusiasm for eminent domain as an important instrument of cheap economic 
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635 Horwitz, Transformation, at 70.  
 
636 This was a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the utilitarian calculation of ‘public 
good’. It requires just a simple extension of its logic to realize that the marginal utility of a dollar 
is much higher in the hands of the poor than it is in the hands of the rich.   
 
637 Blackstone, in the context of eminent domain, had also written: The law will not authorize a 
violation of the right of property, even for the public good. Thus a new road through a private 
ground may be beneficial to the community, but it cannot be laid out without the consent of the 
owner of the land. In vain, may it be argued, that the good of the individual ought to yield to the 
good of the community, for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public 
tribunal, to be judge of this common good. [Blackstone, Commentaries, at 44.] For a critical 
discussion on Blackstone and property redistribution, see, Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Structure of 






growth.”638 The courts, instead of being deferent to the legislature’s judgment about any 
compensated expropriation as long as it served the goal of economic growth, began to 
claim the power of deciding ‘public interest’ for themselves. To that end, they adopted 
more and more generalized formal criteria of determination, instead of the more 
substantive and ‘political’ criteria of promoting growth.639 The concept of eminent 
domain was to be rescued from the potentially dangerous political connotations, and 
restored to the formalized safe haven of judicial legalism. However, while the 
formulation of the compensation doctrine would look similar to its Blackstonian 
predecessor, it had a different set of conceptual coordinates.  
This move of depoliticization was the organizing principle for what American 
legal scholars have termed “legal formalism”, or “classical legal thought”. 640  The 
paradigmatic moment of legal formalism was the emergence of the will theory of 
contract.641 Rather than the more traditional contract law doctrines of eighteenth century 
that took into account the social context in which a particular agreement was reached 
(e.g., the “fair price” doctrine), the will theory understood contract purely as a formal act 
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638 Horwitz, Transformation, at 260.  
 
639 To take the example of railroad companies, a more formal and apolitical criteria were devised 
to sustain their claims to eminent domain, like public access, or route of the train. See, People v. 
Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870); Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor, 44 Tenn. 419 (1867); Reeves v. 
Treasurer, 8 Ohio 333 (1858). 
640 See, James Willard Hurst, Law and the Condition of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), and Duncan Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Washington DC: Beard Books, 2006).  
 
641 See, Duncan Kennedy, ‘From the Will Theory to the Principles of Private Autonomy: Lon 






of agreement between two individuals disembedded from their social setting. Individuals 
were seen as ‘juristic persons’ whose acts of will only manifested in a manner that was 
legally relevant at the moment of entering into a specific legal agreement. The terms 
“consent” and “agreement” therefore had to be determined using purely formal methods, 
abstracted from the social and economic condition in which the contract was negotiated 
and performed. 
Legal formalism insisted on the primacy of the courts of law as the site where 
framing of general rules (the more general the better) could take place.642 These rules 
were to be brought to bear upon particular cases irrespective of the distinction between 
their substantive contexts, the latter seen as irrelevant for the purpose of law. This 
constituted the distinction between the objective domain of law, and the subjective 
domain of politics. Furthermore, legal formalism had the effect of sanctifying in law the 
principle of classical political economy that one’s economic situation was a product of 
abstract laws of the market, uninfluenced by anything but one’s own volition.    
6.2 Compensation in the Constituent Assembly 
It is precisely this abstraction of different economic positions that 
transformational constitutionalism was antithetical to. Transformation required the ability 
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642 See, William E. Forbath, ‘Politics, State Building, and the Courts, 1870 – 1920’, in The 
Cambridge History of Law in America, Vol. II: The Long Nineteenth Century, 1789 – 1920, 
Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), at 643 – 695; and Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850-2000’, in The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal, David Trubek 






to distinguish between different types of property rights, and to determine their claims for 
compensation within the larger context of the socio-economic needs of the country. 
Hence, a majority of the members in the Assembly argued that such a determination 
could only be made by the legislature, since the judiciary was prone to decide on the 
narrow basis of a legal rule in abstraction of the socio-economic context. The phrase ‘due 
process’, which in the early twentieth century America has been the favorite weapon of 
legal formalists to strike down progressive legislations, was the first casualty.643 But 
going further, the demand arose that the term ‘just’ or ‘equitable’ should not qualify the 
term compensation since it would invite judicial review.  
Some of the members defended this by evoking the need for subordinating 
compensation rules to the demands of rapid economic development, much as we saw 
American jurists do in the previous century. The crucial distinction was, unlike the 
American case, in India economic development and reduction of inequity were not 
entirely distinct objectives that made separate sets of demands regarding redistribution of 
property. Govind Ballabh Pant argued that while a principle of just compensation could 
be maintained for acquisition made for governmental purposes (e.g., building post 
offices, railways etc.), it cannot be sustainable for massive acquisitions for social 
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643 The phrase “due process” was first included by the Fundamental Rights Subcommittee based 
on a draft prepared by K.M. Munshi. Despite some opposition to it, the Subcommittee decided to 
keep the phrase in its first report. Subsequently, B.N. Rau gave sent a report which presented a 
strong case for deletion of the phrase based on his experiences in the United States and the 
jurisprudence of substantive due process. G.B. Pant, who was a late entrant in the committee, also 
made his opposition known based on his experience of drafting a zamindari abolition legislation 
in the United Provinces, of which he was the chief minister. Finally, due process was dropped, 
and was never reintroduced in the further stages of drafting, or in the debate at the Assembly. See, 
Shiva Rao, Vol. 2., at 75 – 78 (for Munshi’s draft), 121 – 122 (for the first report of the 





purposes required for a measure like land reform. The latter was required since “we want 
production, and more production and yet more of it”.644 Pant, who as the Chief Minister 
of United Provinces was at the time dealing with zamindari abolition in his province 
maintained that ‘just compensation’ would be beyond the “paying capacity” of the 
government.645 “When we introduce a large measure of social reform”, he said, “then it 
would be most iniquitous to provide compensation on terms which the State cannot 
fulfill, which cannot possibly be discharged and which will either break down the 
machinery of the State or which will be crumbled under its weight.”646 Nehru, who 
strongly supported this point of view, argued that in this regard the judiciary should not 
make itself into a “third house of correction” for legislative determinations about land 
reform, and cause delays and roadblocks to what was an urgent measure.647  
Not all the arguments against the ‘just compensation’ phrasing were made from a 
logistical point of view. Several members sought to challenge the abstraction inherent in 
a notion of ‘just compensation’ understood as market value by questioning how the 
property was acquired and what justifies a claim for compensation. V.D. Tripathi, 
brought up the history of zamindari to argue that the zamindars acquired their property by 
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644 Govind Ballabh Pant, CAD, 12 September, 1949. 
 
645 Proceedings of the Meeting of the Drafting Committee, 24 July, 1949, in Shiva Rao, II, at 382.  
 
646 Govind Ballabh Pant, CAD, 12 September, 1949. To this, Jagannath Baksh Singh, a fierce 
opponent of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act as the leader of the Zamindari Party, retorted 
saying that “Paucity of funds is no argument against payment of compensation to the Zamindars 
when a State Government is making a clean profit of Rs. 45 crores out of sale to the tenants of 
transferable rights in the land acquired.”  
 






collaborating with the colonial regime and hence compensation now would just amount 
to a “reward” for that historic betrayal.648 Furthermore he argued, on more concrete 
grounds, that zamindars have been enjoying enormous profits on most of their estates 
without making any contribution in terms of labor or capital.649 That profit, unjust as it 
was, should count for compensation enough. The argument that the history of zamindari 
– the unjust exploitation, profits and imperial collaboration it revealed – belied any claim 
for compensation at all, found other proponents as well in the assembly.650 Their 
argument was that if one thinks of justness from a historical point of view, rather than as 
a juristic term for equivalence, then perhaps no compensation at all would be the most 
‘just’ outcome. K.T. Shah made the argument that if a property rights is made possible 
and maintained through an unjust system there can be no claim for just compensation. 
“For not all property is such”, he said, “that the present holder or owner of it can claim, in 
justice, in ethics, any right to be compensated […] because much of the [zamindari] 
property has been acquired by force, fraud and violence which under any system of ethics 
can hardly be justified.”651 Damodar Swaroop Seth supported this argument by referring 
to uncompensated abolition of slavery in the United States.652 
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648 V.D. Tripathi, CAD, 2 May, 1947.  
 
649 Ibid.  
 
650 See especially the speeches by V.C. Kesava Rao, A.P. Jain, and Lakshminarayan Sahu. CAD, 
10, 11, 12 September, 1949.  
 
651 K.T. Shah, CAD, 9 September, 1949. Shah also went on to reference Proudhon to say that even 
theft is too mild a word for what zamindari property was.  
 





Both those lines of argument – the first about supremacy of legislative 
determination and the second about the nature of property in question – expressed the 
contradictions between transformative constitutionalism and legal formalism. The former 
had to involve itself with the complexities of social and historical necessities, even if it 
meant certain formal inconsistencies.  
Nevertheless, the Assembly was not comfortable with rejecting in its entirety the 
principles of either compensated expropriation or judicial review. Congress had always 
maintained that expropriation would not be without compensation, something most of 
them thought as no better than a violent revolution that the Constitution was meant to 
avoid. That was an express promise in the Congress platform,653 and both Nehru and 
Patel had assured the Assembly several times that there would be no uncompensated 
acquisition of land.654 Similarly, they felt that jettisoning judicial review altogether would 
be too much of a deviation from principles of constitutional government.655 As K.M. 
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653 The Congress election manifesto of 1945 declares: “The reform of the land system which is 
urgently needed involves the removal of intermediaries between the peasant and the State. The 
right of such intermediaries should therefore be acquired on payment of equitable compensation.” 
This wording was referred to several times during the debates to demand that Congress holds true 
to their promise.  
 
654 A strong push back against any principle of uncompensated expropriation came from the 
industrial capitalist class. They argued that a mere existence of such a provision would be a threat 
to the existence of private capital, and will seriously deter investments, especially from outside 
the country.  
 
655 In the Drafting Committee, Pant had suggested that the “barred from judicial review clause” 
should be attached to the end of the Article. However, AK Aiyyar said that this amounted to a 
carte blanche to the parliament, in which case Art. 24 might as well be dropped. K.M. Munshi 
added that no judicial oversight of compensation meant that hypothetically compensation could 





Munshi, himself a lawyer and the strongest defender of judicial review in the Assembly 
said, “Let there be no mistake: unless you revert to the tribal law, […] you cannot escape 
the tribe of lawyers. But one thing is clear. The rule of the tribe of lawyers is any day 
better than the rule of the tribe of tyrants.”656 Munshi also made an interesting point about 
the impossibility of drafting such a bar of judicial review. Unless one did away with the 
institution of judiciary in toto everything that is in the Constitution is amenable to judicial 
interpretation. Even if the Constitution said, for example, that “compensation shall not be 
questioned in Court” the courts would still be able to adjudicate on the matter, by going 
into queries such as what is the meaning of the phrase “questioned in Court”, whether the 
thing challenged is compensation at all, what does it mean to acquire “by authority of 
law”, etc.657 From the hindsight of history, and given, as we shall see, the subsequent 
practices of the Indian Supreme Court, Munshi’s observation about the impossibility of 
writing the judiciary out of the Constitution was extraordinarily astute.  
After several rounds of redrafting, amendments, debates, and postponements, a 
solution was suggested by Patel for a principally determined –  as opposed to zero or full 
–  compensation, which became the final version in the Constitution. 658  Patel drew upon 
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656 K.M. Munshi, CAD, 12 September, 1949. To this a member asked jokingly why did the 
Constitution not put lawyers in a schedule, like it did with the “Scheduled Tribes”. Munshi 
retorted, with no small amount of foresight, “We may put them in a schedule; they will be too 
glad to legislate upon themselves; but they will take the law to the Courts and come out 
successful – schedule or no schedule.”  
 
657 Ibid.  
 
658 Article 31: Right to Property [selected portions]  





his experience of acquiring land under the Government of India Act, 1935 to devise this 
solution. Hence, the first two clauses closely followed Section 299 of the Act.659 The 
Article stipulated a compensation, rather than just, fair, or equivalent compensation, for 
the acquisition of any property. It added that the legislature would “specify the principles 
on which” the compensation was to be determined and calculated. To keep a check on 
“overzealous” state legislatures, Patel suggested the incorporation of Art. 31(3) 
stipulating that acquisition laws passed in State Assemblies had to first receive the assent 
of the President to come into effect. The Article also had a ‘savings clause’ [Art. 31(4) 
and 31 (6)] for the laws already introduced or passed in different state assemblies, and 
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(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of the law.  
(2) No property movable or immovable, including any interest in, any company owning, any 
commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for any public 
purposes under any law authorizing the taking of such possession or such authorization unless the 
law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes 
the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, 
the compensation is to be determined and given. […] 
(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect 
unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his 
assent. 
(4) If any bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has 
after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President 
and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so 
assented to shall not be called into question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the 
provisions of clause (2) 
(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect:  
(a) The provisions of any existing law other than the laws to which clause (6) apply.  
(b) the provisions of any law that the State may hereafter make – […]  
 (ii) for the promotion of public health or preventing danger to life and property […] 
 
659 For the purposes of comparison, S. 299 of Government of India were as follows:  
299 (1) No person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by the authority of law.  
(2) Neither the federal nor the Provincial legislature shall have the power to make any law 
authorizing the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land […] unless the law 
provided for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount 







assented by the President, protecting them from judicial scrutiny under Art. 31(2).  
As the framers understood it, Article 31 only guarded against acquisition and 
compensation on whimsical or arbitrary grounds, by providing that the legislature must 
have a principled basis for those acts. However, what that principle would be was entirely 
within the domain of the legislature. Its propriety could not be questioned by courts as 
long as it was a principle.660 Therefore, the clause gave the legislature complete freedom 
in two crucial aspects. First, the principle could vary with regards to different classes of 
property, affording the legislature the crucial ability to differentiate.661 Second, it gave 
the legislature full freedom to determine the amount of compensation payable, since there 
were no standards (like just or equitable) provided against which it could be challenged, 
and the principle by which the amount was to be arrived at was within their powers to 
decide. The Court could only intervene when there was a “gross abuse of the law”, or a 
“fraud on the Constitution.”662 
There was absolutely no doubt in the minds of the framers that they had solved 
the vexing question without sacrificing either the transformational or the constitutional 
aspect by setting up, what Upendra Baxi has called, a novel “division of labour” between 
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660 This point was specifically clarified by Munshi in his final reply to the debates on the clause. 
K.M. Munshi, CAD, 12 September, 1949. 
 
661 This was clarified by A.K. Ayyar, another member of the Drafting Committee, and a well-
known lawyer. A.K. Ayyar, CAD, 12 September, 1949.  
 
662 As clarified by Nehru in his speech presenting final draft. Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 






the legislature and the judiciary.663 Under this version of ‘separation of powers’, the 
legislature was to act on complex social and economic questions facing the country, 
including reconfiguring rights in property. The judiciary was to act as a watchdog to 
ensure that such acts never become capricious or arbitrary, and lead to unjust exploitation 
of the population. Nehru, speaking on the final article, was quite clear on this point. “The 
law should do it [land reform]. Parliament should do it. There is no reference in this to 
any judiciary coming into the picture.” 664  This, he insisted, was not just a hopeful 
statement. “Eminent lawyers” have told him, he added, that on a proper interpretation of 
this clause there is no scope for judicial interference.665  
6.3 “Purloined by Lawyers”: The Kameshwar Singh Case and the First 
Amendment 
Evidently, Nehru’s lawyers didn’t given him the best advice. Within five months 
of the Constitution being adopted, the Patna High Court struck down the Bihar 
Management of Estates and Tenures Act, 1949, which provided for the taking over of 
certain large zamindari estates under state ‘management’ to protect the rights of tenants, 
amongst other things, as violating the fundamental right of the petitioner.666 Along with 
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663 Upendra Baxi, “The Little Done, The Vast Undone: Some Reflections on Reading Glanville 
Austin’s The Indian Constitution”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 9 (1967), at 369. 
 
664 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, 10 September, 1949.  
 
665 Ibid.  
 






this, challenges to the government taking over the management of a closed factory 667 and 
acquiring land for resettling refugees from East Pakistan668 in the Bombay and Calcutta 
High Courts respectively, looked like they might be successful, creating a general sense 
amongst the political leadership that the Courts are emerging as a roadblock to the 
transformational agenda. In the January of 1951, the Lucknow and Allahabad High 
Courts issued a stay on the implementation of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act 
passed only a week before.  
Increasingly frustrated, and slightly taken aback by the judicial onslaught within 
the first year of the Constitution, the leadership of the Congress started to discuss how 
“the experience of the past thirteen months have not been very happy”, and thinking 
about potential ways to solve the problem.669 Nehru, in a letter to the Chief Ministers 
stated, “if the Constitution itself comes in our way, then surely it is time to change the 
Constitution.”670 
The final straw turned out to be through another decision by the Patna High Court 
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667  Dwarkadas Srinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., AIR 1951 
Bombay 86. The Government was eventually successful in the case, but the decision was 
subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court. That latter decision was one of the series of cases 
that lead to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution that we will discuss later.  
 
668 West Bengal Settlement Kanungoe v. Bela Banerjee and Others, AIR 1952 Calcutta 554. The 
Government eventually lost this case, and the subsequent upholding of that decision by the 
Supreme Court came to be, as we shall see, the defining property case of the pre-Fourth 
Amendment era. 
669 G.B. Pant, Letter dated 5 March, 1951 to Jawaharlal Nehru. 
  
670 Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter dated 1 February 1951, in Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 2, G. 






in March of that year. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, had required a significant 
amount of political capital to be passed in the first place. Kameshwar Singh of the 
Darbhanga Estate had led an intense lobbying effort against the Act, including meeting 
with the President, Rajendra Parasad. Prasad, who was also from Bihar, and of a more 
conservative bent, was unwilling to give his assent to the bill, and did so only after Nehru 
threatened him with the resignation of the entire cabinet.671 Failing to stop the legislation 
from passing, Kameshwar Singh then challenged it in the High Court. The dispute came 
down to the “slab system” adopted by the Act with regards to calculation of 
compensation, whereby smaller owners were to get a greater proportion of the value of 
their property as compensation, as compared to larger owners.672 The Act fell under the 
purview of Art. 31(4) and hence protected from being challenged under Art. 31(2) – i.e., 
on the basis of the calculation of the compensation. However, the Patna High Court went 
on to strike down the compensation formula as violating Article 14  (right to equal 
protection before the law), since it differentiated between classes of property owners.673 
The Constituent Assembly, as we saw, had foreseen several kinds of legal questions 
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671 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2, 1947 – 1956 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), at 94. Patel was also for being more circumspect about the Act. But the 
fact that he was unwell at the time, and unable to attend cabinet meetings gave Nehru more 
leeway. For more details on the political negotiations behind the Act, see, H.C.L. Merillat, Land 
and Constitution in India (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1970), and Granville Austin, Working a 
Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 
82 – 84.  
 
672  The smallest owners were to get 20 times the value of their annual assessment as 
compensation, compared to the largest owners, who would get only 3 times. [H.M. Seervai, 
Constitutional Law of India, Vols. II, (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Company, 1997, 4th 
edition), at 1369].  
 






regarding compensation, but never did they imagine that “equality before law” under 
Article 14 could be one of them. Differentiating between different types of property 
owners was a fundamental premise of land reform. As we saw, during the assembly 
debates, certain zamindars raised this issue, but they did so more as a normative objection 
against zamindari abolition acts, rather than as a potential constitutional challenge. If land 
reform acts had to pass a strict test of equal protection before the law, almost none of 
them would stand.  
Within days of the decision, Nehru spoke to his colleagues and the chief ministers 
to start work on amending the Constitution “with the utmost expedition”.674 In a few 
months, the First Amendment to the Constitution was introduced in the Parliament, which 
consisted of the same members who made up the Constituent Assembly, now operating 
as the interim legislature before the first general elections to be held the next year. An 
amendment so soon after the adoption of the Constitution had attracted criticisms from 
several fronts, most notably from Prasad. But Nehru was steadfast in his defense of its 
necessity. One could not wait for judicial interpretations of the Constitution to work 
themselves out, like it did in America, because a wait in India would be a wait “amidst 
upheaval”. 675  Presciently acknowledging the contradiction between constitutional 
imagination and constitutional text that would only become starker in the following two 
decades, he said, “Somehow we have found that this magnificent Constitution that we 
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674 Letter dated 21 March, 1951, in Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 2, G. Parthasarathi ed. (New 
Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1989), at 363. 
 






have framed was later kidnapped and purloined by lawyers.”676 The Amendment was 
therefore to rescue “what was intended, or should be intended”, from the “extreme 
rigidity of the written word.”677 
The First Amendment added a clause to Article 31 making any legislation 
concerning estates (i.e. with legislations dealing with intermediaries between cultivators 
and the state) immune from challenges under Part III of the Constitution, which included 
all the fundamental rights provision, including Article 14, and Article 31. But along with 
it, it introduced two principles that would have a momentous effect on Indian 
constitutional practice.  
First, it created the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, which constituted of a list 
of legislations that were completely immune from any challenge under Part III.678 The 
Bihar act, along with twelve others, was included in that list. The Ninth Schedule was an 
extraordinary constitutional mechanism by any account. It created a protected space 
where legislations could be sheltered to provide them absolute immunity from charges of 
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677 Ibid.  
 
678 This was done through the addition of Article 31B to the Constitution. Article 31B read: 
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A, none of the Acts 
and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed 
to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is 
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this 
Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, 
each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to 






unconstitutionality. 679 There were no prescribed criteria for a legislation to qualify for 
inclusion in the Schedule, and no express principle written into it apart from the one of 
avoiding judicial scrutiny. The sincere insistence of the supporters of the First 
Amendment that it would be used in a cautious and circumspect manner soon proved to 
be a promise that was not going to be kept. The Parliament sought to use the Ninth 
Schedule as a way to bypass the Constitution when some legislation was successfully 
challenged in the courts. By last count, the Ninth Schedule had expanded to contain two 
hundred and eighty four acts, and the protracted battle around it between the judiciary 
and the legislature was tentatively resolved only in 2007 when the Supreme Court 
invoked the Basic Structure doctrine to practically nullify its efficacy.680  
The First Amendment’s most lasting legacy would be in the context of 
constitutional politics. It initiated the practice of amending the Constitution to bypass 
judicial decisions that came in the way of significant government priorities. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, during the debate on the Amendment clause, the main concern of 
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679  As Chief Justice Gajendragadkar reportedly said later, India’s is the only constitution 
providing for protection against itself. [Quoted in, Granville Austin, Working a Democratic 
Constitution: The Indian Experience (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 85].  
 
680 I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, 2007 AIR SC 861. A nine-
judge bench of the Supreme Court, heard an appeal arising out of the Gudalur Janmam Abolition 
Act of 1969, dealing with land reform in the context of a specific kind of landownership pattern 
in erstwhile Ryotwari areas of Tamil Nadu. The Court held that from the date of the 
Keshavananda judgement (delivered in 1973), the inclusion of any legislation in the Ninth 
Schedule can be retrospectively challenged for violating the Basic Structure doctrine, and if 
successful, open to a challenge on constitutionality. The full legal impact of the case though 
potentially momentous is yet to be fully gleaned in the short time (relative to the length of an 
average Indian litigation) since it was decided. However, only since 2011 it has been cited/ 






those arguing for an easier amendment procedure was the unforeseen circumstances that 
might arise in the unsettled context of a transition. They did not advance an argument on 
the principled ground of parliamentary supremacy, or conceive of the amendment clause 
as a tool to nullify unfavorable constitutional interpretations that might arise from judicial 
decisions. In other words, the Amendment clause was to be flexible as an aid for 
navigating the uncharted waters of carrying out a social revolution through a democratic 
constitution, not simply as a primary weapon in a struggle between the legislature and the 
judiciary regarding the control over the meaning of the Constitution. Yet the latter turned 
out to be how the Amendment clause was invoked in significant moments. The fact that 
the Supreme Court upheld the Patna High Court decision in the Bihar Land Reforms case 
on appeal, despite Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri acknowledging that the First Amendment 
was “enacted with the object […] of putting an end to this litigation”, signaled that the 
Supreme Court was not going to back down.681 Therefore, the amendment clause soon 
emerged as the principal terrain for the biggest constitutional battles.  
This development reveals a crucial fact about the Indian Constitution that is often 
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681 State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, 1952 (3) 
SCR 889. The Supreme Court went around the restrictions imposed by the First Amendment to 
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missed. The most significant constitutional crises in India in the first two decades was not 
generated simply by factors external to the constitutional structure – say, new social 
movements, political alignments, or ideological proclivities. Rather, they arose from the 
contradictions inherent to the constitutional form itself. The ambition of accomplishing a 
social transformation through a democratic constitution (the constitutional imagination) 
meant, as we had earlier quoted Nehru insisting in the Assembly, that the Constitution 
had to continually adjust itself to a situation that was dynamic and changing. 
Consequently, both the provisions themselves, and their precise scope and effect – in 
other words their meaning – had to be somewhat indeterminate at any given point, and 
open to negotiation. The body that sought to be the arbiter of the process, and had a 
justifiable claim to be best suited for the delicate task involved, was the legislature. As 
we saw, there was a general assumption amongst the framers that this was the way the 
system they were setting up would function. However, inherent in the provision for a 
strong judicial review, and the legalistic presentation (the constitutional text), was 
another different interpretative possibility – that of constitutional law as derived from 
judicial decisions and precedents. This interpretative realm, by its very nature, was firmly 
under the control of the judiciary. The judiciary in carrying out its work was not beholden 
to the constitutional imagination, but rather a distinct, and much older tradition of legal 
interpretation that came with their self-understanding as legal professionals. Legalese was 
not a neutral language, but one that carried with it a history of how to read and fix 
meanings that preceded the transformational constitutional vision. Hence, the conflicts 





obvious political bias towards certain interests. Rather, it came from them doing their job. 
The clearest example of this contradiction in the initial years, between the different 
interpretative traditions arising out of the constitutional imagination and constitutional 
texts, would arise in the Bela Banerjee case three years after the First Amendment.  
6.4 “Well-Established Rules of Interpretation”: The Bela Banerjee Case 
The West Bengal (Development and Planning Act), 1948 was enacted to acquire 
land and distribute it to co-operative housing societies to create housing to rehabilitate the 
massive number of refugees from East Pakistan, left homeless because of the partition. 
Bela Banerjee, whose land in Calcutta was acquired under the Act challenged it under 
Article 31(2) (the Act was not included in the Ninth Schedule at that point). The main 
dispute was about the validity of Section 8, proviso (b) of the Act, that had stipulated that 
the compensation payable should not exceed the market value of the land on 31 
December, 1946, even though the actual acquisition happened only in 1950. The Act 
therefore had provided a clear “principle” for the payment of compensation, which was 
the criteria of Article 31(2). But, the Court wondered, was it “compensation” in the first 
place?  
Attorney General M.C. Setalvad argued that it was clear from Article 31(2), that 
the term compensation “was not used in any rigid sense importing equivalence in value 





sustained by the owner”.682 The Court agreed that under Article 31(2) the legislature was 
given the discretion to “determine the amount”, however, that amount had to be 
compensation, “that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of.” 683 The 
discretion that the legislature was provided in the Constitution was to stipulate the 
principles by which a “just equivalent” of the loss suffered by the property owner could 
be determined. If they failed to do so, they were not principles determining 
‘compensation’, and hence ultra vires to Article 31(2).  
The decision therefore turned on the meaning of the word ‘compensation’. The 
Court argued, contrary to the Attorney–General, that the principle of ‘just equivalent’ was 
inherent to the word compensation. The very decision of the drafters to enshrine the word 
compensation in the Constitution implied that the principle of just equivalence was also 
enshrined in the Constitution. This was, as we saw, required one to completely disregard 
the explicit rejection of the principle of just equivalence (including the use of the words 
just, or equivalent) by the constituent assembly. That disregard of the intention of the 
drafters, so very obvious from any reading of the constituent assembly, was based not on 
an explicit ideological stance taken by the courts in defense of property rights, but on 
well-regarded principles of legal interpretation. H.M. Seervai, the foremost legal 
commentator of the Indian Constitution, writes in a telling passage: “The Court of law 
must gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language used, and what one may 
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believe to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot therefore be prevail if not supported by 
the language, which therefore must be construed according to well-established rules of 
interpretation uninfluenced by the assumed spirit of the Constitution.” 684 In short, in a 
juridical setting, words matter. And Nehru’s poetic invocation that words don’t always 
capture the spirit, is actually a fatal legal flaw. What are those “well-established rules of 
interpretation” that Seervai speaks of? He explains that those rules “require that the 
meaning and intention of the framers of a Constitution […] must be ascertained from the 
language of the Constitution itself; with the motive of those who framed it, the Court has 
no concern.”685 This interpretative tradition, which as Seervai shows was accepted by the 
Supreme Court as early as 1951 and has not been overruled since,686 opens up an 
irreducible gap between the constitutional imagination (what is referred to here as 
‘spirit’) and constitutional text (referred to as ‘language used’). Was that gap inevitable? 
Seervai, like a good lawyer, does not believe it was. He lays the blame at the door of the 
drafters, especially the experienced lawyers amongst them like Ayyar and Munshi, whose 
opinions as we saw were crucial to the final draft. “It is submitted” he writes, “that […] 
Ayyar forgot the elementary principles of accurate drafting, namely that if a word with a 
well-known meaning was to be used in a statute […] to convey a different meaning, then 
such a different meaning must be expressly set out in an explanation instead of leaving it 
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to legal arguments.”687 In other words, the problem was bad, or careless, drafting. If that 
indeed was the case, then Amendments would be an obvious solution to the problem. But 
as we shall soon see, twenty years, and more than twenty amendments later, the crisis 
only deepened. Therefore, we need to inquire if there was a deeper tension between the 
constitutional imagination and text that could not be solved only on the terrain of the 
latter.  
One can start by reconstructing from the decisions of these early years how the 
courts understood the Constitution as a break with colonial rule. Under colonial rule, as 
we discussed in Chapter 3, the autonomy of law was subverted by making law 
subservient to the political expediencies of maintaining colonial domination. The 
Supreme Court, in the years after independence, understood their role as to reclaim the 
autonomy of law so far denied by the logic of political domination. They sought to 
establish law as a relatively autonomous sphere, they way it has been posited in the 
Western legal tradition, where it was thought to have had its own independent logic of 
development, history, and form.688 This autonomy was closely linked to the autonomy of 
the legal profession – and hence by extension the judicial institution, where that 
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688 Harold Berman defines the notion of ‘relative autonomy of law’ as it has been posited in the 
Western legal tradition thus: “A relatively sharp distinction is made between legal institutions 
(including legal processes such as legislation and adjudication as well as the legal rules and 
concepts that are generated in those processes) and other types of institutions. Although law 
remains strongly influenced by religion, politics, morality, and custom, it is nevertheless 
distinguishable from them analytically. Politics and morals may determine law, but they are not 
thought to be law. In the West, though of course not only in the West, law is considered to have a 





profession found its primary practical expression. These professionals, who received a 
distinct specialized training (legal education), and took up legal activities as their full 
time occupation, were seen to be the proper group of people to exercise autonomous 
control over the administration and interpretation of law.689 Legal historian Rohit De has 
shown how this claim for the autonomy of the legal sphere was already gaining 
momentum amongst the judges of the federal court in the late colonial years.690 Post 
independence, it came into its own.  
In terms of classical legal theory, the autonomy of law was seen to be purest in 
the realm of contract law. This is why, as we have shown, contract law came to form the 
theoretical core of classical legal theory. On the other hand, the Constitution in the way 
the Indian framers conceptualized it was concerned with “bigger issues than those of the 
lawyers’ making.”691 In their intention of how it should be read in practice, they 
privileged the point of view of the planner and the politician along with the lawyer. 
Constitutional law in India was therefore ‘corrupted’ from its origin by ‘extra-legal’ 
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considerations. Contract law, as it developed in the late nineteenth century, was 
concerned purely with the “meeting of minds” of two abstract juridical subjects. This 
could be ascertained using purely legal tests – examining the procedures and form of the 
documents – rather than any extra-legal considerations.692 It is to the doctrines of contract 
law that the Bela Banerjee court turned to. The concept of ‘just equivalent’, the way the 
court understood it reflected that. The state was to treat Bela Banerjee as a seller, and 
itself as a buyer.693 All Article 31(2) provided for was that the state could choose 
unilaterally the timing of the exchange of property. It did not nullify the principle that 
there was a ‘price’ to be paid for that exchange. Compensation was to be understood as 
that price, analogous to its usage in the phrase ‘compensation for the goods rendered’ in 
contractual language. The price was to be decided by the apolitical metric of the market. 
The state had limited flexibility in determining what is a ‘market value’. But if their 
determination was obviously erroneous – as was evident from the appreciation in the 
market value of the land between 1946 and 1950 – the court could nullify it saying that it 
was not compensation at all. The fact that Bela Banerjee was a wealthy landowner, and 
that the state was acting on behalf of scores of homeless refugees, were not relevant in 
terms of law. What was relevant was the determination of equivalence based on non-
political criteria on the basis of which the Court could legally validate the valid exchange 
between the abstract juristic subjects ‘Bela Banerjee’ and the ‘State of West Bengal’. 
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Obviously, this was a world apart from the way the Indian framers had used the 
term ‘compensation’. Yet in their inclusion of that term in the Constitution they were not 
being bad lawyers, but rather failing to predict the court’s subsequent assertion of the 
autonomy of legal reasoning. Here, their continuity with the colonial constitutional form 
hurt them. Under colonial rule, ‘constitution’ denoted a set of coherent administrative 
guidance to be followed by different bodies of the state. What mattered in that scenario is 
a clear demarcation of the competence and jurisdiction of different bodies. The framers 
thought, rightly, that they have provided exactly that in Article 31, laying down in clear 
terms what the legislature was competent to do. However, the post-colonial Supreme 
Court was not satisfied, like its colonial predecessors, in merely acting as a guardian of 
administrative apportionments. In the constitutional provision for a strong judicial review 
they found both the institutional as well as justificatory basis for reclaiming law as an 
institution independent of administrative necessities.  
Beyond this historical shift, there was also another contradiction inherent in the 
project of transformational constitutionalism itself. Transformational constitution– 
represented by the constitutional imagination – suggested an agreement that the existing 
property relations needed to be changed. To put it in another way, it posited a common 
cause as to the need for development, and the related necessity of changing the current 
distribution of property. Beyond this common cause existed, as we saw, disagreements 
regarding a homogenous legal doctrine of property. Hence, the constitutional text 
provided for the ways in which the state could intervene in precise and variegated manner 





The courts however deal with individual parties that bring particular disputes in front of 
them, not with a body of experts drawing up national development plans.694 For those 
disputes they require a legal doctrine to apply. If they are insistent on their autonomy, as 
the Indian courts were, they insist on doctrines that are coherent from the point of view of 
legal theory alone, and general in their application in keeping with the principle of rule of 
law. Such a doctrine in the realm of property law could not be supplied by a 
transformational constitutional vision. In fact, as we have seen, the whole necessity of 
transformational constitutionalism arises from the impossibility of providing such a 
doctrine. Hence, the court in Bela Banerjee (and other cases) went to the doctrines of 
private contractual law as developed through the common law tradition.  
The other way of stating the same problematic would be from the point of view of 
the two choices in front of the court.  The Bela Banerjee court had two possible sets of 
considerations they could have used. They could have either used what can be called 
substantive considerations, that is conflicting considerations of public good or welfare. 
Doing so would have required them to defer to the wisdom of the planners and politicians 
who were better suited to make those calculations. Alternatively, they could use formal 
considerations, that is, choose between different legal doctrines or rules, based on their 
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coherence, generality, and applicability.695 Given the desire of the Indian courts to assert 
both their institutional authority and doctrinal autonomy of law, they chose the latter 
course. Formalism signaled autonomy of law and the courts. In so doing, they supplanted 
the incoherent or insufficient legal doctrines available to them in the realm of public law, 
with the coherent doctrine from the realm of private law perfected and honed over 
centuries of legal development.  
Thus, when Nehru complained about the Constitution being kidnapped and 
purloined by lawyers, this is what he meant. “Many of us present here are lawyers”, 696 he 
said to the Parliament. However, in the Parliament, as in the Constituent Assembly, they 
did not inhabit the subject position of a lawyer in a courtroom. There, “the lawyer 
represents litigation”.697 They seek coherent doctrines to decide a particular conflict, not 
think in terms of the larger developmental needs of the nation. As we saw in our 
discussion of early eighteenth century, in certain conditions the court might make 
allowance for developmental necessities. However, in the early days of asserting its 
autonomy, the Indian court was not interested in doing so. Hence, they “represented 
precedent and tradition and not change, not a dynamic process.”698 These were the ‘well-
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established principles of law” Seervai was referring to – precedents and traditions derived 
from a different historical and social context, unlike the constitutional imagination that 
sought to reflect on its own time and place.  
This discussion clarifies yet another aspect of the actions of the Indian judiciary in 
its early years. In America, during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court similarly used 
doctrines derived from the classical legal theory of contracts to strike down progressive 
or redistributive laws. As Jennifer Nedelsky has argued, ideology aside, their views 
corresponded to the original meaning of property in the Constitution.699 The decisions on 
‘takings’ in the Lochner era therefore can be seen as preserving the original formulations 
of the Constitution and how it envisaged the protection of property from the state. On the 
other hand, the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in the fifties, which have received 
similar criticism of being anti-progressive, cannot be seen in any way as preservative. 
They were not trying to preserve the ‘original position’ of the Indian Constitution 
regarding property, if anything they were going against it. The fact that their decision 
made the constitutional framers themselves amend the Constitution attests to this fact. 
Rather, they posited a different interpretative regime for the Constitution, motivated by 
their conviction regarding the autonomy of law in an independent India. And in so doing, 
they manifested the contradictions inherent in the Indian Constitution, due to its history 
(colonial to post-colonial) and its formulation (the tension between the imagination and 
the text).  
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In the aftermath of Bela Banerjee, there arose a strong anti-judiciary sentiment 
amongst the Congress Working Committee.700 There was a strong demand amongst its 
members to amend the Constitution to radically curtail the powers of judicial review as 
well as the powers to promulgate writs. Another popular idea was the suggestion, 
championed by Home Minister K.N. Katju, that expropriation of property as a whole 
should be made explicitly non-justiciable, leaving no room for judicial interpretations. 
The role of Nehru in this context was quite remarkable. On the one hand, he made no 
secret of his profound disappointment at the judiciary’s decisions putting major 
roadblocks in the path of the transformational agenda. Yet, he refused to let that sense of 
disappointment become a justification for attacking the institution of judicial review 
itself. An interesting dynamic is revealed here at the first potential constitutional crisis of 
the young republic. Transformational constitutionalism had two elements to it – social 
transformation and constitution. Nehru’s argument to the Working Committee asking for 
moderation can be read as an argument to hold on to both of those aspects even when 
conflicts arose between them. If judicial review was significantly curtailed, the 
Constitution would lose much of its salience and normative resonance, and move closer 
to being an administrative blueprint that it was under colonial rule. The battle over 
constitutional interpretation should not become an occasion to attack a constitutional 
institution.  
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The Fourth Amendment, passed in 1955, within a year of the Bela Banerjee and 
Saghir Ahmed decisions, did not make any changes to the provisions embodying judicial 
review. Also, it did not make expropriation of property, in general, non-justiciable. An 
important role was played in this latter instance by the pro-business Industry Minister 
T.T. Krishnamachari, who conveyed the point of view of the Indian industrialists to 
Nehru. He argued that there are nascent signs of growth in the industrial sector, and while 
there was a need to go “somewhat left” with regard to Agriculture, a move leftwards with 
regards to industries would dampen business confidence. Hence a complete bar on 
judicial review with regard to property acquisition could seriously hamper future 
investment potentials.701 In the end, his view was accepted by Nehru and the Parliament. 
What the Fourth Amendment did instead was to neutralize Bela Banerjee by adding the 
line, “and no such law shall be called into question in any court on the ground that the 
compensation provided by the law is not adequate” at the end of Article 31(2).702  
After the Fourth Amendment, it seemed for a while that the matter of full 
compensation had been put to rest. There were cases that asserted the correctness of the 
principle that compensation meant ‘just equivalent’, 703 and hence kept Bela Banerjee 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
701 Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), at 104.  
 
702 It also added a new section, Article 31(2A) to clarify that compensation would only be payable 
when the ownership was transferred to the government. This was to neutralize the Saghir Ahmed 
decision on regulations. 
  
703 The most notable of these was P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, 
1965 AIR SC 1017. Chief Justice Subba Rao’s understanding of the effect of the Fourth 
Amendment is rather extra ordinary. He wrote: “The fact that Parliament used the same 





alive as a good precedent.704 But since none of those cases followed that principle to 
make its decision, the issue did not arise again. Finally, in the Shantilal Mangaldas case, 
it seemed that the Supreme Court had finally ratified the idea that the Fourth Amendment 
has successfully invalidated the principles laid out in Bela Banerjee.705 But that truce was 
to last less than a year.  
6.5 From Constitutional Dispute to Constitutional Crisis: Indira Gandhi and 
the Bank Nationalization Case 
By the mid-sixties, a few years after the death of Nehru, the project of social 
transformation was reaching its unsatisfactory limits. The possibility of either growth or 
reduction of inequality through development plans and social reforms of the Nehru era 
seemed to have been exhausted, well short of their ambitious goals. At the same time, 
major cracks had started to emerge within the dominant coalition we described in the last 
chapter, with parts of the rural landowning elites threatening to exit the coalition with 
their significant electoral machinery. After two decades in power, Congress as a party 
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was increasingly viewed by the people more as a party of entrenched interests, rather than 
the party that had promised social justice in the eve of independence. The result of all this 
factors were that Congress faced its biggest electoral setbacks in the state assembly 
elections of 1967. For the first time in independent India, the electoral victory of the 
Congress was in doubt.  
The leader of Congress at that time, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, was facing 
yet another set of challenges as she fought for the control of the party with all powerful 
local party bosses, with their strong patronage network. Faced with a challenge to her 
authority from within the party, and electoral debacle from without, Indira Gandhi took a 
decisively populist turn – deciding to go over the institutional mechanisms of both the 
party and the state to make a direct appeal to the people. In this vein, she sought to restate 
the transformational agenda through strident and vague slogans (e.g. garibi hathao, i.e., 
remove poverty) emptied out of any careful elaboration of policy. Thereby, she sought to 
recast the elections in terms of a referendum on those slogans, rather than discussions of 
policy and institutional mechanisms.  
One of the major planks of her program before the important general elections of 
1971 was to nationalize the banking sector. As a policy move, the nationalization plan 
had many good arguments in favor of it, most important of it was to extend credit and 
banking services to the poorer population and small industries, both of which private 
banks were often unwilling or unable to do. However, the plan was executed in an 





begin, where a nationalization bill could face resistance and public debate, officials of the 
Law ministry were given orders to draft an ordinance. The ordinance was drafted in a 
day, and passed in the Cabinet Meeting without any of the ministers having read it. It was 
promulgated the day before the Parliament was to meet, nationalizing fourteen of the 
biggest private banks in the country. The popularity of the measure amongst the public 
meant that when subsequently it was presented to the Parliament in a few months as a fait 
accompli, it was passed into law.  
Rustomji Cowasji Cooper, one of the shareholders of the banks being 
nationalized, filed a petition to the Supreme Court the day after the ordinance, 
challenging it. Representing the petitioners was Nani Pahlkiwala, who had the impressive 
ability to suggest to the court that beyond the facts of the particular case, the larger fate of 
the democratic constitutional system was at stake. He would put this argumentative tactic 
to frequent and highly successful use during the subsequent definitive cases of the Indira 
Gandhi era that taken together constituted an all out constitutional battle between the 
Supreme Court and the Parliament. Six months later, the Court by a majority of 10 -1 
struck down the Bank Nationalization Act.706 The decision proclaimed that despite the 
Fourth Amendment and the intervening cases, the Court had the right to inspect the 
principles behind compensations provided, and decide whether it was adequate or not.707 
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As the central rationale of the judgment, Justice Shah basically resurrected Bela Banerjee 
in toto, holding that “The broad objects of the principles of valuation is to award the 
owner equivalent of his property with its existing advantages and potentials.”708 The 
Court backed this up with lengthy quotes from Blackstone (that we have quoted 
earlier)709 and Grotius.  
Based purely on its legal merit, the Bank Nationalisation Case was a judicial 
decision of a rather low standard. It flouted the established doctrine of “political 
questions” by questioning the merit of the policy of nationalizing banks; it raised 
evidentiary questions that can only be raised in a civil suit at a trial court level rather than 
in a constitutional writ petition; it refused to accept certain documents submitted by the 
government that could have been easily verified. Most shockingly, it reestablished legal 
principles and precedents – that of just equivalence – that Justice Shah, the very same 
judge who wrote the decision, had expressly declared to be void in the light of the Fourth 
Amendment just a year ago in the Shantilal Mangaldas case. 710  But the Bank 
Nationalization case cannot be examined merely on its legal merits. The discussions 
amongst the judges are closed to us, but the extraordinary 10 -1 majority, the willingness 
to uphold principles in absolute and unqualified terms even if it meant setting aside 
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precedents, and the general suspicion with which the judgment treated the plans of the 
government meant that the Supreme Court did not see itself as only pronouncing a 
decision on a specific point of law, but restating in the most defiant terms the sanctity of 
legal- normative interpretation of the Constitution. Bela Banerjee, the symbol for the 
assertion of the autonomy of law came to stand in for the autonomy of judiciary and their 
role within the constitutional system.  
On the side of the Government, Indira Gandhi, unlike her father, did not refuse to 
let a struggle over constitutional interpretation develop into a battle between 
constitutional institutions. The very next year she went to the voters in the general 
elections making her case explicitly against the judiciary. The Supreme Court and the 
Constitution they had “purloined” had become an enemy of social justice, and of the will 
of the people. She made it a referendum against the institutional structure of 
transformational constitutionalism, rather than an election about possible policy options 
within that framework. Part of her election platform was two constitutional amendments, 
which when subsequently enacted would make radical changes in constitutional 
provisions, including the Preamble. The Supreme Court, with their insistence on 
autonomously deriving their legal doctrine through the formalistic reading of the 
constitutional text, in opposition to the constitutional imagination, provided the foil for 
her anti-constitutional rhetoric. Indira Gandhi went on to win the elections in a landslide. 
But the conflict between the judiciary and the parliament did not end there. Eventually, 
the constitutional battle inaugurated in the late sixties, and subsequently exacerbated, led 





Transformational constitutionalism does not end in 1975. The emergency was 
lifted in 1977, and in the next general elections, the Congress lost decisively. The new 
government, fulfilling their election promise, passed the forty-fourth amendment to the 
Constitution, reversing the changes made by the Amendments under Indira Gandhi. After 
this time, no subsequent Parliament would attempt a major project of social 
transformation, with the notable exception of reservations on the basis of caste. However, 
the judiciary emerged even stronger post-emergency. And starting from the eighties they 
would reinterpret the transformational constitutional project in a wholly different way, 
claiming to be the helmsmen of the social transformational agenda by asserting an 
extraordinary expansion of judicial intervention and activism in all matters of socio-
economic policy.711 Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who was to become the most influential 
champion of this reinterpretation of the role of the judiciary, wrote in a judgment, that, “It 
is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that our Constitution 
[…] is a document of social revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality 
including the judiciary […] to transform the status quo ante into a new human order […] 
The judiciary has […] to become an arm of the socio-economic revolution”.712 Therefore, 
“we need Judges who are alive to the socio-economic realities of Indian life, who are 
anxious to wipe every tear from every eye, who have faith in the constitutional values and 
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almost conservative by comparison to the Indian Court’s leading decisions.” Charles R. Epp, The 
Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Court in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 






who are ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional objectives.”713 
The story of this extraordinary statement of judicial function, and its various 
contradictions, is intimately linked to the original moment of transformational 
constitutionalism. One can show that the so-called ‘judicial activism’ of the Indian 
judiciary from the 1980s onwards was not the result of certain sudden ideological shift 
amongst a few judges, or a result of a judicial frustration with ‘bad governance’.714 It was 
a creative appropriation of transformational constitutionalism, and while the framers 
could never have envisioned this development, without their original formulation, the 
statement by Chief Justice Bhagwati does not become possible. How, and why that 
appropriation happened, and what are the serious internal contradictions and problems of 
that shift, has to be delineated by that future work, perhaps a sequel to the present one.  
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713 Ibid.  
 
714 As implied in the following quote by Pratap Bhanu Mehta: “Court interventions have been 
widely seen as legitimate, or at least tolerated, because the representative institutions are widely 
seen as being immobilized, self-serving, corrupt, and incapable of exercising either their basic 
policy prerogatives or their powers of enforcement.” Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Inner Conflict of 
Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic Structure’, in India’s Living Constitution: 






Transformational Constitutionalism III 
The contradictions at the heart of the Indian Constitution raise questions about the 
contradictions inherent in the title of this work. To what extent is it possible to legalize 
the revolution? Or, to put the question in a more urgent manner for Indian political 
development, to what extent can a revolution be performed through law? The story, 
narrated in the last chapter, of a central piece of the social transformative agenda should 
make anyone skeptical of an optimistic answer to that question. I was once asked, that if I 
am suggesting through the title of my work that the Indian Constituent Assembly wanted 
to be revolutionaries, who were the corresponding counter-revolutionaries? It might seem 
that the last chapter suggests that the answer is the Supreme Court. However, that would 
be too simplistic a presentation of the contradictions between the Constitution and social 
transformation in the Indian context.  
Agrarian reform in India, with a few exceptions, was a failure. But it did not fail 
only because of the Supreme Court, though the Court certainly did not help matters. It 
failed for reasons more quotidian like implementation and local political alliances. The 
landowning classes, soon after the independence, had consolidated their power base in 
rural society. This included the local party and administrative machinery. Which meant, 
firstly, that the reform legislations were watered down at the level of state legislatures, 
which was the competent body to pass agrarian reform laws.715 More importantly, even 
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those laws were not properly implemented. The hold of the landowning classes over the 
rural power base was possible through their control over a central facet of democratic 
politics – electoral machinery. In other words, they could get the votes.  
This raises an interesting problem as to why the marginal or landless peasants 
acquiesced to this control. Scholars have suggested several related reasons. It has been 
shown that even after independence, agrarian production in India was still embedded in a 
complex matrix of social power (both economic and extra-economic) that made the direct 
producers dependent upon the landowning elite in a multiplicity of ways – both material 
and ideational. 716 The landowning elite controlled the access to necessary resources (like 
land, irrigation) and credit, along with enjoying the privileges of caste hierarchies and 
better education.717 Given the actuality of their everyday dependence, it often made 
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as the so called state bosses of the Congress managed to carve out a considerable amount of 
autonomy from the policies of the national leadership, and the Central Planning Commission.  
  
716 Ronald Herring has called this ‘embedded relation of production’ in agriculture, making use of 
Karl Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness. Ronald J. Herring, ‘Embedded Production Relations 
and Rationality of Peasant Quiescence in Tenure Reform’, Journal of Peasant Studies 8:2 (1981), 
at 131 – 172. Also see, Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).  Herring, in a later article, clarified his use of 
Polanyi’s conceptual framework. See, Ronald J. Herring, ‘Contesting the “Great 
Transformation”: Local Struggles with Markets in South India’, in Agrarian Studies: Synthetic 
Work at the Cutting Edge, eds. James C. Scott and Nina Bhatt (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001). 
 
717 In lieu of major structural reforms, the landlord was the main source of the peasant’s 
livelihood through grant of tenancy contracts, as well his major source of credit given the nature 
of the rural credit market. He was also the peasant’s link to the official world of district towns and 
bureaucracy. Given that caste hierarchy closely mapped onto land ownership patterns in most 
parts of India, the distribution of material power was also undergirded through an ‘extra-political’ 
form of hierarchical domination. Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the 
Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 





rational sense for the peasants to acquiesce to the existing structure of power in rural 
society. One can also add to this the use of state patronage by ‘local notables’ to further 
entrench their dominant position and control the electoral machine.718 Therefore, to go 
with the embedded relations of production, democracy also created ‘embedded 
particularities’ whereby successful control over local political base could thwart the local 
implementation of general policies made at the national or even regional capitals.719   
The state of affairs points to a central paradox of land reform. Land is the basis of 
both political and social power in agrarian societies. Land reform seeks to change the 
composition of the control over land. In doing so it has to thereby confront those who are 
the best equipped to resist.720 Therefore, to succeed in land reform, one has to posit an 
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An Analysis of Changing State Society Relationships, Atul Kohli ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988).  
 
718 In 1970, by the time this control was well entrenched, Rajni Kothari observed that “State 
leaders […] control a good part of the election machinery of the Congress Party. This is partly 
due to the size of the country which keeps the central leadership remote from the bulk of the 
population, and partly to the increasing importance of rural patronage and influence in the 
outcome of elections”. Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little and Brown, 1970), at 120. 
Also see, Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967). For one of the first detailed study of the mechanisms 
of the intra-party conflict resolutions, focusing on the state of Uttar Pradesh, see, Paul R. Brass, 
Fractional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). 
 
719 Ronald J. Herring, ‘Embedded Particularism: India’s Failed Developmental State’, in The 
Developmental State, Meredith Woo-Cummings ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), at 
306.  
 
720 Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South 
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), Chapter 8. Also see, John Echeverri-Gent, The 
State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and the United States 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Echeverri-Gent conducts a useful comparative 
analysis of the Indian case with that of the New Deal Era American South, where similar 
embedded forms of dominance, oriented around race, made it impossible for African-Americans 





alternative basis of power that could successfully counter the embedded power of local 
landowners. This could be done in two ways, either from above (centralized state), or 
from below (democratic mobilization of the peasantry). To return to the Indian 
Constitution, we can briefly examine the relationship of each of these possibilities with 
the constitutional form.  
The ‘from above’ argument would be to say that there should have been a 
concerted effort by those controlling the state at the national level – most importantly, 
Nehru – to break the resistance of local power holders. In other words, embedded 
particularities at the local level should have been neutralized by the considerable force of 
a centralized state machinery. It is unlikely that a centralized implementation of that sort 
could have been fully realized within a democratic constitutional structure. More 
importantly, there would have been a real danger of a real trade-off between democratic 
principles and a coercive implementation of that sort. Because, at its heart, what is 
implied in the phrase ‘from above’ is freeing the state as a mechanism from the control of 
social interests, where it could be wielded by rational and unbiased actors against the 
distortions induced by those interests. Yet freeing the mechanism of political rule from 
the influence of social interests is at its core undemocratic.721 The basic tenets of the 
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failure of reconstruction can be found in Eric Foner’s seminal work on the period. Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863 – 1877 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1988).    
 
721  Furthermore, it also assumes too much of the rationality of those wielding the now 
unquestioned power of the centralized state. The Colonial state in India could claim autonomy 
from the colonized society, but it did not bring about rationalized or just social order. Neither was 
such gains made during the period of Emergency under Indira Gandhi, who had made a populist 





Indian Constitution would have made such a move (in its fullest sense) impossible, or 
requiring of a suspension or abolition of the constitutional order. The other major 
problem in this regard was that land was a state subject under the constitutional 
distribution of powers, which meant that state legislatures and administrations, more 
amenable to local landed interests, were the ones which had to pass and implement land 
reform legislations. This was a result of the fractured and uneven nature of land 
settlement systems under colonial rule, and the balance of power between the different 
dominant interest groups in the Constituent Assembly.722 This should not mean that the 
constitution framers could have done nothing in this regard to address the problem of 
local power bases of the landlords. To put it simply, could the transformational 
constitutional design include some more innovations to augment the transformational 
element without sacrificing its democratic character? My answer would be yes, but only 
to a limited extent. Without wading too deeply into the choppy waters of counterfactual 
speculations, one can suggest one such provision in particular whose efficacy is not 
entirely a matter of speculation. The Constitution could have included a provision that 
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the name of ‘real’ social transformation. The state, even when it is not responding to demands 
arising from the society does have its own logic, which are seldom just and egalitarian.  
 
722 Proprietary rights in land under colonial rule were shaped through the particular negotiations 
between the colonial administration and the respective interest groups. The needs and policies of 
the colonial state in each administrative region determined the settlement it reached with the 
different stakeholders in land – resulting in widely different types of proprietary regimes. As we 
have seen, given the nature of the dominant coalition, the question of one uniform set of law and 
policy for land reform for the whole country was never a possibility. Rather, in what could be 
seen as a shadow of the colonial process, each provincial legislature had to devise their own 
solution to the land question, keeping in mind the particularities of the property regime in their 
own region – which, as the years following the Constitution would show, varied greatly both in 






stated clearly that in all land reform legislations in India, the burden of proof regarding 
occupancy by a cultivator would rest on the landowner, rather than on the tenant. This 
would obviously be a very minor step towards addressing the problem, but it would have 
given the tenant, often the one lacking the resources to locate and maintain proper 
records, a valuable tool.723 And if this seems too specific a clause to be part of a 
constitution, one should remember that the Indian Constitution contains numerous 
provisions more detailed and particular in nature than this. Nevertheless, despite this and 
other such minor reinventions, the basic framework of a transformational constitutional 
system would not have allowed for the kind of absolute state power that is required to 
push through a sweeping transformational agenda from above.  
The challenge to the rural power structure from below was a different story. As 
has been suggested, this is what reformists like Nehru envisaged. They thought, that once 
the principle of structural reform of property relations was acknowledged in the 
constitution and as a state policy, and democracy instituted, the rural masses would 
mobilize around those goals and ensure requisite action. In that context, all the 
Constitution had to do was to give a symbolic value to the principle of structural change 
(which it did) and facilitate the necessary legislative and administrative actions when they 
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723 The reason this is not entirely a matter of speculation is that this shift in the burden of proof 
was included in the land reform legislations in Kerala, one of the only two states to carry out a 
sincere program of land reform. It had a noticeable impact on the ground, which one could 
compare with the laws passed by most other states that lacked this clause. In a country like India, 
where approaching the legal system is often too burdensome for a vast majority of the population, 
small procedural changes like these could have an immense effect. The principle has been 
adopted in recent years regarding another law that seeks to help a disadvantaged section of 





did take place (which it could have, to a large extent).  
The problem was that Nehru fatally misunderstood both the deeply embedded 
nature of rural power structure, and the fact that extension of franchise and regular 
election in itself do not produce democratic mobilization. Consequently, there was a 
necessity to actually have a program of empowering peasants through political 
mobilizations around the issue of land reform. There is a disagreement amongst scholars 
whether a mobilization of this kind required a realignment of social forces, or merely a 
committed and motivated political party organization.724 But either way, absent such a 
mobilization, the acquiescence of the peasant, and the control of electoral mechanism by 
the landlords through coercion and patronage, were entirely understandable. In other 
words, sans an ambitious agenda of agrarian politics, the ambitious agenda of agrarian 
reform was always bound to fail.  
What does this tell us about the constitution? As we saw in the last chapter, the 
battle between the Supreme Court and the Constitution was fought on the terrain of the 
constitutional text. Nehru did frequently invoke the constitutional imagination and 
promises as justification for his positions, but the move was to change the text. With 
regards to the Supreme Court, one can argue with some justification, this was the only 
option available, since the Court was adamant in its belief that a strict legal formalism 
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was the way to assert the independence of the legal sphere. However, Nehru (and those 
aligned to him) saw this as the only work to be done to maintain the transformational 
constitutional vision. They had taken the constitutional imagination as granted, and saw 
the realm of the constitutional text as the realm where attention was required. This meant 
that constitutional politics became exclusively about constitutional law.  
What was neglected therefore, was the necessity to create a mass political 
mobilization around the constitutional imagination. Why would this have been valuable? 
Because a constitution can function, if mobilized to that end, as a foundational statement 
of the nation. In politics, it could act as a concrete goal around which to rally. It can 
clarify struggles, as well as provide the justificatory framework for them. This is not by 
any means an argument for a possible different path of political development in India that 
was never taken. Indian political development was determined by multiple factors of 
which the Constitution is only one. However, seen from a point of view of the 
Constitution and its inherent possibilities, one can argue that the constitutional politics 
should have been understood as more than just writ petitions and amendments.  
The familiarity with law as a language one can use to one’s benefit, from the 
colonial period itself, was limited to mostly the upper strata of the Indian society. Hence, 
construing the constitutional practice as purely a legal one on existing terms, rather than 
one that has to be built up through political education and organizing, meant that a vast 
section of the Indian population was excluded from the very beginning from the sphere of 





of the masses were felt the most, through the implicit threat of rebellion and instability, 
was the realm of constitutional imagination. The stratum where their influence was the 
least was the stratum of constitutional text. Similarly, when the constitutional practice 
becomes all about its textual details, it is the masses and their interests that are by and 
large excluded from it.  
Over the subsequent decades, especially since the 1980s, the realm of 
constitutional politics has been expanded in creative ways. This has happened mostly 
through political mobilization around specific constitutional promises. Around certain 
issues such as caste, constitutional promises have provided a discourse for crafting new 
legislations and policies. Around certain other issues, like food security, environment, 
and education, it has lead to creative judicial actions, which have significantly expanded 
or reshaped the nature of the constitutional text itself. In other words, there are several 
examples one could rely upon to show that the flexibility of the transformational 
constitutional form, and the tension between its three strata could be put to productive use 
for progressive purposes.  
This period has also seen a significant increase on a reliance on the judiciary by 
social movements. As I mentioned in the Introduction, there have been no major social 
movements or organizations in India over the last twenty years that have not approached 
the courts for redress. The judiciary has been responsive to some of these cases, and less 
to others.  However, even when it is responsive, the focus of the judiciary is always 





the nature of their functioning. Consequently, the nature of the demands of social 
movements when they approach the judiciary becomes less expansive and transformative, 
and more focused upon administrative redress. There exists very good reasons to critique 
the phenomenon of judicialization of politics, but such a course of action is often 
understandable from the strategic standpoint of the activists themselves. For our purpose, 
there are two relevant lessons here – while when understood only as petitions to the 
Supreme Court, its scope and impact is rather limited, the story of Indian constitutional 
practice is not only one of limitations and failures, but also of possibilities.  
This work does not present a triumphalist picture of the Indian Constitution. It 
doesn’t even present an optimistic one. Nevertheless, it stresses that the transformational 
constitution that India has could indeed offer more than it has been called upon to deliver 
thus far. It can be the site of a productive political struggle. At its core, the Indian 
Constitution bears testimony to a necessity of changing the social order, a necessity born 
out of an acknowledgement by the elites of the tenuousness and fragility of a democratic 
political order sans such transformation. That necessity marks the constitutional 
imagination, and while the constitutional text attempts to limit its consequences, it does 
not erase it.  
Today, when a newly confident elite in India, unmindful that they inhabit a 
country riven with almost as much inequality as during the time of independence, tries to 
reinterpret that necessity as a temporary compulsion, and consequently reinterpret the 





democracy enunciated more than six decades ago. It would be even more important to 
assert that vision through an organized political movement. Almost four decades ago, 
Upendra Baxi urged that the task of a scholar of Indian Constitution should be to rescue 
the social revolution from the ‘dustbin’ it has been consigned to.725 To that end, a scholar 
can only offer a critique of existing dogma and practices, and delineate the possibilities 
for alternatives. The task of realizing those possibilities belongs to another domain.  
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